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In her recently published, brilliant book about Romantic-era historiographies of 
Central and Eastern Europe, the Hungarian historian Monika Baár comes to the 
conclusion that the presumed differences between these historiographies and 
their supposed detachment from dominant Western European historiographies 
were not as compelling as had been heretofore believed. Similarities are so 
frequent, and so deeply ingrained, that “on closer inspection the historical 
narrative reveals the existence of a general template of national historiography 
in our era, which comprised a core story and numerous omnipresent tropes.”1 
Not only do national historiographies share similar narrative patterns – they also 
relate to the same myths and images. For example, one of the things they share 
is the belief in the uniqueness of their own story. 
Romantic-era historiography, which in Central and Eastern Europe is 
associated with founding father figures or innovators who reframed the task of 
the historian, shaped our ways of thinking about the past. In time, Romantic 
narratives came to be criticised and opposed, but the voices rejecting the 
domination of national historiography by the Romantic idea can often be seen 
singing the same tune. While taking positions similar to the ones chosen by 
Romantic historians, the critics also employed similar arguments. At first, 
Marxism served as an inspiration for a research attitude opposed to the early 19th 
century modes of historical thinking. Since the late 19th century, it has inspired 
social scientists. Its influence in Central and Eastern Europe peaked in the 
1960s. Polish and Hungarian historians especially enjoyed success in using their 
methodological backgrounds and local competencies in cooperative work with 
the foremost scholars of France or the United States. In general, the encouraging 
climate for comparative research in economic and social history of the region 
and beyond contributed to what may have been the most productive period in 
the modern history of Polish and Hungarian historiography. The more austere 
regimes in other Eastern bloc countries – such as the GDR or Czechoslovakia – 
                                                            
1 Monika Baár, Historians and Nationalism: East-Central Europe in the Nineteenth 
Century, Oxford 2010, 295. 
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made similar development decidedly harder to achieve, but even there one could 
find scholars who combined Marxist thought with an interest in comparative 
history and international cooperation. 
Before this Marxism-inspired intellectual ferment began, each Eastern bloc 
country went through a more or less prolonged period of forcible, swift 
Sovietisation. Marxism ceased to be just one of the many options that could be 
embraced in one’s methodology or worldview. Reframed as Marxism-Leninism, 
or historical materialism, it became the publicly endorsed doctrine that defined 
the boundaries of history, as well as science. This book discusses four Marxist-
Leninist historiographies in three real-socialist countries: Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and the GDR. My attention will focus on the way these 
historiographies dealt with the tradition of national historiography. Approaching 
revolutionary manifestos and projected institutional or methodological changes 
with caution, I inquire how Czech, Slovak, Polish and East-German self-
declared Marxist historians approached dominant national discourses about the 
past. To what lengths were they prepared to go in reinterpreting the Romantic 
framework in a Marxist vein (as described by Monika Baár)? And if the two 
were irreconcilable, were historians ready to leave tradition behind or 
subordinate Marxist terminology and a materialist philosophy of history to a 
traditional way of thinking about the past? 
There is, then, at least one reason why a comparative analysis suits Marxist 
historiographies better than historiographies of the early 19th century. Here, the 
similarities are not limited to traits generally common to all Western 
historiographies. The correspondences, perhaps enforced, but nonetheless, real, 
also grew out of the region’s existing political situation and the imposition of a 
singular methodology. This makes the dearth of actual comparative research on 
the Communist era even more unusual. The “singularity” of the GDR’s 
historical narrative, which Matthias Middell observed at the turn of the 
millennium, often proves to have been made up of elements common to history 
writing in other Eastern Bloc countries as well.2 
This attempt to partially fill the gap is based on a set of straightforward 
assumptions. Two of them seem to be of key importance in the context of my 
research. At the same time, they rather pointedly illustrate the problems faced by 
comparative history, bound up as they are with a specific practical example. 
First, the comparison in question must not fail to take account of mutual 
influences, the interactions between different historiographies, as well as the 
influence of Soviet historiography on East Central European historians. Otherwise 
                                                            
2 Matthias Middell, “Kulturtransfer und Historische Komparatistik – Thesen zu ihrem 
Verhältnis,” Comparativ 10 (2000), 1, 30. 
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the image resulting from the comparison would amount to nothing more than a 
schematic juxtaposition. According to Michael Werner and Bénédicte 
Zimmermann, this is one of the major dangers of comparative study. However, it 
can be averted if the comparative study is informed by knowledge gained from the 
study of cultural transfers. Werner and Zimmermann propose a histoire croisée, 
which „breaks with a one-dimensional perspective that simplifies and 
homogenizes, in favour of a multidimensional approach that acknowledges 
plurality and the complex configurations that result from it. Accordingly, entities 
and objects of research are not merely considered in relation to one another but also 
through one another, in terms of relationship, interactions and circulation.”3 In 
relation to Marxist historiographies discussed in this book, this translates into the 
necessity not only to take mutual influences into account, but also to reflect on the 
relationships between these countries and other states beyond East Central Europe. 
The image of Slovak historiography – whether Marxist or not – is never complete if 
it does not reflect on its relationship to the work of Hungarian historians. A similar 
focus is necessary when studying the works from GDR historians, whose attitude 
toward West German historians and historical narratives is particularly relevant to 
the study of East German historiography. As I also believe, it is important to note 
that no transfer of ideology or interpretative framework culminates in a state of 
total domination or the formation of one historiography by another. This 
observation is particularly useful when considering the relationships between any 
one of the Eastern bloc historiographies and Soviet historical sciences. Even if one 
could never treat them as equal, to describe any one of these relationships in terms 
of unilateral domination would be fundamentally inaccurate. Middell’s idea of 
comparative history moving from bilateral toward multilateral perspectives finds an 
apt illustration in the comparative study of Marxist-Leninist historiographies.4 By 
juxtaposing two examples “cleansed” of non-bilateral influences, not only would 
we produce a distorted image, we would also make it more difficult to develop a 
proper reading of the complex processes behind the adoption of intellectual 
currents, ideologies or even systems of science. 
Second, I believe that a comparison should not be “rigid,” i.e., limited to an 
analysis of the way each historiography treats a specific, narrowly defined topic. 
Already in its heroic period during the early 19th century, historiography was 
both an inspiration for the study of problems faced by the community and a 
source of answers to such problems – concerning questions of the community’s 
genealogy, its rightful territory, or characteristics of its collective psychology. 
                                                            
3 Michael Werner, Bénédicte Zimmermann, “Beyond Comparison: Histoire croisée and 
the Challenge of Reflexivity,” History and Theory 45 (2006), 38. 
4 Middell, “Kulturtransfer,” 39-40. 
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At the same time, historians gave substance to the fundamental myths 
undergirding these communities. As a rule, they aimed to make their 
compatriots happy rather than forcing them to critically rethink their own 
positions or self-evaluations. If we focus on the themes that recur throughout 
different national cultures, the myths that tell the same old story with the support 
of different details, then chronological turning points will prove to be of 
secondary importance. Instead of rigidly comparing Marxist interpretations of 
specific epochs, I begin my analysis by examining the role particular historical 
phenomena played in the collective memory as well as in the historiography of a 
given nation, which is important because historiography comprises both a part of 
that memory and a medium for its dissemination. I believe that this kind of 
functional comparison can yield many positive results, even if it often leads one 
to connect ostensibly unrelated facts. The reader of this book will easily notice 
that this functional comparison is used, for instance, to set the Czech and Slovak 
national revival against the Polish uprisings. The Medieval expansion of East 
German feudal lords or the battle of the Teutoburg Forest, that pitted Germanic 
barbarian tribes against the Roman legions, are seen simply as different 
examples of the same historiographical narrative. Looking for instances of social 
revolt against growing feudal oppression, Marxists from different countries of 
the Eastern bloc traversed national histories with apparent ease, building 
analogies between events as far apart as the Great Peasant Revolt and the 
activities of the Carpathian robbers. Such unusual juxtapositions grow out of 
Thomas Welskopp’s Max Weber-inspired idea of fashioning comparative 
models that can prove useful in describing different circumstances.5 The goal is 
not to come up with a universal schema, but rather – as Welskopp and Weber 
claim – to lend substance to an idea of how things would have developed had 
history taken a different route. A comparative study produces data about 
potential possibilities of historical development, which, while speculative, are 
still more realistic than pure speculation. 
The history of historiography in general, and particularly the history of 
Marxist historiography, can benefit greatly from this kind of comparative study, 
or histoire croisée, and not only because new facts might be uncovered, relations 
between different countries highlighted, and mutual inspirations and borrowings 
underlined. In my opinion, however, the greatest premium which this kind of 
approach can provide us is the rare chance to take temporary leave of our own 
backyard and look at it from the outside, through the eyes of another. In this 
                                                            
5 Thomas Welskopp, “Stolpersteine auf dem Königsweg. Methodenkritische 
Anmerkungen zum internationalen Vergleich in der Gesellschaftsgeschichte,” Archiv 
für Sozialgeschichte 35 (1995), 365-367. 
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light, what once was considered exceptional often proves extremely typical and 
schematic, that which seemed dangerously pathological becomes the grim norm, 
and that which looked quite obvious seems suddenly inexplicable. The 
comparative approach is therefore useful outside of comparative studies as well. 
Some of its tools appear to be indispensable if we are to advance any reliable 
historical claims that go beyond stating obvious facts. 
 
*** 
The circle of people to whom I owe a debt of gratitude for the help and 
inspiration they offered during my work on this book is very broad and 
continues to expand. To all those whom I thanked in the Polish (2007) and 
German (2011) editions, I would like to add the employees of my home 
institution, the Institute of History at the Polish Academy of Sciences, without 
whose aid this considerable undertaking would not have gained the necessary 
financial support. The translator, editor and publisher know how highly I value 
their involvement in our common work. Finally, at the risk of sounding 
ingratiating, I would like to thank the quite sizeable group of reviewers of 
previous editions of my book. The differences between the successive editions 







One of the most intriguing characteristics of the history of Marxist 
historiography in the last twenty years is its separation from the agenda of a 
“general” history of historiography. It is, on the one hand, a somewhat-“natural” 
side effect of the largely unchallenged position that the year 1945 is a turning 
point in recent history. But it is also, on the other hand, a reflex of post-1989 
historical and political debates which spread their influence over historical 
science. Polish, Slovak, Czech, and German authors decisively distinguish 
between the historiography of the 19th century and that of the interwar period on 
the one side, and postwar Marxist-Leninist historical science on the other. 
Attempts at unifying both periods are rare and, even if they meet in the same 
book, the qualitative difference between them is emphatically marked. One of 
the most frequent oppositions discussed after 1989 was embodied in the 
contrast: “continuity or discontinuity.” Whereas the answer seems to be more 
than obvious: Marxism of the Soviet type has nothing to do with “normal” 
historiography. It was an attempt – to use the formulation of Polish historian of 
science Piotr Hübner – to decapitate the intellectual elite.6 
This post-1989 narrative identifies Marxist methodology as a part of an 
external attempt to subordinate and control the historians’ milieu. As soon as the 
deepest incursions of Stalinism had abated, historians were able to go back to 
their previous ideals, running their business more or less as usual.7 Even when – 
as happened after 1968 in Czechoslovakia – there was a backlash of a strong 
dictatorship and a revitalisation of Stalinist narratives, the dichotomised picture 
remains dominant: a clear division between historians on one side and 
Communist party functionaries on the other.8 
                                                            
6 Piotr Hübner, “Stalinowskie ‘czystki’ w nauce polskiej,” in: Skryte oblicze systemu 
komunistycznego. U źródeł zła, ed. Roman Bäcker & Piotr Hübner, Warszawa 1997, 
220. 
7 See Maciej Górny, “‘Przełom metodologiczny’ na łamach ‘Przeglądu Historycznego’ 
na tle wybranych czasopism historycznych w Europie Środkowowschodniej,” Przegląd 
Historyczny 2006/1, 39-48. 
8 See Michal Kopeček, “In search of ‘national memory.’ The politics of history, nostalgia 
and the historiography of communism in the Czech Republic and East Central Europe,” 
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The notion of discontinuity, as it is being used in the post-1989 history of 
historiography, refers not only to the scientific policy of Communist regimes, 
but also to dominant historical narratives. As Rafał Stobiecki puts it, Marxists – 
rather unwittingly – destroyed elemental social ties of historical continuity 
linking state and nation.9 The East Central European Marxism of the 1950s was 
thus clearly perceived as a gap in the development of historical science. In the 
historical debates that arose immediately after the collapse of Communism in 
East Central Europe, the notion of “white spots” (among others) was intended to 
represent the difference between ‘Communist’ historiography and the new, truly 
scientific, non-ideological historical science. The debates submitted to the logic 
of the totalitarian paradigm. Whereas Polish historians discussed the status of 
the People’s Republic of Poland (Polska, Rzeczpospolita Ludowa, PRL), 
describing it variously as a case of Soviet occupation or limited independence, 
of a totalitarian or authoritarian regime etc.;10 in Czechoslovakia the Communist 
regime was declared unlawful and criminal; the thematic rupture, coupled with 
an increased interest in the history of political resistance and dissent, 
automatically brought on criticism of pre-1989 historiography.11 One of the 
interesting effects of this process was a sudden popularity of source literature, 
epitomising the “historical truth.” 
To historians of historiography, the events of 1989 brought open access to 
archives, including the archives of the Communist party. It allowed them to 
study issues such as the balance of power in historical institutions, ways in 
which authorities influenced historians, personal connections, interdependences 
and conflicts, which were previously more or less known, but had no available 
evidentiary support in the documentary record. These new possibilities aroused 
an immense interest in the history of historiography in 1990s, especially in 
Germany. Dozens of historians (most prominently Konrad Jarausch, Matthias 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
in: Past in the making. Historical revisionism in Central Europe after 1989, ed. Michal 
Kopeček, Budapest 2008, 78-80. 
9 Rafał Stobiecki, Historia pod nadzorem. Spory o nowy model historii w Polsce (II 
połowa lat czterdziestych – początek lat pięćdziesiątych, Łódź 1993, 182. See also his 
article, “Between Continuity and Discontinuity: A Few Comments on the Post-War 
Development of Polish Historical Research,” Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropa-Forschung 
2001/2, 214-229. 
10 The 1990s public debate over the nature of the Communist regime in Poland is analysed 
by Anna Magierska, Dylematy historii PRL, Warszawa 1995. For an international 
perspective, consult Obrachunki z historią, ed. Włodzimierz Borodziej, Warszawa 
1997. 
11 For the post-1989 East Central European debates on the legacy of Communism, consult 
the collective volume: Narratives unbound. Historical studies in post-communist 
Eastern Europe, eds. Sorin Antohi, Balázs Trencsényi, Péter Apor, Budapest 2007. 
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Middell and Martin Sabrow) agreed concerning the end of these political 
debates: “To escape from the vicious circle of mutual accusations and egoistic 
self-admiration, we need to critically historicise GDR historiography.”12 From 
this perspective, new research should focus on a comparison between East 
German and other historiographies of the East Bloc as well as historical science 
in Nazi Germany.  
This approach became a wholeheartedly embraced practice in Poland, in the 
Czech Republic, and in Slovakia. Polish works devoted to this aspect of history 
focus on such phenomena as the conference in Otwock (1951-52, planned as an 
official imposition of Marxism on Polish historiography), the Party-governed 
colleges, or the Institute of History at the Polish Academy of Sciences (founded 
in 1953 under Marxist auspices). Research on Czechoslovak historiography 
develops more or less along the same lines. The turning points in this case are: 
the last democratic congress of Czech historians in 1947, the purges 
accompanying the Communist takeover in 1948, and institutional changes 
concomitant with the persecution of professors and students. German and Polish 
historians were the first to analyse the impact of political censorship on 
historical writings.13 The main research question for all the scholars in this field 
is whether continuity was maintained in historical sciences, or if Stalinism did 
cause a personnel and institutional break. 
The Verwissenschaftlichung (which in this context means 
“professionalisation”) of research on GDR historiography became the topic of a 
special issue of Historische Zeitschrift in 1998.14 Some of the texts it includes 
may be treated as research suggestions for the near future (and in fact Czech 
                                                            
12 Konrad Jarausch & Matthias Middel, “Einleitung. Die DDR als Geschichte: Verurteilung, 
Nostalgie oder Historisierung?,” in: Nach dem Erdbeben. (Re-)Konstruktion ostdeutscher 
Geschichte und Geschichtswissenschaft, eds. Konrad Jarausch & Matthias Middel, 
Leipzig 1994. 
13 Zbigniew Romek, “Cenzura w PRL a historiografia – pytania i problemy badawcze,” in: 
Metodologiczne problemy syntezy historii historiografii polskiej, ed. Jerzy Maternicki, 
Rzeszów 1998; Cenzura w PRL – relacje historyków, ed. Zbigniew Romek, Warszawa 
2000; idem, Cenzura a nauka historyczna w Polsce 1944-1970, Warszawa 2010; 
Siegfried Lokatis, “Die Zensur historischer Literatur in der DDR unter Ulbricht,” in: 
Die DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft als Forschungsproblem, eds. Georg Iggers, Konrad 
Jarausch, Matthias Middel & Martin Sabrow, München 1998; idem, “Die Zensur 
historischer Literatur in der DDR,” in: Geschichte als Argument. 41. Deutscher 
Historikertag in München 17. bis 20. September 1996. Berichtband, eds. Stefan 
Weinfurter & Frank Siefarth, München 1997. 
14 Die DDR-Geschichtswissenschaft als Forschungsproblem… 
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scholar Martin Nodl adopted a majority of them to Czech historiography).15 
These were, to name but a few: relations between East German historians and 
their ideological opponents from the Bundesrepublik,16 opposition to and 
collaboration with the authorities, and relations between power and historical 
science, or censorship. The same topics are discussed at least to an extent in 
Polish, Czech and Slovak historical works. 
The same Sonderheft included a text by Frank Hadler and Georg Iggers, 
discussing the possibility of a comparative analysis of various Communist 
historiographies.17 John Connelly’s analysis of Polish, Czechoslovak and East 
German universities under Stalinisation is without a doubt a prominent example 
of the advantages offered by such an approach.18 
 The first appeals for the use of postmodernism in research on Marxist 
historiography were made in Germany. In the aforementioned special issue of 
Historische Zeitschrift from 1998, Konrad Jarausch proposed postmodernism as 
a tool for interpreting East German historical science.19 In 2000, during a 
congress of German historians in Aachen, the issue was debated by Jarausch, 
Matthias Middell and Martin Sabrow, among others.20 Their postulates were 
almost immediately – at least in a formal sense – put into practice, with 
contemporary German authors analysing the Meistererzählung (master 
                                                            
15 Martin Nodl, “Možné přístupy ke studiu dějin české historické vědy v letech 1945-
2000,” Soudobé Dějiny 2001. 
16 Martin Sabrow, “Die Geschichtswissenschaft der DDR und ihr ‘objektiver Gegner’”; 
Rainer Eckert, “Die Westbeziehungen der Historiker im Auge der Staatssicherheit”; 
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nationalen Meistererzählung in der DDR: das Lehrbuch der deutschen Geschichte,” in: 
ibidem. 
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narrative) and the Herrschaftsdiskurs (discourse of power) within the GDR.21 
The best practical example of the advantages and disadvantages of this method 
is Martin Sabrow’s book Das Diktat des Konsenses. Geschichtswissenschaft in 
der DDR 1949-1969.22 It is based on broad archival research and describes not 
only various aspects of party dictate, but also the initiatives of historical circles. 
Sabrow analyses (in a very detailed, but somewhat tiring manner) mechanisms 
for the creation of rules in GDR historical discourse. The image he comes up 
with is much more complicated than a one-way model of the subordination of 
science to politics. Sabrow points to the moments when historians themselves 
disciplined their colleagues, creating an efficient system of self-control and thus 
reducing the need for direct political intervention. But, surprisingly, Sabrow 
devotes relatively little attention to a seemingly vital problem – the analysis of 
historical narratives, rhetoric, style or strategies of argumentation. Thus, his 
analysis is not a deconstruction of the content of GDR historiography but a 
description of historical sciences in the GDR. Because of this, one might wonder 
whether postmodernist notions are truly useful in this type of analysis. 
Nevertheless, Sabrow’s influence on later international research cannot be 
denied. In some cases – as in the recent monograph of Slovak Marxist 
historiography by Adam Hudek – the outcome may be a well-balanced mix of 
institutional and textual analysis.23 
Sabrow’s interesting attempt has one more feature that seems characteristic 
of the new type of German research into the history of science in the GDR. The 
question whether or not East Germany was a totalitarian state hinges upon the 
issue of research professionalisation. German authors generally relate to 
contemporary definitions of totalitarianism, concluding that none of them fully 
describes the GDR: the dictatorship of the Communist Party (Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands, SED) was seriously limited, ergo, the GDR could 
not have been a totalitarian state. This explains why John Connelly’s claims 
concerning the Sovietisation of Central European universities met with a rather 
cold response in Germany.24 Instead of referring to abstract models, Connelly 
compared the reality of scholarly work in the GDR to the situation of 
                                                            
21 See Die historische Meistererzählung. Deutungslinien der deutschen 
Nationalgeschichte nach 1945, eds. Konrad Jarausch & Martin Sabrow, Göttingen 2002 
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scholarship under Polish and Czechoslovak Stalinism. Such a comparison 
inevitably leads to the conclusion that, even if none of these countries was 
actually totalitarian, East Germany came surely the closest to clear-cut 
totalitarianism. 
In the programmatic article cited above, Konrad Jarausch opposed 
deconstructivism in the history of historiography to a simplified formula, within 
which Marxist historiography is analysed exclusively in its legitimising function. 
Jarausch noted that “The common critique of the instrumentalisation of 
historiography in the GDR leads to the tricky question: what to do with all those 
libraries full of East German intellectual heritage.” Postmodern analyses are 
supposed to yield as broad an image of historiography as possible, and not be 
restricted only to one function of it (regardless of its importance). Nevertheless, 
despite all the conceptual differences, those two different approaches often lead to 
similar effects. Characteristically, a number of recent works on the historical 
legitimisation of political power in East Central Europe show a solid background 
in theories of sociology, visibly exceeding the typical level of engagement with 
sociological theory for each of the respective historiographies.25 Although 
historiography is not always accorded a central position (for instance, by Marcin 
Zaremba), it is always referred to as an important legitimising tool. In most cases, 
however, historians dealing with the process of legitimisation through 
historiography look at the problem from the perspective of rulers and their need 
for history (or their fear of history) rather than considering historiography as a 
science or art with its own tradition. Furthermore, the period researched (whether 
it is a Communist or Nazi dictatorship) is often treated in isolation from the rest of 
national history, as an abnormality contrasting with the supposedly “normal” 
before and after.26 All this leads back to the simplified ascriptions of 
totalitarianism. The paradox is even more striking if we consider that those works 
commonly conclude that Communists eagerly borrowed nationalist ideas – in 
other words, that they borrowed a lot from their predecessors. 
Opposition towards the tendency to treat Marxist historiography, or, more 
generally, the culture of the Communist period, in isolation may have different 
reasons behind it. According to Jarausch and Sabrow, Marxist historical science 
should not be compared to “normal” historiographies of the democratic, liberal 
West. They believe that the research on historiography in the GDR should be 
conducted without reference to what was happening simultaneously in the 
                                                            
25 Marcin Zaremba, Komunizm, legitymizacja, nacjonalizm. Nacjonalistyczna 
legitymizacja władzy komunistycznej w Polsce, Warszawa 2001; Michal Kopeček, “Ve 
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26 See Marcin Zaremba, Komunizm, legitymizacja, nacjonalizm…, 398. 
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Federal Republic of Germany.27 Within this scheme, historiography is perceived 
as a part of the Herrschaftsdiskurs, but it is also a science, so East German 
historians should not be judged in the same way as journalists of Neues 
Deutschland. GDR historiography is supposed to be analysed only as an aspect 
of the SED’s dictatorial rule. 
Another German-American historian Georg Iggers seems to be of a different 
opinion. He questions sharp distinctions between historiography under 
dictatorial and democratic rule. In both cases, history serves non-scientific 
purposes. From this point of view, Marxist historians of the Eastern Bloc may 
stand in line with Michelet, Droysen or Palacký.28 Iggers obviously believes that 
“objective historiography” is a purely normative term, but as Karl Popper said, 
historians may try to show wie es eigentlich nicht gewesen.29 
The idea of supporting the treatment of the history of historiography as a 
continuous effort, without subjecting the 45 postwar years to exclusive 
treatment, seems very appealing. The works of John Connelly and others 
highlight the fascinating encounters between tradition and “Sovietisation,” 
including the pressures applied and concessions made in view of creating a new 
compromise. To answer the question whether historical science maintained 
continuity during the era or not, we should refer not only to the dimension of 
personal or institutional politics; of equal importance are the questions whether 
Marxist historiographies follow in the footsteps of their bourgeois predecessors, 
and if so, how. The title of one of Sabrow’s books, Das Diktat des Konsenses, 
could be used to describe relations not only between historians and authorities 
but also between Marxist historical narratives and the national traditions in 
Poland, the GDR and Czechoslovakia. 
Assuming that a broader perspective on the analysis of Marxist 
historiographies is useful and needed, we should draw methodological 
inspiration from at least a small part of the history of “classic” historiography. In 
the process, we will probably notice that scholars researching 19th century 
historiography have already raised a number of questions that are still untouched 
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or have only been addressed recently by historians of Marxist historiography. 
For instance, manipulations of historical memory were discussed in a well-
known essay by Herbert Butterfield, The Whig Interpretation of History, 
published in 1931.30 Links between past heroes and current political trends were 
characteristic of Marxist historiographies as well. 
In mid-1950s, Butterfield postulated that historians should raise the 
heretofore neglected question of the impact of historical science on European 
nations over the previous 150 years.31 This area was visited not only by 
Butterfield himself, but also by numerous other scholars. In East Central Europe, 
this question was researched as well, primarily by the most eminent 
representatives of the so-called Łódź school of the history of historiography: 
Marian Henryk Serejski and Andrzej Feliks Grabski. Both analysed various 
forms of historical thought, without restricting themselves to the so-called 
scientific discourse. Both also held historiography in high regard as a science 
concentrating on a broad complex of problems, including considerations of 
organisational structures, theoretical foundations and interpretations of the 
past.32 According to Serejski and Grabski, a historian of historiography should 
be interested in both historical institutions and the content of historical books – a 
far from obvious statement for many contemporary historians dealing with the 
Communist period. This perspective not only accepts but demands an interest in 
everything that shapes popular historical knowledge. 
Both postulates were fulfilled in detailed works by the two historians of the 
Łódź school. Where Serejski wrote about references to “nation” and “state” in 
Polish historical thought,33 Grabski described phenomena occurring on the 
margins of professional historiography, such as the works of Franciszek 
Duchiński, the 19th century Polish-Ukrainian author of the theory of the 
Russians’ non-Slavic origin, or of the political aspects of 19th century historical 
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competitions.34 A similar approach can be found in the writings of other Polish 
authors, such as Andrzej Zahorski’s or Andrzej Wierzbicki’s works on 19th 
century historical culture.35 The latter wrote a short book Konstytucja 3 Maja w 
historiografii polskiej, which is of particular interest for the present study.36 
Wierzbicki describes the 19th century debates on the 1791 Polish Constitution, 
but then moves on to a discussion of Marxist authors. Zahorski follows a similar 
pattern in his writings. Neither of the two authors introduces any division 
between the “normal” pre-1945 historiography and its “Stalinist” incarnation; by 
doing so, they achieve a clear and coherent narrative of specific intellectual 
debates. 
The idea of a history of historiography as a broad panorama of concepts and 
events shaping an image of the past is surely not new. This kind of approach is 
familiar to the history of ideas and collective memory. With respect not only to 
the history of historical science, but also to the culture of Bohemia (including 
German Bohemian historiography) and Slovakia, it can be found in the brilliant 
work of synthesis by František Kutnar and Jaroslav Marek.37 The German 
conception of history, one of the early books by Georg Iggers, offers a similar 
perspective.38 Iggers applies ideas of German historicism to the German national 
awakening, especially the Befreiungskriege, which – according to him – played 
for Germany a role equivalent to that of the French revolution.39 Josef 
Macůrek’s book on East European historiographies since 1946, although 
devoted for the most part to professional science, deals with politics and culture, 
and may be perceived as a powerful and continuously appealing manifesto of 
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European cultural unity.40 Macůrek strongly opposed submitting European 
historiography to geopolitical divisions: it is singular and should be treated as 
such. In addition, such a division would be very problematic for Macůrek 
himself, as his book on Eastern European historiography does not discuss either 
Czech or Slovak historiographies. Should they be placed in the West, or did 
Macůrek perceive them as being somewhere in-between the two poles? 
There seems to be enough evidence not to doubt the usefulness of the 
research frames of older historiography for the analysis of East Central 
European Marxist historiographies. On the contrary: they may help to develop a 
complex picture including not only institutions and the scientific policy of party 
and state, but also all the interconnections between historiography and historical 
tradition, the imaginings of the national past, the history of ideas and collective 
memory, and, finally, historical myths. 
In 1986, Jerzy Jedlicki formulated the idea that “Nations which in their 
history experienced (and still experience) mostly failures and humiliation and 
which still share the same feeling of unfulfilled individual and group aspirations, 
those nations search in their history not so much for learning, but for 
compensation.”41 It is worth mentioning that in other conditions the same 
“creative” attitude towards history may be found also among those who win, as 
was the case with the aforementioned Whigs. Already in the Middle Ages, the 
imagined ethnogenesis of European nations was based on myths that proved 
surprisingly durable. The 19th and 20th century debate between the “Latin 
school,” which claimed that Romanians were descendants of the Romans, and 
historians who stressed their Dacian and Daco-Roman heritage should suffice as 
an example. Both intellectual strains shared the conviction that Romanians, 
whether they derived from Romans or Dacians, were the first inhabitants of 
Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania, a contention by which they demonstrate 
their difference from Hungarians or Slavs. Such “political” myths belong in the 
broad “margins” of historiography researched by Grabski and other 
aforementioned Polish, Czech, and German historians (I put “margins” into 
quotation marks because, in fact, the myth is often more important – and no less 
true – than the fact on which it is built).42 
The 19th century is a particularly rich research field in this respect as the 
period saw the birth of many “historical traditions,” not only in the nations 
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discussed in this study. The problem was illustrated by Lucian Boia in the 
example of Mihal Viteazul, who is said to have united Romanian lands and who 
in fact ruled over Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania, albeit for one year 
only (1599-1600). This fact did not prevent him from playing the role of a 
national hero in the works of Mihail Kogălniceanu and Nicolae Bălcescu in mid-
19th century.43 Other “national rebirths,” “awakenings,” and “renaissances” 
could yield many analogous examples. The Czech “national awakening” is the 
best known and, to some extent, universal example because – due to the path-
breaking research by Miroslav Hroch – it is used as a referential frame for other 
equivalent phenomena.44 
Vladimír Macura authored a very concise analysis of the Czech “national 
awakening.” He believed that the very idea of comparing the efforts of a national 
movement to an awakening is connected with a mythical, non-linear 
understanding of time.45 Macura’s works offer a catalogue of various strategies 
used by Czech patriots to “discover” (or construct) a national past, sometimes 
resulting in brand new national traditions.46 He also raised the question of the 
imagined traditions originating in the 19th century, claiming that “we were made 
of illusions, myths and mystifications.”47 The task of the scholar is not to 
demystify ideas of the past, even in a just cause, but rather to discover the origins 
of the social or national imagined past and the mechanisms governing it.48 
As already mentioned, the “Czech” perspective is also applied by non-Czech 
authors, sometimes even in a much sterner manner, as in the case of Maria 
Bobrownicka, who stressed the cultural infertility of the Slavic myth in Central 
and South-eastern Europe, especially in Bohemia and Slovakia.49 Boia’s book 
showed that attempts to describe national myths using historical categories can 
meet with a violent reaction.50 Maria Janion and Maria Żmigrodzka analyse the 
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myths of Polish Romanticism in an only slightly different manner, with relation 
to literature.51 
The formation of nations in the 19th century has become one of the most 
popular topics of comparative research over the past few decades. Christoph 
Conrad and Sebastian Conrad stress that this approach is useful also for work in 
fields that are traditionally considered “untranslatable,” i.e. national in a very 
strict sense. In other words, the belief in the uniqueness of nations is one of the 
most common forms of faith.52 
Vladimír Macura analysed 19th century patriotic culture, as well as Czech 
myths of the Communist period.53 There are undoubtedly serious differences 
between Communist ideology and the “national awakening,” starting with a 
completely different definition of time. While the reborn Czech nation saw itself 
in an eternal cycle, socialist culture was based on the notion of a new beginning 
and perceived time as running toward a strictly defined goal along the lines of 
progress.54 This might raise some doubts as to the concept of a continuity of 
ideas between the 19th century and the Communist period. To eliminate those 
doubts, I propose to forego theoretical considerations for a moment and to 
concentrate on the phase of development of Soviet historiography which was 
supposed to set the tone for East Central European historical sciences after 1945. 
The Bolshevik takeover was not directly followed by any general change in 
Russian historiography. It was only in 1926 that a Marxist Historical Society 
was created, and a new methodological orientation was officially approved at an 
historical congress in 1928-1929. The new interpretation of Russian history was 
inspired mainly by Mikhail N. Pokrovsky. He attacked Russian historiography, 
criticising particularly all attempts at portraying Russia as a unique and special 
case of a country following its own Sonderweg. According to Pokrovsky, Russia 
had developed just as any other country, it was simply backward. Traditionally 
crucial elements of Russian history, such as the country’s territorial expansion, 
were seen not as any particular tsar’s success, but as a result of the development 
of trade (by this token even Alexander Nevsky was a servant to capital). The 
christianisation of Russia was deemed “an incident” and wars against the Tatars 
were viewed as a struggle between two cultures at the same stage of 
development. Pokrovsky accused tsardom of imperialism, and interpreted the 
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Polish-Russian wars of the early 17th century not as Polish aggression but as a 
social struggle against the tsar. Even more strikingly, Pokrovsky claimed that 
Russians were most likely of Finnish origin, which likened his approach to 
Franciszek Duchiński’s fantastic theories formed in the mid-19th century.55 
The domination of Pokrovsky’s interpretation of history did not last long. 
He died in 1932, and his theories were rebuked only two years later. They were 
characterised as abstract, unusable in school education, and indebted to 
inappropriate sociological frameworks. But in fact – as foreign commentators 
noted – it was Pokrovsky’s hostility towards Russian national traditions that 
invited the most disapproval.56 His sociological leanings were soon displaced by 
a Stalinist model of historiography, referring in many respects to earlier 
interpretations of Russian history.57 The new narrative of national history was to 
be filled with a Russian-Soviet patriotic spirit, and was indebted to the Russian 
heirs of German historicism in its method. Like Ranke, Karamzin and others, 
Soviet historians referred to the state as a focal point of history. The importance 
of each state was estimated according to its military power. Even the term 
“historicism” was adapted in the USSR as “Marxist-Leninist historicism,” 
letting it survive the next crisis of historiography in 1945 when “western” 
notions fell out of fashion.58 Russian nationalism achieved its peak in Soviet 
historiography during World War II. Josef Macůrek noted almost immediately 
after its end that “You could see everywhere that the Russian past was viewed 
not in Marxist, but in patriotic terms, as a fight for independence and freedom 
against numerous aggressors and plunderers, above all ‘against the German 
element’; it was described as the Russian people’s eventual rise to power, the 
development of outstanding military skills, but was simultaneously also a 
struggle for freedom only, which hugely affected the universal culture. Russian 
science elevated the moral and spiritual forces in Russians, and we may say that 
it contributed to this historical victory in the defence of Russia, civilisation, and 
the national existence of many nations conquered by the Germans.”59 
The victory of “national values” over Pokrovsky’s interpretation was not 
easy, with some Russian Marxist historians seriously fearful of a relapse of 
nationalism. During the Russian offensive of May 1944, Anna Pankratova 
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issued a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, criticising the re-evaluations of historical figures such as Ivan the 
Terrible, Peter the Great or Alexander I. She observed that Soviet historians (and 
Soviet propaganda) had lost sight of the fact that the masses were the subject of 
history, not the leaders. In late May and early June 1944, a meeting took place in 
Moscow between representatives of the two tendencies of interpretation of 
national history, all aspiring to be Marxist. While they came to no final solution, 
Pankratova was later punished for distributing material pertaining to the 
meeting.60 
An interesting variant of the same evolution occurred in Ukraine. The 
situation of historians there was even more uncertain than in Russia. Not only 
did they not know whether they should interpret the history of Ukraine from a 
“class” or “national” perspective, but they also had to determine the role played 
in it by Russia. Soviet Ukraine had its own Pokrovsky in a young historian, 
Matvyi Yavorsky. His theses on national history competed with the dominant 
“national” interpretation of Mikhailo Hrushevsky. Javorsky rejected the idea of 
the nation as the driving force of history; at the same time, he was not at all pro-
Russian. In his interpretation of the Bolshevik revolution in Ukraine, he 
underlined its peculiar characteristics which were dissimilar to those of the 
Russian Revolution. Javorsky’s success – the official condemnation of 
Hrushevsky’s interpretation - was almost immediately followed by his own fall. 
Javorsky was arrested in 1933; Hrushevsky, who had been recognised as 
‘fascist’, died a year later. During the war, the historical policy in Ukraine 
bowed to the necessity of boosting confidence in national values, but still 
without any clear guidelines. Zhdanovshchyna, which for Russians meant the 
campaign against “Occidentalism” and liberalism, for Ukrainians was also a 
fight against nationalism. This increased the chaos in the Marxist interpretation 
of Ukraine’s history. Finally, as in Russia, Ukrainian Marxist historiography 
similarly adopted the Hrushevskyian “national” paradigm, combining it with 
elements of historical materialism. 
By the second half of the 1940s, other, newly conquered nations were 
expected to adjust multiple professions, including those related to the historical 
sciences, to the Soviet model. However, Marxism, soon to become the only 
acceptable methodology, was no longer understood in the same way in 
Bolshevik Russia. Its Soviet variation borrowed heavily from the tradition of 
Russian historiography and the Russian national tradition. The variations 
formulated in the satellite countries were also less likely to break away from 
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existing traditions than to revise and re-evaluate them, along with the 
perspectives on Russia’s role in the history of Central and Eastern Europe. 
This current work attempts for the most part to find an answer to one 
question: how did the Marxist historians of Poland, Czechoslovakia and the 
GDR employ national historical and historiographical traditions? The reader will 
likely spot the differences between the mode of analysis of Marxist-Leninist 
historiographies proposed herein and their previous evaluations. Outlining the 
relationships between different Marxist-Leninist historiographies, I usually 
(though not without exceptions) put stress on “lateral” relations (between Polish, 
Czech, Slovak and East German historians) more than on “vertical” relations 
(between each satellite historiography and Soviet historiography). Analysing the 
content of Marxist works, I rarely depend on Party publications (though 
statements on historical matters from relevant directorships will be frequently 
referenced). I strive to maintain a focus on historical publications without 
tampering with the facts, if possible, even if the works in question fail to retain a 
proper scientific profile. Finally, in my analysis of the views of Marxists, I put 
greater stress on elements of continuity and on references to non-Marxist 
historiographical traditions – that is, while conscious of a lack of continuity in 
numerous aspects of scholarly life, I focus on the signals of a continuity of 
historical thought. All these factors of my analysis constitute a deliberate 
attempt at presenting a different, and, in my opinion, more complete, perspective 
on Marxist historical sciences in Central and Eastern Europe. It is more of an 
invitation to debate than a closing remark on a past discussion. 
The extent and propriety of using the terms “Marxist” and “Stalinist” with 
reference to the intellectual or cultural phenomena of the Stalinist period 
remains questionable. Georg G. Iggers points to differences between “Western 
Marxism” and the official Marxist philosophy of international Communist 
parties. Leszek Kołakowski, on the other hand, claims that Stalinism was in a 
certain sense a form of Marxism: Marxism-Leninism of the Soviet type was 
deeply dependent on “classic” Marxist thought. This view naturally does not 
indicate that Stalinism as such was the only possible and logically necessary 
extension of Marx’s thought.61 
There is, on another note, no specifically original concept behind the time 
frame which I have chosen for this study. The dates differ between the countries 
under discussion – I accept the boundary dates specified by Polish, Czech, 
Slovak and German scholars. In the case of Poland, these are 1948 or 1949 and 
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1956; with respect to Czechoslovakia, the years 1948 and 1963 are assumed to 
mark the beginning and end of the Stalinist period. Allowing for lengthy 
publication processes, I used 1965 as a final boundary date for my research, and 
in some cases went as far as 1968. In the history of the GDR, the starting date of 
the Stalinist period is widely assumed to be 1949 (which is, by the way, also the 
date of the country’s formation itself), and the closing date is put at the end of 
the 1960s, a period which saw an ongoing centralisation of schooling, an 
introduction of another school reform, as well as generational changes in 
scholarly circles.62 
                                                            
62 These dates refer to the generally applied chronology of cultural history and, as such, 
are not always accepted by historians of historiography. Nevertheless, they represent not 
only the main turning points in the scientific policy in the Soviet bloc but also prove to 
be flexible enough to reflect specific features of historiography (i.e., the time needed for 
the publication and reception of a given publication). For the criticism of my approach, 
see Martin Nodl, Dějepisectví mezi vědou a politikou. Úvahy o historiografii 19. a 20. 
století, Brno 2007, 106.  
 
Chapter II 
The Organisation of Historical Sciences  
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The impact of war and occupation between 1939 and 1945 on historical 
scholarship varied considerably from country to country. Polish historiography 
suffered heavy losses in academic personnel. Moreover, with the death of 
Marceli Handelsman in 1945, postwar historiography was deprived of its most 
innovative theoretician. However, the reorganisation of research and education 
progressed even in an almost totally devastated Warsaw. Influential figures in 
the field of history, such as Tadeusz Manteuffel, the first postwar director of the 
Historical Institute of Warsaw University and, in subsequent decades, the first 
director of the Institute of History within the Polish Academy of Sciences, were 
also in contact with the new political leaders from the Communist Party. 
None of the other historiographies examined here had to deal with such a 
drastic collapse of infrastructure and such devastating human losses. Slovak 
historians actually profited from the violent dissolution of Czechoslovakia. The 
subsequent expulsion of Czech professors from the only Slovak university in 
Bratislava opened positions for their Slovak colleagues during wartime. After 
1945 only a small group of nationalist historical propagandists fled the country 
to avoid the approaching Soviet army. The rest proved to be much more self-
confident and sceptical towards the idea of Czechoslovak unity than had been 
the case during the interwar period.  
Though the Czech universities were closed under German occupation, 
historians were allowed to perform research and publish their findings, and the 
Czech Academy for Sciences and Arts (Česká akademie věd a umění, ČAVU) 
operated unperturbed. Losses in scholarly personnel were limited to the few 
murdered and tormented at the concentration camps.63 Paradoxically, the 
casualties sustained both before and just after the war proved much more 
significant. Josef Pekař, one of the most outstanding Czech historians, died in 
1937. That same year saw the death of his rival in the dispute over the meaning 
of Czech history, the first president of Czechoslovakia, Tomáš Garrigue 
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Masaryk; while not a historian, he often took part in discussions on Czech 
history and formed the outlook of numerous Czech scholars. Kamil Krofta, a 
survivor of the Terezin camp, died in 1945, while Josef Šusta, accused by an 
overeager “patriot’s opinion” of being a collaborator with the Germans, 
committed suicide the same year. As a result, the historical community was 
robbed of a number of scholars distinguished not only by the extent of their 
output, but also by their potential for being leaders, capable, like Poland’s 
Tadeusz Manteuffel or Stanisław Lorenz, of acting as representatives of the 
scholarly world before the authorities. 
In occupied Germany, the key task was to deal with scholars who 
collaborated with the National-Socialist regime. In the eyes of many students, 
especially those expelled from universities during Hitler’s reign, the steps that 
rectors took to denazify the schools were not radical enough. At any rate, 
administrators from the occupying states soon took control over personnel 
matters. They worked hard to perform a thorough denazification, leading to an 
actual break in continuity in personnel in the scholarly departments of the Soviet 
occupation zone: over 80% of professors active before 1945 could not continue 
to occupy their posts after the war.64 In spite of denazification and the Soviet 
army administration’s strict supervision, new universities and scientific 
institutions began to form swiftly in the Eastern part of the country as well. All 
decisions concerning the scientific policy were made by the Soviet military 
administrators, with the aid of the Deutsche Zentralverwaltung für Volksbildung 
(German Central Administration for National Education), serving as a German 
“conveyor belt.”65 
Throughout the first postwar years, the work of the Polish, Czech, Slovak 
and German historians concentrated on reconstructing scientific institutions, 
replenishing archives and libraries, and reinstating regular study programs at 
universities. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, scholars clearly maintained ties to 
the prewar period, putting stress most of all on the independence of research. 
Though it seems that for Czech historians, as for most of their native society, the 
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Communist Party did not constitute a threat (in any case, Communists won over 
43% of the popular vote in Bohemia during the free elections of 1946.). In this 
context, Alexej Kusák writes of the irrationality of the Czech intelligentsia, 
which traced “Fascism” in petit bourgeois behaviour, while at the same time, 
failing to see it at work in Communist-supported state control, collectivism, and 
anti-German nationalism.66 In these circumstances, the Czech historians’ 
relations with their Slovak counterparts could indeed seem to be the biggest 
problem to tackle. Having suffered a far worse fate and – even more importantly 
– having had a chance to observe the Communist Machtübernahme at work, the 
Poles seem to have looked to the future of their profession with more caution. In 
the Soviet occupation zone in Germany, scholars were effectively barred from 
any attempt at self-government; all decisions concerning programs and 
personnel were issued by the Soviet occupational government in the form of 
military orders. 
In the process of achieving power, various national Communist parties 
searched for legitimacy. The broad social support the Czech Communists 
enjoyed was an exception rather than the rule. Even in the Slovak part of the 
state the Communist Party lost sympathy during the early postwar years. In this 
situation, the Communists looked in the first instance to national culture and 
national history for support in the assumption of power. All attempts to reshape 
the preexisting Communist historical narratives were marked by this necessity. 
The interwar Communist movements were extremely critical of national 
traditions of any kind, offering an internationalist counter-narrative in opposition 
to dominant nationalist interpretations. This changed partly during the second 
half of the 1930s and certainly during the war, evolving along with the Soviet 
historical narrative. Thus the adoption of the Soviet paradigm in 1945 did not 
mean adopting the native Communist tradition of historical thought but rather 
searching for a new interpretation that would be “national in form and socialist 
in content.” 
In their first attempts to attract the sympathy of the “common people” 
Polish, Czech, and Slovak Communists invoked recent history. A strong anti-
German sentiment was common currency in postwar Europe, not restricted to its 
eastern parts. Poland and Czechoslovakia were among the countries that 
expelled German populations from their older or newly “reunited” western 
areas. Both states referred to a long history of conflicts with Germans, stressing 
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at the same time the importance of Slavic brotherhood in past and future 
battles.67 
The need for a widely accepted national Communist policy was responsible 
for the development of a network of Polish research institutes, the most 
prominent of which was the Western Institute (Instytut Zachodni) in Poznań. 
Under the directorship of Medievalist Zygmunt Wojciechowski, Instytut 
Zachodni was a significant landmark on the Polish historiographic landscape, 
publishing its own periodical Przegląd Zachodni (The Western Review) and 
opening branches in several Polish cities. Wojciechowski was not only a gifted 
historian, but also a nationalist politician. In the interwar period he had been a 
proponent of the concept of ‘Polish maternal lands,’ a national geography 
including more or less the lands that were transferred from the collapsed Third 
Reich to Poland after 1945. Wojciechowski’s book Polska—Niemcy: Dziesięć 
wieków zmagania (Poland and Germany: A Thousand Years of Struggle), first 
published in 1933, reappeared in 1945 in a new edition, considerably more 
critical of Germany than the first one. According to Wojciechowski, the whole 
western branch of the Slavic world had been shaped by constant military 
struggle against German aggression. The Germans, he contended, were unable 
to cohabit peacefully with Slavs, since they ‘biologically’ hated everything 
Slavic. Now, after 1945, “A new epoch of the Slavic march to the west has 
begun, replacing the German Drang nach Osten. Those who cannot comprehend 
that, will not understand the new era and will not recognize the true role of 
Poland in the new international reality.”  
The Przegląd Zachodni vividly supported Wojciechowski’s view of Polish–
German relations. At the same time, the editors of the journal expressed their 
loyalty to the Communist leadership and their gratitude to Stalin for the new 
and, in their view, legitimate western border of Poland. As a mixture of political 
and scholarly arguments, this so-called Polish western idea was a mirror image 
of the German Ostforschung with a pan-Slavic sentiment. As such, it had no 
Czechoslovak counterpart. Although the German problem was crucial for the 
Czech national movement from its beginnings (and perhaps because it was so 
important), there was no separate Czech or Slovak “western idea.” 
Consequently, no person could embody such a movement in the manner of 
Wojciechowski, who provided a face for this political tendency in Poland. The 
expulsion of Germans from Czech lands was accompanied by texts that 
questioned the moral and cultural values of the defeated enemy. Historical 
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writings described a thousand years of Czech-German struggles and an evil 
innate in the national character of Germans whose aggressive inclinations had 
led inexorably to the emergence of the Nazi dictatorship. However, in contrast to 
the Polish situation, postwar Czechoslovak historiography did not view Germans 
as a popular topic.68 But there was another motif that attracted the attention of 
Czech and Slovak historians: the idea of Slavic brotherhood. An editorial in the 
first issue of the postwar Český Časopis Historický (Czech Historical Journal) 
claimed that “the Slavic idea in its new Russian understanding makes us sure 
that our motherland will never be a part of Greater Germania and, with all our 
frank sympathy for Europe, we will be allowed to develop as an independent 
nation.”69 One of the most important animators of this Slavophile campaign was 
Zdeněk Nejedlý, musicologist, minister of education, first president of the 
Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, and the unquestioned leader of Czech 
Marxist historical sciences. 
As in the Polish example, some Czech historians, who were rather far 
removed from the Communist camp, nonetheless supported the pan-Slavic and 
anti-German line. In 1947 a liberal Moravian historian, Ladislav Hosák, 
published his history of the Czech lands,70 a rather typical example of interwar 
Czech historiography. Nevertheless, it introduced nationalist elements that 
argued against the more general liberal line. The Hussites were, according to 
Hosák, “cleansing our country of a religious and national enemy.” Lajos 
Kossuth was characterised as a “denationalised Slovak.”71 But the most critical 
remarks were reserved for Germans, who were characterised as having chosen 
since 1848 a path of hostility towards everything Czech, a path which led 
straight to Munich and the Second World War, and which culminated in the 
expulsion of the incurably traitorous Germans. The book ends with an 
affirmation of the belief in the “Slavic orientation” of Czechoslovak policy and 
with predictions of a glorious future for Czechoslovak-Russian brotherhood. 
A largely similar picture was drawn by František Bokes, the Slovak author 
of a history of Slovakia and the Slovaks (published in 1946).72 Both Hosák and 
Bokes mixed the language of interwar geopolitics with radical new ideological 
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tendencies. Traditional references to Slavic mutuality gained new meanings 
when uttered in a new political context.  
In the late 1940s when both Poland and Czechoslovakia entered a period of 
Stalinisation, the orthodox historical outlook underwent a rapid change. During 
a conference in Wrocław in 1950, Zygmunt Wojciechowski was condemned for 
his anti-German chauvinism. A local Marxist historian Ewa Maleczyńska 
commented: “I think that those who understand the postwar changes according 
to the dictum that once they beat us and now it’s their time to be beaten—those 
who want to replace the German Drang nach Osten with the Slavic ‘Drang nach 
Westen’—I think that those people don’t understand the meaning of recent 
developments.” 73 As a consequence, though Polish, Czech, or Slovak Marxist 
historical writings never lost their anti-German undertones, the candid blend of 
nationalist and Communist perspectives on the past was for a time marginalised. 
In the postwar period, the “revolutionary” was sometimes combined with 
the “national” even at the cost of reproducing explicitly nationalistic 
interpretations. Though short, this period was then indicative of the Communist 
politics of history as well as of the reaction of historical communities in East 
Central Europe. The Communists learned how to approach a wider audience 
with a popular vision of the national past; the historians learned how to retain at 
least a part of their freedom in exchange for close cooperation with the new 
power. 
*** 
In each of the aforementioned cases, the authorities introduced a number of 
solutions that stripped universities of their autonomous status and expanded the 
state’s importance to the fashioning of academic careers. The properties owned 
by academic institutions were nationalised. In Poland and Czechoslovakia, the 
Soviet system of collective institutional leadership and central planning in 
research was introduced; the former was implemented in the GDR in 1968. The 
plan was enforced by basic party cells at every university. New, Soviet-inspired 
academic titles were introduced.74 The work conducted in historical 
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departments, both at the universities and at the academies of science (newly 
formed in the early 1950s), was expected to embrace the ruling ideology, not 
only through the choice of a uniform methodology, but also through 
“worldview-affecting” activities: academic gatherings and ideological 
instruction. The scientific candidate exam, introduced as a result of the 
implementation of new academic titles, focused on testing one’s basic 
knowledge of Marxism. To be able to tackle it, younger tenured scholars were 
expected to attend special preparatory lectures. Though the exam was mandatory 
only for the younger cadres, all scholars employed at scholarly institutions were 
expected to attend the exam preparations. 
Yet, the changes involving structure, schedule, political education, academic 
titles and planning were not at all sufficient in transforming schools into 
institutions capable of propagating the achievements of Marxism-Leninism. 
While Polish, Czech and Slovak Communists gradually tightened the noose over 
their respective countries, borrowing heavily from reservoirs of nationalist 
interpretations of history along the way, they also made their first attempts at 
changing the social profile of students. The goal of the ruling caste in each of the 
countries under discussion was a “proletarianisation” of the universities, that is, 
effecting a situation in which card-carrying Communist professors of worker 
and peasant origins would teach the youth of worker and peasant classes to be 
good citizen and Party members. 
The authorities ultimately failed to transform universities into a power base 
in Poland. John Connelly, who has studied this problem, stressed the importance 
of the strong relationship binding Polish professors and their students, which 
was a characteristic feature of scholarly life in Poland, and which made it 
impossible to drive a wedge between the two groups (a feat accomplished in the 
GDR). This failure was not only a result of the ineffectiveness of authorities, but 
also a consequence of differences among the scholarly traditions of Poland, 
Germany and Czechoslovakia. In the two latter countries, modern universities 
never became an autonomous community of scholars and students. On the 
contrary: they were deeply rooted in the structures of the state and therefore 
susceptible to its dealings. Polish universities were renowned for their curious, 
“lateral” structure of half-formal and informal relations which helped build a 
dense and broad network, observable even to this day. It played a seminal role in 
the struggle for control over the peoples’ minds. University employees were 
accountable most of all to their own community of intelligentsia; contrarily, in 
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Germany and Czechoslovakia universities were not as distinguishable from the 
rest of society and much more dependent on the Party. 
Despite the limitations which could not have been overcome through 
scientific policies introduced by the PPR and the PZPR, the struggle for 
“proletarianisation” of the universities could be said to have yielded one definite 
result. Though neither professors nor students joined the Party en masse—and 
those of them who did never severed ties with the community—the authorities 
managed to ensure that a significant number of the youth of authentic worker-
peasant origin studied at universities. During the 1950s, these students amounted 
to about 50% of all admitted first year students.75 However, youth with an 
“appropriate” background did not necessarily act as puppets of the authorities – 
having found themselves at the universities, they were influenced by a cadre that 
was indifferent, and at times even unsympathetic toward the government. 
According to Connelly, “With the doors to seminar rooms or lecture halls shut, 
the Party was left alone in the corridor.”76 As a result, after 1956 the situation 
was returned to the state prior to the “Stalinisation of the universities.”77 
Besides, even the problematic success of “proterianising” efforts is questionable; 
Connelly seems to give undue credit to admission politics. Looking at the social 
stratification of those admitted, as well as all candidates, it is apparent that 
already in 1949 workers-peasants made up a third of the Warsaw candidates, 
while “working intelligentsia” was responsible for half of all applications; 
moreover, this breakdown persisted throughout the Stalinist period. It would 
seem, then, that the long-term effects described by John Connelly were secured 
as much through the Stalinisation of the universities as through accelerated 
social advancement, the migration of numerous peasant families into towns and 
the pauperisation of society. One could therefore hazard the claim that, at least 
as far as the Stalinist period is concerned, the significant rise in the percentage 
of students of worker-peasant origins in Poland was not caused by Party policies 
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toward universities; in fact, it was an effect of huge social changes brought 
about not by the authorities (though they played a part), but rather by the war. A 
far larger proportion of candidates of worker-peasant background became 
students after the war simply because so many more of them applied. 
The efforts of Central European Communist Parties to transform universities 
politically and socially yielded divergent results. Authorities showed the greatest 
consistency in this regard in the Soviet occupation zone in Germany, and later in 
the GDR. Here, universities were turned into “proletarian” outposts controlled 
by the SED. The reaction of the majority of the East German intelligentsia to the 
worker’s uprising in Berlin in 1953 already proved the value of this policy. 
Neither in Czechoslovakia, nor in Poland did the governments succeed in 
winning the genuine support of the intelligentsia. In fact, the opposite was the 
case: it was the intelligentsia that served as the breeding ground for the leaders 
of social revolts up until and including 1989. The Polish Communists’ policy 
toward the universities did not yield the desired effects. Though the social base 
of the student community broadened, the authorities and government’s role in 
the achievement of this goal is debatable. The Polish universities avoided 
purges, and their staff did not join the Party en masse – which had occurred in 
Czechoslovakia, where the government managed to put the universities under 
Communist control, but failed to fill them with representatives of the urban and 
rural proletariat. 
The defeats and victories of the academic politics of the Communist states 
and parties had crucial significance for the communities of historians in each of 
the countries under discussion. In the late 1940s in the GDR, after denazification 
and another purge, this community almost had to form anew. Communist 
historians enjoyed a numerical superiority over their “bourgeois” colleagues, 
growing with every new batch of graduates from “proletarianised” universities. 
In Czechoslovakia, where purges were not as thorough and occurred only after 
1948, the community of historians was also shaped for the most part by 
Communists. Representatives of the “bourgeois” academy were pushed to the 
margins, relocated to universities outside Prague, and sometimes even barred 
from teaching altogether. In Poland, the community was led by “bourgeois” 
historians, forced to endlessly negotiate with the authorities. Over the long term, 
their position was reinforced by the fact that, at the expense of PZPR, they 
retained control over schooling of the younger generations of scholars. 
Despite numerous differences among the communities of historians in 
1950s’ Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR, the government of each of these 
countries set similar goals for the scholars to meet. They were supposed to 
create a new, Marxist historical science, and record it in magazines and in 
general works on national history. Deviations from the established norms were 
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unacceptable, and individualities were condemned. The historians worked in a 
fearful climate caused by the terror aimed against enemies of the new order, 
whether real or “objective” (who learned of their guilt only during 
interrogations). At times, it affected education and science in a highly direct 
manner. The so-called campaign against bourgeois nationalism, begun in 
Slovakia in 1950, started out as an effort to locate the Czechoslovak 
“supporters” of Tito, but, with the arrest of the commissioner of education (an 
equivalent of a minister in the Slovak government) Ladislav Novomeský, many 
teachers – historians as well – were removed from schools.78 
Despite obvious examples of Stalinist terror in each of the countries under 
discussion, we should also pose the question: is the monochromatic image of the 
1950s really representative of what occurred outside prison walls and camp 
fences? Or, if we are talking about the intelligentsia – was the dictatorship of 
new governments and “faithful” artists and scientists an absolute rule? In each 
case, we are dealing with a process which took years to complete, a process of 
bringing together authorities’ demands and historians’ responsiveness. 
Social scientists discuss and exchange opinions in scientific journals as well as 
at a variety of conventions, conferences and congresses. Obviously, quite a few 
of these occurred at locations and times which are the focus of this study. To 
describe the circumstances in which historians performed their work, however, it 
is advisable to distinguish those meetings that played a crucial role in shaping 
the views and actions of their community. Some of those “special” conferences 
are vividly remembered, almost as symbolic events, and memories of them are 
held to this day; in the case of Poland, one such event was definitely the First 
Methodological Conference of Polish Historians in Otwock, at the turn of 1952. 
A similar role can be ascribed to historical associations’ conventions and to 
international historians’ congresses (which were especially well-suited to 
perform the role). Each such event, to an extent, provides insight into dominant 
intellectual currents, the contemporaneous political situation, and the 
interpersonal relations within the organised historians’ guild. As far as my own 
interests are concerned, of highest importance will be the conferences, 
conventions, etc., during which the representatives of “bourgeois” 
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historiography clashed with Marxists in a struggle that serves as the focal point 
of the current study. 
The intellectual and personal continuity between prewar and postwar Czech 
historiography was symbolically confirmed at the II Convention of 
Czechoslovak Historians in 1947. The convention was at the same time a portent 
of coming radical changes. Its organisers, the Czechoslovak Historical Society 
(Československá Historická Společnost), led by Karel Stloukal, invited some 
800 guests (including a negligible Slovak contingent). Foremost among the 
topics were historical materialism and other methodological novelties, the 
German question, the question of Slavic cooperation, and the problem of Czech-
Slovak relations.79 Even before the proceedings began, a conflict arose between 
the organisers and a group of representatives of Marxism. The latter demanded 
that the paper on the October Revolution and the Slavic world be presented by 
Zdeněk Nejedlý rather than Jan Slavík, a well-known opponent of the Soviet 
Union. After a discussion with the leadership of the historians’ union, Slavík 
agreed to give the topic away to Nejedlý, but one would be excused for doubting 
that this concession resolved tensions. As Josef Hanzal observed, the key 
problem was that most of the active proponents of Marxism in its Soviet 
incarnation were closely connected to Slavík before the war as collaborators on 
the Dějiny a přítomnost magazine. After the war, Václav Husa, Jaroslav 
Charvát, Václav Čejchan, Jan Pachta, Oldřich Říha and Jaroslav Vávra found 
themselves among the ranks of KSČ, while their “spiritual father” became an 
“inveterate enemy” of the first country ruled by workers and peasants.80 
The convention proceeded in due course until Zdeněk Nejedlý, then-current 
Minister of Labour and Social Affairs, took the stage to present his paper. His 
text sketched in a very raw outline the leading role of Soviet Union among the 
states and nations of the Slavs. The reaction of the public present to his talk was 
reserved to the utmost – some of the listeners already heard that Nejedlý’s 
presence at the convention was practically forced upon the organisers. When 
Nejedlý finished his presentation, Jan Slavík took the floor with a critical 
response, exceeding the time allotted; among other things, he described to the 
congregated the methods of Stalin’s dictatorial rule.81 Instead of countering, 
Nejedlý left the convention in a fury, stating that the old generation was 
evidently unable to comprehend him (in fact, Nejedlý was Slavík’s senior by 7 
years). The convention concluded with a double visitation at the graves of Josef 
Šusta and Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk. As Josef Hanzal rightly observed, 
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“Reading the proceedings of the convention today, we may be surprised at the 
fact that just before the February catastrophe historians could allow themselves 
to be so carefree, at ease, and fail to see the signs of an impending threat.”82 At 
the same time, the conflict between the Marxist group (self-proclaimed 
representatives of the Slovak historians) and Karel Stloukal presaged a coming 
storm.83 
As is well known, the danger materialised several months after the 
historians’ convention, in the shape of a political upheaval with utterly dramatic 
consequences for Czech historians. In the following years, the authorities 
stepped cautiously through the field of historical sciences, avoiding a direct 
confrontation between Marxist and non-Marxist historians; instead, 
administrative decisions were carried out, and debates were replaced by purges 
in historical departments. The gradual liberalisation of cultural life that began in 
the first half of the 1960s was also not the work of “bourgeois” academics, but 
of card-carrying Marxists, including personages so vital to the shape of the 
1950s as František Graus or Josef Macek. This is the reason why, until the early 
1960s, meetings in which Czech historians took part were for the most part 
manifestations of the community’s ideological unity. Executive decisions by the 
Party took a special importance for the period’s historians; for instance, in May, 
1951, the Central Committee of the KSČ accepted the motion that works on 
Czech history should include a broader focus on the most recent events. As 
Nejedlý put it, scholars should become interested in Lenin’s Prague rather than 
the Baroque Prague.84 Yet none of the other similar ideologically-charged 
conferences became such a visible focal point – their results were known well 
before they occurred, and they served more as conveyor belts for motions that 
had already been accepted behind closed doors. No “mass conversions” were 
expected, since they were proclaimed before the fact: people who did not appear 
likely to cooperate were robbed of the power to affect either the scholarly 
community or students. 
The ground-breaking moment in Czechoslovak historiography, which also 
attained the rank of a symbolic event, was the involvement of 200 Czech and 
Slovak historians in the international congress of historical sciences in Vienna in 
1965. At that point, the thaw had already arrived: cultural and artistic 
personalities had abandoned Socialist-Realist patterns, the Prague Spring had 
just begun, and heretofore “hardliner” Marxists like Graus or Macek were 
backing away from Party orthodoxy. Historians arrived at the congress on a 
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small, rented ship. Both in Vienna and during the following year’s conference 
on the problem of nation in the Habsburg monarchy, scholars from the West 
were surprised to see that they were dealing with actual historians, and not Party 
functionaries.85 The attitudes of Czechoslovak historians must have seemed 
surprising, since other participants were often quite aloof toward them. Henryk 
Wereszycki, barred from working with students during the Stalinist period, was 
also expected to attend the conference, but his passport application was rejected. 
In a letter to Piotr Wandycz, Wereszycki commented acerbically on the 
differences between himself and historians from other countries of the Soviet 
bloc, who were allowed to attend the venue: “they travel with ease,” he wrote 
with irony – “their luggage is small.”86 
In Slovakia, the situation developed largely along the same lines as it did in 
Bohemia. During the first plenary meeting of the community of Slovak 
historians (Slovenská Historická Spoločnost, SHS) in April 1946 in Piešťany, 
participants focused primarily on the problem of normalising relations with their 
Czech colleagues. The newly-formed Slovak Historical Society, led by Daniel 
Rapant, enjoyed the support (including financial) of the Slovak government. The 
meeting featured speeches from then-commissioner for education, Ladislav 
Novomeský, as well as A.J.P. Taylor.87 No Marxist minority appeared because 
none had existed at the time.88 The second plenary meeting, scheduled for 1947, 
was cancelled. Several weeks after the scheduled meeting, one of the secretaries 
of the union of historians, Vendelin Jankovič, was arrested for allegedly taking 
part in an anti-government conspiracy.89 Then, several months before a further 
meeting, scheduled for 1948, Czechoslovakia underwent a political coup. 
The most important changes within the Slovak historical community took 
place during the process of “verifying” university personnel, just like in 
Bohemia.90 Purges affected the historians’ society as well. The discharge of 
Daniel Rapant as the president of SHS (and a professor at the University of 
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Bratislava), a man commonly named to this day as the greatest Slovak historian, 
became a symbolic event. Several other historians were ousted from their posts 
as well, and threateningly charged with anti-state activities.91 After the 
“victorious February,” SHS joined in with the official support of the Communist 
Party. The third plenary meeting of the organisation in October 1948 became 
one of the last occasions for expressions of protest against the changes taking 
place in the country as well as in the historians’ union. This occasion was used 
by an archivist, Maria Jeršová, who declined an invitation to take part in the 
meeting, since her husband, a hero of the uprising of 1944, was at that point 
locked up in jail.92 At any rate, this was the penultimate meeting of the SHS. 
Between 1950 and 1957, the organisation was practically inoperative. 
The postwar historical consciousness of the Slovaks was significantly 
affected by the Slovak National Uprising (Slovenské Národné Povstanie, SNP), 
an assault on the German occupiers as well as on the pro-German Slovak 
government. Shifts in the official interpretation of that event render various 
symptoms of Stalinisation, and then of the thaw, eminently more visible. The 
Stalinist reinterpretation of the Uprising was related to the fact that 
contemporaneous Communist leaders, Gustáv Husák and Ladislav Novomeský, 
were accused of rightist-nationalist leanings and spent the whole Stalinist period 
in prison, awaiting, in all likelihood, death penalties. In this context, the yearly 
conferences devoted to the uprising achieved a symbolic status: in a way, they 
sketched out the current disposition of Slovak historiography. Jozef Jablonický 
compares two such conferences: The first, organised in 1953 by the Institute of 
History of the Slovak Academy of Science (Historický Ústav Slovenskej 
Akadémie Vied, HÚ SAV) shared the same outlook as Czech conferences on 
cosmopolitanism. There was no discussion involved other than the postulate, 
presented by the director of the Institute, that the presenters “unmask” the 
connections between the leaders of the Uprising and foreign intelligence—the 
Intelligence Service in particular—with more daring.93 Another conference, in 
June 1964, occurred in the dramatically changed atmosphere of the “Slovak 
Spring.”94 The Slovak National Uprising was returned to official memory, and 
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while its Communist leaders were rehabilitated, there was enough room for the 
non-Communist majority involved also to be recognised.95 
The cultural and political thaw in Slovakia began, like in Bohemia, around 
1963. In June of that year, a plenary meeting of the Slovak Historical Society 
took place in Bratislava. The participants performed a special kind of self-
criticism, seeking out traces of the “cult of personality” in their own works of 
the preceding years. They also criticised the influence of Party functionaries, 
show trials and falsifications of history. Participants also raised an issue of a 
more general nature: Whether historians guilty of all those shortcomings were 
still worthy of the name, or that they should be treated exclusively as 
propagandists.96 The 6th convention of Slovak historians in Martin became a 
sort of a high-water mark for the “Slovak Spring.” The very choice of location 
for the convention was significant – during the 1950s, Martin, the birthplace of 
the Slovak national movement and the seat of Matica Slovenská, was closely 
symbolic of Slovak clerical-fascist nationalism.97 Presentations devoted to the 
state of historiography of the previous 20 years bore special importance. 
Ľubomír Lipták observed a lack of foreign relationships along with efforts at 
breaking the generational continuity of Slovak historiography and its generally 
poor state.98 Ján Mlynárik spoke with even greater vehemence: he underlined the 
decline in the quality of instruction of historians after 1948 and spoke up for 
Daniel Rapant (who had been previously ousted from all public positions).99 
However, Ľudovít Holotík, then-president of the historians’ association and 
director of the SAV’s Institute of History, distanced himself from papers 
presented at the convention, claiming that they criticised the “past period” too 
vehemently.100 
The self-definition of Marxist historiography of the GDR was significantly 
affected by the fact that it was in a constant dispute with other German 
historiography. Relations between neighbours and ideological opponents were 
dependent to a large extent on the political climate, which sometimes fostered 
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limited cooperation, but at other times turned ice cold. Common, all-German 
historical conventions, involving scholars from the GDR up until 1958, gave the 
Marxists a special opportunity to meet representatives of “bourgeois” 
historiography. East-German conferences and scientific meetings did not offer 
this opportunity, since as a rule, they did not allow for an exchange of divergent 
opinions or the persuasion of the resistant, being more akin to the manifestations 
of an already-achieved Marxist unity as had been the case in Stalinist 
Czechoslovakia. 
The first postwar conventions of the Verband der Historiker Deutschlands 
(VHD) involved very few Marxist scholars. The sole representative of the GDR 
was typically Walter Markov, a Marxist from Leipzig, who was valued in the 
West as well (he fell victim to hunts for Tito’s supporters in the GDR in 
1951).101 East-German historians invited to the 1951 convention in Marburg did 
not receive passports and were unable to take part in the proceedings.102 A 
breakthrough occurred in 1953, in Bremen. The government decided to send a 
sizeable contingent, including non-Party specialists. GDR historians constituted 
about 10% of all participants (ca. 700), and took active part in the discussions 
and lobby conversations. In his report from the convention, published in 
Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, Fritz Klein joyfully observed that only a 
few West-German historians approached the Marxists with hostility (which they 
did in a highly unpleasant manner, denying them the right to call themselves 
historians).103 The general, official response to the event was therefore mildly 
positive.104 Still, the aggressive statements of Heinz Kamnitzer and Joachim 
Streisand, reproaching some of their Western colleagues for their national-
socialist past, could suggest a different interpretation.105 
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Another confrontation with non-Marxist German historiography took place 
three years later, during a VHD congress at Ulm. The young GDR 
historiography had already made its international début by that time at the 
congress of the Comité International des Sciences Historiques in Rome, though, 
on that occasion none of the contingents from people’s democracies managed to 
overcome the image of a manipulated, centrally controlled and politicised 
academy.106 At Ulm, the GDR was represented by a tight group of Party 
functionaries. The discussion spots were entirely orchestrated. A scant 
description of the proceedings in Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft lauded a 
sober German-German discussion and observed with satisfaction that historians 
from GDR were quite visible at Ulm.107 The subsequent number of the magazine 
offered an even more optimistic representation of the event. The GDR historians 
wrote that Marxism was rejected by mostly the elder generation from the West, 
while the young doubted the cognitive capabilities of bourgeois historiography 
and were much more open to cooperation with the GDR.108 
The year 1956 was at the same time the final period of a more or less 
peaceable exchange of opinion between the two German historiographies. The 
20th convention of the CPSU, the Hungarian Uprising and the Polish October, 
and then the anti-revisionist campaign in the GDR (including the persecution of 
Jürgen Kuczynski and the ousting of Fritz Klein and Joachim Streisand as 
editors of Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft) radically altered this picture. If 
Marxist historiography was to retain its dominant position in the country, it had 
to eschew direct confrontation with other methodological and political currents. 
The ideological organ of the SED, Einheit, published a fundamental critique of 
the politics of a direct exchange of opinions: “Scientific debate, a fruitful 
exchange of views, and a national meeting between German historians from the 
West and the East – all of these can work to the advantage of a progressive 
science, peace and international understanding, as long as they remain grounded 
in an inexorable struggle against imperialist historiography. On this ground, 
every contact with West German historians can prove fruitful and desirable.” 
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The final joint convention of German historians took place in September 
1958 at Trier. The GDR delegation was on that occasion organised by the 
Deutsche Historiker-Gesellschaft (DHG), which formed several months before 
under the leadership of Ernst Engelberg, and was approved by the Department 
of Science of the Central Committee of the SED. This new association of East 
German historians vowed to struggle against militarism and neo-fascism for the 
victory of socialism in the whole of Germany.109 Alfred Meusel’s proposition 
that DHG members should also join VHD was rejected; more than that – 
members of the East German association were expressly forbidden to join 
VHD.110 Even before the convention began, Zeitschrift für 
Geschichtswissenschaft published an assault on some West German historians, 
branding them as imperialists.111 In addition, the number of GDR historians 
escaping to the West rose rapidly in the months directly preceding the 
convention; VHD filed a protest against the GDR government’s attempts to 
suppress this wave. The affair of Willy Flachs added insult to injury: Flachs, a 
scholar who could not endure the oppressive atmosphere of East Germany, fled 
to FRG and committed suicide.112 The GDR side vehemently rejected the notion 
that his decision was in any way affected by a period of imprisonment or by 
being stripped of all his titles.113 
An official severing of ties with West German historiography was for the 
most part a pure formality. At Trier, West German historians reacted to the pre-
planned performances by their Eastern colleagues by taking away their right to 
speak.114 From that point on, the East German scholars treated their Western 
colleagues exclusively as ideological enemies, an attitude reflected in more and 
more denounciations in the Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft.115 The death 
of Alfred Meusel, a proponent of relative openness toward the Western scientific 
community, just before the 11th Congress of CISH in Stockholm, gained a 
symbolic meaning. Without him among the ranks, the GDR prepared an 
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independent contingent, focused around an “ideological struggle” against their 
peers from the U.S., the FRG, Yugoslavia as well as against Polish émigrés.116 
East German historians no longer tried to win anyone over. Enclosed in their 
own milieu, they no longer needed to, or indeed could, confront their beliefs 
with adherents of other worldviews. 
Poland differed from Czechoslovakia and the GDR in that the Stalinist 
“Sturm und Drang” lasted relatively shorter there. Before 1956, the Party failed 
to secure total control in terms of ideology or personnel, and criticism of the 
Stalinist schematism in historiography began to appear even before the Polish 
October. Hence, the Stalinisation of the Polish historiography proved to be an 
unfinished process, which makes it all the more interesting. In Poland, the 
confrontations between Marxists and “bourgeois” historians spread out over 
several years, with milestones occurring at conventions and conferences of great 
value and importance to the community. As a result, conferences were not pure 
formalities, as in the case of Czechoslovakia or the GDR, even though they did 
not foster a free and unrestrained exchange of opinions. 
The first public appearance of an organised group of Polish Marxist 
historians occurred at the 7th General Convention of Polish Historians in 
Wrocław, which took place on September 19-22, 1948. Among the invited were 
a delegation of Soviet historians (Fyodor Tretyakov, Arkady Sidorov and Ivan 
Udaltsov, each delivering a paper). On the other hand, though, invitations were 
also extended to Charles Morazé, representing the CISH, and Josef Macůrek 
from Brno, a historian out of favour with Czechoslovak Communist authorities. 
One of the papers was presented by another historian who soon became persona 
non grata, Henryk Wereszycki (1898-1990).117 A motion by Wanda 
Moszczeńska “for the necessity of including an up-to-date course on the 
methodology of history, and specifically historical materialism, in the regular 
university curriculum in history,” won unreserved approval.118 The convention 
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occasioned the official formation of a group of Marxist historians (under the 
name of the Marxist Association of Historians), which was supposed to 
coordinate the actions and enhance the skills of the very few proponents of the 
new methodology. 
At the convention, the achievements of Marxists were judged to have been 
rather limited.119 Worse than that – talks given by Polish Marxists did not earn the 
approval of the Soviet guests.120 Hopes for the future were mostly associated with 
the emergence of an organised group promoting the new methodology. The 
Marxist Association of Historians (Marksistowskie Zrzeszenie Historyków) was 
expected to perform this role, but it needed the government’s trust and support to 
operate efficiently. At the same time, it became evident early on that this Marxist 
organisation had a rather negligible effect on the Polish historiography. The 
Marxists spent several months intensively preparing for the CISH Congress in Paris 
in 1950.121 It soon turned out that the profile of the Polish delegation for the 
Congress was dependent on the composition of the German contingent. The French 
organisers sent out a list of the German participants to all concerned, asking for any 
critical comments or reservations. In Poland, the reservations were quickly voiced 
by the Western Institute (Instytut Zachodni), which protested against the 
participation of several German scholars in the Congress.122 Soon enough, Party 
historians came up with their own list of objections to the arrangement of the 
German delegation. During a meeting at the Department of Science of the Central 
Committee of the Party in January, Żanna Kormanowa pointed out that “There are 
[in the German delegation] only three people from Berlin, and [Jürgen] Kuczynski 
isn’t there. The organisers are apparently trying to smuggle in the imperialist 
historians.… They obviously want Poland to be their dummy. The Party authorities 
will have to decide this matter.”123 Not long thereafter, Żanna Kormanowa handed 
to Manteuffel a list of representatives of “the German democratic historical 
science,” who should have been invited to the Parisian Congress. By April, 
Tadeusz Manteuffel prepared a list of Polish delegates to the Congress for the 
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Ministry of Education, but “Party authorities” had already been forced to decide to 
boycott the event. Tadeusz Manteuffel was told to draft a letter to the organisers, 
rejecting the invitation in the kindest of terms.124 
The manner in which the authorities chose to settle the issue of the Polish 
involvement in the Congress of Historical Sciences exemplifies not only the 
attitude of the government toward historians as such, but also toward Marxist 
historians who, just like all the others, had already prepared their presentations, 
with some, like Żanna Kormanowa, putting quite an effort into organising the 
event and giving it an appropriate ideological resonance. The government’s 
decision, whether it was taken at Moscow’s behest, or in response to the 
composition of the German delegation, or even resulted from the increasingly 
strained post-1949 Polish-French relations, illustrates the disdain with which it 
treated historians, whether or not they were card-carrying Party members. 
While the question of the Polish participation in the Parisian Congress of 
Historical Sciences was still up in the air, more and more Party-members began 
to voice their demands of serious changes in personnel and organisation of the 
field. According to the preliminaries of a Party group at the Department of 
Science of the Central Committee, the Congress was meant to serve as an 
opportunity to prove the qualifications of a group of leading Polish Marxists and 
to illustrate its cohesion. What’s more, the guidelines for the content of the 
presentations, delivered to the Polish Historical Association (Polskie 
Towarzystwo Historyczne), demanded that non-Party historians reference works 
of “progressive” science, at least in footnotes, just like Marxists. Had those 
plans succeeded, their creators’ works would have gained a fantastic opportunity 
to enhance their scientific standing. However, with the trip to Paris called off, 
administrative repressions and a “closing of the ranks” seemed to the Marxists a 
more viable method of exerting control over the community. In this climate, 
preparations for the 1st Congress of Polish Science, originally drafted by the late 
Jerzy Borejsza, took place. 
The participants of the meeting of the Subsection of History were 
presumably impressed the most by a paper which summarised their debates, 
presented by Żanna Kormanowa. Kormanowa began by stressing the role of 
history as one of the most Party-bound social sciences, heretofore exploited with 
relish by the possessor classes. A brief outline of the history of Polish 
historiography before 1918 was complemented by a broader section devoted to 
the interwar period. With all the positives (sometimes deemed questionable) of 
the period, Kormanowa found ample room for a scathing critique of some still 
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active colleagues and several academic institutions.125 Then, she stated that the 
Western Lands have officially been incorporated into the fatherland, which in 
her view meant that the Western Institute lost its raison d’être.126 Among the 
postulates of the Subsection, the presenter named the formation of corporate 
departments in the manner characteristic of the Soviet Union, a deeper 
centralisation of academic publishing, and the formation of an Institute of 
History at the Polish Academy of Sciences.127 
Kormanowa’s presentation made a lasting impression on her audience 
primarily because of her use of a rather primitive language when describing the 
achievements of widely known historians. This certainly did not bode well for 
the quality of the future Marxist scholarship in the history of historiography. 
One could hazard that the proceedings of the 1st Congress of the Polish Science 
were the final wake-up call for non-Party historians, alerting them to the dangers 
they faced, both personally and as a community. This was not because of a 
“totalitarian structuring” of the proceedings (according to Piotr Hübner), but 
rather thanks to fairly clear signals from card-carrying scientists, such as the 
philosopher Adam Schaff, or, in historiography, Żanna Kormanowa. The 
positions of non-Party professors who failed to submit to the new policies were 
now under threat. Partly independent scientific institutions, deemed obsolete 
already at that stage, were also in danger; according to Kormanowa, they 
included the Polish Academy of Learning (Polska Akademia Umiejętności) or 
the Western Institute. One could also expect the newly-formed, centralised 
scientific structures of the Polish Academy of Sciences to be handed over to 
historians who, like Kormanowa, acted for the government in regards to their 
colleagues. This was not a welcome development, especially in light of the fresh 
memory of a fragment of her presentation, in which she stated that, in the 
struggle for the completion of the 6-year plan, “we, historians, failed to keep the 
pace of the miner, the steelworker, the founder, the weaver.”128 It soon 
transpired that some historians were conscious of these developments and drew 
the right conclusions. 
The next opportunity for a meeting of numerous Marxist and so-called 
“liberal-democratic” historians came with the First Methodological Conference 
of Polish Historians in Otwock between December 28th, 1951 and January 12th, 
1952. The Otwock conference inarguably has an exceptionally bad reputation. 
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Its main goal was to prove the superiority of card-carrying historians over their 
non-Party colleagues. The conference was rescheduled several times to give the 
young Marxists enough time to prepare for it.129 The venue was visited by a 
huge number of historians from all the major research centres and many younger 
tenured scholars. No invitation was sent to, among others, Władysław 
Konopczyński or Zygmunt Wojciechowski, both of whom were criticised by 
Kormanowa at the 1st Congress of Polish Science. 
The participants were to be evaluated not only by representatives of the 
Party and state authorities, but also by a delegation of Soviet historians: the 
director of the Institute of History of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Boris 
Gryekov, Yevgeni Kosminsky, Arkady Sidorov and Fyodor Tretyakov. The 
non-Party historians could derive comfort from the way the Soviet guests carried 
themselves. They did not offer support to the proponents of Stalinism, never 
allowed themselves to be isolated from their Polish colleagues, and spoke 
competently and courteously, emphasising the high qualifications of their 
hosts.130 The leader of the delegation, Boris Gryekov, won the Polish 
participants over when he asked the organisers to take him to one of the villages 
near Otwock, where he quartered during the First World War. This led to a 
meeting with an aged landowner, who supposedly kept fond memories of the 
erstwhile officer.131 When the conference ended, the Soviet guests were 
entertained by Bolesław Bierut, who expressed a great interest in the 
proceedings, and most of all, in the evaluation of the Polish academic cadres. 
The guests spoke highly of the non-Party historians, a fact which, as Leonid 
Gorisontov claimed, had very sad consequences for some of the Soviet delegates 
(back in their home country, Anna Mikhailovna Pankratova, a member of the 
Academy and an acquaintance of Żanna Kormanowa,132 accused them of 
yielding to the influence of the Polish bourgeois academy).133 
The evaluation presented by the Soviet guests was expected to frame the 
government’s decision on the leadership of the future Institute of History at 
PAN.134 Appeased by it, Tadeusz Manteuffel could safely pass on the resolution 
recommending the formation of the Institute to Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz.135 
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The likelihood of the Institute’s being handed over to someone like Żanna 
Kormanowa decreased. However, before the cadre of the future Institute of 
History at PAN took shape, the Otwock conference also brought about a number 
of events that inevitably worsened the non-Party historians’ mood. These were 
the assaults of Roman Werfel, Tadeusz Daniszewski and Józef Kowalski on 
Henryk Wereszycki, the author of Historia Polityczna Polski w dobie 
popowstaniowej 1864-1918 (The Political History of Poland in the Post-
Uprising era, 1864-1918, Warszawa 1948), a book they deemed pernicious, as a 
result of which it was withdrawn from bookshops. Asked to present a self-
criticism, Wereszycki explained that he had not known nor applied the rules of 
Marxism-Leninism while working on the book. The assailants judged this self-
criticism insufficient and renewed their assaults during subsequent sessions. The 
atmosphere became stressful not only for the victim of the assaults, but also for 
the other participants. Wereszycki himself thought that an arrest during the 
proceedings might be in the cards.136 
The Otwock conference is the last in a series of events that, in the eyes of 
both contemporaneous and current scholars, led to the Stalinisation of the Polish 
historiography. What did this Stalinisation consist of? A comparison of the 
proceedings of historical conventions and major conferences in each of the 
countries under discussion suggests that Stalinisation begins when the historical 
community is taken over by card-carrying Marxists, who then gradually force all 
members of the historical community to join the Party. This goal was fully 
achieved in the GDR, where authorities were greatly helped both by the 
denazification that decimated departments of the humanities at East German 
universities, and by the availability of an escape route to the West, chosen by 
many a dissident historian. In Czechoslovakia, the goal was actually achieved 
twice before 1989: first during the 1950s, and then after a period of 
“normalisation” that followed the Prague Spring. In Poland, neither of the stages 
crucial to its attainment were completed. Not only were the Marxists unable to 
achieve a numerical and qualitative advantage over the “bourgeois” historians; 
they even failed to come up with Marxist candidates for leadership of the 
community who would be capable of representing Polish historiography abroad. 
As a result, the Soviet guests at Otwock, for instance, expressed their esteem of 
Tadeusz Manteuffel or Aleksander Gieysztor (1916-1999), and not Żanna 
Kormanowa or Celina Bobińska. A comparison of the form, character and 
progress of the major conferences and conventions of historical societies shows 
that, in contrast to the other countries under discussion, in Poland the new 
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methodology had to be introduced repeatedly. It is not inconceivable that these 
attempts would eventually have yielded a definite result, and that both the Polish 
“liberal-bourgeois” historians and their students would have embraced a role 
similar to that of the university elites in the GDR. Still, the fact that the pressure 
to unify historiography lessened palpably already before 1956 undermined such 
an evolution of attitudes, and Polish historians were spared the fate shared for 
decades by their colleagues from the GDR or Czechoslovakia. 
Every Central European Marxist historiography aimed to produce a 
comprehensive and useful synthesis of national history. A new textbook was 
meant to displace the old, “bourgeois” history books, entirely changing the 
perspective from which history was to be written; the popular masses were now 
supposed to become its subject. The production of this new “grand narrative” 
was also meant to exemplify a new approach toward historical work, treated as a 
collective endeavour. In most countries under discussion the task of the 
textbook’s creation was handed over to historical institutes formed at the newly-
created academies of sciences. The structure of these institutes (broken down 
into chronologically ordered departments) roughly corresponded to the structure 
of the planned textbooks. Research queries as well as writing and editing duties 
for each of the volumes were delegated to numerous employees whose 
involvement in the work was not always marked by the inclusion of their names 
on the title pages of its final product. The work on the final versions of the 
textbooks took a long time – in the case of Poland, it was never completed – so 
the published books played their designated role only rarely and briefly. The 
effort put into their preparation turned out to be disproportionate to the effect. 
Though the necessity of producing a Marxist textbook seemed obvious both 
in Poland, in the GDR, and in Czechoslovakia, the scheduling of the work and the 
hierarchy of goals to be achieved along the way to the final product were open to 
debate. Sometimes even card-carrying scientists were not entirely in agreement as 
to the type of textbook whose publication should be prioritised. In both 
Czechoslovakia and Poland, priority was eventually given to works of smaller 
volume, which could be of use for the final years of high school and at 
universities, and primarily the kind that would be easy to prepare and publish 
quickly.137 The story of the publication process of a certain Polish university 
history textbook is most instructive in this regard. During a session of the 
scientific committee of the Institute of History at PAN in September 1953, a 
controversy arose between Leon Grosfeld and Żanna Kormanowa with respect to 
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the choice of the first book to be prepared for publication. Grosfeld believed that 
the academic textbook should receive an absolute priority; Kormanowa, on the 
other hand, supported the idea of focusing on a textbook for the later high school 
classes first.138 In this dispute, Kormanowa had the upper hand at all times. Polish 
history schoolbooks were prioritised by the authorities even a few years before 
the formation of the Institute of History at PAN. In 1951, a textbook written by 
Gryzelda Missalowa and Janina Schoenbrenner, and edited by Kormanowa 
herself, arrived in print.139 The work was a highly critical portrayal of national 
history, comparing the self-induced (by the gentry) collapse of the Polish–
Lithuanian Commonwealth to the defeat of September 1939. During debates over 
this textbook, which engaged prominent historians, Party members and non-
members alike, the book was criticised for evident deficiencies, among them for 
its all-too-critical approach to the national traditions.140 
The authorities, as much as the leading Polish historians, wanted the new 
Polish history textbooks to represent an advance in quality both in terms of 
content and attitude toward national history. General history offered no such 
problem, since translated Soviet textbooks were in wide use.141 Before the 
publication of the especially important textbook intended for the final years of 
high school (classes 9 to 11), a range of consultations were organised – a 
practice observed after each re-edition of the work.142 The textbook for classes 9 
to 11, eventually published in 1952, did not quite meet all the original 
guidelines.143 Several weeks after the meeting of the Academic Council of the 
Institute of History at PAN that revealed the split between Kormanowa and 
Grosfeld, a session of the Department of Polish History at the Institute of the 
Education of Scientific Personnel (Instytut Kształcenia Kadr Naukowych, an 
institution devoted to teaching Party specialists), centered on the problem of the 
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textbook, took place. During her presentation on that occasion, Żanna 
Kormanowa conducted a self-criticism for herself and her collaborators on the 
book, claiming that its deficiencies resulted from “our insufficient familiarity 
with theory.”144 According to her, the errors were partially explained by – 
paradoxically – the absence of a university textbook which could serve as a 
basis for authors of textbooks designed for high-school students. The responses 
of other participants in the session were highly critical. In their view, the book 
was simply poorly prepared, “Particular authors wrote their pieces, others did 
not read what they wrote, and as a result the book includes a horrendous amount 
of repetitions, including repeated citations and dates, while numbers do not 
always add up,” observed Sylwester Zawadzki, a doctoral student at the Institute 
for the Education of Scientific Personnel, “the textbook should be appealing, it 
should foster a love for the workers’ movement.… But because it was written in 
such dry tones, one could even say: scribbled in a kind of – if you excuse the 
term – Marxist jargon, it does not appeal, it does not foster love.… Furthermore, 
I have to say,” Zawadzki continued, “that I don’t enjoy its criticism of the 
PPS.145 The major error consists in the fact that the authors apparently criticise 
the PPS constantly for struggling for an independent Polish state. Instead of 
attacking their anti-national attitudes, the authors choose an entirely opposite 
route.”146 According to this speaker, “the textbook at times resembles Party 
minutes,” particularly irritating by its sectarian view of Polish history, according 
to which “if there’s such a thing as an honest man, he must be a Communist.… 
There are no Poles if not Communist.… I’m not talking about the superstructure, 
… but … there’s no Żeromski, Prus, Konopnicka, Orzeszkowa, there’s no 
Matejko, none of our painters, there’s no room for those who protested.” 
Zawadzki’s arguments were accepted by Zygmunt Modzelewski, who identified 
the major flaw of the textbook as “its narrowing down of the object of analysis 
to the history of the workers’ movement.” “The textbook itself,” he concluded, 
“may finally prove the frailty of our historical front. At this point, our Polish 
Marxist historiography is still rather feeble, and this is obviously visible in the 
product of our writing, in what we now receive.… The main point of this 
textbook is to raise our youth in the spirit of love toward the Polish nation, the 
masses who created Polish history, and they need to be represented in this book. 
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And they aren’t. We heard it said here that the man has disappeared. Because of 
humanism and the Renaissance, we talk of the man, but I think we should rather 
be speaking of a nation as well – this is the background against which we will 
see the leaders. The nation should come first at all times.”147 
The experience of the debates on school textbooks had a definite influence 
on the organisation of work on the university textbook on Polish history. The 
work on Polish, Czechoslovak and Slovak textbooks progressed according to 
patterns so similar that one could use these examples to illustrate the specific 
rules of production for Marxist syntheses. It was assumed that the textbooks 
should result from a broad discussion, which was to take place before the 
publication of their final versions. After the publication, texts of a canonical or 
normative character were expected to attract controversy no longer. For this 
reason, the publication of the final versions of particular volumes was preceded 
by lengthy discussions over periodisation, the evaluation of specific events, and 
finally the printing of extracts from selected fragments of the textbook. Another 
important stage consisted in the publishing of “theses” and “drafts” meant to 
serve as a basis for discussion, both with national and international (primarily 
Soviet) historians.148 Central historical magazines widely distributed news of the 
progress of successive stages of the work. 
Work on Marxist textbooks proceeded at a slow pace. The draft of the first 
volume of Přehled československých dějin was published in 1958.149 The first 
volume of the Polish “Draft” saw print in 1955 (in two parts), while Dejiny 
Slovenska (the idea of having a “draft” printed first was in that case dropped) 
went to press in the early 1960s.150 The whole endeavour may have been 
ambitious, but there were also other, more mundane reasons for the slow 
progress of the work. It quickly transpired that despite sincere dedication of all 
involved in the work, a quality synthesis was hard to come by in the absence of 
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monographic works. The first “draft” saw print in Poland, and yet its editor, 
Tadeusz Manteuffel, was rumoured to have purposefully slowed the progress of 
the work, especially the part devoted to the latest period, which was by nature 
given to the most severe political deformations. I was unable to verify this 
claim, but as far as the earlier volumes were concerned, Manteuffel hardly 
needed to apply any pressures of the kind. Quite the contrary: he expended a lot 
of energy trying to put authors who were running late with commissioned texts 
back on track. The Archives of the Institute of History at PAN have collected a 
number of more or less coarse admonitions, including dispatches categorically 
demanding the submission of delayed works.151 The entire endeavour was to an 
extent unfortunate; some of the delays were caused by the theft of collected 
materiel.152 The progress of the work was also greatly slowed by debates 
concerning matters of key importance from the perspective of Marxist 
historiography. In the case of Poland, the most important problem was the 
characterisation of the achievements of national and foreign historiographies. 
Josef Macek and František Graus, who chaired sessions devoted to the first 
volume of the Czechoslovak “draft” in February 1959, faced mostly hundreds of 
small remarks and claims about particular historical facts, to which they 
repeatedly responded that the textbook was not meant to replace the nonexistent 
monographs on particular subjects.153 
The lack of clarity over criteria for evaluation of “bourgeois” historiography 
is reflected in the debate on the historiographical chapters of the following 
volume of the Polish textbook, which took place in April 1955. Marian Serejski 
criticised the views maintained by Celina Bobińska, who claimed that 
conservative historians of the Kraków school, and especially Michał 
Bobrzyński, stood out from the other “imperialist” historians because they “saw 
through the patterns of history.” Since the conservative Bobrzyński was 
supposedly a comparatively progressive moderate – responded Serejski – how 
should we evaluate the progressive liberals, Wacław Tokarz, Bolesław 
Limanowski or even Marceli Handelsman?154 
Slovak Marxists also faced numerous obstacles in interpretation, sometimes 
of an entirely essential nature. A traditional problem, encountered already in the 
works of Július Botto and František Sasinek, was the determination of the object 
of history (beside the obvious, though hardly specific assumption that history 
should always speak primarily of the popular masses). Should the Marxist 
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synthesis be a history of the Slovak ethnic grouping, or of the territories it 
inhabited? How should one approach the problem of Slovak-Hungarian and 
Slovak-Czech relations? The authorial collective attempted to merge national 
and territorial perspectives, making itself susceptible to criticism. Commenting 
upon the “Theses,” František Bokes pointed precisely to the fact that they were 
concerned more with “Slovak history” than with “history of Slovakia,” which 
stood in contradiction to the title of the work.155 Still, Dejiny Slovenska was in 
later years valued more than any of the other Marxist syntheses. The most basic 
reason for this was the fact that this unprecedented and daring attempt could not 
rely on any pre-existing sources, which meant that its authors had to conduct a 
series of pioneering inquiries. It was impossible for them to rely extensively on 
analyses and sources published by native historians of the 19th century, as the 
Czech Marxists among others did.156 
The work on the university textbook on the history of Poland and the 
reception of the first published volumes of the “Draft” both perfectly illustrate 
the political transformations of Stalinist Poland. The first critical reactions to 
contemporaneous policies toward historians were heard at the General Assembly 
of the Polish Historical Society in 1956. The final meetings prior to the 
publication of the “Draft” did not lead to any significant debate over the form of 
Marxist interpretation of national history. The coming political thaw is perfectly 
visible in comments on the debate over the first volume of the “Draft,” 
published in the mid-year Kwartalnik Historyczny.157 The authors of the report 
optimistically concluded that “the synthesis marked an attempt … – mostly 
successful – to avoid committing the errors of the previous epoch when being 
schematic equalled being in the right, and when some historians, entangled in 
dogmas and their own opportunism, were given to describing events according 
to an ideal pattern – ‘the way they should appear,’ not taking into account the 
abundant original sources.”158 The same yearbook of Kwartalnik Historyczny 
included an assessment written by Witold Kula, entitled W sprawie naszej 
polityki naukowej (“On our scientific policy”). The piece was a printed version 
of a presentation given at a session of the Academic Council of the Institute of 
History at PAN in June 1956, in which the author evaluated the achievements of 
Polish historiography after 1945. Describing the initial postwar period, he noted 
“a flood of rubbish, often imbued with undisguised nationalism” rising against 
the gradually strengthening influence of the Annales school. For Kula, the 
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Wrocław convention was a failure, not so much for card-carrying historians, as 
for their “progressive” non-Party colleagues denounced both by “traditional” 
historiography and by the decision-makers. The period from 1949 to 1952 was 
marked by the rule of the iron fist, which resulted in a total stagnation as well as 
a flight from history into related disciplines: archaeology, history of art or 
economics. At Otwock, “Representatives of the Party and state authorities saw 
that, in spite of what their informers had said, most of the Polish historians were 
in fact people, living, thinking and feeling, respondent to the enormous scientific 
perspectives opened up by Marxism, wanting to be and capable of being of use 
to the country.”159 Further on, Kula claimed that the first postwar decade 
brought a multitude of disappointments. Marxism was at times applied in a 
primitive manner: “It sufficed to prove the ‘constantly worsening’ lot of the 
peasant, it sufficed to say anything bad about the relations between Poland and 
any western country in any century – and one was already deemed a Marxist. It 
sufficed to juggle the term ‘objective progressiveness’ to be thought of as a 
dialectician.”160 Kula criticised the sorry state of research into recent history, 
stemming from the self-delusion of Party representatives: “It is time to end with 
making a secret (strictly guarded, but remembered by elder people and known to 
younger historians through documents) of the Party position, which was either 
faulty for its time, or, if right, no longer remains valid.”161 The article also 
included mentions of falsifications of historical sources, “a censor’s attitude 
toward the past,” and also of a certain “pessimism” of the history of Poland as 
viewed in this Marxist light (a motif of high importance to later “thaw” debates). 
The same problem was discussed in the final volume of Kwartalnik Historyczny 
published in 1956, in the report Z prac organizacji partyjnej w Instytucie 
Historii PAN, compiled by Krystyna Zienkowska and Jerzy Jedlicki.162 
Paradoxically, Witold Kula combined these exceptionally critical remarks 
with a generally positive evaluation of the achievements of the first decade 
under Communism: “We can claim with full responsibility that there does not 
seem to have been, in the history of Polish science, another decade as 
progressive.”163 Nevertheless, some changes in academic policy seemed 
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necessary even to Kula who gave a lot of weight to the freedom of scientific 
debate and highlighted the importance of research trips abroad.164 
Even before Kula’s article appeared in print in Kwartalnik Historyczny, it 
sparked a heated debate during a session of the Academic Council of the 
Institute of History at PAN. Its primary participants, Marian Małowist (1909-
1988) and Leon Grosfeld opted to cushion the blow Kula delivered, pointing to 
the “problem of a dangerous tendency toward reverse dogmatism” and the 
undesirability of a complete rejection of Marxist methodology.165 Aleksander 
Gieysztor made a much harsher statement; he spoke for the hasty organisation of 
a general convention of historians. “It should have a impetuous character to it – 
he added – as a kind of vote of no confidence.”166 “We should also,” he 
continued, “demand to be told about employed scholars who were dragged into 
the archives.” When Małowist commented that, compared to other fields of 
study, historiography did not plummet so low under Stalinism, Gieysztor replied 
that “while it didn’t suffer the worst, it doesn’t mean it’s doing well.” 
Gieysztor’s statement unleashed a flood of criticism toward the scientific 
policies of the Communists. Stefan Kieniewicz raised the issue of censorial 
interferences and obligations to tamper with historical truth.167 Marian Henryk 
Serejski made a statement that could have informed Witold Kula’s later claim 
that Polish Marxist historiography was stretched between Communism and 
nationalism. Serejski reminded the congregation that during the “past period,” 
questions of a national nature were treated in a highly unusual manner: “for 
instance, it was said that Suvorov was a Russian patriot, while Batory was 
nothing but a reactionary Pole.” Years later, Kula concluded that “Traditional 
historians accuse Polish historiography of the years 1948-1955 of excessive 
revisionism and deprecating national traditions. For proof, elements such as a 
critical evaluation of Batory, depictions of the armies of the old Rzeczpospolita 
as an instrument of class repression, or putting stress on the reactionary 
character of Czartoryski’s milieu, and so on, suffice. Historians who have been 
tied to the progressive movement for years were surprised by the exact opposite 
of that: pressures toward apologetics, the untouchability of ‘national sanctities,’ 
a hagiographic streak.”168 This difference of opinion remains valid in today’s 
evaluations of Polish historiography under Stalinism. 
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The wave of “reverse dogmatism,” which Leon Grosfeld feared, was not a 
purely imagined danger. Some of the reactions to ever more visible signs of the 
coming thaw could make card-carrying historians quite apprehensive, and in 
time, they were also found to be distasteful even to some of their non-Party 
colleagues. The Marxist textbook on the history of Poland, both in its “Draft” 
edition and in its final incarnation, was one publication which, due to its 
importance, met with very stern appraisal from the reviewers. In 1957, Henryk 
Wereszycki delivered a crushing, though tactful, analysis of its second volume 
for Kwartalnik Historyczny.169 Early in his review, he lauded the authors of the 
“Draft” for clearly striving to avoid a vulgarisation of history. Later on, though, 
he criticised the crucial, most important aspect of the book: the vision of 
national history that it represented. “After reading some thousand and more 
pages of post-Partitions history,” he asserted, “I was overcome by an irresistible 
feeling that we were presented with a clearly pessimist image of our nation’s 
past.”170 Wereszycki did not agree with this pessimist outlook. He pointed to 
several sources for the authors’ pessimism. First, he named the “pessimism of 
the historian’s workshop”: “The authors of the draft seem to have somehow lost 
faith in their own vocation. Skimming through chapters of the first part of the 
second volume, I noted that, some fairly important issues related to the period of 
the Partitions are quite often resolved with recourse to the authorities of Marx 
and Engels – scholars whose views on matters of Polish history took shape a 
hundred years ago. Throughout these hundred years, Polish historiography 
worked diligently, particularly with regard to the period of the Partitions. But for 
the authors of this textbook, scholars of a hundred years ago remain the highest 
authority on the matter. Therefore, the whole scholarly effort of those hundred 
years of work by Polish historians has come, to an extent, to waste. For a Polish 
historian writing in our times, whose teachers belong precisely to the lineage of 
that century, teachers who schooled him in that century’s context, whom he 
valued in his youth, and sometimes even revered – it must fill him with 
pessimism and lack of faith.”171 There was also another kind of pessimism, 
which depressed Wereszycki even more. Since the synthesis which he reviewed 
was apparently supposed to serve as a kind of “justification” of the People’s 
Republic of Poland, it inevitably became an apotheosis of the people and a 
condemnation of the possessing classes. According to Wereszycki, these basic 
assumptions were justified in the textbook by recourse to two claims: “The first 
claim, that all anti-feudal movements were eo ipso movements for the freedom 
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of the nation. And the second claim, that every counter-revolutionary idea, every 
idea defending feudalism was also anti-national. These claims draw us to the 
very depths of pessimism. The peasant who struggles against the feudal 
oppression is the driving force of the liberation movement: that is an oft-
repeated phrase. Yet, the textbook is scientifically sound, and hence, specific 
facts stand in constant contradiction to this main claim. As a result, the peasants’ 
movement in Galicia in 1846 [aimed against Polish insurrectionists – MG] 
becomes the greatest Polish anti-feudal movement of the era. If that is a 
liberation movement, and particularly the greatest of the era, then the main claim 
is surely awash in pessimism.”172 Wereszycki argued that in the 19th century, 
the achievements of the higher classes were necessarily of a much higher 
importance for Polish culture and the national cause; yet these classes were 
deplored by the authors of the textbook. It was an obvious mistake to evaluate 
the past anachronistically, through the lens of contemporary politics. The 
authors should have reminded themselves that their work was addressed 
primarily to the young reader. “Therefore, if the authors want to make the minds 
of the youth more susceptible to the ideas they propagate, they need to take their 
feelings into account as well. If the feelings of the youth are offended, the youth 
will be inclined to reject all that the textbook offers.”173 
Wereszycki’s statement was only one among many critical evaluations of 
the “Draft.” In April 1957, during a debate over its second volume, the number 
of critical comments rose so high that a resigned Witold Kula scribbled in his 
notebook: “What I’m not going to talk about: 1) How the same people judged 
the same things in January 1956; 2) How those responsible avoided criticism in 
January 1956.”174 When he finally got to speak, he conceded that though the 
Marxist historians set numerous historical falsities straight, they created a spate 
of new ones themselves, thereby risking losing the confidence of their readers. 
According to Kula, the thaw was sometimes understood in historiography in an 
unwise manner, veering dangerously close to nationalism. This was not the 
result he had envisioned from the work of correcting the Stalinist period’s 
errors. And yet, after 1956, it was becoming customary to shrug off the entire 
output of the previous decade, without making any efforts at distinguishing 
between its virtues and its vices.175 
The authors of the textbook tried to apply all the necessary (and possible) 
corrections to their work before its final version saw print. The brunt of those 
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corrections was in fact borne by several people, primarily Witold Kula, Tadeusz 
Manteuffel, elected as the solitary editor of the entire work in 1956 (up until that 
point, in accordance with the rules promoting at least formally collective work, 
the book was edited by a team of several people), and finally Stefan Kieniewicz, 
who had, for instance, made corrections to chapters on the 19th century, which 
were prepared by Celina Bobińska.176 Despite their efforts, the reaction to early 
volumes of the final version of the textbook was hardly positive. In June 1958, 
Twórczość magazine published an article by Paweł Jasienica, an author one 
would hardly associate with the Marxist methodology.177 Of course, Jasienica 
had a number of reservations with regard to the university textbook on the 
history of Poland as well (mostly related to the selection of boundary dates for 
the particular volumes), yet it was the way other critics had lambasted the 
book’s authors that elicited his firm protest. “The work on The History of 
Poland began in Autumn 1952,” Jasienica wrote, “In subsequent years, many 
things changed for the better, and it made the work of this team of scholars 
decidedly more complex. The outposts of ‘schematism, dogmatism and one-
sided distortions,’ at first dismantled piece by piece with great effort, started 
falling one by one in 1956. Life took on an insane pace, and the heavy machine 
working on the History at full-steam had to adjust to rapidly changing 
conditions.”178 The team working on the textbook did all they could – Jasienica 
continued. After the thaw, the only way to make everybody happy was to call a 
halt to all work on the project and “linger, keeping one’s ears to the ground.” 
However, in his eyes, such behaviour would be simply foolish. 
Jasienica also believed some of the reactions to the work betrayed ill will: 
“The printing process for the History ended in November 1957, and the book 
reached the readers only in January. Yet already on December 17th, Polityka 
carried an extensive piece entitled ‘Adult prose.’ Its author scoffs loftily: ‘A 
serious work, an effect of a collective effort, perhaps a bit untimely, but fairly 
ambitious, a synthesis of a representative character, claims that Władysław II 
Wygnaniec “became an agent of foreign intervention.” We are talking about a 
prince from the second quarter of the 12th century, a son to Bolesław 
Krzywousty.’ The statement could likely be found in the ‘draft’ of the work, but 
sounds much different in the final version of History: ‘Władysław II, later called 
Wygnaniec, quickly followed the route chosen by numerous disinherited rulers, 
bringing foreign intervention into his homeland.’ It’s beyond my 
                                                            
176 Dział Rękopisów BUW, Spuścizna Witolda Kuli, p. 13, t.: Bieżące funkcjonowanie 
zawodowe – Stefan Kieniewicz to Kula on February 26 1956: “I’m returning the final 3 
chapters by Bobińska … The historiography now looks decidedly better.” 
177 Paweł Jasienica, Tylko o historii, Warszawa 1992. 
178 Ibidem, 73. 
66 Chapter II  
 
comprehension, this tendency to put spokes in others’ wheels, to a public 
condemnation of faults in the project that were actually mended! I wouldn’t 
tussle over any given piece if it wasn’t for the fact that one can hear sometimes 
caustic remarks about History from people who have not seen or read it. This 
bad credit of faith – inevitably inflated by some personal scuffles – hurts people 
who performed a hard, necessary and useful work. It isn’t free of errors and 
faults, but I doubt that anyone could have done it better in the complicated 
conditions of the past few years. It’s very likely that the final fruit of the work of 
the authors of History is in reality fairly close to a best possible performance in 
these circumstances.”179 
The authors of the textbook took the critical comments of the readers of the 
“Draft” very seriously. This is well illustrated by an analysis of the introduction 
to the first part of the second volume of the book, published in 1958 (edited by 
Stefan Kieniewicz and Witold Kula).180 The editors started the book off by 
informing the readers that, as a result of the debate over the “Draft,” the meeting 
in Sulejówek, and the article by Henryk Wereszycki, “It can be said that some 
chapters were written anew.”181 The highly controversial issue of the boundary 
dates chosen for the volume – 1764 and 1864 instead of the traditional choices 
of the Third Partition (1795) and – e.g. – the insurrection of 1863 – was treated 
in detail (these were the boundary dates both Wereszycki and Jasienica 
questioned). The authors of the preface underlined with force that “The rules of 
periodisation … were approved … in the years 1953-54, and have been 
maintained in the same general shape without changes. These rules are entirely 
debatable by definition.”182 The period discussed in the volume was 
characterised by the authors as the crisis of feudalism, yet it is hard not to think 
that by 1958 such “Marxist” periodisations, based on the theory of formations, 
were typically cast aside, to make room for reinstated traditional caesuras. This 
is where the following hint, included in the preface, comes from: “The first part 
of the second volume, together with the two parts of the first volume, forms a 
three-volume history of independent Poland, while the second and third parts of 
the second volume are a beginning of a four-volume history of post-Partition 
Poland.”183 
Compared to the Marxist syntheses of national histories published in Poland 
and Czechoslovakia, the GDR’s Lehrbuch der deutschen Geschichte stands out 
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already by its appearance. Both the “Drafts” and the final versions of the other 
textbooks are typically bulky volumes marked by the names of several editors 
and even more collaborators, co-authors of specific fragments and authors of 
studies used to create the textbooks. In the case of the textbook written in the 
GDR, we are dealing with a series of slim books of a smaller size, distinctly 
marked with the name of a single author (or sometimes two). The collective that 
was involved in the preparatory work remained in the shadow of the seminal 
figures of East German historiography, a practice which marked something akin 
to a revision of the otherwise commonly embraced egalitarian methodological 
and organisational guidelines. 
The decision to publish the Marxist synthesis of the history of Germany at a 
faster pace, until 1953, was taken by the Central Committee of the SED in 
October 1951. Alfred Meusel, the only card-carrying historian in the GDR who 
could boast a pre-World War II professorship, was named chief editor of the 
project. Having returned from exile in Great Britain in 1946, Meusel taught at 
Humboldt University in Berlin, where he was also appointed Dean of the 
Department of Philosophy. In 1947, he became the first Marxist full professor, 
and then was appointed director of the Museum für Deutsche Geschichte. The 
authors of the particular volumes of the Marxist textbook benefited from rich aid 
provided by the employees of the Museum für Deutsche Geschichte and the 
Institut für die Geschichte des deutschen Volkes of the Humboldt University in 
Berlin. Among the authors, one could also find formidable figures of East 
German historiography, such as Ernst Engelberg, Gerhard Schilfert, Heinz 
Kamnitzer, Karl Obermann or Albert Schreiner. Outlines of particular chapters 
were discussed at the publishing committee meetings and published in 
Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft.184 
The ambitious undertaking faced numerous obstacles, some of the kind 
reminiscent of the work on the Polish “Draft” and some entirely singular. The 
composition of the team of authors changed constantly – suffice it to say that 
seven names “fell out” of the initial list. Despite pressure from Walter Ulbricht, 
the work on the textbook became a protracted effort, and the deadline for its 
completion was inevitably pushed back. After 1956, the publishing committee 
was torn by an open conflict. First, Alfred Meusel’s position was weakened 
when his close friend Jürgen Kuczynski fell out of favour with the authorities. 
Then, as a result of a discussion on the character of Novemberrevolution, Albert 
Schreiner was deposed from the committee. The personal and aspirational 
conflict between Meusel and Ernst Engelberg, however, proved the most fateful. 
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It was, to an extent, a struggle over the interpretation of national history. Alfred 
Meusel, an ardent supporter of German unity, believed that the forcible 
unification of the country and the formation of an empire in 1871 was a 
progressive event, despite its limitations. Engelberg, who was to become 
Bismarck’s biographer and the co-author of the “Prussian renaissance” in the 
GDR, was at that time far more critical toward this part of the national tradition, 
and considered Meusel’s interpretation unacceptable. The conflict between the 
two historians played itself out through internal reviews, memoranda to the 
authorities and conversations with employees of the Abteilung Wissenschaften 
of the Central Committee of the SED rather than in professional magazines or 
even the popular press, but Meusel, who at first had enjoyed a higher standing as 
an editor reviewing Engelberg’s text, made some exceptionally vicious 
comments, also with regard to the writing style of his competitor – he stated that 
professors should not demand of their pupils that they write in good German as 
long as they cannot do it themselves.185 
At the point when the work on the textbook (and the attendant conflict 
between Engelberg and Meusel) were progressing at an ever-increasing pace, 
Alfred Meusel was one of the leaders of the community of historians of the 
GDR. This was also how he was seen within the Party: the very fact that he was 
given the task of overseeing the publication of a key work proved it beyond 
doubt. Engelberg, on the other hand, was a “greenhorn” Marxist, struggling both 
to gain acceptance for his interpretations and to achieve a position that would 
match his personal ambitions. Tried and imprisoned in the Third Reich, he had 
later emigrated to Switzerland. After the war broke out, when the Swiss 
authorities began to persecute antifascists, he had agreed to take up a job as a 
German teacher at the Istanbul University. After his return to Leipzig in 1948, 
Engelberg gave lectures on German history at the local university and was 
appointed director of the Institut für Deutsche Geschichte. Despite alleged 
connections with Rudolf Slánský, Engelberg’s career proceeded apace. Luck 
was apparently on his side, as Meusel’s position began to wane in the later 
1950s. The dissolution of remnants of unity between German historians on both 
sides of the border, as well as the anti-revisionist campaign, both worked to 
Engelberg’s benefit. 
Meusel’s position became precarious as a result of an affair that gave East 
German historiography a bad name abroad. Meusel had high hopes for a 
younger colleague he ardently promoted – the émigré Heinz Kamnitzer (1917-
2001). Having returned from England, Kamnitzer joined the SED and, since 
1947, lectured at Humboldt University. Between 1952 and 1954, he headed the 
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university’s Institute of History (Institut für Geschichte des Deutschen Volkes) 
and was the Dean of the University, and between 1953 and 1955, he co-edited 
the Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft. In 1952, Meusel’s monograph, 
Thomas Müntzer und seine Zeit, appeared in print; Kamnitzer selected source 
materials for the publication. In his introduction, he professed that the texts he 
chose were completely new to historians. In reality, however, the selection 
consisted of texts that had already come out in print and were familiar to 
historians. The damage to his reputation was all the more significant for the fact 
that, as a Communist and Jew, he eagerly castigated West German historians 
with a national-socialist past. Now, it was their time to exact their revenge on 
the moralist. In later years, Kamnitzer left history behind and devoted himself to 
literature. 
Meusel and Engelberg’s struggle consisted of sending letters to Party 
authorities. Ignoring the rules of collective work (as well as many other rules), 
Engelberg contacted the Department of Science of the Central Committee of the 
SED in February 1958 with a proposal for the publication of a volume under his 
editorship, Deutschland von 1849 bis 1871.186 He complained that because of 
Meusel he fell victim to indiscriminate attacks from the publishing committee 
and hence suggested that the committee be bypassed in this case. The authorities 
accepted his suggestion, and the volume, devoted to the years 1849 to 1871, saw 
print as the first of the series, despite being scheduled to appear as only the 
seventh of the sequence. What is more, because of his steadfast rejection of any 
kind of cooperation with West German historiographers, Engelberg earned 
himself the position as head of the newly-formed association of GDR historians, 
the DHG. 
This was not the end of Engelberg’s assaults on his elder colleague 
though. In subsequent letters to the Central Committee of the SED, Engelberg 
demanded that Meusel be removed from his position as chief editor in the 
author’s collective. He accused Meusel of espousing liberal views, criticised his 
interpretation of history, and finally charged him with a deviation from the 
ruling methodology. He concluded that their conflict was a “clash between a 
warring Marxism on the one side, and a just as combative and conscious non-
Marxism on the other.”187 More importantly from the perspective of the work on 
Marxist synthesis, Engelberg expressed the belief that Meusel’s activities robbed 
the author’s collective of any ability to act further. Therefore, he advocated that 
the collective be disbanded and individual agreements signed with particular 
authors.188 
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The ruthless struggle over the main historical undertaking of the East 
German academy ended only with Alfred Meusel’s death in September 1960. 
Eventually, as Martin Sabrow remarked with irony, this erstwhile seminal figure 
of East German historiography did not get his name on any of the textbook’s 
volumes.189 His idea that “Drafts” of the subsequent volumes of the textbook be 
printed first, like in other people’s democracies, to spark a broader, national 
debate, was also dropped. Though the textbook did eventually appear in print, it 
hardly qualifies as a monument to a collective effort. It was found wanting in 
terms of its professional status, reliability, and level of detail. The final shape of 
this East German historical synthesis largely bears out the character of the 
community of local card-carrying historians, whose main and most 
representative example was the efficient tactician, experienced political player, 
and also historian, Ernst Engelberg. 
In each of the countries that interest us here, scientific associations of 
historians, academies of learning and professional societies boasted an old and 
rich tradition. However, the decision of Communist authorities to introduce deep 
organisational changes, leaving behind old scientific traditions, should not be 
thought of as an act of reckless vandalism; in fact, it was an outcome of 
reasoned calculation (as far as the authorities were concerned). Of course, 
historical institutes of the Party, focused on the history of local organised 
workers’ movements and filled with deserving Party activists, had already been 
in place at that time. The goal was not to counterbalance the existing structures, 
but rather to form and control an institution that would oversee the entire 
historiographical effort of each nation and would command the respect of 
society as well as the esteem of the historical community. The formation of 
Academies, tasked solely with research activities and a representative role, 
facilitated control over the historians and made it possible to create elevated 
offices for leading card-carrying scholars, who could then devote their time to 
writing, at a remove from teaching obligations. Additionally, a structure created 
from the ground up could be easily shaped and politically controlled. 
The centralisation of scientific societies was universally opposed – the 
opposition, however, did not utterly and fundamentally reject the policy of 
centralisation, but rather resisted the shape of reforms that were expected to 
occur sooner or later in any case. The members of several Czech scientific 
societies conducted extended negotiations with authorities, hoping that the 
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projected Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences (Československá Akademie Věd, 
ČSAV) would turn out to be merely a “cap” over the other organisations, a 
formalised centre for a federation of independent entities. Their hopes turned out 
to have been futile. 
From the very beginning, both Polish and other academies of science were 
all expected to attain two seemingly contradictory goals. On the one hand, they 
were supposed to introduce the new methodology, setting an example for 
scientists all over their respective countries. On the other hand, though, as the 
authors of the Polish Party’s internal document wrote, “For political reasons, it 
[wa]s necessary that PAN t[ook] over from the Polish Academy of Learning and 
other general associations the serious and recognised scholars not currently 
engaged in academic work; though they may often be ideologically foreign to 
us, [because] they [we]re well known to have been of great service to the Polish 
academy.”190 PAN was therefore conceived as a Marxist institution as well as a 
refuge for scientists who exerted a pernicious influence on the youth. This 
characteristic befit the Institute of History at PAN as well.191 
Consequently, traditional scientific associations and the newly-founded 
academies of science based on the Soviet model recruited their personnel in 
highly similar ways. Even members of old associations, who – as in 
Czechoslovakia – questioned the sensibility of the government’s centralisation 
policy, were typically inducted into the academies of science.192 The new 
academies were even open to those scientists whose credentials were in doubt 
due to the Party cells at their home departments.193 To an extent, then, 
academies acted as a preserve for those who were refused the right to teach. In 
the case of Poland, the two spheres in fact never separated entirely, as scholars 
of the Institute of History at PAN could often enjoy double employment: both at 
the academy and at a university. As a rule, academic institutions benefited from 
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a decidedly more friendly atmosphere than the universities, and were much more 
welcoming to “bourgeois” scholars.194 
At the same time, in both the Czech and Slovak scholarly communities a far 
greater role was played by a sizeable group of younger scholars, steadfastly 
supportive of government policies and in most cases belonging to the Party. 
Lýdia Kamencová writes of sections of SAV in which the “young,” ardent 
supporters of the Communist ideology, were paired with the “old,” typically 
opportunist scholars, seeking only to adapt to the new situation.195 At times, 
conflicts erupted between these two groups. 
Polish, Czech and Slovak institutes of history at the national academies of 
science, established between 1952 and 1953, shared a similar structure and an 
identical set of goals. The research units which comprised them were divided 
according to chronology – in Czechoslovakia, they owed their names to the 
theory of formations, while in Poland, the boundary dates between the great 
epochs served as official titles. In the early 1960s, when its personnel was 
already fully established, the Institute of History at PAN employed over 180 
people; toward the end of the 1950s, its Czech counterpart employed just over 
70 people.196 At the time of its formation, the Institute of History at SAV 
employed 16 people, but that number grew steadily.197 The Institute of History 
at PAN stood out among other equivalent institutions because of its 
decentralised structure: nearly half of its personnel worked in affiliate institutes 
(the Prague Institute had only two branches; the idea of creating branches was 
only considered at the SAV in the 1960s). 
Aside from the production of monographs, the institutes were tasked with 
popularising Marxist methodology through the publication of central historical 
magazines, the creation of Marxist syntheses of national history, documentary 
and bibliographic work, as well as the schooling of younger cadres. In terms of 
work organisation, they were expected to introduce collective methods 
(exemplified by university textbooks on the histories of Poland, Czechoslovakia 
and Slovakia). The employees, task groups and entire institutes were supposed 
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to draft yearly plans, and then report on their completion.198 In practice, planning 
was a real nuisance, especially in the early years of the new academies. The new 
model of work organisation raised issues which are well illustrated in the debate 
over a project of a general plan for the entire Institute of History at PAN, 
presented by Witold Kula at the third meeting of the Academic Council, in 
November 1953. The project was criticised by the auditorium for having missed 
questions that particular members of the Academic Council deemed vital, or for 
devoting insufficient space to the work of regional branches that these members 
oversaw. Celina Bobińska protested against the exclusion from the project of the 
Kraków unit she directed which was devoted to researching class conflict in 
Lesser Poland. She underlined the political weight of the plan, which in its 
current shape had “st[olen] all support from the only combative Marxist 
department, already working in adverse circumstances.”199 Nearly all 
participants in the meeting agreed that the plan was chaotic and overlooked too 
many issues of prime importance. The director of the Institute was forced to 
explain to his audience the meaning of planning in science: “Planning isn’t 
easy,” he said, “we’re still learning from those more experienced than us. 
Actually, though planning in science has been introduced in the Soviet Union 
over 20 years ago, no one dares to suggest a general, national plan for science. 
Each institute has its own plan, but there’s no national plan. We need to draw 
conclusions from this fact. We shouldn’t forget that both PAN and the Institute 
of History are productive establishments that plan their output and claim 
responsibility for it. Planning means committing oneself. A failure to complete a 
plan leads to very serious consequences. We can’t plan to meet all guidelines for 
essential research tasks. These guidelines are meant to act as indicators whether 
financial aid should be offered for a given research proposal or not. This current 
debate, despite its advantages, leads us down a very dangerous alley. We can’t 
and would invite ridicule for having the whole plan disqualified.”200 
Marxist research centres were expected to address new questions and come 
up with interpretations that would contest the products of “bourgeois” 
historiography. During a session of the Academic Council of the Institute in 
January 1954, Stanisław Arnold proposed that young academic employees 
focused solely on the most recent history. His proposal was supported by 
Stanisław Okęcki, who named several key topics of concern: “the necessity of 
shaping a ‘historical’ answer to Adenauer’s revisionist propaganda. … There’s a 
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campaign going on to vindicate AK, NSZ201,” Okęcki complained, “During the 
past two months, [Radio] ‘Free Europe’ broadcast 85 programs devoted to topics 
from Polish history. We have nothing with which to oppose this. This problem 
should be addressed in our press, in our historical publications. We need to lend 
more focus to counteracting enemy ideology.”202 
Until the early 1950s, decisions concerning the scholarly life in the Soviet 
occupation zone of Germany were taken exclusively by the military 
administration of the Red Army and its German auxiliary, the Deutsche 
Zentralverwaltung für Volksbildung. A drastic shortage of scholarly employees, 
dismissed as a result of denazification, forced the authorities to allow numerous 
“bourgeois” scholars to maintain their posts to keep universities running. By the 
end of the 1940s, the government policies in science were becoming more 
stringent. As a part of the Sturm auf die Festung Wissenschaft (Assault on 
Fortress Science), announced in 1951, historical institutes in half of East 
German universities were liquidated. Until a sufficient number of Marxist cadres 
was schooled, only institutes of the history of the German people (Institute für 
Geschichte des deutschen Volkes) in Berlin, Leipzig and Halle, were 
maintained.203 In October 1951, the Central Committee of the SED proclaimed 
the formation of a museum of German history, and then also of an institute of 
history at the academy of sciences.204 
At first, the museum was to be devoted to the history of the German 
workers’ movement, but eventually, it assumed the decidedly more neutral name 
of the Museum für Deutsche Geschichte (Museum of German History). It began 
operating in 1950. Describing its goals, Wilhelm Pieck said that until that point, 
museums “still devote[d] too much space and attention to some mediocre 
princelings. I believe that we should put an end to that and give that space to the 
real German people, the workers and the peasants, thinkers and poets fighting 
for freedom, to all who are entitled to this space on merit.”205 The museum was 
supposed to discover and commemorate the progressive traditions of the 
German nation from the German Peasants’ Revolt until Ernst Thälmann.206 
Among the museum’s employees one could find “bourgeois” historians (“big 
names”) as well as Party members; gifted graduates of historical departments 
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were also sought after with intent, since the museum was supposed to become a 
central research institute for East Germany as well, an equivalent of an academic 
institute of history. 
The enlistment of employees for the new institution turned out to be a 
problematic task. Historians working at universities, or even the Party’s Marx-
Engels-Lenin-Stalin Institute (M-E-L-S-Institut) at the Central Committee of the 
SED, were loath to leave their jobs. Alfred Meusel also failed to show any 
enthusiasm upon receiving his nomination for the post of museum director 
(throughout an almost two-year initial phase, the organisation was temporarily 
directed by an associate of the Marx-Engels-Lenin-Institut, Eduard Ullmann).207 
This choice exemplified a tendency toward shaping the museum as a separate 
institution not associated with the Party, but rather with the unitary German 
nation, in accordance with the views espoused by Meusel, a tireless militant for 
a united, socialist Germany. The museum was also supposed to train young 
Marxist cadres. To ensure the proper quality of the training, however, it had to 
employ a tremendous percentage of “bourgeois” scholars. Their employment at 
an institution that was also responsible for visual and printed propaganda led to 
conflicts and violent divisions. Incidentally, these conflicts did not arise solely 
between the Party-members and non-Party employees.208 
Keeping the museum working day in, day out gave its directors quite a 
headache. Personnel shortages translated into a dearth of middle-aged scholars, 
while young graduates and students closer to graduation were represented in 
throngs. Almost no one (including the director himself) had any experience in 
museum work; most employees were only learning the basics of scholarly work. 
The first exhibitions were scheduled to open on May 1st, 1952, but were running 
late by over two months. The museum operated under continuous and very strict 
control from the Central Committee, which sanctioned exhibition plans and 
evaluated their completion. Stefan Ebenfeld quotes an exemplary intervention of 
the Central Committee of the SED, concerned with the period from 1918 to 
1945: “While exhibiting the fascist terror, the use of the poem Kinderschule by 
J.R. Becher is advised” (Johannes R. Becher was an officially approved 
prominent poet of the GDR),209 and Fritz Haecker’s painting was to be remade 
because the members of the Political Office “look[ed] too thin.”210 
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The work of the museum was also troubled by internal conflicts between its 
director and Albert Schreiner. The latter, a veteran of the Novemberrevolution 
and a Party apparatchik, became the chief of the museum’s department 
concerned with the 1918-1945 period and pushed it to approach that era from a 
strictly Party perspective, with special attention to the November Revolution, 
which in his eyes was a proletarian affair. Meusel did not accept that vision. 
“This script,” he wrote, “represents a story of a German failure, illustrated – or 
even better – identified with the history of the KPD. It’s a story about the good 
who are always right, but unfortunately always lose, while the bad, who are 
always wrong, unfortunately always win. Had the script not ended with the 
victory of the Socialist Soviet Union during the Second World War and the 
Potsdam Treaty, I’d be forced to call it one of the saddest stories I’ve ever 
read.”211 With regard to the general character of the exhibition, the Party 
authorities lent Schreiner their support; however, the Novemberrevolution was 
re-evaluated in accordance with the guidelines of the Short course....212 
The ambiguity of the position of the museum was also exposed in the fact 
that, beside the didactic and museum work, its employees were also expected to 
prepare a Marxist textbook on German history. The fact that Alfred Meusel 
became the chief editor of the entire work was in no way a coincidence: the 
production of the textbook was expected to engage the “human resources” found 
at the museum, and the directors of particular departments were to act as (and, to 
an extent, became) authors of particular volumes of the projected work. More 
than that: despite there being no formal connection between the Zeitschrift für 
Geschichtswissenschaft and the museum, the central historical magazine of East 
Germany was commonly assumed to have been yet another outlet of the 
Museum für Deutsche Geschichte.213 
With both the museum and the historical departments at several East 
German universities in place, the formation of a central academic historical 
institute turned out to be a rather daunting challenge. Each of the existing 
institutions came with its own set of card-carrying, well-connected directors. 
This system did not favour centralisation, as it would have been concomitant 
with renouncing personal privileges, submitting to another leading historian, or 
losing part of one’s independence. The choice of the first director of the Institut 
für Geschichte at the DAW was a question of compromise: though Karl 
Obermann was a Communist returnee, he was not as significant as Leo Stern, 
Alfred Meusel or Jürgen Kuczynski (nor as competitive as Ernst Engelberg). He 
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was, however, one of the first scholars researching the workers’ movement and 
19th century workers’ history. As we shall see, this curious compromise with 
regard to personnel did not hold too long. 
The newly-established (in March 1956) Institute took over the main task of 
the Museum für Deutsche Geschichte: the creation of a Marxist textbook on 
German history. Among the ranks of the academic institute of history were 
numerous employees of the museum, with prominent historians of the museum’s 
Academic Council topping the list. During its first year, the Institute recruited 
over sixty people for its five chronologically divided departments.214 Though the 
Institute was located in Berlin, the directors of its particular departments 
transferred their work to cities in which they held professorial or administrative 
positions. Because of that, the Institute of History of the DAW became as 
decentralised as its equivalent at PAN, the main difference being that its 
decentralisation was a result of a power play between prominent Marxists of the 
GDR, rather than an attempt at empowering provincial research centres. 
Compared to academy institutes in other people’s democracies, the East German 
incarnation of the institution was also distinguished – as Martin Sabrow points 
out – by a very strict, quite organic politicisation.215 
The Institute of History at DAW was imagined as the ground-breaking 
institution for the new science. A year after it officially opened, both the 
Institute and the Museum für Deutsche Geschichte publicly condemned Jürgen 
Kuczynski, who was suspected of harbouring revisionist sympathies. This 
moment marked a distinct caesura in the history of the Institute: the authorities 
and some card-carrying historians used this opportunity to vehemently criticize 
what they perceived as the excessively high standing of their “bourgeois” 
colleagues. Heinrich Scheel called for a reorganisation of the Institute into a 
strictly Party-bound research centre.216 In September 1958, director Obermann 
was assaulted by Rolf Dlubek, who discerned remnants of positivism and 
“factology,” an “archival fetishism” and objectivism in the part of the Lehrbuch 
Obermann was tasked with preparing.217 Prominent directors of several 
departments of the Institute of History at DAW – Ernst Engelberg, Albert 
Schreiner, Leo Stern and Jürgen Kuczynski – also spoke out against Obermann. 
Though engaged in mutual argument, they were all in perfect agreement in their 
critical evaluation of the director. Party leadership took up an interest in 
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Obermann, assuming that his political qualifications were not sufficient for 
performing such a prominent function.218 
However, Obermann’s critics were unable to reach a compromise as to his 
prospective replacement. The basic Party organisation at the Institute reserved 
the seat for Leo Stern, who directed the department of the museum tasked with 
researching the Second World War. However, while Obermann was 
characterised by an insufficient political commitment in the eyes of the Party 
activists, Stern was charged with even heavier crimes. The erstwhile would-be 
director of the Institute of History at DAW, Leo Stern (born Jonas Leib), hailed 
from Austria. He was the only East German émigré historian to have taken part 
in the Second World War on the side of the Soviets (he fought in the Battle of 
Stalingrad). In 1945, he lectured at the University of Vienna, but his Austrian 
career was soon broken by a fatal coincidence. As a delegate of the Austrian 
Communist Party to the celebrations of May 1st at the provincial town of 
Kleinpöchlarn, he was assaulted and wounded by unrecognised drunks. The 
Soviet soldiers, who were summoned to the location, shot several random 
participants in the celebrations, incidentally Communists. From that event on, 
Stern was labelled a NKVD spy. Because of this, he joyfully accepted an 
invitation to take over the department of modern history at the University of 
Halle. As a professor since 1950, and three years later as a rector of that 
university, he presided over the task group Dokumente und Materialien zur 
Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung. The group was composed mostly 
of “bourgeois” historians, some of them even burdened with a national-socialist 
past. This made Stern susceptible to political assaults. The first of these took 
place in 1954, when one of Stern’s collaborators, Werner Frauendienst was 
accused of glorifying Prussia. Corrections sent to the editors of Neues 
Deutschland did not improve his situation, and Frauendienst opted not to wait 
for the story to unwind and fled to West Germany.219 Four years later, the 
University of Halle was afflicted by a series of escapes to the West; among the 
escapees was yet another assistant professor, Ernst Klein, and Stern was 
summoned by the Rütten&Loening publishing house to provide an explanation 
for the fact that a collection of documents concerning the Great Socialist 
October Revolution would not appear as scheduled after several of his 
collaborators on the project permanently left the country.220 
Stern’s rival to the seat of director of DAW’s Institute of History, Ernst 
Engelberg, was fully capable of ruthlessly exploiting all of Stern’s mishaps. As a 
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member of the younger generation of historians of the GDR, he steadfastly 
opposed all kinds of collaboration with “bourgeois” scholars. At the point when 
he took over the leadership of the East German historical association, having 
pushed Alfred Meusel from his position as the chief editor of the Marxist 
synthesis of German history, and took up the position the director of the Institute 
of History at DAW, East German historiography entered a new phase of 
development.221 Ernst Engelberg was at the same time the last “great” among 
GDR historiographers. After him, no one ever played as seminal a role: the new 
education system, shaped in part by Engelberg himself (as well as his rivals), did 
not foster such exceptional individuality. 
The struggle for the position of director of the Institute of History at the East 
German Academy of Sciences was unprecedented in either of the other countries 
under our consideration. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the competition ended 
with the equivalent position at the Czech Academy handed to Josef Macek 
(1922-91), a young historian of the Mediaeval era. According to Bohumil 
Jiroušek, this was a surprising decision, since the design of the structure of the 
Institute of History at ČSAV was the brainchild not of Macek, but of Václav 
Husa. Going forward, Macek’s eventual victory proved to have affected the 
frigid relations between the academy of sciences and the philosophical 
department of Charles University in Prague, where Husa led the Czechoslovak 
history section.222 At the same time, it was just another stage in a career that led 
the former student of Zdeňek Kalista to considerable heights. Macek became not 
only the director of the Institute of History at ČSAV, but also a representative in 
the National Assembly, and even a member of the Central Committee of the 
KSČ.223 Right after his nomination as director of the Institute, he was also 
appointed a regular member of the ČSAV – and all at the age of only 31!224 At 
the dawn of this stunning career stood a national award the young historian 
received in 1952 for his work entitled Husitské revoluční hnutí. 
What could have prompted such swift promotion? Petr Čornej, who 
questioned Macek about the circumstances of the award’s presentation, recounts 
the following story: “Right after 1948 [when Macek passed his M.A. exam – 
MG], he devoted himself to researching the beginnings of Tábor in a broad work 
entitled Tábor v husitském revolučním hnutí. Sadly, no one was interested in 
publishing the book; every publishing house pointed to the specialist nature of 
the work and suggested that the author submit a piece that could explain to ‘the 
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working people’ the Marxist views on the role of the Hussite movement in 
Czech and European history. This is supposedly how Husitské revoluční hnutí, 
the work that paved the way to the highest positions and a strong political 
standing for the thirty-year-old Macek, came into being. It hardly needs to be 
added that it took personal ambition and good connections in the Communist 
leadership to make such a brilliant career possible. By a twist of fate, Macek’s 
history of the Hussite movement was published while a prominent Communist 
functionary overseeing the formation of the Czechoslovak Academy of 
Sciences, Ladislav Štoll (1902-81), was recovering in a hospital. He killed time 
reading the latest books – that is how he happened upon Macek’s Husitské 
revoluční hnutí, a book he found enchanting. It was Štoll who put the young 
historian on the road to success, bringing him his national prize.”225 
Ambitious, intelligent, and enjoying the support of Party leadership, Josef 
Macek cut a figure reminiscent of his senior of 13 years, Ernst Engelberg. Yet, 
his later career followed a much different route. Macek took an active part in the 
liquidation of the remnants of Czechoslovak Stalinism. Following his 
involvement in documenting the 1968 intervention of Warsaw Pact forces in 
Czechoslovakia, he was ousted from his position and rejected the right to 
publish his works in the country by the Husák regime. This did not prevent him 
from enjoying worldwide renown as a specialist on the Renaissance, or from 
publishing in foreign languages. 
There was no ruthless struggle for the position of director in the new 
institute in Slovakia either. In this particular case, the Communist authorities 
simply had no candidates on hand that could offer a proper scientific quality as 
well as guarantee faithfulness and loyalty to the cause. While the German 
occupation was still in place, Alexander Markuš seemed an option, but he died 
prematurely while being transported to a concentration camp.226 At the turn of 
the 1940s, the position of director of the Institute of History at SAVU was held 
by, among others, Jaroslav Dubnický (1916-79, born Jaroslav Honza), a Marxist 
historian of art and an official of the Plenipotentiary for Education and Culture 
(“plenipotentiary” was an equivalent of the ‘ministry in Prague, tasked with 
representing the central government of Slovakia). Dubnický was briefly 
preceded in his directorial position by three “bourgeois” historians: František 
Bokes, Alexander Húščava (1906-69) and Branislav Varsik (1904-94). 
Dubnický also took over lectures in the history of Slovakia for students at 
Komenský University in Bratislava from the expelled Daniel Rapant (in 1950-
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51, Dubnický was the Dean of the Philological Department at the university). He 
was one of the few Slovak scholars in the humanities who had any knowledge of 
Marxist methodology, which is why he was tasked with the heavy burden of 
teaching it to other Slovak historians.227 His ties to the KSČ dated back to before 
the war; he formally joined the Party in 1945, and three years later, he oversaw 
purges in the Slovak historical association.228 
With an excess of responsibilities on his hands, Dubnický was replaced as 
director of the newly-formed Institute of History at SAV by Ľudovít Holotík 
(1923-85; he was already the director of the Institute of History at SAVU since 
1951). Holotík was an alumnus of the Prague School of Politics and Society 
(Vysoká škola politická a sociální, which preceded VŠPHV). After graduation, 
he worked at the School as an assistant and conducted classes in Marxism-
Leninism at the Medical Department of Charles University. Following his return 
to Slovakia, he also became the chief editor for Historicky Časopis SAV and 
edited the Marxist synthesis of national history. Despite his apparent 
prominence, Ján Mlynárik describes Holotík as a tragic figure in his role as one 
of the leading representatives of Slovak historiography. Too intelligent to gain 
the trust of Slovak Party apparatchiks, Holotík became a “buffer”: for the 
historical community (as well as the reading public), he became the face of the 
Stalinisation of historical sciences, slandering the heroes of the Slovak National 
Uprising and condemning the sins of interwar Czechoslovakia, both real and 
imagined. He was evidently unable to stay in tune with the times: his book 
“unmasking” the real face of Milan Rastislav Štefánik appeared only in 1958, 
well after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at a 
time when such publications were already dated. In 1968, this work stood as a 
symbol of the Stalinisation of Slovak science and was publicly burned in effigy 
by students protesting against this repressive policy. A year later, Holotík 
published a text in which he claimed the ephemeral Slovak Soviet Republic, far 
from being an example of proletarian internationalism, was actually a Hungarian 
attempt at violating the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia. Meanwhile, card-
carrying scholars were mostly of the persuasion that the Slovak Soviet Republic 
represented a “progressive tradition of the Slovak nation.” As a result of these 
interpretative mistakes, a lack of both a political sense and the support of 
sufficiently powerful friends, Holotík, the director of the Institute of History at 
SAV and the editor of the central historical magazine as well as the synthesis, 
never became a full-time member of either the SAV or the ČSAV. On the 
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contrary: 1968 de-Stalinisation deposed him from all posts (he ceded his 
position as director terminally, and resigned from his editorship duties 
temporally). A suicide committed in 1985, at the height of Husák’s 
normalisation, provided a tragic ending to his story.229 
The Institute of History at PAN differed significantly from other equivalent 
institutes of the newly-formed academies; some scholars see this difference as an 
aftermath of the Otwock conference.230 However, the final decision to offer the 
seat of director of the Institute to a non-Communist widely recognised both at 
home and abroad, Tadeusz Manteuffel, actually occurred only after the Otwock 
conference. The Central Archives of Modern Records in Warsaw store several 
variants of the directing cast of the Institute, all framed by the Department of 
Science of the Central Committee of the PZPR between 1951 and 1952. Neither 
proposed Tadeusz Manteuffel as the director. Initially, the cast was supposed to 
be formed entirely of “Party elements.” Henryk Jabłoński was the first 
prospective director, while Żanna Kormanowa, Nina Assorodobraj, Stanisław 
Arnold and Roman Heck were to act as his deputies. Positions within the 
Institute’s sections were also supposed to be filled with Party members. The 
project left the issue of the post of director of the section of Polish history 
between 1795 and 1917 unresolved (the rivalling options were Celina Bobińska 
and Stefan Kieniewicz, but Kieniewicz’s name came with an annotation stating 
that he was a Catholic).231 Another plan of the personal cast for the Institute of 
History at PAN, appended to the previously mentioned projected resolution about 
the tasks of the Institute, suggested that Henryk Jabłoński become the Institute’s 
director, while Stanisław Arnold and perhaps Natalia Gąsiorowska-Grabowska 
would act as his deputies, and Żanna Kormanowa would become an assistant on 
scientific matters. Manteuffel was included in the cast as one of the director’s 
deputies.232 This shows that the first corrections had already been applied, raising 
the number of non-Party historians involved in governing the Institute. 
The findings of the Otwock conference were assessed by a special 
commission formed by the Office of the Political Bureau. Its work bore fruit in 
the shape of a resolution which, beside calls for improved efforts in the swift 
formation of the Institute of History and for the promotion of Marxist 
methodology, also included a motion to “promote to directorial positions non-
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Party historians who showed a sufficient command of the Marxist-Leninist 
method and whose faithfulness to the People’s Republic of Poland is beyond 
doubt.”233 The resolution also included another projected cast for the Institute of 
History at PAN, this time suggesting Natalia Gąsiorowska-Grabowska as the 
prospective director. Manteuffel was presented as her projected deputy, as were 
two further historians, Henryk Łowmiański and Bogusław Leśnodorski (1914-
85); the position of the scientific assistant was reserved for Witold Kula or 
Juliusz Bardach.234 This particular project was sent to Tadeusz Manteuffel for 
evaluation: he criticised it from top to bottom. He pointed out the overgrown 
directorial cadre, explaining the inevitable fragmentation of responsibilities that 
would result from it. It is hard to assess the extent to which his evaluation 
affected the academic policies of the authorities; it seems more instructive to 
read between the lines of his opinion. Manteuffel wrote: “Fully accepting the 
necessity of handing the position of the director to a Party member, we see two 
possible ways to make this course acceptable – a) to offer the position to a 
candidate of a younger age and essentially active, b) to offer it to an older 
candidate with a high political standing, who would only outline the general 
direction of the work of the Institute, while relying on a deputy to substitute for 
him on a regular basis.”235 
Obviously, the decision-makers eventually ceased to consult on the 
proposed cast for the Institute of History at PAN with Tadeusz Manteuffel and 
simply nominated him for the post of director of the Institute. Manteuffel 
differed in every possible way from the typical official leaders of Marxist 
historiography chosen in other countries discussed in the present study. He was 
not a member of the Party; he had studied in the West. He gained recognition 
already before the war, particularly as the organiser of the 1933 congress of 
Comité International des Sciences Historiques in Warsaw. During the 
occupation, he helped organize underground education, and right after the war, 
as we already know, he was involved in recreating the Historical Institute at the 
University of Warsaw. Consequently, as director of the Institute, he depended on 
his academic standing and organisational abilities. In 1950, he became elected 
president of the Polish Historical Society (PTH), his victory serving as proof of 
having gained the trust of the community. The fact that he was able to 
successfully negotiate the tendencies of the authorities to intrude into the lives of 
historians resulted also from a peculiar personal trait, unequivocally asserted by 
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numerous witnesses who had the chance to make his acquaintance. He was 
endowed with a veritable charisma – he exuded trustworthiness while being 
quite fearsome.236 In Party circles his comportment won him the nickname of the 
“wooden prince.”237 His authoritative standing is well illustrated by an anecdote 
recounted by Henryk Samsonowicz. During the 1956 elections for the new 
government of the historical society, the only candidate proposed and approved 
by the authorities, Natalia Gąsiorowska-Grabowska, lost out. Having long been 
connected with the Left (she belonged to the Parisian section of the PPS in 1904, 
sided with the party’s left wing after it split, and during the interwar period, until 
1922, was a member of the group that later reformed into the Polish Communist 
Party), she moved away from it after 1922, and did not join the KPP or the PPR. 
She did join PZPR in 1949, however. The authorities saw her for a while as a 
candidate for the editorship of Kwartalnik Historyczny, as well as a prospective 
director of the Institute of History at PAN; later, she presided over the Academic 
Council of the Institute, was a member of the Board of the PAN, and the 
president of the Polish Historical Society.238 Gąsiorowska-Grabowska’s defeat 
in the elections perplexed and scared the General Board of the Society, which 
then decided to call on Manteuffel, who was absent from the convention due to 
an illness. Manteuffel listened to a report by telephone, and then calmly asked: 
So what? His reaction prompted the Board to call for another election, this time 
with no candidates set for an instant victory.239 
 
*** 
An in-depth analysis of the Communist scientific policies and their effect on 
historians would necessarily take much more room than we can afford to give it. 
The overview of the most important problems presented above is supposed to 
act as an introduction to the main part of this book – an analysis of the 
relationship between Marxist historiographies and national traditions, including 
the traditions of national historiographies. It delineates circumstances in which 
works quoted later on were written, and specifies the names of the historians 
engaged in the aforementioned scientific and political struggles. As we shall see, 
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some of the traits of particular historical sciences discussed in this chapter are 
reflected in the shape and character of historical publications. Simplifying the 
astonishingly complex situation as much as humanly possible, one might say 
that Czech and Slovak Marxist historiographies were centralised and unified to a 
far larger extent than Polish and East German historiographies. Hence the 
question: can a unification (or lack thereof) be observed in publications 
emerging in the 1950s, affecting, for example, the variety of the Marxist 
opinions being formulated? On the other hand, taking into account the origins of 
the most politically, intellectually and socially important Marxists, we would be 
excused for assuming that the superiority of the historiography of the GDR in 
that regard should result in the greater methodological maturity of its output – 
or, in other words, that Marxism should have had a greater role to play in its 
historiography than in all the other historiographies discussed. 
There are also similarities that should be accepted before we attempt to 
comprehend the mechanics of the process for creating Marxist interpretations of 
history. Obviously, the manner in which scientific debates were conducted in 
each of the countries under discussion differed from country to country (suffice 
it to remind one of the differences between Poland and the GDR in that regard). 
Still, some traits were shared. In each of the countries of interest to us, Marxist 
historians aimed not so much to convince their opponents and readers, or even to 
present their views in a compelling way, but rather to dominate and monopolize 
a fragment of the commonly accepted interpretation of history. There could be 
only one interpretation – only one reading of the classics was right. A 
multiplicity would suggest a weakness and a lack of discipline among Marxists, 
which was downright unacceptable. The subsequent chapters will show, among 
other things, how historians more or less successfully performing their work 




On the Lookout for Progressive Traditions 
 
 
The Marxist vision of national history tended to focus attention on a specific 
category of historical events that were – or could be – understood as a nation’s 
“progressive traditions.” According to the ruling methodology, this category 
included all social and political upheavals as well as attempted coups. Upheavals 
were believed to mark a society’s advance to another, higher level of 
development, in accordance with Marxist theory of formations. Debates over 
that theory among Russian historians were cut short by Joseph Stalin, whose last 
word on the matter was that transitions from one formation to another occurred 
by way of revolutions.240 The task of Marxist historians was therefore to locate 
such revolutions in order to rewrite the national history according to the 
framework set by their Russian peers. All revolutionary movements – even those 
which, as so often was the case in East Central Europe had usually ended in 
failure – could count, provided one interpreted them the right way. Marxist 
historians worked diligently to properly emphasise their social importance. 
Sometimes a historical breakthrough could hardly be located at a distinct point 
in time (such was the case with early feudalism, whose origins were consigned 
to oblivion.). In these cases historians often entered disputes over chronology 
and nomenclature; hence, for instance, the Czechoslovak historians’ quarrels 
over the form of government in Greater Moravia. Elsewhere, the breakthrough 
points were more or less obvious, as in the case of the Hussite Wars in Bohemia, 
the Great Peasants’ Revolt in Germany, the Miners’ Revolt in Slovakia, the 
Central European upheavals inspired by the French Revolution, as well as 
national movements, uprisings, and revolutions of the 19th century, or finally 
the Great October Socialist Revolution (in this last case, the influence of the 
event was traced in countries neighbouring the Soviet Union, but also in 
countries further away).241 
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These issues were often popular with historians before the 1950s as well; 
some contributors to earlier historiography believed revolutionary movements to 
have a national character. Such was the case with Hussites. Similarly, the onset 
of the feudal era was bound up with an emerging state structure that was also of 
interest to “bourgeois” historiography. Furthermore, 19th century nationalist 
movements played a significant role in shaping the cultures, national self-
definitions, and interpretations of the past in each of the countries in question. In 
these circumstances, Marxist historiography entered into dialogue with existing, 
fixed historical traditions. As we shall learn further on, the results of this 
dialogue were extremely varied. The new, “Stalinist” interpretations of the 
national history were by no means bound to differ from past assessments. In the 
following analysis of key tropes, I pay special attention to yet another aspect of 
continuity: a reference to a historicist methodology particularly visible in the 
evaluation of state structures. 
Finally, one should observe the similarities and differences between 
historical events that have become familiar to historians and were deemed 
common knowledge before 1945 or 1948, and those that entered the popular 
consciousness, in a way, when a nation’s “progressive traditions” were found 
lacking when compared to those of its neighbours. Few knew (or had heard) of 
the robust Polish Hussite movement until Ewa Maleczyńska made it a focus of 
her specialist works. In a similar vein, Peter Ratkoš played a seminal role in 
“discovering” the great miners’ revolt of 1525-1526 for Slovak historians. The 
interconnections between such freshly “invented” traditions and the established 
image of Hussites’ revolt in Bohemia or the Great Peasants’ War in Germany 
speak volumes about the Marxist historians’ way of thinking about history. 
 
At the Dawn of Feudalism 
According to basic Marxist methodological assumptions, the feudal state could 
only emerge from a sufficiently developed base. Jan Baszkiewicz elaborated on 
this idea by naming three elements facilitating the emergence of the early feudal 
state: “a swift rise of feudal relations of production and deepening forms of 
dependence, from which followed – deepening class antagonisms.”242 At a 
slightly different angle, the Polish state could be seen to have been invented out 
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of necessity: “The rise of the Polish early feudal state played a crucial role in the 
progressive development of our country. It made it possible to effectively defend 
the Polish lands against foreign aggression, especially that of feudal Germany, 
and it secured the political independence of those lands.”243 Greater Moravia 
played the same role with regard to Frankish aggression.244 The circumstances 
leading to the rise of the German state, obviously free from the threat of German 
assaults, were explained in a slightly different fashion. What mattered here were 
the class conflicts between free peasantry on one side, and knighthood and 
aristocracy on the other. Hence, the early feudal state was seen to have emerged 
as a product of the possessor classes’ fear of the ever-threatening eruption of 
discontent among the oppressed strata.245 
According to Stalin, when socio-economical development has reached a 
level sufficient for the creation of a political organisation, the requirements have 
been met for the emergence of a nation in its infant shape, that is, of a 
nationality.246 The rise of the state was seen both as a result of the processes 
responsible for the rise of nationality, and as its direct cause.247 Having recorded 
numerous manifestations of a national consciousness in the Gallus’ chronicle, 
Stanisław Piekarczyk asked: “How far back from Gallus’ times can the 
emergence of a Polish nationality be moved into the past?” The historian opined 
that the nationality must have been developing well before the turn of the 11th 
century.248 In this, Piekarczyk agreed with the Soviet authors of Istoriya Polshi 
(Истopия Пoльши), who dated the emergence of the Polish nation to the turn of 
the 7th century.249 Meanwhile, Czech historians had no doubts that the Lands of 
the Crown of St. Wenceslas should simply be treated as a Czech state. On the 
other hand, they entirely rejected the claim that the Přemyslid state could simply 
be a successor to Greater Moravia.250 
It’s interesting to set the claims of East German Medievalists against this 
backdrop. Throughout the period in question, they approached the issue of the 
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development of German nationality with utmost caution, if only because 
accusations of nationalism carried more weight in post-war Germany than 
anywhere else. For this reason, they were more inclined to write on the history 
of the state, rather than the nation formation process; the emergence of a 
German nation was customarily associated with the rise of the Saxon dynasty.251 
However, the difference between Polish or Czech historians, embroiled in the 
task of detecting signs of the emergence of nations even before the rise of 
Medieval states, and their East German peers amounted to nothing more than a 
question of style. Although Leo Stern and Hans-Joachim Bartmuß wrote that the 
unification of different Germanic tribes under Frankish rule was a condition for 
the later emergence of the German state, they probably meant the rise of the 
German nation, despite never using the phrase.252 In Volume One of their 
Lehrbuch der deutschen Geschichte, one can also find an interesting discussion 
of the nation-building potential of the Saxons, brutally subordinated by 
Charlemagne. Stern and Bartmuß claimed that Saxons were no strangers to the 
feudal system and were in fact in the process of forming their own feudal state 
before the Frankish conquest.253 Hence, the Saxons were already in the process 
of raising a German feudal state, when the Franks destroyed it. At that stage, the 
Saxon aristocracy betrayed their own people by pinning their hopes for 
expanding their control over the rest of society on the Franks. “Only the 
peasants of Saxony continued to defend their freedom against the yoke of 
oppression from the Frankish feudal state and its Saxon allies.”254 These 
peasants clearly represented German progressive traditions, and as victims of 
Western aggression they were, in effect, represented in a style characteristic of 
GDR propaganda two years after the rise of the Berlin Wall. 
While Polish and Czech historians had no doubts over the national character 
of their Medieval states, similar claims would prove hard to defend for Slovak 
scholars. This was not a new state of affairs. Before 1918, Czech history was 
taught as the history of Austria, then as the history of Czechoslovakia, and 
nowadays, with few alterations in terms of factual data, it is taught simply as 
Czech history.255 At each of those stages, the past of the nation was imagined as 
a state-territorial continuum: Greater Moravia gave way to a Czech state which 
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suffered from severe Habsburg oppression since 1620, but was reborn in 1918. It 
was much harder to review the history of Slovakia in a similar manner due to a 
lack of continuity. Hence, nationalist historiographers developed the idea (which 
in many respects continues to hold sway) that all early Medieval state 
formations emerging on Slovak lands were essentially Slovak.256 The staunchest 
defender of this claim – František Hrušovský – emigrated from Slovakia in 
1945.257 Because of its tainted origin, Slovak Marxists could never simply 
embrace it; besides, their Czech peers also staked a claim to Greater Moravia.258 
As a result, Czechoslovak publications customarily referred to it as “the first 
joint country of Czechs and Slovaks.”259 Claims of its unanimously or partially 
Slovak provenance reappeared in mid-1960s due in part to the political thaw and 
a new opening in the debates over Czech-Slovak relations.260 During the 
Stalinist era, the question of Medieval nation-building processes on Slovak 
territories was often raised in historical journals, leading to rather animated 
debates.261 A draft of a university textbook on the history of Czechoslovakia 
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professed that the Slovak nationality had formed already after the dissolution of 
Greater Moravia, under the rule of the Kingdom of Hungary.262 
When Greater Moravia fell victim to a Hungarian invasion, the future of the 
Slovaks was bound with Hungary for the next thousand years. This posed 
numerous problems to historians who accorded extraordinary significance to the 
institutions of a national state since there were few sources that could serve as a 
basis for a singularly Slovak political history. They tried to bridge this gap by 
discussing the history of culture, especially folk culture. Still, this only allowed 
one to draw very general conclusions that “the Slovak people, separated from 
the ruling classes by an unbreakable divide of language, led its own cultural life. 
The wandering musicians, folk singers of the time and of later centuries, 
travelled from town to town, from village to village, and the people itself 
constantly enriched the cultural heritage, passing it on from one generation to 
another.”263 Within the Hungarian state, Slovaks were assumed to represent a 
folk element. At a Hungarian historians’ congress in 1953, Ľudovít Holotík 
simply stated that the “neighbouring nations” fought for true independence side 
by side with the Hungarian folk: “In the olden days in Hungary, the Slovaks 
were an oppressed nation, but the Hungarian working people faced conditions 
just as troubling. The Slovak and Hungarian people were naturally drawn 
together against common native and foreign exploiters.”264 Even if the relations 
between Slovak and Hungarian historians grew colder in later years, the image 
of Slovaks as allies and collaborators in most of the progressive undertakings in 
Hungarian history retained its vitality. 
With Marxist historians putting so much stress on the problem of the 
emergence of the state and (their particular) nation, the question of identification 
of early state-like entities with particular formations gained in importance. 
Already when discussions over the history of Poland began, the Marxist scholars 
encountered an obstacle concerning nomenclature: did the newly-formed state 
truly amount to a feudal entity, and if so, was it fully developed or only in early 
stages of development? An initial suggestion for periodisation from Stanisław 
Arnold, who dubbed the state of the early Piasts pre-feudal, was criticised by 
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Soviet scholars and consequently rebuked.265 Such was the general tendency at 
that time: a similar critique was levelled against Jürgen Kuczynski, who 
protested against what he saw as a premature staking out of new eras.266 The 
propositions of Polish scholars were not unaffected by the wording chosen by 
the Medievalists of neighbouring countries. At several points, including the 
Otwock conference, Karol Maleczyński pointed out that František Graus saw “in 
the 10th century a fully-formed feudal system in a not yet entirely organised 
Czech feudal state.” Meanwhile, Ibrahim Ibn Yaqub, in his reminiscences from 
travels through this part of Europe dating from the very period, claimed that 
Mieszko’s state was the most powerful in the region, which meant that it had to 
be more powerful than the Czech state of the same epoch. This comparative 
analysis proved that, already in the 10th century, there was a developed feudal 
state on Polish soil.267 
Czech and Slovak historians were deeply concerned about the proper 
classification of the form of government predominant in Greater Moravia. 
František Graus and Václav Husa’s initial suggestions, deeming it a pre-feudal 
state, were rejected, as were analogous proposals put forward by Stanisław 
Arnold with regard to Poland.268 According to a contending interpretation, 
Greater Moravia was an early feudal state. In the case of Slovakia, Peter Ratkoš 
observed that the concepts of periodisation proposed by Ľudovít Holotík left no 
room for any questions regarding the Greater Moravian state formation. Holotík 
claimed that Slovakia became a feudal state in the 10th century, but did not 
comment on the form of government in the country prior to that historical 
stage.269 According to Ratkoš (as well as later theses on the history of Slovakia, 
edited by Holotík, and also the Czechoslovak university history textbook), 
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Greater Moravia was the first instance of a feudal formation in the region.270 For 
the authors of Dejiny Slovenska, this suggested a kinship to the Kievan Rus, a 
native, Slavic early feudal formation.271 
The debates over periodisation of the feudal era among Polish, Soviet, 
Czech and Slovak historians appear to be marked by a particular ambitious 
streak. Karol Maleczyński precisely captured the essence of these discussions: it 
was simply unacceptable that Polish feudal relations should be less developed 
than those prevalent in Bohemia in the same historical period.272 On the other 
hand, interpretations which suited the suppositions of Soviet historians with 
regard to the history of the Kievan Rus were promoted. These two features of 
the historical debate are vividly registered in the so-called Norman theory. 
This theory, according to which the Kievan Rus was formed by Scandinavians, 
was criticised both in view of its scientific viability and the political role ascribed to 
it. According to Aleksander Gieysztor, Normans did traverse Ruthenia “as 
merchants or enlisted in mercenary troops formed by the Ruthenian princelings. 
Yet, they did not – and could not – play the role of an independent political 
agent.”273 At the Otwock conference, one of the members of the Soviet delegation, 
Yevgeni Kosminsky, proposed a less measured opinion: “Don’t the western 
historians stick to the rubbish they call the theory of Norman conquest, whose 
essence lies in denying Slavs the ability to form their own states?” – he asked 
rhetorically.274 In V. Mavrodin’s pamphlet, published in Poland as well, 
“Normanism” was characterised as a rhetorical weapon of western reactionaries in 
their struggle against the Soviet Union.275 Violent assaults on the theory abated 
only after 1956, and not in every country of the eastern bloc. In a book published in 
1957, Henryk Łowmiański admitted that “The theory of the Norman origins of Rus 
and its statehood was, so to speak, a proper historiographic phenomenon only so far 
as the interest in political history prevailed and the historical process was viewed as 
an outcome of actions taken by individuals and dynasties, with mass processes 
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thoroughly neglected.”276 Łowmiański’s book faced criticism in the GDR for an 
all-too-tame approach to the subject, while the debate over the beginnings of 
Ruthenia was assumed to have been finally and decisively resolved in accordance 
with the Party’s “anti-Normanist” views.277 
Unquestionably, Poland (whether feudal or early feudal), like Bohemia, 
faced foreign aggression from its inception, especially from the Germans – so 
much so that Polish borders seemed to have been threatened from one side only. 
According to Marxist writers, Poland’s relations with Ruthenia were the 
opposite of Polish-German relations.278 Soviet authors promoted similar 
views.279 The belief in an essential and perennial Polish-German enmity, on the 
other hand, resembled quite closely the beliefs of Zygmunt Wojciechowski. The 
fact that Wojciechowski himself was castigated as a nationalist in no way 
affected West Germany’s bad press in Poland. For Poles, wars against the 
Germans were “just wars, conducted in defence of our own country and Western 
Slavs threatened with complete extermination at the hands of German feudal 
lords.”280 The point of the struggles against German aggression was maintenance 
of the country’s natural boundaries – boundaries which, from the very 
beginning, matched national divisions.281 
The concept of the Polish motherland was naturally supported by historians 
associated with the Western Institute. During the Otwock conference, Michał 
Sczaniecki took part in a discussion on the issue, proposing a thorough focus in 
scientific texts on “borders whose existence we owe to the Soviet Union, and 
which so faithfully replicate the boundaries of the Polish motherland.”282 At that 
point in time, East German historians also offered unqualified support for 
historically-grounded Polish borders in the West.283 
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The German Expansionspolitik became a major issue for East German 
Medievalists. While they found little redeemable value to it, they stressed the 
connection between the brutal conquest of the Polabian Slavs and the criminality 
of the Prussian state,284 as well as chancellor Adenauer’s equally repulsive 
foreign policy.285 At times, East German authors even accused their Polish 
counterparts of underappreciating the political effect of the phenomenon.286 The 
said conquest proceeded in a manner reminiscent of the way Charlemagne’s 
Saxon Wars were described. Slavic possessor classes collaborated with German 
aggressors, gradually embracing a German identity. The broad, popular masses, 
however, responded to the foreign invasion with fierce resistance which was 
broken with an unprecedented brutality.287 While much Medieval German 
expansion was of a pacific nature, even German law settlements were deemed to 
have brought more harm than good.288 Ostexpansion, whether military or 
economic, caused “German-Slavic relations to become poisoned for centuries, 
until modern times, and the Revanchists of Bonn continue to stir anti-Polish, 
anto-Czech and anti-Russian resentments, whether openly or under the cover of 
anti-Communism; they hope to use them to win the masses over for their 
criminal purposes.”289 Historians from the GDR posed the actions of their 
Western brethren in opposition to the tradition of German-Slavic cooperation, 
for instance the Polish-German brotherhood in arms during the fight against the 
Tartars at Legnica in 1241.290 
Czech writers, whether Marxist or not, persistently referenced the Germans, 
beginning with the Franks, who had posed a constant threat to the Greater 
Moravia by military means as well as through propaganda, i.e. the Catholic 
Church. Hence Marxist historiography assigned a mostly defensive role to the 
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Saints Cyril and Methodius, who sought to guard the state from the infiltration 
of German clergy.291 Czech sovereigns were assessed according to their ability 
to maintain a political and spiritual independence from the Empire. Even the 
latest representatives of the Přemyslid dynasty, during whose reign Medieval 
Bohemia enjoyed its heyday, did not enjoy much appreciation on account of the 
fact that, along with their courts, they underwent cultural Germanisation.292 
Slovak historians focused on German feudal aggression only insofar as it 
concerned Greater Moravia, for obvious reasons. The Hungarian invasion, 
however, received a different interpretation; unsurprisingly, given that one of the 
axioms of Slovak historical consciousness is the claim that Magyars were 
“civilised” by the Slavic inhabitants of Greater Moravia, who were also partially 
responsible for the formation of the Kingdom of Hungary.293 
As already mentioned, East German scholars could not use the threat of 
feudal aggression to justify the formation of a state-like entity on their lands, 
since Germany posed precisely such a threat to other countries in East Central 
Europe. Still, even German history includes a period when the fragmented 
forces of the country joined to rebuke Western expansion, with much success. 
Nevertheless, this happened long before the formation of early feudal state-like 
entities. According to Karl-Heinz Otto, in the first years A.D., Romans crossed 
the Rhine, decisively changing the nature of their struggles with the Germans. 
From that point on, the latter were fighting a war of liberation.294 Meanwhile, 
the Roman slave system suffered a deep crisis, illustrated by increasingly 
frequent slave uprisings, including the War of Spartacus, the foremost rebellion 
(which, as Otto added, also involved slaves of German origin).295 In this light, 
neither side of the Roman-German conflict represented a higher stage of social 
development, but the Germans could claim the moral high ground. As Otto 
observed, “The great triumph over the superior forces of Rome was the fruit of a 
true struggle for freedom. The result of this struggle proves the historical fact 
that when an organised liberation struggle is elevated as the highest of values, 
the forces of the oppressed popular masses are released, making them stronger 
than the better equipped mercenaries serving the dominant power. … German 
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warriors were morally superior to Roman mercenaries because they were 
struggling to free their homeland from Roman occupation.”296 
The triumph over Romans in the Teutoburg Forest also had a singular hero. 
Hermann, the chieftain of the Cherusci, whose memorial near Detmold became 
a symbol of German nationalism, was referred to in East German historical 
works exclusively by his Latin name, Arminius. The authors stressed that the 
historical image of the leader of German resistance was falsified to serve a 
chauvinist version of history. Meanwhile, all his qualities notwithstanding, one 
should not forget that the Romans were vanquished primarily by the German 
popular masses.297 
This interpretation of Roman-German conflict met with critique from Polish 
scholars. Kazimierz Tymieniecki observed that, by exaggerating the importance 
of the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, his colleagues from the GDR were closely 
following the traditional, popular, nationalist reading of national history. In his 
opinion, the battle, though bloody indeed, had very little political effect – it 
could hardly be credited, for example, with having brought about the withdrawal 
of Roman forces behind the Rhine. The response to this statement, given by Leo 
Stern, left no room for doubt as to the importance of this element of German 
progressive traditions: “the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest was, as Engels put it, 
one of the turning points in history, and we should not allow ourselves to be 
misled by the fact that this statement was echoed in popular literature. … The 
German working class has to summon all of its traditions of liberation to 
reinforce the will to resist American imperialism with its ‘European idea,’ 
destructive of the national consciousness, as well as the West German 
bourgeoisie with its ‘European integration’. W. Ulbricht spoke in the same spirit 
at the 2nd Congress of the SED: ‘Our professors of history remain silent about 
the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest, where, as Engels writes in his Der Ursprung 
der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staats, the Romans were beaten 
because Germans were free people whose personal courage and discipline far 
exceeded those of the Roman troops. They were fighting for the freedom of their 
country’.”298 Tymieniecki’s critique left no mark on the East German 
interpretation of the battle. 
As far as the Polish history was concerned, the key event, not only from a 
Marxist standpoint, was the baptism of the state. Neither in Germany, nor in 
Czechoslovakia was so much weight attached to analogous events. Polish 
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historians underscored the ambiguous nature of the acceptance of Christianity: 
the baptism had positive as well as negative effects. Historians steadfastly 
opposed the traditionally accepted view of its anti-German meaning. Henryk 
Łowmiański agreed that “the baptism solidified Poland’s international position 
in the Christian world,” but at the same time stressed that “Bourgeois historians 
moved this less important moment to the foreground, claiming that Poland 
accepted the baptism to fend off the danger of German assaults, when, 
undoubtedly, the essential aim of assuming Christianity was strengthening the 
rule of the feudal lords.”299 For Czech historians, state baptism had more vices 
than virtues, while at the same time, it did play a progressive part insofar as it 
sped up the feudalisation of society.300 Nevertheless, it did not elude their 
attention that Christianity in general supported existing social relations – at one 
point even upholding the system of slavery.301 Yet, even in Marxist works, one 
can find surprising deviations from the rule proclaiming that events hastening 
the onset of a subsequent social formation have at least a partly progressive 
character. According to Jan Baszkiewicz, “The acceptance of Christianity aided 
the further development of feudalism, strengthened and justified the class rule of 
the feudal lords over the feudally dependent peasantry. Christianity of the time 
was no longer the progressive Christianity known from the first centuries 
A.D.”302 
This difference of opinion between Medievalists echoes the dispute over 
whether phenomena which accelerate the advance toward subsequent formations 
(feudal or capitalist) are by necessity objectively progressive, or, in the opposite 
case whether all popular, anti-feudal and anti-capitalist movements are always 
progressive, even when they objectively delay historical advance (according to 
the criteria of a given epoch). Henryk Łowmiański and Jan Baszkiewicz gave 
contradictory answers to this question: Christianity and the Church structure 
certainly hastened the development of feudalism, but while this was interpreted 
as a virtue by Łowmiański, Baszkiewicz saw it as a vice. In time, Baszkiewicz’s 
views prevailed and Henryk Łowmiański partially revised his view on the 
Baptism of Poland, while stressing its long-term negative effects.303 
This difference of opinion should not be taken as proof of any essential rift 
among Marxist Medievalists as to the role of the Baptism. All authors were in 
perfect agreement as to the negative effects of the decision. First of all, the 
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acceptance of Western Christianity tied Poland to the Vatican. Another 
important drawback of the Baptism was that it arrested the development of 
national literature and the Polish language, which, in turn, impeded the 
formation of the Polish nation. The claim that the introduction of the Church 
accelerated the development of the country was refuted. At the same time, “the 
negative impact of Christianisation in the Latin creed was reflected in the 
erection of a cultural division between the Polish and the Southern and Eastern 
Slavs.”304 
This last aspect drew Polish historians closer to positions taken by their 
Slovak and Czech colleagues. It is fairly obvious that Christianity was accorded 
two different readings, depending on the rite. The activities of Saints Cyril and 
Methodius usually received a far more favourable appraisal than those of the 
German clergy, or even the patron saint of Bohemia. Due to the fact that early 
modern reactionaries used him as a symbol of opposition to the progressive 
Hussite tradition, the cult of Saint Wenceslas received a critical evaluation from 
Czech Marxists.305 The development of the “national” cult of Saint Stanislaus in 
Poland received a similar treatment. The particularly negative attitude the 
Marxists had toward this specific figure naturally translated into a rather positive 
treatment of Bolesław the Bold, the bishop’s killer, who stood up against the 
Empire (though this also meant that he sided with the Papacy), allied himself 
with Yaroslav the Wise, and finally killed Saint Stanislaus – all of which 
received positive evaluations from the Marxists. Still, the authors of the “Draft” 
claimed that Bolesław erred in letting himself be coronated as a king “as this 
meant the submission of Poland to the Papacy which arrogated to itself 
superiority over all Christian states; the coronation thereby gave the Pope the 
right to interfere in Polish affairs.”306 Apparently, the selfsame antipathy toward 
the Vatican in particular and all ecclesiastical undertakings in general is 
responsible for the inconsistency inherent in evaluations of Christianity in the 
Middle Ages. As one of the areas where a Marxist evaluation could not rely 
solely on the authority of the classics, it was to a significant extent shaped by the 
Soviet Union’s current politics. 
It is plain to see that Marxist Medieval studies attached particular attention 
to matters related to the creation and formation of states. Syntheses of national 
histories opened with ruminations on the origins of particular states, the reasons 
for their emergence, and the stage of development they reached, as well as the 
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influence they had on the formation of national consciousness. Of vital 
importance was the ability to trace the political history of the states in question 
back to an appropriate development of the indigenous forces of production, 
rather than foreign invasions or personal achievements of individuals. It was the 
state that faced German aggression (in the case of Germany, the state-forming 
Saxons struggled against the invading Franks). Christianity, on the other hand, 
attracted the interest of historians only insofar as it facilitated the consolidation 
of feudal structures and/or limited the independence of the states by 
subordinating them, to an extent, to the Papacy. Marxist methodology was also 
open to other topics, as long as they worked to highlight the importance of the 
state as the most revered of all accepted values. Each of the historiographies 
under discussion introduces numerous examples corroborating this conviction. 
For example, historians of the GDR justified their critique of Germany’s 
Eastward expansion by means of a moral argument as well as through analyses 
of internal politics: like Italian campaigns, Eastward expansion weakened 
central power while improving the position of the magnates, opening the way to 
a splintering of the state.307 This feudal breakup, in turn, had dire consequences 
for the people as well as the state – both of which sufficiently corroborate the 
predominant interest of the popular masses in the unification of Germany.308 
Successive stages of decline and reinforcement of the Zentralgewalt form an 
axis for weaving the history of Medieval Germany in the Lehrbuch der 
deutschen Geschichte. Marxist works revived the theory of the German 
Sonderweg: the feudal victory over the centralised power prevented the Empire 
from becoming the crystallisation of the German nation, as it had been in France 
or England.309 This vision of German history also includes motifs present in 
works of authors belonging to the Prussian school: the elevation of the state to 
the rank of an absolute good because it was the entity designated to bring about 
the idea of national freedom for the Germans. Interestingly, German historians 
differed from their Soviet or Polish colleagues in their evaluation of the 
splintering of their respective states. Outside of Germany, historians agreed that 
it was a natural phenomenon, characteristic of a certain stage of historical 
development, and in this sense positive. “In the changed circumstances of a 
well-grounded feudal regime,” wrote Juliusz Bardach, “the power of the central 
prince was hardly of any use to the feudal lords.”310 From Jan Baszkiewicz’s 
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perspective, the feudal breakup (a term commonly used in the 1950s) was not 
only progressive – it actually led to an even stronger unification of Polish 
territories.311 
Though the feudal breakup was not by itself a regressive, or even a troubling 
phenomenon to Polish historians, Marxist Medievalists commended the princes 
of the Piast lineage for attempting to reunite the country. As a fragmented 
Poland progressed socio-economically, feudal fragmentation ceased to be 
considered opportune and turned into a regressive event, “a check on further 
economic development.”312 As in Germany, the peasantry was supposedly the 
group which held the most interest in reunification. Polish society also included 
groups which did not support reunification or tried to prevent it. Marxist 
analyses often remind the reader that “neither all the Polish clergy, nor all the 
Catholic hierarchy supported the unification of Poland.”313 In these 
circumstances, Marxist Medievalists had also to reevaluate the cult of Saint 
Stanislaus. Jan Baszkiewicz characterised “the use of the cult of Stanislaus – 
regardless of the extremely harmful, negative role the figure played in Polish 
history in relation to the concepts of renewing the crown and unifying the 
country as well as popularising these ideas. It (using the cult of Stanislaus) 
played an objectively [Baszkiewicz’s italics] crucial and positive role for the 
unification of Polish lands. Objectively, that is, irrespective of the intentions of 
the creators of the cult of bishop Stanislaus (beginning with Wincenty 
Kadłubek) and the advocates of his canonisation; more than that – perhaps even 
in spite of their intentions.”314 The author did not explain the subjective goals of 
the creators of the cult, but his explication found its way into the “Draft” of the 
university textbook on Polish history: “The positive attitude of the Papacy 
toward the canonisation of Saint Stanislaus is justified by its contemporaneous, 
intensive attempts – failed, as we know today – at subordinating the Orthodox 
Church in … Red Ruthenia. The canonisation reinforced the position of the 
Church in Poland as Catholicism’s outpost closest to Ruthenia.”315 Among the 
social groups that did not support the unification of the country, the clergy was 
joined by feudal magnates, primarily the district princelings with a personal 
interest in retaining an independent control over their respective principalities.316 
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Marxist monographs, especially those about Polish or German history, can 
easily serve as a basis for an analysis of a phenomenon similar to that which 
occurred in the Soviet Union in the mid-1930s. There, after a period of domination 
by a rigorous Marxist vision of history framed by Mikhail Pokrovsky, the previous 
interpretation was reinstated. It diverged from Pokrovsky’s views in ascribing 
instrumental value to the tsarist state, whose strength, external and internal 
development, and military victories were thenceforth to be celebrated with 
solemnity befitting the successes of the Bolshevik regime. Historians previously 
castigated for nationalism, idiographic tendencies, and other offences against 
Marxist methodology (like Evgeni Tarle), were allowed to return to work. Their 
scientific approach, in turn, was rooted in the tradition of German historiography. 
This vision of national history, which reconciled the claim to freedom with the 
concept of a strong state, going so far as to find its embodiment in the firmly 
centralised state of Prussia, was precisely a product of the Prussian school and its 
key contributors such as Heinrich von Sybel, Heinrich von Treitschke or Hermann 
Baumgartner. According to them, the state played the political, as well as ethical 
role assigned it by Hegel.317 This particularly German variation of liberalism, 
mediated by the historians of the Russian Empire, proved equal to Marxism as an 
ideological tool for the interpretation of Medieval history, which did not prevent 
Marxist scholars from criticising historians of the Prussian school. Perhaps the two 
trends in methodology were joined by the idea of submitting the individual to a 
higher power – to the state in German historicism, and to historical processes in 
Marxism. Therefore, Marxist historians did not need to borrow directly from 
representatives of the Prussian school – they could refer to Karl Marx as a 
mediator, since his ideas were formed at the same time and place as those of 
Johann Gustav Droysen, an effervescent, talented national-liberal activist from the 
period preceding the Springtime of the Peoples. At the point when Marxist 
Medievalists transferred their interests from the popular masses to structures of the 
state, they moved closer to Sybel or Treitschke. Their description of Western feudal 
(or “slavish” in the case of ancient Romans) aggression, on the other hand, moved 
toward beliefs espoused by Joachim Lelewel, who perceived Slavic peoples as 
being marked by a drive to freedom of a more or less democratic nature, and as 
subjected to Germanic aggression. When referring to the same tropes of national 
historiographies, Marxist scholars stressed the state-building abilities of the Slavs 
(or the Saxons), abandoning the idea of their cultural superiority to the West. 
Instead, they focused on the equality of both worlds in terms of culture and 
civilisation, while maintaining the belief in the moral superiority of their own 
ancestors over the aggressors. 
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In this respect, Andrzej Feliks Grabski’s claim of an antinomy between the 
dominant methodology in the Stalinist model of historiography and the political 
demands set before historians needs to be reevaluated.318 The claim that the 
demands of current politics in the 1950s were more important than Marxist 
methodology is obviously true for the most part, but it does not significantly 
alter our knowledge of the historiography of that period, or of historiography in 
general. This lends a certain poignancy to the image of a historiography whose 
thin veneer of Marxism fails to preclude elements of an older methodological 
tradition, at times fairly distant from said Marxism. If Marxist historiography is, 
then, truly incoherent, it is not due to the collisions between Marx’s “theory” 
and the contemporary political interests of the Soviet Union, but rather to the 
fact that changes in politics uncover and introduce other, competing 
interpretations of history, ruled by their own internal logic and therefore seldom 
in agreement with Marxist orthodoxy. 
There is a minor, but interesting divergence between different Marxist 
interpretations of Medieval history – it pertains to the evaluation of feudal 
fragmentation. The fact that it received divergent appraisals from country to 
country can be explained in two different ways, both of which seem acceptable 
to me. On the one hand, in the case of the Holy Roman Empire, other than in 
Bohemia or Poland, the unification did not occur swiftly. An historical fact, 
which was of transitory interest to Czech and Polish scholars, was for the 
Germans an event of enormous significance that in time rose to the rank of a 
stumbling block on the way toward implementing the program of the national 
movement. On the other, one can see the divergence as a result of the 
employment of two different methods of Marxist interpretation. Polish and 
Czech historians treated feudal fragmentation as one of the laws of history, 
corroborated by other examples (e.g. from the history of Russia). This led them 
to assume the historical process as a certain continuous whole. One can also 
discern another source of inspiration at work in this decidedly Marxist view: it 
likewise agrees with Leopold Ranke’s understanding of historical processes as 
the result of forces and phenomena which could have affected the balance of 
history if they were to achieve solitary dominance. According to this optic, it is 
illogical to reproach the Empire for having fallen apart, and its unity can no 
longer be seen as a dogma by which one can measure and evaluate historical 
events. East German historians, favouring a different approach, more often than 
not looked to the tradition of the German national movement for inspiration, 
interpreting this section of the Medieval period in a manner deeply akin to that 
of the historians of the Prussian school. 
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The Anti-Feudal Social Revolution 
At its inception in the Central and Eastern Europe, feudalism was a progressive 
phenomenon. However, as already shown, its vices were on display even prior 
to that – as seen, for instance, by the fact that it was introduced by force, or that 
the Church facilitated its introduction. Hence, one can hardly be surprised by the 
fact that Marxist historians searched for signs of this formation’s decline at very 
early periods. The so-called crisis of feudalism in Bohemia was dated to the 
14th-15th century, that is, before the Hussite Wars. At the same time, analogous 
structures were uncovered by Polish, as well as, East German historians (in this 
case, the crisis predated the eruption of the Great Peasants’ Revolt.). According 
to Stalin’s thesis on the revolutionary character of inter-formational phases, 
every crisis paving the way to another capitalist formation should be followed 
promptly by a revolution. Such crises were treated as progressive events solely 
because they catalysed other formations. As a result, previous uprisings and 
revolts could not be deemed progressive, having occurred during feudalism’s 
heyday – i.e., while it was still responsible for the progress of history, rather 
than for pegging it back. This diagnosis caused much pain to historians who 
believed their main task to be describing the history of the struggle of the 
popular masses against the possessor classes – because Marxist historians 
typically sympathised with the weak and poor. 
From the point of view of this new methodology, potentially the most 
arresting event of the early Piasts’ reign was the pagan revolt, which figured in 
works of the 1950s as a popular uprising. Still, even this case posed serious 
methodological questions. Just as with the Baptism of Poland, Henryk 
Łowmiański noted that “The popular uprising broke out at a time when 
feudalism was at a stage of ascension and corresponded to the existing state of 
creative forces.”319 The popular uprising, conducted with the intent to bring the 
country back to the pagan tradition, could not relate to the contemporary socio-
economic situation and therefore was not likely to be treated as a progressive 
movement. Again, as in the case of the Baptism of Poland, Jan Baszkiewicz 
presented an opinion radically different from that of Łowmiański: “The pagan 
slogans,” he wrote, “like the movement’s ideology, were an expression of a 
struggle against feudal oppression. … Rejecting the openly brutal forms of 
feudal dependence, the popular uprising played an objectively progressive role, 
regardless of the intentions of the peasants who took part in the uprising and 
doubtless pushed for a return to the past community. … [W]ith the popular 
uprising quashed, the reactionary elements of slavery, and the elements of a 
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slave system in Poland, were put to serious question.”320 Łowmiański’s claim 
was criticised at the Otwock conference by Marian Serejski, who recounted the 
positive evaluation granted feudal-era popular uprisings in Soviet scholarly 
works. Though Łowmiański attended the venue, he did not venture to respond in 
his presentation. The version of national history presented in the “Draft” agreed 
with Baszkiewicz’s interpretative claims.321 
East German and Czechoslovak historians approached the early feudal 
peasants’ revolts with much more caution. In 1965, the Zeitschrift für 
Geschichtswissenschaft published a debate between Siegfried Hoyer and Hans 
Mottek, concerning the peasants’ uprising of 1336-1339. Mottek vehemently 
debunked Hoyer’s all-too-favourable view of the event and even went so far as 
to state that it was not a popular uprising at all, merely feudal-inspired anti-
Jewish riots.322 Czech historians, on the other hand, treated the early-feudal 
pagan reaction as a phenomenon characteristic of the previous formation, hence 
ill-suited to play a progressive part. This was reserved for phenomena like the 
more “mature” heresy, and, in particular, the revolutionary Hussite 
movement.323 
As we will see presently, the Hussite movement played a very special role in 
Czechoslovak Marxist historiography (in part because of the fact that earlier 
historians also believed the period of the movement’s existence to have been the 
most important in the history of Bohemia).324 The fact that two leading young 
Czech Marxist historians of the 1950s – Josef Macek and František Graus – 
were interested in this movement also played a part. The new Marxist 
interpretation of the Hussite period was subjected to a tripartite division, 
suggested by Graus, into phases of the supremacy of the poor, the supremacy of 
the bourgeoisie, and the final phase which culminated in the Battle of Lipany 
and the victory of the nobility.325 Nevertheless, the numerous works of Josef 
Macek and other Marxist Medievalists often make the reader feel as if the 
transformation of religious movements into revolutionary ones did not constitute 
the axis of their narratives, and consequently, that the tracing of the progress of 
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revolution hardly constituted an enterprise worthy of the effort. Of far greater 
import seems the appraisal of individual and mass actors involved in the events 
described. This is primarily due to the fact that the Hussite movement is 
analysed not only as a historical event, but also as a myth. On the one hand, it is 
a national myth, for centuries a hallmark of Czech culture. On the other, due to 
its chronological precedence, the movement became a crucial link in the chain 
of so-called “progressive traditions” through a partially competitive re-reading 
of the myth by Marxist historiography. 
In spite of Marxist demands for a “deheroisation” of historiography, the 
Czech interpretation of the Hussite revolution reserved the main roles in the 
event for two heroic figures of the period – Jan Hus and Jan Žižka. Hus was 
described as a dedicated internationalist, hostile to all nationalist obstinacy. This 
image was particularly affected by his attitude toward Germans. His 
internationalism did not go so far as cosmopolitanism. Quite the contrary: he 
was a staunch patriot, open to calls for Slavic cooperation.326 Hence “Our 
socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism finds a living specimen and 
exemplar in Hus” even at so late a time.327 Hus’ social background was also 
found highly commendable – he was born to a poor family, and earned his post 
as a university teacher thanks to his hard work and ability. 
However, Czechoslovak Marxist historians soon discovered that they faced 
a crucial problem of interpretation. Not only was Hus a preacher whose 
teachings translated into the language of programs for political and social 
revolution only with great difficulty. They also did not include any revolutionary 
elements, but only calls for a return to the real faith, chastity and an expiation of 
the sins of the Church. These problems were recognised.328 The solution 
implemented consisted of claims that Hus’ moderate ideology achieved 
revolutionary implications in the context of his fate.329 Hus’s death as a martyr, 
which transformed him into a national and religious symbol, was not the only 
reason for treating him as a revolutionary. He was said to have undergone an 
evolution well before his demise. According to Josef Macek, this evolution 
consisted of a “dialectical coupling” of the exceptional individual with the 
revolutionary people. Hus’s teachings, having become more and more 
“optimistic,” gained a progressive resonance.330 
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Hus was not the only one to undergo the translation of his reformatory 
religious postulates into the language of political programs – the same treatment 
was applied to preachers who spread his teachings. They were to play the role of 
his political tribunes: “The ideological struggle against the Church could only be 
conducted by those who were properly armed for it with sufficient education – 
and these were typically petty, impoverished priests, preachers. Yet their 
struggle could only be conceived in the same frame which the Church used to 
veil its class dogmas. … Popular preachers could urge the people to war from 
the pulpit.”331 According to Marxist scholars, the Hussites were not propelled by 
love of God or a desire for salvation, but by humanism, anti-clericalism, and a 
belief in the progress of humanity – features found in later progressive 
movements as well.332 There were other common, timeless traits shared all 
across this broad spectrum, such as the desire to destroy the forces of reaction, 
as well as the exploiters and the entire feudal system.333 
Jan Žižka was as troubling a figure for Marxist historiography as he was for 
historians of the 19th century. His noble birth and troubled past (he was said to 
have dabbled in banditry in his youth) were usually left unsaid or dismissed as 
fabrications of bourgeois historians.334 Josef Macek played down the problem of 
Žižka’s noble birth, claiming that “the Trocnov warlord did not differ that much 
from any of the richer peasants.” In Tábor, however, Žižka formed ties with the 
middle bourgeoisie instead of bonding with radical sectarians. However, given 
the economic situation of the time, he was forced to rely on towns to be able to 
operate effectively. Had he sided with the poor, he would have lacked sufficient 
resources to succeed militarily. In the end, Marxist scholars decided to take 
Žižka’s side. Like Hus, he was said to have won the support of the “progressive 
poor” with his uncompromising approach; like Hus, he was believed to have 
undergone an evolution through his experience with the simple folk-
revolutionaries whom he commanded. 
The positive appraisal of the Hussite leader seems to be primarily due to his 
extraordinary military talents. According to Marxist historians, Žižka was far 
more nationalist than Hus. Philosopher Milan Machovec named him “the 
inheritor of Hus’s torch.” In this role, he became “the favourite of the Czech 
nation.”335 
For the Communists, Žižka’s image was tarnished by his ruthless dealings 
with the Hussite sectarians – the Adamites. As opposed to the earlier, 
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historically “immature” heretics, the Adamites “were by no means religious 
fanatics, they struggled for the rights and victory of the poor. … Their common 
sense and healthy reason and the conclusions drawn thereupon assailed 
Medieval obscurantism and fostered a primordial atheism.”336 Still, there was no 
chance for the realisation of such a radical program. Czech historians thus faced 
a problem analogous to the appraisal of the pagan revolt in the Piast state, and 
responded to it by showing less sympathy for the popular movement with no 
chance of hastening the arrival of another formation.337 The example of Žižka 
and the Adamites shows with striking clarity how the national-liberal patriotic 
tradition and the struggle for a Marxist historiography intermingled, even if they 
tended to accentuate different moments. Milan Machovec seemed to favour a 
more nationalist form of Marxism than Macek. His views on the Adamites were 
fairly straightforward: “If during the Hussite revolution the popular masses 
would have succumbed to similar errors and dependence on aid from above, it 
would have disarmed the people and made it believe in Jesus Christ more than in 
the flails.”338 Ewa Maleczyńska accused Macek of awarding the Adamites undue 
recognition. In her opinion, they were not as significant as Macek believed, but 
she showed understanding of the “Marxist historian’s emotional attachment to 
those most oppressed and persecuted.”339 Interestingly, the university textbook 
on the history of Poland, published in 1957 and co-authored by Maleczyńska, 
included a highly similar appraisal of a different radical religious group – the 
Polish Brethren of the 16th and 17th century. According to the textbook, their 
ideology, “though utopian at the time, was in social terms the most progressive 
program of the Polish Renaissance.” Like the Adamites, the Brethren were not 
“impoverished, disorganised and shapeless in class terms”: “The Arian left 
propagated a utopian Communism, endemic to plebeian political programs of 
the period, and far ahead of contemporary socio-economic relations.” The author 
of that portion of the textbook, Kazimierz Lepszy, actually identified only two 
serious weaknesses in the Arian ideology: that the Arian gentry oppressed the 
peasantry as much any other gentry did, and that the Brethren’s pacifism could 
prove to be pernicious. “The Polish Brethren’s position, denouncing all wars, 
whether aggressive or defensive, is understandable. However, this noble 
disposition against wars carried in itself a serious danger. On the one hand, it led 
to an abstention from conflicts as such, even if the independence of the 
fatherland was at stake. On the other, by throwing away their arms, the Brethren 
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renounced all struggle for social justice if conducted by sword.”340 Apparently, 
then, the heretic movements could be interpreted in two divergent ways: one 
could either imbue their theology with a sense of progressive political ideology, 
and bring out the social content hiding behind religious phrases – as did Josef 
Macek; or, one could accept the religious character of the heretic movements, 
but only as an error, a deviation from proper revolutionary ideology. In both 
cases, Czech Marxists were particularly prone to tie themselves to a traditional 
interpretation of national history, for which the Hussite movement was much 
more than just a heresy, and the theological questions it posed were deemed 
irrelevant to its character. 
As was the case with tracing the beginning of Medieval states, the history of 
the Hussite movement was subjected to a thorough “influence-ological” 
analysis: both external influences affecting the particular revolution and Hussite 
currents in other countries were taken into account (the latter with a far more 
considerable dose of enthusiasm). Within this frame, Josef Macek wove his 
ruminations, reminiscent of the debate over the “Norman theory”: “The 
revolutionary ideology of the popular heresy was therefore not condemned to 
transfer the ‘idea’ from one sect to another, from one country to another, but it 
could rise on its own in a local environment, from the depths of humiliation, 
oppression and exploitation experienced by our kinsfolk. If, then, the numerous 
heretic errors share so many similarities, this is due to a (qualitatively) identical 
level of exploitation of the peasant folk in our country, Southern France, Austria 
or England, and to the similar identity of the enemy, the exploiter-Church.”341 
Robert Kalivoda, whose work won recognition from Western Medievalists as 
well, offered another view. Having set out from the same Marxist basis, he 
traced the influence which European heresies had on the Hussite movement.342 
The contrast between these two perspectives serves as yet another illustration of 
the extent of changes that took place in Czechoslovak scholarly life between the 
mid-1950s, the time of Macek’s writing, and the early 1960s, when Kalivoda 
published his work.343 
By far the most spectacular manifestation of the Hussite influence abroad 
was evident in the military expeditions called “rejza.” In historiography, these 
raids were represented primarily as propaganda efforts. For Marxist scholars, the 
reactions of the West, so fearful of the Hussites they resorted to slander, seemed 
akin to anti-Bolshevist propaganda of the interwar period.344 Czech and German 
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“bourgeois” historiography treated the Hussite raids as typical wars of plunder. 
This view was summarily rejected by the Marxists, who endorsed an opposite 
view: “The Hussites subscribed to an age-old dream of stirring the peoples of 
neighbouring countries crushed by feudal oppression and binding them together 
in a struggle against a common enemy, the Church, which was the cornerstone 
of feudalism.”345 This new concept was bound up with widespread research into 
the resonance the movement enjoyed in East Central European countries, of 
which we will yet speak further. 
From the perspective of Czech historians, the problem of the Hussite 
movement’s reception turned out to have been quite simple. As a rule, scholars 
assumed that the popular masses of neighbouring countries were friendly toward 
the Hussites, while the feudals responded with hatred. This comes as no 
surprise, given the oft-repeated claim that the Hussites solely pillaged feudal 
possessions.346 On the other hand, historians underlined the military efficacy of 
the Hussites and the fear they inculcated in the surrounding areas – even though 
the latter and former claims were completely at odds.347 
Understandably, the foreign reception of the Hussite movement was of 
considerable interest to Marxist historiographies of Czechoslovakia’s neighbouring 
countries. The readership of East German historical literature were offered 
unlimited access to the interpretation of the Hussite movement provided by Czech 
Marxists through translations published both in the GDR and in Czechoslovakia.348 
Scholars of the GDR often referenced the findings of their Czech colleagues, 
sometimes tempering their enthusiasm on the subject of Hus. On the other hand, 
though, they thoroughly agreed with claims about a vivid response to the Hussite 
movement in Germany, acting on the assumption that the Czech revolution was 
joined by numerous Germans, among them the “German Hussite” Friedrich 
Reiser.349 Nevertheless, German scholars attached primary importance to the effect 
the Hussite revolution had on the participants and leaders of the Great Peasants’ 
Revolt, Thomas Müntzer most of all. Asserting this influence was hardly a 
straightforward or uncontroversial matter. As late as 1955, in an unprecedentedly 
virulent review of Heinz Kamnitzer’s work on the beginnings of the Great 
Peasants’ Revolt, Rosemarie Müller put one of the axioms of Czech historiography 
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to question, writing that both the Hussite movement and the anti-feudal movements 
in Germany followed the example of peasants’ uprisings in France and England. 
This amounted to a rejection of the thesis concerning the overwhelming influence 
the Hussite movement had on Germany. Furthermore, Müller disagreed with 
Kamnitzer’s appraisal of Müntzer, whom she saw as hardly matching the brilliance 
of the figure described by Kamnitzer.350 In the early 1960s, Bernhard Töpfer 
debated Václav Husa in the pages of the Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, 
accusing the latter of overestimating the influence which a short stay in Bohemia 
had had on Müntzer’s revolutionary beliefs.351 Still, the prevailing claim dictated 
that just as the Hussite revolution had influenced the Great Peasants’ Revolt, so 
Hus had influenced Müntzer. 
The research into the reception of the Hussite movement abroad played a 
particularly important role in Slovak Marxist historiography. As in Bohemia, the 
Hussites counted among the most crucial local progressive traditions. Already in 
the first pages of the inaugural number of the Historicky Časopis SAV, Ľudovít 
Holotík named as a significant task set before Slovak Marxist historical science 
the investigation of the influence of the Hussite movement, an issue to that point 
tendentiously avoided by bourgeois scholars.352 A more detailed analysis of the 
attitudes toward the Hussite movement prevailing among Slovak historians was 
presented by Peter Ratkoš. In his view, while their stance was generally negative 
(e.g. in describing the Hussite raids as pillage expeditions), there was a vivid 
tradition of Hussite thought in Slovakia, which, in the 19th century, became a 
foundation for the Slovak national movement.353 
According to Marxist scholars, Slovak Hussitism was both an imported 
ideology and an indigenous anti-feudal current. While the Czechs organised 
raids into Upper Hungary, the area eventually began to house permanent bases 
of the so-called bratríci, a group led by Jan Jiskra of Brandýs and Petr Aksamit. 
According to Ratkoš, the bratríci movement was already imbued with a national 
spirit.354 The outbreak of the Hussite revolution in neighbouring Bohemia 
significantly strengthened the Slovak bourgeoisie in its confrontation with the 
German patricians, and solidified its feelings of kinship with the Czechs, thereby 
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laying foundations for the modern Slovak nation.355 This did not mean, however, 
that Slovaks joined the Hussites in large numbers. On the contrary, the powerful 
gentry and patricians were fully capable of preventing a revolt among the poor 
townsfolk. In view of this fact, historians contented themselves with stating that 
news from the West generally aggravated class warfare in Slovak towns and 
villages. An unambiguously positive appraisal of a key portion of Czech 
progressive traditions often contrasted with the sources which the Slovak 
Medievalists were condemned to use. For example, a very soundly prepared 
1965 re-edition of Branislav Varsik’s interwar work, replete with citations from 
original sources, almost exclusively registered the devastation the Hussites 
caused during their raids (specifically, the estimated numbers of buildings 
burned). Although Varsik observed that “Today we can have no doubt that the 
Hussite period was the only moment since the collapse of the Greater Moravia 
when the clouded skies of Slovakia’s past cleared somewhat,” the reader of his 
work will likely miss this bright moment of improvement concealed as it is 
behind the smoke of Bratislava’s burned outskirts.356 Varsik’s book may have 
been based on a doctoral dissertation defended way back in 1928, yet the author 
had ample time and opportunity to “colour” somewhat the image of the Hussite 
influence in Slovakia. The progressive role of Czech cultural influence – 
linguistic, musical, etc. – was also described in fairly general terms. 
The works of the Polish Medievalist Ewa Maleczyńska, the founder of the 
centre for Hussite study in Wrocław, Poland, constitutes a special case in the 
reception of the Marxist interpretation of the Hussite movement. As Wojciech 
Iwańczak observed, this particular topic has always suffered from a strong 
infusion of ideology, but Maleczyńska’s writings surpassed even the notoriously 
one-sided analyses dating back to the 19th century in the ease with which she 
formed broad historical claims.357 The choice of Hussitism as one of the objects 
of particular interest to the Silesian Medievalists was also connected to the 
contemporaneous political situation. Ewa and Karol Maleczyński, as well as 
other scholars from Wrocław, realised that the history of that region, which 
merely moments ago had belonged to Germany, was rich with memories of 
Polish-German and Polish-Czech conflicts. As a common ground for Polish-
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Czech cooperation, the Hussite movement represented a research opening into 
Medieval history that was devoid of dreadful spectres from the past.358 
The Wrocław Medievalists attached the most importance to researching 
Polish involvement in the Hussite movement. Hussite ideology was said to have 
had a particular influence on Silesia. “In Silesia, the Hussite troops were joined 
by local peasants. Some castles … were inhabited by Hussite leaders, mostly 
Poles.”359 The Hussite movement was particularly strong among Polish 
inhabitants of Wrocław.360 These, in turn, “dragged” the German city rabble and 
peasants into the movement.361 Although less pronounced than in Silesia, the 
influence of the Czech Hussite revolution in other Polish regions still played a 
role of some significance. Historians recounted how, during the Constance 
council, the Polish delegation stood up for Jan Hus against accusations of 
heresy, and his demise caused all of Poland to “reverberate with powerful 
slogans of Slavic bonds.”362 The calls elicited a particularly strong response in 
Ruthenia, where even “The inquisition began to track Hussite agitators.”363 
The Hussite movement on Polish lands was as revolutionary as the one in 
Bohemia. However, there were no real grounds for the victory of a social 
revolution in the 15th century. This phenomenon was explained at the Otwock 
conference by Evgeni Kosminsky: “Why didn’t the peasant movement win? 
Because it couldn’t. We know well enough that a peasant movement … won’t 
win if it is not led by a hegemonic class. … The bourgeoisie of the period could 
not exert this kind of influence. It only reached that stage during the era of 
bourgeois revolution, which is when it matured enough to claim that role.”364 
Hence, it is hardly surprising that the Polish revolutionary Hussites often had to 
seek sanctuary beyond the borders of their country. For them, Bohemia 
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embroiled in revolutionary flames, seemed like a natural destination. This 
movement developed until reaching its apogee in the 1430s.365 
Due to these translocations, Poles became a significant force within the 
Czech Hussite movement, especially in its radical wing.366 The collapse of that 
wing of the Czech Hussite movement at the Battle of Lipany was said to have 
caused an increase in migration to Poland, and the subsequent rise of a radical 
ideology in the country. These phenomena brought about the confederacy of 
Spytko of Melsztyn, interpreted by Ewa Maleczyńska as “an openly Hussite 
revolt in Poland.”367 Her thesis was approved by Polish Marxist Medievalists.368 
Spytko’s defeat – like the failure of the Czech movement – was caused by a 
“class” betrayal of a section of the gentry, which, “just when it faced … the 
radical, plebeian current of Hussitism,” switched sides: “Just as the treason of 
the utraquists [led] to Lipany, so in Poland the majority of the participants in 
Spytko’s confederacy of noble birth [left] the camp in Grotniki on the eve of the 
battle.”369 
Polish Medievalists engaged in cooperative work with their Czechoslovak 
counterparts, a partnership which helped produce, among other publications, 
another book by the leading Czech scholar of the epoch, Josef Macek (Husyci na 
Pomorzu i w Wielkopolsce, Warszawa 1955, orig. publ. 1952). The work in 
question was devoted to a description of the Czech mercenaries’ involvement in 
the service of the Polish king in his wars against the Teutonic Order, as well as 
to Polish-Czech exchanges in radical thought. In time, though—especially after 
the publication of Ewa Maleczyńska’s Ruch husycki w Czechach i w Polsce—
scholarly cooperation faced substantial obstacles, and Czech Medievalists began 
to view their neighbour’s attempts to co-opt their native progressive traditions 
into the catalogues of the Polish national history with more scepticism. 
Maleczyńska’s claims were more and more vocally opposed. She was accused 
of an unwarranted overinflation of the role of Polish Hussitism and of 
attempting to paint it as even stronger and more radical than the Czech Hussite 
movement itself.370 
Similar reservations toward revelations about the strength of the Polish 
Hussite movement were voiced by Polish Medievalists as well (though in this 
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case, the motivation may well have been different than with the Czechoslovak 
Marxists). In a review of one of Maleczyńska’a earlier works, Karol Górski 
stated, among other criticisms, that she “endeavours to prove that the Hussite 
movement enjoyed a broad reception in Poland, using as proof, among other 
things, accusations raised by foreign preachers, while failing to test their 
veracity.”371 For a historian, it was clear that Maleczyńska transposed 
phenomena described by Czech Medievalists onto a Polish environment without 
bothering to find sufficient support for her claims. As late as 1968, in 
Kwartalnik historyczny, she published an article in which she clearly and 
unambiguously defined her own understanding of historical truth. She found it 
essential “to ensure that the historian who engages in an analysis of particularly 
dense material is fully morally committed to building socialism; that, if the 
material leads him to critical conclusions, he will formulate them not to attack 
this reality, but to mend it, to point the way toward mending it.”372 The manner 
in which the author of these words approached her research problems might 
serve as ample proof of her genuine belief in the subservience of history to 
politics. According to this logic, the Polish Hussites had a double use for 
propaganda: as a native progressive tradition and an example of a Polish anti-
feudal movement strictly bound to the “Recovered Territories,” Silesia in 
particular. In this light, it comes as no surprise that the Party historian’s status 
remained unshakeable well into the 1960s.373 
Research into responses to the Hussite movement in Bohemia’s 
neighbouring countries was grounded in a shared belief in the movement’s 
progressive role. Furthermore, Czech historians were convinced of the 
movement’s exceptional character. An astute reader of Slovak and East German 
scholarship would likely notice that their opinion was not a universally accepted 
truth. Both historians of the GDR and Slovak Marxists researched their native 
anti-feudal revolutions and created separate catalogues of progressive traditions. 
Czech Marxists overlooked several competing traditions, first and foremost 
the Great Peasants’ Revolt, whose importance for German history was described 
already by Engels. For historiography in the GDR, this tradition was of key 
importance. In Alexander Abusch’s Der Irrweg einer Nation, the failure of the 
people’s movement was already identified as an early origin for the Deutsche 
Misere. Abusch described the Peasants’ Revolt through a conflict between two 
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exceptional personalities, representatives of mutually hostile socio-political 
camps: Thomas Müntzer and Martin Luther. In his view, Müntzer was “the 
greatest revolutionary figure of his day.”374 Still, his revolution failed; and, 
according to Abusch, Luther was at fault for this failure. He was the one who 
had prevented the formation of a durable alliance between the bourgeoisie and 
the peasantry, and his teachings essentially solidified the people’s belief in the 
righteousness of their subservience in the feudal system.375 
The Great Peasants’ Revolt was “the first act of a European anti-bourgeois 
revolution.”376 To be more precise, it was a stage of an early-bourgeois 
revolution. Max Steinmetz, who attempted to redefine this historical event in 
1960, established the boundary dates for this revolution as spanning 1476 to 
1535. The movement drew its inspiration from the Hussites, from the ideology 
of György Dózsa’s Hungarian revolt, as well as from the beginnings of 
Reformation.377 The latter became a catalyst for the people’s rebellion, 
somewhat in spite of the will of its creators. As Leo Stern observed, “the great 
figures of the religious reformation: John Wycliff, Jan Hus and Martin Luther 
were drawn into political and social conflicts of their day against their will, 
caught in the revolutionary movements of the peasantry fighting the existing 
feudal order.”378 Yet, the Marxist appraisal of Hus differed significantly from 
that of Luther. While Czechoslovak scholars fully recognised the progressive 
character of their native reformer’s ideas, for decades Luther remained a symbol 
of the Deutsche Misere. Abusch stated that “The German reformation is to 
blame for the failure of the peasants and for the fact that urban and rural 
communities could not come together under a common program. … Martin 
Luther became the key figure of the German counter-revolution, and went on to 
claim that status for centuries.”379 When, in the 1950s, the hyper-critical 
interpretation of national history fell out of favour, historians opted to change 
their views on the Reformation as an event, rather than on its instigator. Their 
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only courtesy toward Luther being that they granted him that, until 1521, his 
ideas had a desirable (negative, in this instance) effect on his compatriots’ 
attitude toward the Papacy.380 In Alfred Meusel’s Thomas Müntzer und seine 
Zeit, published in 1952, the author recounted Friedrich Engels’ opinion that the 
Reformation was a part of the early-bourgeois revolution. The Great Peasants’ 
Revolt supposedly formed yet another part of the same historical event.381 The 
Reformation, the oft-repeated claim went, should not be treated as a religious or 
cultural phenomenon, but primarily as a stage that resulted from class warfare.382 
Initially, the Swiss “progressive-bourgeois” Reformation received a positive 
appraisal in comparison with its German “feudal-absolutist” counterpart.383 
Noteworthy changes in the evaluation of Luther’s role began to take place in the 
1960s, beginning with Max Steinmetz’s presentation at a conference in 
Wernigerode which sparked a renewed interest in the Reformation among GDR 
historians.384 The increasingly positive image of the reformer was an outcome of 
political shifts – the resignation from calls to reunify German and the formation 
of a new concept of an East German nation. Eventually, it was agreed, as Josef 
Foschepoth wrote, that, “without the reformer of Wittenberg, Thomas Müntzer 
would not have been possible.”385 By the early 1980s, Luther was already firmly 
ensconced in the catalogue of the GDR’s progressive traditions, so much so that, 
in 1983 when West Germany celebrated his jubilee, East Germans hosted a 
competing celebration.386 
Thomas Müntzer did not pose as many problems of interpretation as Luther, 
and, consequently, his image in the historiography of the GDR did not undergo 
as significant an evolution. The German historiographic tradition formed two 
opposing interpretations of the figure. For Georg Sartorius or Leopold Ranke, he 
was a bane to the social order, a dangerous individual threatening the state itself. 
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For the same reasons, Müntzer was revered by scholars of a liberal-democratic 
persuasion, such as Karl Hammerdörfer or (before the revolution of 1848) 
Wilhelm Zimmerman.387 Until the mid-1960s, East German historiography saw 
in Müntzer essentially the progressive antithesis to Luther. While Czechoslovak 
authors discussed kinship between the enemies of the radical Hussites and the 
“reactionaries” of the 20th century, East German historians construed two 
historical lineages: “namely, the lineage which proceeds from Müntzer to the 
national politics of the working class (that is, a tradition of radical progress); and 
the other tradition, spanning from the anti-national alliance between Luther and 
the princelings up until the anti-national policies of the West German 
bourgeoisie, a tradition of reaction and betrayal.”388 Müntzer’s image was 
reminiscent in a myriad of ways to that of Hus, the difference being that East 
German scholars attached even less importance to the religious underpinnings of 
Müntzer’s beliefs. Although the German revolutionary was named as an heir to 
Hus,389 he was not treated merely as the executor of a program for social 
revolution developed in Bohemia. The German reviewer of Václav Husa’s book 
Tomáš Müntzer a Čechy stressed that, contrary to Husa’s claims, Müntzer’s stay 
in Prague did not bring about his detachment from Lutheranism, which was 
destined to happen anyway and in no way predicated on the influence of the 
Czechs.390 Like Hus, Müntzer was said to have undergone an evolution from a 
moderate reformer to a revolutionary.391 But, most of all, Müntzer was said to 
have been a propagandist and campaigner for an early-bourgeois revolution. As 
a “conservative” revolutionary, he was, therefore, to some degree better than 
Hus. Ernst Werner consequently compared Müntzer to Želivský, the most 
radical of the Hussite preachers. “Müntzer’s teachings,” he wrote, “were a genial 
anticipation of a history that was already in the making, and of a budding class 
that did not originate in any of the existing social strata of the 16th century – 
neither the peasantry, nor the common folk. Still, this new class found its 
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necessary support in the lowest strata of urban and rural people. It created and 
revolutionised the movement, forming an alliance between the poor of the city 
and the poor of the country, and establishing objectives for future general 
upheaval.”392 
What made the appraisal of the revolutionary even more celebratory was the 
fact that he “could only summon a hazy precognition of what was already 
established knowledge to Marx and Engels – that the most oppressed class was 
precisely the one endowed with an historical mission.”393 One could hardly be 
surprised, then, that Müntzer became so hated and was slandered by 
reactionaries. The early 1950s image of Müntzer – as an incendiary 
revolutionary – retained validity outside of GDR historiography as well.394 In 
time, especially toward the early 1960s, East German historians began to think 
of Müntzer no longer in terms of Hus or Želivský, but in terms of Žižka, a doer, 
an experienced revolutionary politician far removed from all, even noble, 
utopias.395 “We fulfil the ideas of Thomas Müntzer” counted among the most 
common phrases summoned by East German propaganda, and the ideas in 
question had decidedly nothing to do with religion.396 
Despite this high esteem for its leader, the early-bourgeois revolution in 
Germany (incidentally, just like everywhere else) failed. The reasons given for 
this defeat also shared a distinct similarity to the theses of Czechoslovak 
Marxists who analysed the defeat of the radical Hussites. Though the revolution 
worked in the interest of a still non-existent bourgeoisie, the class which 
resembled it the most, the Medieval townsfolk, not only did not support the 
peasants’ movement, but actually rose against it. The “revolutionary alliance 
between the country and the city” proved to have been still lacking.397 Josef 
Foschepoth proposed two ways of interpreting this problem: one could either 
assume that the popular masses objectively acted in the interest of the townsfolk, 
which at that point in time opted to join the counter-revolution (and hence acted 
against its own interest); or one could divide the townsfolk into a progressive 
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(consciously or not) section that worked for the revolution and its reactionary 
counterpart.398 East German historiography used both explanations, either of 
which, like the evaluation of the Hussite radicals, amounted to a simple enough 
assertion: the revolution had broken out several hundred years too early. 
The structural similarities between Marxist interpretations of the Great 
Peasants’ Revolt and the Hussite movement are hardly accidental. Rather they are 
the result of both events having performed a similar function in the schematic 
interpretations of history. At stake in both were traditions that existed prior to 
1945 or 1948-1949. While Marxist historiography’s task was to reinterpret them, 
it was not forced to single-handedly “invent” them – the Peasants’ Revolt was a 
topic broached by Engels, and the Hussites had been discussed already by 
Palacký. Liberal historians took note of the anti-feudal nature of the heretic 
movements even prior to the Springtime of the Peoples, as did the conservatives, 
who viewed the movements as cases of upheaval against social stability and 
attempts at rousing the dormant destructive powers of the common folk. In a way, 
Ukrainians and Poles could relate to one similar event from their national 
traditions, namely Khmelnytsky’s Uprising (whose goal, according to Soviet 
historiography, was the incorporation of Ukraine into Russia).399 Attempts at a 
“takeover” of the progressive Hussite tradition and its adaptation to Polish history, 
made by Wrocław Medievalists, resulted from a belief (justified or not) that an 
analogous native tradition was not available. In the final analysis, Ewa 
Maleczyńska’s works proved the “superiority” of the history of Bohemia over that 
of its neighbours. But adaptation was not the only means of picking out native 
anti-feudal revolutions. One could also attempt to fabricate them from raw 
elements, and this is precisely what Slovak historians did. 
A significant portion of the Czechoslovak university history textbook is 
devoted to a description of the most powerful Slovak anti-feudal effort: the 
1525-1526 revolt of the miners of Banská Bystrica against the owners of the 
mines, the Fugger and Thurz families. The uprising began with a strike 
instigated by the miners, dissatisfied with a diminished payment for their work. 
The upheaval was exacerbated by the formation of the religious “Brotherhood of 
the Body of Christ,” founded by the miners, which sparked a new conflict. In 
time, however, “The miners’ uprising transformed from a struggle for daily 
wages into a revolutionary combat under admittedly vague calls for a classless 
society.”400 The progression from a religious conflict and a battle over wages to 
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a veritable revolution was explained in several ways. The Brotherhood was 
designated as an example of the reception of the radical reformation’s slogans, 
like those of Thomas Müntzer, whose stay in neighbouring Bohemia attracted 
genuine interest from Czechoslovak historians. Historians interpreted it as an 
attempt to revive the program of the Tábor and bring about another revolution. 
The Brotherhood was also a vivid testament to the crisis of feudalism, which 
reached Slovak territories at the turn of the 16th century.401 The miners’ wage 
demands, which proved eventually to have been their only stated grievance, 
were not supposed to be treated literally. According to Peter Ratkoš, “it would 
be a mistake to treat the content of their proclamations as the final postulates of 
the revolutionary struggle. Written manifestos and demands are merely their 
tempered reflection. The real programs of anti-feudal struggles, such as the 
miners’ uprising, … have to be construed by the historian from the military 
clashes and court minutes; he must take note of wage issues as well as costs of 
living, ideological currents and political events, in order to be able to draw the 
right conclusions.”402 So, the revolutionary program of the insurgents was said 
to have been hiding behind economic and religious considerations, and found its 
most perfect expression in the general idea of “weeding out all the lords.”403 
The question of nationality was another interesting problem with regard to 
the uprising. In the early 1950s, when Slovak historians “discovered” this part of 
their native history, they often stressed the uprising’s progressive, 
internationalist resonance. It is worth quoting at length from an article by Gustáv 
Hackenast, published in 1954, that went the furthest in stressing the 
internationalist agenda of the miners: “The heroic legacy of the Slovak and 
German miners’ uprising in Banská Bystrica marks a fitting beginning to the 
centuries-long struggle of Hungarian miners for humane living conditions, for 
freedom. It fills us with pride, and it inspires even more dedication to work, and 
an ever more heroic attitude befitting the rightful heirs of this tradition: the 
Slovak and Hungarian miners in their successful endeavour to build socialism, 
the Hungarian and Slovak working class and Hungarian and Czechoslovak 
people, will forever be bound with the bonds of brotherhood.”404 Within the next 
few years, Marxist authors abandoned the idea that the rebellious miners of the 
16th century should be treated as an example for the strike workers of the 1950s, 
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but they also removed all mentions of Hungarians and verified the involvement 
of the Germans in the rebellion. In Ratkoš’s essential monograph devoted to this 
subject, Povstanie baníkov na Slovensku roku 1525-1526, published in 1963, the 
national question took centre stage. The author claimed that the German miners 
were likely more ideologically enlightened, acting as a conduit for passing the 
slogans of the Great Peasants’ Revolt on to the Slovaks.405 At the same time, 
though, he observed: “the fact that the manifestos of the rebellious miners’ camp 
were written in German should not be taken as proof that the uprising was an 
action comprised solely of the German element.”406 Ratkoš also stressed that the 
miners were opposed by German patricians and moderate German 
reformationists. The interpretation that remained largely unchallenged was the 
thesis that the political program of the miners’ uprising was an extension of the 
aims of the Great Peasants’ Revolt as well as Dózsa’s uprising in Hungary. 
The miners’ uprising in Banská Bystrica has indeed been a recognised fact 
for years, but until the 1950s no one attached any importance to it. Its emergence 
as a topic for research is unequivocally tied to Peter Ratkoš, who played the 
same role in Slovak Medievalism which Josef Macek played in the Czech part 
of the country.407 At first, Ratkoš attempted to shed some positive light on the 
influence the Czech Hussites enjoyed in Slovakia – a daunting enough task 
given the conviction, commonly held in sources from the era and replicated by 
earlier Slovak and Hungarian historiography, that the rejzas were nothing more 
than brutal plundering expeditions. The miners’ uprising was a less 
controversial, and more importantly, native Slovak source for progressive 
traditions, even if, as contemporary Slovak historians believe, Ratkoš not only 
decidedly overestimated its importance, but also romanticised the progression of 
the events he described.408 
The ease with which Peter Ratkoš introduced the 16th century miners into 
Slovak history was quite uncommon among attempts at positioning newly 
uncovered progressive traditions as key links in the chain of historical progress 
and as sources of national pride. It is far easier to cite examples of anti-feudal 
movements which, despite the efforts of some Marxist scholars, retained a 
marginal status and failed to garner the kind of attention accorded the Hussite 
movement or the Great Peasants’ Revolt. One such case was highlander 
banditry, linked in Slovak tradition primarily to Juraj Jánošík, a figure well-
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known in Czechoslovakia and beyond who was sometimes called the Slovak 
Robin Hood. 
Jánošik was exploited already by the ideology of interwar Czechoslovakia as 
a symbol of the struggle against the monarchy and the nobles. It was only after 
the war, however, that the bandits of the Carpathian Mountains became 
protagonists not only of children’s schoolbooks and popularising efforts, but 
also Czechoslovak historiography. In several of his works devoted to Jánošik, 
Andrej Melicherčík provided a general characterisation of the phenomenon of 
highlander banditry, judging it to have been an effective form of fighting 
feudalism. Banditry was not an outgrowth of a highlander mentality nor of the 
folk’s living circumstances, as previously believed, but was a reflection of class 
relations. Melicherčík listed numerous similarities between Polish, Ukrainian, 
Slovak and Hungarian highwaymen. In his opinion, the great peasant revolts of 
the 16th and 17th centuries, typically devoid of political programs and the 
support of townsfolk, were doomed to failure. Banditry, on the other hand, was 
considered to be an effective method of harassing class opponents.409 Jánošík 
also retained legendary status among the Slovak common folk as late as the 19th 
century when banditry had already faded away as a result of the rise of social 
consciousness among the working class.410 According to Melicherčík, the 
memory of the highlander bandits became a sort of bandit messianism, deftly 
illustrated by the example of Oleksa Dovbush: “And yet the Ukrainians of yore 
believed more than anything in the coming of a new Dovbush. Their faith was 
confirmed by the legend that the gun which Oleksa Dovbush buried deep in the 
ground before his death draws closer to the surface every year, and that, when it 
emerges completely, the new Dovbush will arrive. That hope of the Ukrainian 
people, tied in literary practice to Oleksa Dovbush’s name, has already 
materialised.”411 
The problem of banditry affected Poland to a rather large extent, which 
meant that Polish Marxist historiography, comparatively, devoted the most 
attention to it. The authors of the draft of the university textbook on the history 
of Poland wrote: “The finest bandit commanders … became the stuff of legend 
for the people well before their death. Banditry served as fuel to the fire of class 
warfare, but at the same time was also a playground for developing the 
peasantry’s military skills and partisan tactics.”412 In a way, it made up for the 
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absence of a native early-bourgeois revolution, since, as Bohdan Baranowski 
complained, “In Poland, there were no anti-feudal peasant revolts of proportions 
similar to those in some other European countries … Struggles as vehement and 
dramatic as those which took place, for instance, in Germany, England or 
Russia, were unheard of in Poland.”413 For most Marxist scholars, though, 
bandits were far less unambiguous than for Slovak historians. The authors of the 
“Draft” recognised that “while their activities to an extent assumed the shape of 
a class war against the oppressive feudals, they quite swiftly transformed into 
something completely different, being restricted to simple robbery of not only 
noblemen’s properties, but also peasants’ huts.”414 In the early 1950s, bandits 
became the topic of several works (mostly collections of original sources).415 
Some of them reframed the highwaymen in the manner of folktales. As 
Baranowski observed, “The bandits of the time were characterised by a specific 
code of ethics. One could only assault and rob the manors of the gentry or 
corrals belonging to rich landowners who made their wealth from another’s 
misery. No self-respecting bandit would take anything from the poor – he would 
rather divide the riches stolen from the wealthy among the impoverished.”416 
Claims like these, though generally supportive of the “good cause,” met with 
critical responses from reviewers at specialist journals. Janina Bieniarzówna, 
writing in Przegląd Historyczny, criticised the “idealisation of bandit groups, 
whose unquestionable class disposition cannot erase evidence of the common 
robberies that took place.”417 In an even sterner response to a work on 
highlander banditry, Juliusz Bardach pointed out “the class line distortion in 
banditry.”418 
A special type of banditry developed in the Ukrainian territories of the 
Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The area was located at the crossroads of 
class, religious and national conflicts. The resulting mixture was far more 
complex than was the case with Polish highlander bandits. The leadership of this 
collection of bandits was assumed by the Zaporizhian Cossacks, and it found its 
most significant manifestation in Khmelnytsky’s Uprising. 
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The Cossack Uprisings formed the portion of Rzeczpospolita’s history 
which was subjected to the most thorough reinterpretation after 1945. In works 
by members of the Kraków School, the analysis of Khmelnytsky’s revolt already 
included more criticism of the Polish gentry than of the rebels.419 Still, the 
popular understanding of the war, shaped by Henryk Sienkiewicz’s novels, 
determined the society’s way of thinking about the events. The problem 
decidedly warranted an explanation. This need was recorded by Jan Micigolski, 
a reader of the journal Nowe Drogi who posed the following question in a letter 
to the editor: “I was taught in middle school about the so-called rebellion of 
Bohdan Khmelnytsky in the Ukraine. In 1946, I read H. Sienkiewicz’s With Fire 
and Sword. I feel that my previous knowledge of peasant rebellions in the 
Ukraine was insufficient. My stay at the Party-governed school in Kielce in 
1949-1950 helped very little in this regard. I often travel around the Kielce 
voivodship and I can see that many people lack a clear vision of the problem, 
especially those who finished their schooling before the war. Therefore, I ask for 
a clarification of this problem in the pages of Nowe Drogi.”420 
The editors’ explanation, like the new interpretation of Khmelnytsky’s 
uprising included in Marxist works, painted a decidedly favourable image of 
both the Cossacks and Khmelnytsky himself. The rebellious leader “felt the 
misery of the Cossacks and the suffering of the Ukrainian nation, the more so 
since he too had fallen victim to the licentiousness of the Polish feudal lords and 
their retainers.”421 Because of the complex nature of the uprising, commingling 
social, national and religious issues, its social basis was very broad: 
“Khmelnytsky’s standards were carried not only by the peasants, but also by 
Ukrainian townspeople, as well as by a section of the Ukrainian gentry and the 
Orthodox clergy; in other words, the rebel forces formed a united front of 
Ukrainian social and national forces against the rule of the Polish magnates.”422 
At the 2nd Congress of the PZPR in March 1954, Nikita Khrushchev, speaking 
as a guest, advanced an audacious claim that the rebel army included a 
significant contingent of Polish peasants.423 The Ukrainian uprising received 
disinterested aid from Russia, but other neighbours of Ukraine were animated by 
completely different designs toward the rebels. In the “Draft” of the university 
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textbook on the history of Poland, Turkey was mentioned as Khmelnytsky’s ally 
only in inverted commas. The Tartars received a similar appraisal.424 The Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth represented the interests of the magnates who 
wanted to continue their oppression of the Ukrainian folk. For this reason, all 
later attempts at a compromise between the warring sides were doomed to fail. 
Consequently, the section of the Cossack elders who chose to support an 
agreement with Poland were seen as traitors to their own nation.425 
The Treaty of Pereyaslav, binding Ukraine to Russia, received a 
dramatically different evaluation. In the Soviet Ukraine, its tricentennial was 
celebrated as a holiday honouring the “immovable” unity of two brotherly 
nations, with the ethnic and cultural proximity of Ukrainians and Russians 
emphasised heavily.426 In Polish Marxist historiography, the treaty’s 
incorporation of a part of Ukrainian territory into the Russian state was praised 
as a step that fostered Ukrainian autonomy.427 The authors of the “Draft” 
phrased this claim in an even more radical manner, stating that “For a long time, 
the broad Ukrainian popular masses drifted toward Russia, to which they were 
bound by historical tradition.” In their view, within the Polish Republic of feudal 
nobles, “the very existence of Ukrainian nationhood was threatened with 
extinction in such circumstances, and its only hope was to merge with 
Russia.”428 The Treaty was said to have had a positive effect on the peasants’ 
daily lives.429 
No less progressive than the fortuitous development of Ukrainian nationality 
was the strengthening of the Russian state through territorial expansion.430 For 
obvious reasons, Poland, the Crimean Khanate, or Turkey viewed the 
“Pereyaslav deed” (in Zbigniew Wójcik’s diction) unfavourably.431 “The feudal 
Rzeczpospolita summoned all its powers to break the bond between Ukraine and 
Russia, which had put an end to the predatory policies of the Polish possessor 
classes.”432 The convergence of the interests of Moscow and Ukraine was quite 
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clearly depicted in a work approved by the Central Committee of the Soviet 
Communist Party, The Theses for the Tricentennial of the Unification of Ukraine 
and Russia: “Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s historical merit was that, by expressing the 
age-old longings and strivings of the Ukrainian nation for a close alliance with 
the Russian nation, and by guiding the formation process of Ukrainian 
statehood, he rightly perceived its tasks and perspectives, and he saw that the 
Ukrainian nation could not exist if not unified with the great Russian nation, 
which is why he relentlessly strove to unify Ukraine and Russia.”433 
For Poland, Khmelnytsky’s uprising and Russia’s annexation of a portion of 
Ukrainian territory were said to have been a blessing. The very fact of this 
territorial loss weakened the magnates.434 Besides, the uprising in the Ukraine 
fostered anti-feudal movements in the Polish lands, sparking innumerable 
rebellions: “the metal-workers and miners’ joining forces with Kostka-
Napierski’s revolt, the liberation of Warsaw in 1656, the anti-gentry townsfolk’s 
movement in Lublin in 1656 under Wojciech Reklowski, gathered under the 
slogan ‘Noblemen, your liberties are ceased,’ and finally the few preserved 
positive appraisals of the English Revolution and the mass involvement of the 
townspeople, especially the petit-bourgeois and the poor, in the struggle against 
the Swedes.”435 
Although Khmelnytsky’s Uprising played an important part in the works of 
Polish Marxists, it did not belong to native history, but was rather a fragment of 
the progressive traditions of Soviet Ukraine. For obvious reasons, it could not 
have been “Polonised,” as had been the case with the Hussite movement in Ewa 
Maleczyńska’s writings. One could, however, attempt to associate other events 
in Poland with the Cossack uprising, casting about for Khmelnytsky’s Polish 
allies. In Marxist works, the little-known Kostka-Napierski’s rebellion was 
viewed both as analogous to the Ukrainian movement and as influenced by it. 
The fact that Kostka-Napierski operated in the Podhale region reflected the 
similarity of the local peasantry’s social situation to that of the Ukrainian 
peasantry.436 Furthermore, Kostka-Napierski maintained close relations with 
Khmelnytsky. As Józef Leszczyński learned, “Kostka-Napierski, whose 
collaboration with Khmelnytsky is ultimately beside the point, waited in 
Czorsztyn for the arrival of troops conscripted in Silesia. It seems that the 
rebellion in Greater Poland, organised most likely by Khmelnytsky’s agents, 
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enjoyed a certain resonance in Silesia.”437 The authors of the “Draft,” on the 
other hand, wrote about the conspiracy of the Warsaw poor, “whose participants 
were expected to prepare an uprising which would explode when Khmelnytsky’s 
army drew closer.”438 Given the broad influence the uprising enjoyed in Polish 
territories, Czapliński could hardly be said to have exaggerated when he stated 
that “in this period, the earth trembled under the feet of the gentry throughout 
Poland.”439 
Polish Marxist historians exploited only a fraction of Kostka-Napierski’s 
“potential” in building up the history of their native progressive traditions. 
Among the obstacles they had to tackle was limited knowledge of the figure: 
“This peasant or bourgeois son was evidently filled with compassion for his 
injured and humiliated brethren, and must have viewed the brutal attempts at 
quelling the Ukrainian rebellion with undisguised aversion” – ventured Bohdan 
Baranowski, who admitted at the same time that he had no specific knowledge 
of Kostka-Napierski’s supposed plans for spreading the rebellion throughout the 
country, nor of the particular means for communicating with the Ukrainian 
rebels.440 The weak peasant movement, commanded by a man of unverified 
origin and unknown past, essentially could never compare with the anti-feudal 
revolts in neighbouring countries. 
The tradition of the uprising of 1651 was nonetheless construed as the 
foundation for all later peasant political movements. According to Marxist 
historians, it was also one of Poland’s most decidedly progressive national 
traditions.441 Juliusz Bardach claimed that “During the popular movement of 
1651, there was a clear coming together between the Polish peasants and the 
Ukrainian folk, representing the progressive forces of social and national 
liberation, in a united front against the main force of reaction – the Polish feudal 
nobles. … The Ukrainian peasants were the armed avant-garde of the rest of the 
Rzeczpospolita’s peasant masses, which, led by the Ukrainians’ example, and 
maybe even working in tandem with them, joined the struggle against feudal 
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oppression and exploitation.”442 The most shocking part of the Marxist 
interpretation of Khmelnytsky’s Uprising is precisely this attempt to construe a 
movement aimed against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as beneficial for 
the state. To corroborate this view, historians needed to identify a sufficiently 
broad section of Polish society that possessed a suitable comprehension of 
Khmelnytsky’s progressiveness. Such a portion of society would then act as an 
ally of the Cossacks in their attempt to overthrow feudalism in Poland. Hence, 
the peasant anti-feudal movements, Kostka-Napierski’s rebellion, and the 
presence of Khmelnytsky’s and Rákóczi’s agents were all acting to 
counterbalance the fact that Khmelnytsky’s uprising was aimed against the 
Polish state. 
Slovak historians writing on the anti-feudal movements of the 17th century 
could not name Khmelnytsky’s uprising as a direct source of inspiration for their 
native revolutionaries. In their case, far more compelling, but also more 
troubling, were the ties that existed between class warfare in Slovakia and the 
Hungarian anti-Habsburg rebellions of István Bocskay, Imre Thököly and 
Francis II Rákóczi, as well as the involvement of Transylvania against Austria in 
the Thirty Years’ War. 
The attitude of Slovak historiography toward the Hungarian rebellions grew 
out of its appraisal of the Revolution of 1848 (which will be discussed in more 
detail later). Indeed, both in the popular understanding of Hungarian history and 
in the opinion of numerous Hungarian Marxists, the liberation movements 
formed a continuous lineage that culminated in the revolution of 1848-1849, 
both as the most glorious moment of national history and the deepest fall from 
grace which Hungary ever experienced. During the first years of the new 
methodology’s implementation, one would be excused for assuming that Slovak 
scholars would follow Marx in his appreciation of Bocskay, Thököly and 
Rákóczi. Indeed, in the first yearbook of the Historický Časopis SAV, Ľudovít 
Holotík wrote of the alliance between Hungarian and Slovak common folk, who 
had joined in a struggle against foreign and local forces of reaction.443 The 
theses on the history of Slovakia, formulated some two years later, proposed that 
Rákóczi’s uprising began as a social struggle of Slovak and Ukrainian farmers. 
Only later was this vivid movement used to further the cause of an anti-
Habsburg state revolt, losing its class character along the way.444 After the 
suppression of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, Czechoslovak 
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historiography’s tune turned sour. In the 1958 draft of the university history 
textbook, the authors pointed out that most of the victims of the feuds between 
the Hungarians and the Habsburgs were Slovak civilians, that the uprisings only 
served the gentry, and that “one could never treat them as national liberation 
struggles, as the Hungarian bourgeois historiography did. … The state rebellions 
… from the vantage point of the history of the Slovak people, should be judged 
as a struggle of two ruling classes over the right to exploit Slovaks.”445 
Furthermore, as Jozef Vlachovič observed, the rebellious Hungarians allied with 
the most reactionary power in Europe, the Ottoman Empire.446 The increasingly 
critical appraisal of the anti-Habsburg rebellions eventually affected the 
appraisal of the Habsburgs themselves. This observation seeped into 
Vlachovič’s article from 1960, quoted above; as he wrote, “We cannot accept 
the high appraisal Bethlen’s revolt received from Hungarian historians. A 
revision is also in order when it comes to their unanimous damnation of the 
Habsburg monarchy in the same period.”447 A year later, the editors of 
Historický Časopis SAV criticised the participants in the congress of the CISH in 
Stockholm for idealising Transylvanian policies and demonising the 
Habsburgs.448 
The events referred to above served more or less successfully as “early-
bourgeois revolutions” in the histories of the countries discussed. At the same 
time, other revolutions affected national histories only partially – like 
Khmelnytsky’s Uprising or the Hungarian struggles against the Habsburgs. 
Given that they were accorded comparable roles in compendia of national 
histories and in catalogues of progressive traditions, an analysis of the 
differences between them seems pertinent. We would be excused for supposing 
that the signifier “early-bourgeois revolution” finds its fullest representation in 
the German Reformation and the Great Peasants’ Revolt (After all, this is how 
Friedrich Engels saw them.).449 Still, a reading of Marxist analyses shows that it 
was not German history that served as the point of departure for progressive 
traditions of other countries in the area. The Reformation, and Luther in 
particular, received a great deal of criticism. All the admiration for Thomas 
Müntzer could not conceal the extremely unfavourable assessments of the 
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peasant rebels’ capabilities. The most praised, least controversial and “most 
modern” early-bourgeois revolution, as it turned out, was the revolutionary 
Hussite movement. Czech Marxists completed an arduous task: they managed to 
depict a thoroughly religious movement as a powerful social and anticlerical 
revolution. Their triumph was all the more significant because of the fact that 
this same evaluation of the Hussite movement was also accepted by foreign 
Marxists, who engaged in broad research on the resonances of the Hussite 
movement in their native countries, sometimes even attempting to stake a claim 
to the movement. Compared with the Hussite movement, the partly progressive 
movements discussed by Polish historiography, such as the pagan revolt, 
Kostka-Napierski’s rebellion, or banditry in the Carpathian Mountains, lacked 
some of the same flair, either due to an absence of sufficient ideological 
foundations, or because they never reached the grand scale of the Hussite 
movement. In truth, only the revolt of the miners in Banská Bystrica (though 
probably in large part because of Peter Ratkoš’s efforts as its chronicler) claimed 
a similar status as an uncontested, progressive, national and internationalist 
revolutionary movement – though it still failed to reach as great a scale. 
This “success” of the Hussite movement resulted from a particular virtue of 
Czech Marxist historiography, which claimed, for the most part, the national-
liberal image of history, and infused it both with Marxist terminology and 
analogies to modern history. The Hussites were accorded a special place already 
in Palacký’s works, and the historians of the 1950s by necessity cited him more 
often than Marx and Engels in their own analyses.450 Neither Polish, nor German 
scholars could rely on such a self-explanatory, socially acceptable interpretation 
of national history. 
The differences between particular early-bourgeois revolutions highlight the 
role which local historical traditions played in Marxist historiographies. In this 
respect (as in many others), the similarities deriving from a shared methodology 
and similar political commitments did not preclude the divergences that resulted 
from differences in the prior achievements in historiographies in East Central 
Europe. It was the relative weakness of the historiographic tradition in Slovakia 
that facilitated the formation of new interpretations, perfectly attuned to the 
current needs of the Marxist vision of history. In the case of Slovakia, the 
catalogue of “progressive traditions” was enriched not only with the miners’ 
rebellion, but also with Jánošik who, according to Polish historians, did not 
merit serious scholarly study. 
The interpretation of uprisings, rebellions and revolutions also provides 
particularly colourful examples of interactions between different Marxist 
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historiographies. All popular movements were treated as one system infused 
with the “boiling” revolutionary élan. At times, an “enhancement” of a local 
“progressive tradition” resulted in the degradation of a tradition hailed by one’s 
neighbours. Hence Slovak history became for Slovak historians more 
progressive as Hungarian history became less progressive. The emphasis placed 
by Czech historians on connections between Müntzer and the Prague townsfolk 
was also meant to “diminish” somewhat the image of the greatest German 
revolutionary until Marx. A particularly spectacular example of this course of 
action are the works of Ewa Maleczyńska, whose high appraisal of the Polish 
Hussite movement forced her into a critical relativisation of Hussitism in 
Bohemia. The only peerless progressive traditions belonged to the nations of the 
Soviet Union, and neither Polish, Czechoslovak, nor East German Marxist 
works ever attempted to belittle their legacy. 
The unquestionable interactions between particular Marxist historiographies 
also prove that, to properly analyse their achievements, one cannot limit oneself 
to a model comparing only Soviet historiography with any one of the 
historiographies belonging to the people’s democracies. This model works well 
so far as methodological considerations, general statements, or a few historical 
analogies are concerned. The history of East Central (and South Eastern) 
Europe, broadly understood, provides us with unlimited specific material for 
comparative analysis. As we have seen, the early-bourgeois revolution was 
made to conform with the model of the Czech Hussite movement, the ideas of 
interpretation provided by East German historians were critically evaluated by 
their Polish peers, and Slovak scholars constantly participated in an exchange of 
opinion with Hungarian historians. On the lookout for ways to describe events in 
local histories in a new, Marxist fashion, historians reached out for the 
experiences of their neighbours, read their analyses, assuming that many of the 
phenomena in question probably found proximate analogies in other countries of 
the region. Marxist historians seemed to have taken more note of those analogies 
than our contemporaries. Small wonder, given the schematic approach favoured 
by Marxism, which encouraged this search for analogies. If the laws of historical 
progress were replicated everywhere, regardless of the circumstances, the claims 
to national distinction, untranslatability, and exceptionality had to yield to a 
highly specific kind of comparative study. 
 
Between the French Revolution and the Russian Tanks 
Just like in numerous other versions of history, the French Revolution is also a 
unique event within the Marxist schema of history. It forms the frame of 
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reference for every other revolution in multiple aspects, ranging from its 
particular vocabulary (for instance, use of the term “Jacobins” for 
revolutionaries such as Ignác Martinovics or Hugo Kołłątaj, or the numerous 
Robespierres and Saint-Justs of the many failed Central European revolts), 
through the division into left and right sides of the political stage it introduced, 
up until the creation of such useful catchphrases as “revolutionary terror,” 
“counter-revolution,” and “reactionary intervention.” Within the “table of rank,” 
this revolution had at first claimed a precious spot, earning the moniker of “the 
mother of all bourgeois revolutions,” as well as being, in a way, the mother of 
the Great Socialist October Revolution. Lenin, for instance, compared 
Bolsheviks to Jacobins. In time, in the later 1930s, the French Revolution began 
to lose significance, particularly as it ceased to be mentioned as the forerunner to 
the October Revolution. However, despite yielding its status as the single proper 
context for the October Revolution in Russia, the French Revolution retained all 
its progressive glamour for East Central European states well into the 1950s. 
It was said to have sparked unrest in rural areas of Bohemia and Slovakia; 
the peasants eagerly anticipated breaking of bonds of serfdom, erroneously 
perceiving Napoleon as their saviour.451 For authors of the Marxist history 
textbook (particularly Josef Kočí), the pro-French tendencies among the Czech 
peasantry caused “an exacerbation of class warfare.”452 As Zdeněk Nejedlý 
wrote, “The news that the French forces were approaching the borders of 
Bohemia were reason enough for unrest among our peasants … willingly 
offering their services to the revolutionary French army as their liberator.”453 
The revolution sparked similarly vivid reactions in Germany. In 1790, peasants 
in Saxony erupted in revolt. Though their movement was brought about by 
social oppression and a bad harvest, events in France added fuel to its fire.454 
Still, the revolt was said to have been doomed to fail, with the peasants unable to 
enlist bourgeois support for their cause. The author of a dissertation describing 
the event mentioned only in passing that the rebel forces were limited to some 
500 men, arguably an even more convincing cause of the movement’s failure.455 
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In the early 1950s, this pioneering research by Percy Stulz was complemented 
by further analyses of the early 1790s unrest in rural Germany.456 
German historians also pointed to the positive response the revolution 
enjoyed in literary and scientific circles. Joachim Streisand, author of the 
relevant volume of the university textbook on German history, stressed that, just 
like the peasants, the German intelligentsia constituted an oppressed class. They 
had had to serve the Evangelical Church or “make the princes’ courts shine” just 
to make ends meet, but, in fact, the slogans of the French Revolution were very 
dear to their hearts. Furthermore, they also always affirmed that the very same 
slogans should serve as a call for the liberation and reunification of the German 
fatherland.457 The revolution won the admiration of the most formidable of 
Germans, Goethe, as well as of Hegel, Lessing, Kant, Schiller – German 
classicism in general.458 For the Romantics, on the other hand – the Schlegel 
brothers, Tieck, Novalis, Schelling and Schleiermacher – the initial awe was 
quickly replaced by a wariness of social progress and support for remnants of 
the feudal order.459 
Though Marxist historians perceived the reaction to news from France as 
being similar across the entire East Central Europe, only Germany was blessed 
with a “sisterly” Republic of Mainz, formed on German territory and 
functioning under actual French occupation. This ephemeral state-like entity was 
described as “the first democratic republic on German lands” and consequently 
received positive evaluation. Its native character and relative independence from 
the French government or inspiration seemingly invited amicable treatment. 
Streisand wrote extensively on the various initiatives undertaken by the 
townsfolk of Mainz, who began spreading revolutionary [sic – M.G.] 
propaganda already in the 1750s.460 Figures such as Andreas Joseph Hofmann, a 
professor of philosophy and history, or the writer, librarian and naturalist Georg 
Forster, as well as other, unnamed German Jacobins were said to have been even 
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more radical than the French military-men occupying Mainz.461 Scholars also 
emphasised that, though the peasantry of the Rhineland were grateful to the 
French for repealing feudalism, this should not have been taken to mean that 
they perceived themselves as French. “The love of the people for their 
fatherland,” wrote Streisand, “was so powerful that no political or military 
threats, nor material gains could obliterate the German character of the 
region.”462 The peasants of the Rhineland were to prove their German patriotism 
several years later, when Germany engaged in a war against France. 
Precisely, if France could turn from a progressive force into a reactionary 
enemy of the German peasantry in such a short time, it became essential to 
locate the specific moment this change occurred, the point when the country 
took on its negative role. This task, however, proved rather difficult to complete. 
German historians recognised two competing answers: the first, offered by 
Heinrich Scheel, ascribed a progressive nature to France up until the collapse of 
the internal counter-revolution and the beating back of foreign intervention 
forces, in other words, until sometime between 1794 and 1795. Most of the 
participants in the international discussion (attended by Polish and 
Czechoslovak scholars as well), organised by the Institute of History at DAW in 
November 1956, leaned toward the claim that France remained progressive until 
it beat reactionary Austria at Austerlitz, and Prussia at Jena and Auerstedt. The 
Polish historians (e.g. Stefan Kieniewicz), who played quite a significant role in 
the proceedings, argued that the formation of the Duchy of Warsaw should 
receive a positive appraisal.463 In accordance with this claim, the East German 
university history textbook established the date for the transformation of France 
into a reactionary power as 1807, when the French bourgeoisie achieved a 
dominant position in Europe and resistance began to germinate in Germany.464 
Several years later, Heinrich Scheel radically altered his views and decided that 
the French accelerated the advent of capitalism, and their progressive role in that 
regard had not ended even as late as 1807, as Streisand believed.465 In the same 
way, Scheel also entered another dispute, initiated by Alfred Meusel and Ernst 
Engelberg, and conducted on the pages of Sonntag, a cultural weekly. Meusel 
fully agreed with Polish historians, while Engelberg asked, rhetorically, whether 
Napoleon should be named the benefactor of the German nation. As was the 
                                                            
461 Ibidem. 
462 Ibidem, 72. 
463 “Arbeitstagung des Instituts für Geschichte an der Deutschen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften zu Berlin,” Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft 1957, 364. 
464 Streisand, Deutschland, 132. 
465 Heinrich Scheel, “Zur Problematik des deutschen Befreiungskrieges 1813“, Zeitschrift 
für Geschichtswissenschaft 1963, 1281. 
 On the Lookout for Progressive Traditions 137 
 
case with other debates between the two scholars, the disagreement culminated 
in a rather brutal mutual smearing by means of letters to the Central Committee 
of the SED.466 
The appraisal of France’s progressiveness was problematic to Polish 
historians as well. Just as in the GDR, the evaluation of the revolution was at 
odds with the appraisal of native progressive traditions, represented by the anti-
Russian Kościuszko Uprising of 1794. The Uprising’s greatest achievement was 
said to have been in aiding the first bourgeois revolution by engaging the forces 
of the states intervening in it. This is why, in spite of all the debates concerning 
the extent of the progressiveness of the entire movement as well as its particular 
participants, it was assumed that within Europe as a whole, it did play an 
eminently progressive role. The ties between the two movements in question 
were underscored already by the classics of Marxism.467 
While Kościuszko aided France, there was hardly any reciprocity on the part 
of the Revolution’s leaders because all Polish calls for help were patently 
ignored. The Polish Marxists were in disagreement as to the evaluation of this 
fact. Stanisław Herbst, author of the corresponding chapter in the Polish “Draft,” 
stated that the Committee of Public Safety “proved to lack sufficient insight and 
failed to reckon with the fact that the fate of the revolution was, to an extent, 
decided over the banks of Vistula; and that, by aiding the rebels, it would not 
only weaken the feudal-absolutist states inimical to Poland, but also strengthen 
the Jacobin regime.”468 Witold Łukaszewicz offered a much more severe 
appraisal of the French policies: according to his interpretation, Polish émigré 
activists succumbed to the deceitful propaganda spread by the “matadors of the 
Gironde.” “The Poles did not realise that the whole Convention, clamouring 
with decrees and bursting with calls to the oppressed and slogans of brotherhood 
of the revolutionary arms, was in reality merely a cunning political tactic, 
designed to ward off the anti-French coalition; that the appeals to the peoples of 
the land to engage in a war against the tyrant-kings resonated quite differently 
on the parliamentary tribune than in the secluded cabinets of the ministers of the 
almighty Committee of Public Safety … The Poles did not realise that just when 
Kościuszko appeared in Paris, the ministry of foreign affairs was busily 
preparing a recognition of the second partition of Poland, treating it as a part of 
the perfidious plan to pacify European relations.”469 Łukaszewicz followed this 
dramatic account with an admission that, while he generally approved of the 
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French Revolution, “one has to admit that the uprising received no aid, not only 
because it was led by the gentry, but also, to a rather large extent, because ties to 
the uprising would have been unwelcome for the French who, by rejecting calls 
for help, furthered their peace talks with Prussia and consequently facilitated the 
dismantling of the coalition besieging France.”470 
An opposite argument, patently rejected by Łukaszewicz, was made in 
Celina Bobińska’s work published two years later. Bobińska believed that the 
highly positive appraisal of the Uprising and the Constitution of May 3rd by the 
classics was greatly exaggerated. As far as non-existent French aid was 
concerned, Bobińska claimed that the Jacobins displayed “an unbending class 
line and revolutionary vigilance with respect to the uprising – a movement of the 
gentry, in class terms, politically tending toward a compromise with 
feudalism.”471 Furthermore, she believed that the “slandering of the Jacobins,” 
accused of cold-hearted calculation, was characteristic of Polish bourgeois 
historiography of a nationalist bent. 
Though Marxist historians treated the first bourgeois revolution as a 
generally positive phenomenon, their sympathy for the movement was evidently 
limited in a myriad of ways. In the case of both Poland and East Germany, the 
French Revolution collided more or less emphatically with national history, and, 
as a result, was often accorded a mixed evaluation, if only for that reason. 
Further on, we will learn that a similar judgement was meted out to the 
Hungarian revolution of 1848-1849. Still, the revolution’s positive influence 
was placed in doubt not only because of the praise heaped on Kościuszko or the 
Befreiungskriege, but also as a result of the fact that one of the powers seeking 
to quash revolutionary, and later Napoleonic, France was Russia. 
Zdenĕk Nejedlý, whom we have quoted above, named in one breath two 
incidentally if not entirely mutually contradictory progressive events, of which 
the Czech folk both delightedly approved. The peasants did not only await 
impatiently for the eruption of the French Revolution in their own country – 
they also “understood” the Slavic idea at precisely the same time and welcomed 
with open arms the Suvorov-commanded Russian army, advancing to do battle 
with the French. “And with his fervent friendship for the newly-found Slavic 
brethren, [Suvorov – MG] infused our people with a new, Slavic consciousness, 
which later played such an important role in our renaissance.”472 
Nejedlý’s idea of connecting the Russian presence in Moravia in 1799 to the 
national revival received a mixed response from Marxist historians. Josef Kočí 
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assumed that the Russians were responsible for a significant strengthening of 
Slavic ideology, which played a seminal role at an early stage of the revival, 
thereby aiding Czechs in an indirect manner. Besides, “the Czech people saw in 
their own eyes the beautiful traits typical of the Russian soldiers, their humility 
… self-assurance, cordiality, generosity and devotion. They were pleased by the 
hearty treatment their children received from the Russians, and admired the 
travelling soldiers’ courage and strength. They enjoyed the songs of the 
Russians.”473 Čestmír Amort claimed that the passage of the Russian troops 
proved indispensable for the national revival, since they virtually raised the 
nation from the dead. The same author also discussed the passage of the 
Russians through Slovakia, which occurred during the retreat from Austerlitz. 
He stressed not only the moral virtues of the simple soldier folk, but also the 
genius and paternalistic care of Mikhail Kutuzov, their commander: 
“Contemporary accounts – those already known and those we have just recently 
discovered – pay due homage to Kutuzov, an exceptional commander, who was 
not only a brilliant strategist and a strict superior, but also a caring father to all 
of his soldiers. He was just; when one of his subordinates was at fault, the 
culprit received due punishment whether or not he was a ‘blue blood.’ Not only 
did he care for his soldiers, their provisions, quarters, clothes, etc., but also for 
the civilians whom they met on their routes. Many orders, directives and letters 
reveal these traits of his character.”474 
The works of Amort were vehemently criticised in the Československý 
Časopis Historický, first by Milan Švankmajer, then by Jan Novotný, as well as 
in the Historický Časopis SAV by Zdeňek Konečny. Švankmajer accused Amort 
primarily of grave exaggeration. It was not the passage of the Russian forces, 
but the development of capitalism that propelled the Slavic revival. This analysis 
led to Švankmajer’s severest accusation: Amort’s theories were not only non-
Marxist, but actually anti-Marxist.475 Novotný, on the other hand, charged 
Amort with an uncritical treatment of his sources. He singled out Amort’s use of 
documents which originated in an urban environment as illustrative of the 
situation in the rural Moravia. At the same time, he agreed with Amort in his 
assessment of national activists who were critical of the Russians as instruments 
in the hands of the global forces of reaction. These activists were mistaken in 
undervaluing the influence which the Russians had on the development of the 
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national life of the Czechs.476 Konečný limited his input to a recognition of 
Amort’s book’s striking unreliability, listing the places where its author was at 
odds with the facts.477 
The debate over Amort’s dubious claims continued during a conference 
devoted to the role of the Soviet Union in Czech and Slovak history since the 
end of the 18th century. Jaroslav Vávra attempted to reconcile the French 
Revolution and Suvorov’s influence through a precise distinction: while Russia 
and Austria were reactionary so long as they wanted to destroy revolutionary 
France and attacked Napoleon, they became progressive once forced to defend 
themselves against the French. Later, when Napoleon began to lose ground, both 
his opponents turned reactionary yet again.478 For Vávra, the Russia of the late 
18th century embraced the role of Europe’s policeman, keeping all progressive 
currents in check. At the same time, he did not follow Amort’s lead in claiming 
that the Czechs were happy about the situation when forced to provide for the 
Russian army wintering on their lands. Furthermore, Vávra believed that 
Russia’s reactionary position did not antagonise Czech national revivalists – in 
truth, they were anxious that the ideas of the French Revolution might take root 
in their fatherland. There were no documents that could prove the thesis that 
Austrian authorities engaged in any sort of combat against Russophilia during 
the period.479 
Švankmajer took a similar stance at the aforementioned conference. He 
faulted Amort for being mistaken in claiming that popular Russophilia dating 
from 1798-1799 formed a particularly important element of contemporaneous 
relations between Czechs, Slovaks and the Soviet Union. That feeling, he 
reasoned, had far more reasonable grounds in then present-day Czechoslovakia. 
Amort responded that, while the goals of the Russian soldiers might have been 
extremely reactionary, objectively they played a positive role, exerting a 
“progressive” influence on the Czech people. In response, Švankmajer accused 
Amort of idealisation and oversimplification. There was to be no compromise 
position on the matter.480 
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It seems that Amort’s claims on the essential role the Russians played in the 
national revival were far more welcome in Slovak historiography. Karol Golán’s 
1964 volume of studies, published posthumously, stated that the sense of 
belonging to the Slavic community, which proved crucial for the revival of the 
Slovak nation, was born in 1805, when Kutuzov crossed Slovakia with his army, 
the greatest force in Europe.481 
While even Čestmír Amort agreed that the time spent by the Russians in 
Moravia and Slovakia affected the Czech and Slovak national revival only 
indirectly, Russian involvement in the war against Napoleon undoubtedly 
mattered for Germany. The Russians took part in the campaign of 1806-1807, 
culminating in the crushing defeat of Prussia, as well as, the campaign of 1813, 
during which the French were cleared entirely from all German territories. 
Russia also offered solace to Prussian patriots who were developing plans for 
liberating their fatherland from French domination. 
The defeat of Prussia sparked political and military reforms, bound up with 
the names of Baron Heinrich Friedrich Karl vom und zum Stein, General August 
Neithardt Gneisenau, Gerhard Johann von Scharnhorst, Karl von Grolman and 
Hermann von Boyen. The reforms, though enforced from the top down, received 
positive appraisal as a catalyst for the new capitalist formation. With the gentry 
compromised by the defeat to France, the key role in reforms was played by the 
bourgeoisie.482 Although Stein himself hailed from the wealthy nobility, he 
adhered to an ideology so progressive that in the early 1950s he rose to rank as 
one of the seminal figures in the Marxist retelling of German history. It was not 
insignificant that, having been deposed as the King’s minister, he travelled to 
Russia, where, as an advisor to tsar Alexander, he acted as an ambassador for 
Germany. Alexander Abusch compared Stein’s activities to the role played by the 
Communist Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland in Moscow.483 Heinz Kamnitzer 
wrote emphatically of the achievements of Stein and other like-minded patriots: 
“How hard was it for these people! How different was their situation from the one 
we live in! The German patriots of 1812-1813 were forced to rely on a 
spontaneous popular movement. Their official ally, tsarist Russia, had just at that 
point become the rallying point for the forces of resistance against the French 
occupation, and yet, at the same time, it was bent on achieving its own dynastic 
goals. Today, every German patriot knows that the German people living in a 
section of our fatherland can depend on its parties, organisations and the 
government, which inscribed on the land’s banners the slogan of freedom for our 
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entire country. Their powerful, infallible bedrock is Socialist Russia, which 
shields us from American aggression and aspires to ensure the unity and 
independence of every nation.”484 In the popular East German interpretation of the 
Befreiungskriege, every participant in the contemporary struggle had an historical 
counterpart: the United States were the France of the Napoleonic era; the 
countries of Western Europe, and West Germany in particular, were the 
Confederation of the Rhine; the Freikorps were described as “partisan troops,” 
and the role of tsarist Russia, the liberator, was handed to the Soviet Union.485 
The people inhabiting German territories were painfully tested by the French 
occupation while absorbing ever more patriotic propaganda. The first anti-
French popular revolt broke out in Tyrol, but the townsfolk were isolated from 
the peasant movement, and the ruling classes of Austria betrayed the Tyroleans 
by striking a deal with Napoleon. These events created a rift between Austria 
and Germany.486 Another wave of popular revolts swept through Germany in 
1813, with German patriots returning to the fatherland along with Russian 
troops. The Russians were offered a welcome befitting liberators, the more so 
because of the presence of a German legion among their ranks. The way in 
which the Russian folk defeated Napoleon was to serve as an example for the 
Germans.487 The heroism of the Russian soldiers and officers (and also the 
German patriots), however, contrasted with the cautious, greatly reserved 
conduct of the Prussian court, which was consumed by fears of a real popular 
uprising. After the Battle of Leipzig, when Russian and German officers of the 
“folk’s kin” argued for a continued offensive to the West of the Elbe, 
“reactionary circles” in Prussia halted the coalition’s victorious march.488 In 
general, East German Marxists believed that the tsar’s troops implemented 
German policies far more successfully than Prussian ruling circles. 
Just as had been the case during their earlier passage through Moravia and 
Slovakia, Russians proved their exceptional goodwill, internationalism and 
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discipline to the Germans as well: “They were infused with the spirit of popular 
war, driving them to defeat Napoleon’s armies. The entire nation offered 
generous support to their cause. And even though the Russian armies of 1812-
1813, as earlier, were of a feudal nature in class terms, one could never perceive 
them as a blind tool of the tsar.”489 They were marked by a very high morale and 
even the unfavourable, pedantic Prussian authorities had nothing to complain 
about in relation to the passage of the allied troops.490 
The role Marxist historians of the GDR and Czechoslovakia assigned to the 
Russian soldiers remained perennially obvious up until 1989. The highly positive 
appraisal of German reformers in works produced before and during the jubilee of 
1953, on the other hand, proved far less durable. Already in 1950, Soviet scholars 
attacked the exceedingly positive depiction of Baron vom Stein in Heinz 
Kamnitzer’s Stein und das Deutsche Komitee in Rußland 1812/1813. In the pages 
of Voprosy Istorii, they pointed out that the German baron was not only an 
aristocrat, but also an English sympathiser.491 The Party’s guidelines for 
historians, published in 1955 as Die Verbesserung der Forschung und Lehre in 
der Geschichtswissenschaft der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, stressed, 
among other things, the necessity of providing appropriate definition to the role 
played by the masses in the Befreiungskriege.492 The university textbook on 
German history emphasised the national-liberal movement’s leaders’ persistence 
in pursuing a liberal-bourgeois political program for fear of an anti-French revolt 
turning into a social revolution. Joachim Streisand even recalled that Gneisenau’s 
plan for the rebellion put in place specific measures meant to hold back the 
“hotheads” who wanted to bring about a war against the gentry.493 During the 
next jubilee in 1963, criticism was heaped on the publications of 10 years before, 
with claims that those publications had often overstated the role of the reformers 
at the expense of the aspirations and achievements of the German folk.494 
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Heinrich Scheel even voted for the inclusion of popular movements that did not 
challenge the French at all in the national liberation struggle’s narrative. For him, 
the unrest in rural Saxony or Silesia, where news of the Prussian defeat caused the 
local peasants to breach their duties, was a progressive and patriotic event. He 
was, at the same time, fully conscious of the paradox inherent in his argument, as 
the very same peasants were quite welcoming toward the French.495 
The role Napoleonic France, or indeed the Russian troops, played in Polish 
history simply could not be viewed in a manner analogous to the prevailing 
interpretations in historiographies of the GDR or Czechoslovakia. Even in the 
early 1950s, it was unthinkable to write of Suvorov’s humaneness when his 
army was culpable for the slaughter of the populace on the eastern outskirts of 
Warsaw. One could never hope to prove the existence of a Polish-Russian 
brotherhood of arms, nor of any positive influence the Russians could have 
exerted on the development of Polish national culture; neither did Russians exert 
any recognizable influence on local radical social movements, which typically 
harboured an anti-Russian attitude. Works of the kind Čestmír Amort produced 
in Czechoslovakia never emerged in Poland. Still, the role played in Polish 
history by Napoleon, the Legions, or the Duchy of Warsaw, were re-evaluated. 
Bonaparte ranked as one of the historical figures who grew steadily less and 
less progressive in the eyes of Marxist scholars with the passage of time. The 
young general of revolutionary France, successfully commanding the Army of Italy 
against one of the culprits of the partitions of Poland, was a pristine figure. The 
same could not be said of Napoleon the First Consul, and even less of Emperor 
Napoleon I, a reactionary ruler if there ever was one. The Napoleonic legend was 
just as reactionary, especially in the part involving Poland, “the legend of Napoleon 
as ‘the father of all Poles’ or ‘the reviver of the Fatherland.’”496 Adam Korta 
observed that “The Napoleonic legend … was exploited by the Polish bourgeoisie 
… as a means of spreading and deepening anti-Soviet sentiments within our 
society.”497 The lion’s share of responsibility for popularising this legend went to 
Józef Piłsudski, who did all he could to transfer “onto the Soviet Union all the 
hatred the Poles harboured for the tsars.”498 
Just as Napoleon could represent the forces of progress as well as reaction, 
his subordinates served divergent causes, especially the Polish troops in the 
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service of France, and the army of the Duchy of Warsaw. Some of these bore a 
certain resemblance to just wars, others were unquestionably unjust. The very 
fact that the dedication and courage of Polish soldiers remained the same 
regardless of the nature of the wars they were engaged in, inclined some 
scholars toward vehement criticism of their attitudes. For Adam Korta, it was 
precisely during the Napoleonic period that “the romance arises of glorious 
cavalry assaults or courageous bayonet charges, with standards aflutter to the 
sound of the drum, drowning out, in seeming willfulness, any consideration of 
the goals and meaning of the struggle at hand, any question regarding the actual 
value of the struggle for Poland.”499 However, Marxists did recognize some 
positive values in the democratic nature of the Polish Legions. Radical émigré 
leftists “were struck” by the contrast between the often reactionary role the 
legionnaires were largely made to play and the popular character of the 
formation in which they served. With the latter trait enjoying an undeniable 
supremacy, “many … Polish radicals joined the Legions to fight for Poland hand 
in hand with the Polish soldier-peasant.”500 Cooperation between radicals and 
the peasant soldiers of the Legions spawned numerous plots against Bonaparte’s 
dictatorial rule.501 The fact that the Polish forces were formed for the most part 
from the peasantry had far-reaching consequences, as they were later 
transformed into “rural ‘troublemakers’ and peasant leaders in the class 
struggle.”502 
At the same time, as already mentioned, the Legions were sometimes tasked 
with fairly inglorious duties. They occupied an ambiguous position at the very 
beginning of their service, acting as gendarmerie, or perhaps the overseers of 
Napoleon’s less reliable Italian allies.503 The involvement of Polish soldiers in 
quelling the rebellion in San Domingo proved particularly vile and damaging. 
According to the authors of the “Draft,” the Poles were sent into the Caribbean 
primarily because of the spread of anti-Napoleon plots among the soldiers. The 
fact that “people who fought for Polish freedom were ordered to subdue the 
Negroes fighting for their own freedom” was deemed the most disagreeable of 
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all. The soldiers did not want to be involved in the expedition: “Polish soldiers, 
being of peasant stock, did not enjoy this combat, in their hearts siding with the 
Negro peasant.”504 
Yet, the involvement of Polish forces in the Napoleonic wars sometimes 
proved beneficial. In 1806, hearing news of the impending arrival of French 
forces into the lands Prussia claimed during the Partitions of Poland, “The richer 
section of landowners remained inactive, but the peasants, especially the farm 
retinue, gladly joined ranks with the enemies of the Prussians. … In the Łęczyca 
voivodship, a peasant mob wilfully arrested a German squire as an enemy of the 
French.”505 The Poles played a particularly important role in the siege of 
Gdańsk.506 Even later, in another “ever Polish” territory – Silesia – the local folk 
welcomed the soldiers of the Duchy with arms wide open.507 The defensive war 
of 1809 also had a positive impact as a national liberation struggle. Of particular 
interest is the manner in which the tactical moves of the Polish commander-in-
chief, prince Józef Poniatowski, were interpreted. His decision to distribute arms 
to the people of Warsaw right after the battle of Raszyn was read as a timid 
attempt at sparking resistance among the popular strata. The fact that the 
withdrawal of Polish forces from Warsaw and their relocation to Galicia, behind 
Austrian lines, prompted the archduke Ferdinand to engage in talks with 
Poniatowski was understood to have been occasioned by the fear of “a possible 
resistance in a town renowned for its traditions of revolt.” At the same time, the 
move was also deemed to have been caused by Poniatowski’s anxiety with 
regard to a vivid popular movement. By giving the town away to the Austrians, 
Poniatowski “from a political standpoint, freed himself from pressures exerted 
by the revolutionary capital and robbed the Jacobins of all power to mobilize the 
people of Warsaw. The people itself was outraged at the news of capitulation, 
and Warsaw’s saleswomen slung mud at the withdrawing commander-in-
chief.”508 In other words, Poniatowski handed Warsaw to the Austrians for fear 
of the revolutionary stirrings of the popular masses, and the Austrians engaged 
in negotiations with the Poles because of this very same revolutionary fervour. 
Comparing the treatment accorded the French Revolution, Napoleon and his 
Russian adversaries in the historiographies in question, we witness another 
interesting methodological problem: how should one relate commonly approved 
progressive traditions to local national histories? In Stalinist incarnations of 
Marxist historiography both the French Revolution and, to an even greater 
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extent, the Russian army, were the bearers of historical progress. Evidently, 
scholars of Central and Eastern Europe tried to prove (if possible) that their 
nations, or at least the popular strata, viewed both the French Revolution and the 
courageous tsarist soldiers favourably. This was more easily said than done, 
when the two progressive phenomena in question stood on opposite sides of the 
barricade. The clash of these positive ideas was typically won by the eventually 
victorious Suvorov, while the French Revolution, having proven itself defective 
in ever-new ways, ultimately transformed into a reactionary Napoleonic regime. 
It is hard not to notice that East German works painted Napoleon in a much 
darker hue than Polish studies. Both Polish and German authors retained 
essential sections of their national traditions which maintained their positive 
resonance despite changes in the frame of reference. Thus, the Baron vom Stein, 
a Prussian reformer, was associated with the liberation struggles of the German 
folk rather than the reactionary monarchy (or monarchies) he served. The 
Legions, on the other hand, remained a progressive, popular force even while 
serving such unjust causes as the oppression of other nations. It seems that 
scholars of the GDR went farther than their Polish counterparts in this drive 
toward incorporating particular figures and events of the Napoleonic era into 
their “progressive traditions.” The reactionary “Napoleonic legend” made its 
way into numerous Polish Marxist studies, while the analogous problem posed 
by the interpretation of the Befreiungskriege in 19th and 20th century Germany 
did not attract as much attention, despite the Prussian reformers’ persistent 
presence as the most favoured historical protagonists of the “Prussian school,” 
and despite Johann Gustav Droysen’s belief that the Prussian reforms ranked 
among the most important revolutions in human history (on par with the 
American and French Revolutions).509 Marxist scholars were also silent on the 
role the Befreiungskriege played in the Third Reich’s propaganda around the 
end of the Second World War. 
Of note is also another virtue of the historical plots discussed above. As Karl 
Heinz Schäfer noted, the Marxist interpretation of the Befreiungskriege elevated 
the people while pushing the ruling classes deep into obscurity.510 This 
somewhat self-explanatory observation sidesteps a rather arresting aspect of the 
phenomenon in question. The fact that the popular masses are cast almost 
exclusively in progressive roles was used not only to further the critique of the 
ruling classes; at times, phenomena of note for national history were “redeemed” 
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in the face of Marxist critique precisely because they engaged the popular 
masses. The Befreiungskriege, the Polish Legions in Italy, and even the positive 
views of the Russian army held by Czech and Slovak peoples serve as perfect 
examples of this phenomenon. Their popular nature sufficed as evidence of their 
progressiveness, in a way, even though the reins of power continued to be held 
by the privileged classes, and political programs often proved to be far from 
revolutionary. 
 
The National Movements of the 19th Century 
Czech and Slovak Marxist historians repeatedly stressed the unchallenged status 
of national revival movements as supreme achievements in the histories of their 
respective nations. The revival was said to have been designed and executed by 
the Czech and Slovak people. The author of the preface to the Polish edition of 
Arnošt Klíma’s book on the events of 1848 commends Klíma precisely for 
debunking “the traditional belief that the revival was the fruit of the work of 
exceptional individuals of noble or bourgeois origin.”511 At the same time, 
Marxist historians never failed to reckon with the impact of particular national 
revivalists, quite a few of whom were born and raised among the people. 
Lenin’s dictum to the effect that the intelligentsia does not constitute a social 
class, but merely a stratum, and thus can be of service to different classes, was 
invoked repeatedly. During the revival, the intelligentsia served the Czech and 
Slovak people.512 Yet, the main protagonists of the revival, the priest-revivalists, 
would never attain the status of social reformers, being heavily implicated in the 
feudal system.513 
Nevertheless, the assessment of the national revivalists was unquestionably 
positive. In Marxist studies, Josef Dobrovský became a tireless pioneer and 
champion of human progress; Jan Kollár, the creator of the theory of Slavic 
reciprocity, was imbued with progressive humanism and a democratic spirit. 
Their errors stemmed solely from a self-explanatory ignorance of Marxist 
thought. Dobrovský, for instance, a representative of the Enlightenment, “could 
not have fully understood the revolutionary underpinnings of the Hussite 
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movement,”514 while the arrival of Ľudovít Štúr’s national activists rendered 
Kollár and his pan-Slavism objectively reactionary.515 
The national revival also played a seminal role in shaping the common 
future of Czechs and Slovaks in a single state.516 Ideas of Slavic cooperation 
were rooted in the period of national revival.517 According to Kočí “Hence it is 
not by chance that our socialist society, imbued with a vivid, loving interest, 
evaluates and appreciates the significance of our national revivalists. At the 
same time, it steers clear of an uncritical cult of these great people, accepting the 
historical conditions of their efforts and struggle.”518 
Independent Slovak research on the national revival was in many ways 
reminiscent of the work conducted by Czech Marxists. Slovak scholars also 
relied on a fixed set of assumptions about the significance for the national 
revival of the masses’ involvement, the decomposition of feudal relations, and 
the emergence of a new, capitalist order.519 Likewise, they appreciated the role 
played by exceptional individuals, the national revivalists. Historiography of the 
1950s made great strides in this respect, recognising the achievements of 
Ľudovít Štúr as well as his predecessors, especially Anton Bernolák. This area 
was also the scene of several battles between Czech and Slovak scholars. The 
Czech Slavist, Frank Wollman, in his Slovantství v jazykově literárním obrození 
u Slovanů (Praha 1958), offered a critique of Bernolák’s 1787 proposal for the 
codification of a Slovak literary language that was accepted by Catholic circles 
of the Slovak intelligentsia. Wollman, like other Czech scholars of the era, 
tended to promote an alternative current of late 18th century Slovak culture that 
advocated the assumption of Czech as the literary language for Slovaks. Slovak 
Marxists were far more supportive of Bernolák and his followers, recognising 
their involvement in the shaping of the national language, as well as their 
progressive political program.520 This positive appraisal of Bernolák made its 
way into the university textbook on the history of Czechoslovakia.521 
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There was also room enough for a positive assessment of the Slovaks who 
had laid the groundwork for the Czech national revival. Pavol Jozef Šafárik, the 
author of a fantastical theory of the European indigenousness of the Slavs, 
“proved beyond all doubt that Slavs participated actively in the history of 
Europe from time immemorial, and besides, demonstrated that Slavs also took 
an active part in the shaping of European culture.… [T]he goal of his work was 
to abolish the superstitious belief in Slavic retardation, to illustrate the influence 
the Slavs exerted on ancient culture, and further, to prove that they played a 
major role in the formation of European culture in the first millennium A.D.”522 
Jan Kollár, who “sympathised with the Russians since his childhood,”523 was 
also named as a source of Slovak progressive traditions.524 
Slovak publications often addressed the problem of Czech-Slovak relations 
during the period of national revival. The tone employed, however, differed 
from that found in the works of Czech scholars. Scholars researching the 19th 
century from a Slovak perspective often compared the two national movements, 
finding the Slovak one to be more progressive. This was supposedly most 
visible during the Springtime of the Peoples. Jarmila Tkadlečková pointed out 
that the Czech bourgeoisie attempted to dominate the young Slovak national 
movement in order to eventually lead it into reactionary positions.525 Although 
in the end both Czech and Slovak national activists failed to join in with the 
Revolutions of 1848, Slovaks continued to embrace a progressive standing for a 
longer time, mostly because they initially considered resolving the Slovak 
national issue through becoming a part of a multi-national, democratic 
Hungary.526 
The national revivalists were typically bound to the Slavic idea. In her 
comparative studies of the cultural consciousness of Western and Southern 
Slavs, Maria Bobrownicka counts Czechs and Slovaks among the nationalities 
particularly badly infested with the “Slavic myth.” Embraced by national 
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cultures, this myth inadvertently translated into a willing rejection of an original, 
existing tradition that bound the respective nations to the European West. 
Instead of pursuing a more comprehensive realisation of a culture of the West 
(which, for Bobrownicka, would be the “natural” course of development), the 
Slavic revivalists turned away from it.527 It is debatable whether the Czech and 
Slovak national revivals did indeed represent as singularly an anti-European 
drive as Maria Bobrownicka claims, but one can hardly overlook the fact that 
her interpretation bears a number of similarities to the popular reading of the 
“Slavic myth” disseminated across Bohemia and Slovakia in the latter half of the 
19th century – the difference being that the pan-Slavist nationalist activists 
tended to ascribe a diametrically opposite value to the phenomenon than did 
Bobrownicka. 
The “anti-Occidentalism” of the national revival was also a crucial subplot 
of Marxist analysis of the phenomenon, and was typically approved of by 
Marxist historians. Given that the revival was bound up with the emergence of 
the idea of cooperation between Slavic states and nations under the aegis of the 
Russians, the political implications of the Slavic myth seem to have played a 
crucial role in this respect. It was clear for Marxist historians that true Slavic 
reciprocity could only take place in collaboration with the Soviet Union.528 In 
January 1948, Zdeněk Nejedlý offered a telling parallel with 19th century pan-
Slavism: “We are fighting in the name of a Slavic orientation represented by 
Stalin. This is how we understand Slavic politics today. But we can see that the 
bourgeoisie fully comprehends the implications of this. And it looks to history, 
too, hoping to prove that we have always been a Western nation and never had 
anything to do with the East.”529 
The Slavic idea underpinned the drive toward independence for Slavic 
nations. Polish scholars who did not accept this view found themselves under 
fire from Czechoslovak Marxists.530 For the Czechs, the idea was undoubtedly 
progressive, although not without important reservations. While Russophiles of 
the early 19th century were seldom criticised, their later counterparts received 
less favorable assessments. Capitalist society produced two forms of 
Russophilia: the first, a regressive, bourgeois attachment to the tsarist order; the 
second, a progressive and revolutionary workers’ movement.531 Nonetheless, 
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any variant of pan-Slavism ranked higher than Austro-Slavism. The Slavic idea 
diminished in time, as a result of tsarist policies: the quelling of both Polish 
uprisings, in 1830 and 1863, seriously affected the image of Russia in 
Czechoslovak Marxist historiography. In both cases, the most progressive 
currents within Czech and Slovak societies sided with the revolutions and 
against the tsar.532 At the same time, scholars repeatedly stressed that “the 
Russian folk had nothing to do with this eruption of tsarist despotism.”533 After 
the collapse of the January Uprising of 1863 in Poland, Czech Russophilia 
became an unequivocally progressive cultural movement, devised to salvage 
progressive and lasting values from the wealth of Russian culture.534 
Similarities between the Marxist interpretation of Slovak and Czech national 
revivals go far beyond the parallels we have drawn here. In truth, the only 
significant difference was the fact that Czech historians looked to the German 
revolution of 1848 as a point of departure for their national movement, while 
their evaluation of the Hungarian revolution of the same year played an 
important, but hardly crucial role. 
The events of 1848 were often joyfully recounted in Marxist historiography, 
with the radical wing of the revolution and the aborted Prague uprising receiving 
the highest accolades. Marx and Engels’ praise of the uprising was eagerly 
recollected. Marxist scholars also directed attention to the fact that different 
groups involved in the uprising took divergent stances toward it, resulting in 
clear-cut divisions between the reactionaries (opposing the movement) and 
progressives (taking part in it).535 In scholarship devoted to the events of 1848, 
the leading role was invariably ascribed to Josef Václav Frič, an insurgent 
leader. Espousing a supposedly correct view of the situation, Frič advocated a 
revolutionary outbreak; the moderate Palacký, on the other hand, was invariably 
cast as his misguided counterpart.536 At the same time, Czech scholars did not 
fail to add that Czech liberals were hardly isolated in their embrace of a 
reactionary position in 1848 – Hungarian and German liberals did likewise. The 
Germans of Prague were even said to have sabotaged the initiatives of Czech 
democrats from the outset.537 Even the German democrats failed to comprehend 
the nature of events and did not support “the Czech national interest in a 
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common, revolutionary struggle against the feudal, imperial Vienna.”538 This 
misjudgment allowed the Czech bourgeoisie to introduce appeals for a fight for 
national equality, a position which swayed the popular vote. The proletariat was 
alone in rejecting the nationalists’ propaganda.539 Czech Marxist historians also 
often stressed that the uprising was quelled by units formed from Germans and 
Hungarians.540 
The Slavic Congress was another historical event which received divergent 
appraisals from Czech historians and their Soviet colleagues. For Ivan Udaltsov, 
the sole progressive aspect of the Congress stemmed from the involvement of 
Polish delegates,541 but the authors of the university textbook on the history of 
Czechoslovakia had a much more positive opinion of the event.542 According to 
Czech historians, the year 1848 also reinforced a rising sense of community 
between Czechs and Slovaks, with both nations forced into strict cooperation 
because of German and Hungarian nationalisms.543 
The attitudes Marx and Engels espoused toward the Czech national 
movement became a stinging matter for Czech historians – so much so that the 
subject was rarely even broached. Typically, historians limited their input to 
passing remarks about the positive response of the classics to the eruption of the 
Prague uprising.544 Engels’ view of the Czechs as a people with no history, 
condemned to dissolution in the German sea, was never quoted in any 
Czechoslovak publication. Udaltsov favored a different approach, arguing in the 
preface to his book that, “[i]n a number of works, Marx and Engels vehemently 
condemned the Czech nationalist movement of the year 1848-1849 for its 
counterrevolutionary stance toward the European revolution.”545 In conclusion, 
he concurred with the opinion of the classics: “In this light, it becomes apparent 
that the role played in 1848-1849 by the Czech national movement should be 
deemed counterrevolutionary, and the positions taken by the Czech nation in the 
second stage of the movement—in the decisive period for the revolution raging 
throughout Austria—cannot be taken as anything other than reactionary.”546 
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The Hungarian revolution of 1848-1849 was a crucial component of 
Udaltsov’s “European revolution.” According to Udaltsov, in this European 
conflict, the Czech national movement opted to side with the monarchs, proving 
itself “reactionary.” As already evident, Czech Marxist historians attempted to 
defend their national tradition from such a slanderous opinion. However, they 
never went as far as their Slovak colleagues, who denied the progressive nature 
of the revolution, because that would have set them in conflict not only with the 
opinions of Marx and Engels, but also (and more importantly) with those of 
Soviet historiography, represented by Udaltsov. They preferred laying stress on 
the notion that the Czech bourgeoisie was isolated in its aversion to the 
Hungarian revolution, which meant that Udaltsov was right in deeming its 
position reactionary. The lower classes, however, took a different course of 
action, often exhibiting sympathy with the Hungarians.547 
This was not the only means employed by Czech historians to rehabilitate 
the Czech national movement. They also tried to indirectly defend the position 
of the national leadership, so vehemently criticised by Udaltsov. The strategy 
they used was borrowed from their Slovak colleagues. As Arnošt Klíma noted, 
“Undoubtedly, the Hungarians, much like the Germans, were themselves 
partially responsible for the Slavs’ rejection of their revolutionary cause in 
1848.”548 In the university textbook on the history of Czechoslovakia, one can 
also find a passage comparing the two Hungarian revolutions – of 1848 and 
1956 – and highlighting the reactionary aspects of both.549 
The task set before Polish and German Marxists was never as demanding as 
the aforementioned reinterpretation of the classics. Marx and Engels viewed the 
Polish national movement in a decidedly more positive light than they did its 
Czech or Slovak counterparts; they supported the Polish uprisings, and were 
themselves actors in the events of the Springtime of the Peoples in Germany. I 
already discussed the problem the Kościuszko Uprising posed for Polish Marxist 
historiography. The same doubts – whether the limitations of the Polish liberation 
movements outweighed their progressiveness – were raised with respect to each 
of the later revolts. Only the folk was deemed to have played an indisputably 
positive role throughout – it was solely due to its support and inspiration that the 
November Uprising ever broke out. In studies from the 1950s, Marxist historians 
highlighted the role of the Warsaw townsfolk in keeping the movement 
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(established by young members of the intelligentsia) alive. Participants in the 
original plot – “adolescent members of the gentry and intelligentsia, a potential 
reservoir for the left, were easily manipulated by aristocratic circles that sought to 
employ them as an advance guard for the counterrevolution.” This may have been 
inevitable had it not been for the commotion among the Warsaw folk, and 
particularly the seizure of the Warsaw Arsenal. It was “[t]he peasants and the 
plebeians [who] single-handedly transformed a minor military disorder into a 
major movement, an almost year-long battle against the might of the tsarist 
regime,” and, since the outbreak of the uprising on that November Night, “the 
victory of the uprising lay in the hands … of the people of Warsaw.”550 
With the urban popular masses claiming initiative, “cautious milieus” grew 
uneasy. They (successfully) attempted to gain control over the uprising in order 
to strip it of its revolutionary aspect. It may seem a paradox, but Marxist studies 
of the uprising tended to depict members of extremely reactionary circles as 
having been supportive of the idea of incorporating Ukrainian and Belorussian 
territories into the Kingdom of Poland – which indirectly meant they were 
supportive of an energetic spread of the uprising to the East. Obviously, they 
were guided by the desire to reconstitute their rule over the Belorussian and 
Ukrainian peasantry.551 
Of the political currents represented in the uprising, only the far left 
consistently, though clumsily, opposed the counterrevolution. The left was 
isolated in its struggles to improve the peasants’ lot, but “it failed to formulate a 
revolutionary call for peasant enfranchisement, this being the foremost reason 
why it could not attain victory.”552 The fact that the left wing of the uprising was 
specifically involved in seeking a total break with Russia was largely omitted in 
studies published in the 1950s. 
The Marxist assessment of Joachim Lelewel, one of the leaders of the 
insurgents’ left wing, was very typical of his political camp. This exceptional 
historian proved a wobbly politician, seeking “to use his political club as a sort 
of conduit between the people and the parliament, a conduit which would 
neutralize and blunt the vehemence of the plebeians’ assaults on the 
government.”553 Żanna Kormanowa stressed the difficulties faced by the leader 
of the only revolutionary club and a member of a procrastinating insurgent 
government, as well as the irreconcilable paradox of his position: “He should 
have preferred leaving the compromise-seeking government,” she reasoned, “to 
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contend for power in the name of the left wing of the movement under the 
banner of agrarian reform. It would have been wiser to prepare the grounds for a 
resolution by force, or for a coup d’état.” But – as the historian duly noted – 
“[Lelewel] was not a man of action – he was a scholar.”554 
The erroneous, wobbly, undecided, and sometimes even reactionary politics 
of the insurgent leadership were poignantly illustrated in its diplomacy. Prince 
Adam Jerzy Czartoryski, tasked with maintaining foreign relations, persistently 
failed to reckon both with the enmity of Western European elites toward the 
Poles, and with the sympathy of their countries’ popular strata. Even in 
Bohemia, despite the dominance of pan-Slavic ideology, “The popular masses 
… and a significant proportion of the townsfolk supported the Polish cause 
against the tsar.” In addition, Russian soldiers sometimes switched sides to join 
the Poles.555 
Given the impotence (or treason) of the upper classes, the better part of 
responsibility for conducting military operations rested with the people. A sense 
of “treason by the elites” spread wildly, finding expression, e.g., in popular 
songs and a growing “revolutionary turmoil” in rural areas.556 Successive 
counterrevolutionary measures by the government finally led to an eruption of 
the disaffected people of Warsaw. On August 15th, 1831, a mob lynched 
prisoners and demanded a more energetic prosecution of the military campaign. 
Though these events were brought about by the leftist Patriotic Society, none of 
its leaders commanded the mob. While the events of August 15th did not result 
in a leftist coup, the fact that they presented the possibility of this kind of a 
development had a bearing on the period after the demise of the uprising: “It is 
extremely telling,” Tadeusz Łepkowski stated, “that the tsarist regime ruthlessly 
pursued and punished the ‘perpetrators’ of the events of the night of August 
15th, while showing so much compassion to several members of the uprising’s 
‘top.”557 
Taking into account the various factors affecting the critique of particular 
political groupings and politicians of the November Uprising, one would be 
excused for assuming that the assessment of the event by Marxist 
historiographers could not be positive. However, the fact that the uprising 
sparked some radical activism swayed historians to accept the notion that the 
uprising was – at least to an extent – a bourgeois-democratic revolution. Though 
Engels saw it for a “conservative revolution,” Józef Dutkiewicz observed that 
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“In the term ‘conservative revolution,’ one should not put too much stress on the 
adjective ‘conservative,’ but conversely, underline clearly and firmly that the 
uprising was, in the particular conditions of the era and contemporary 
understanding of its significance, a revolution.”558 From a broader perspective, 
the collapse of the uprising compromised the aristocracy and, hence, hastened 
the advance of a future revolution.559 For Marxists, the movement’s primary 
gain was the crystallisation of the Polish political scene: a clear-cut division into 
the popular progressive camp and the noble-aristocratic reactionary camp. In 
studies I gained access to, the necessity of an all-national movement and a 
bloody Polish-Russian war for the representation of the progressive and 
regressive camps in Polish society was never presented as a possible question 
for scholarly examination. Though an inquiry into the merits of the uprising 
would seem pertinent in the wake of the war, it did not occur to historians to 
pursue this problem until later on. 
With the collapse of the uprising, its active participants sought refuge 
abroad. The émigré political factions that emerged from these events served as a 
subject of particular interest to Marxist scholars, if only for the rich ties binding 
the refugees to the creators of Marxist philosophy. However, this interest did not 
translate into an unequivocally positive representation of the Great Emigration 
in studies from the 1950s. The characteristic critical edge of the Marxist 
interpretation of Polish history manifested itself in the description of the nature 
and achievements of the Hotel Lambert’s conservative-liberal camp. In works 
published toward the end of 1940s, Stefan Kieniewicz characterised the politics 
of Prince Adam Jerzy Czartoryski as approximating other, more radical émigré 
societies. Each of those “were staked nearly single-mindedly on the 
revolutionary card,” always in pursuit of the goal of peasant enfranchisement.560 
On the other hand, Żanna Kormanova’s booklet on Lelewel, published in 1946, 
identified Czartoryski as a member of the aristocratic reactionary camp.561 The 
“methodological breakthrough” in Polish historiography pushed Polish 
historians into embracing Kormanowa’s views in this regard. In studies 
published during the next few years, one could find passages on the so-called 
“Czartorism” (czartoryszczyzna), a reactionary political program of rightist 
                                                            
558 Józef Dutkiewicz, “Ewolucja lewicy w powstaniu listopadowym,” in: Z epoki 
Mickiewicza. Zeszyt specjalny „Przeglądu Historycznego” w rocznicę śmierci Adama 
Mickiewicza 1855-1955, eds. Stefan Kieniewicz, Izabela Bieżuńska-Małowist & Antoni 
Mączak, Wrocław 1956, 89.  
559 Historia Polski. Makieta, vol 2, part 2, 385. 
560 See Stefan Kieniewicz, Oblicze ideowe Wiosny Ludów, Warszawa 1948, 55; idem, Czyn 
polski w dobie Wiosny Ludów, Warszawa 1948, 7-9 & 149. 
561 See Kormanowa, Joachim Lelewel, 92-93. 
158 Chapter III  
 
circles of the Great Emigration. The programmatic goals of Czartorism affected 
the camp’s politics: “Czartoryski’s aristocratic camp sought to resolve the Polish 
question via a reactionary, ‘top-down’ approach – desiring an adjustment to 
necessary capitalist shifts, it also wanted to smuggle them through in a similar 
manner. The goal was to betray the revolutionary, patriotic strivings of the 
masses: to subordinate the future of Poland exclusively to international haggles 
and intrigues conducted in the anterooms of distinguished diplomats, avoiding 
the engagement of revolutionary classes at home and the forces of European 
revolution. This faction wanted most of all to avoid binding the cause of 
liberation to dangerous social aspirations.”562 
This final aspect of the internal politics of the Hotel Lambert faction drew 
particular focus in studies published in the 1950s. “Czartorism perpetually talks 
about independence,” wrote Bronisław Baczko, “but the cause of national 
liberation is always treated as separate from the struggles of the popular masses 
for anti-feudal transformation.” The reactionary camp was consumed with a fear 
of the masses. For this reason, liberal émigré circles proved even more hostile to 
the cause of liberating the oppressed classes than openly reactionary politicians. 
Baczko compared Hotel Lambert to national renegades like Henryk Rzewuski 
(who declared that the demise of the Polish state led first to a degeneration, and 
then to an obliteration of the Polish nation).563 The “aristocratic-feudal camp” of 
the Emigration propagated an Occidentalism that was pernicious to the Polish 
cause.564 It also circulated anti-Russian propaganda, seeking to prevent all 
cooperation between Polish and Russian revolutionaries.565 
Czartoryski’s reactionary camp was contrasted with the leftist émigré 
societies – the Polish Democratic Society (Towarzystwo Demokratyczne 
Polskie, TDP) and the Communes of the Polish People (Gromady Ludu 
Polskiego, GLP). Potentially, these organisations constituted highly “efficient” 
elements of a progressive heritage for the Polish nation. The stated goal of both 
was a reconstruction of social relations, but each bound the transformations to a 
nationalist agenda. Foremost among the Polish Democratic Society’s virtues was 
a widely shared distaste of Czartoryski’s camp. The Polish Democratic Society 
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contradicted the clerical bent of Hotel Lambert by embracing a decidedly more 
advanced position: “The left of the Society railed against mysticism and 
messianism, vindicating the tradition of the Polish Enlightenment, with its 
materialist and rationalist achievements. The Society was particularly vehement 
in its assaults on towiańszczyzna566, which spread like a fungus in the 1840s, 
feasting on the dearth of ideological development and the collapse of numerous 
progressive thinkers and activists of that period.”567 Still, neither anti-clericalism 
nor rationalism were enough to treat this element of the Polish Democratic 
Society’s ideology as undeniably progressive. Bronisław Baczko observed that 
“The Enlightened taunts of TDP’s publications sometimes overshadowed its 
limited outlook – a lack of a decidedly materialist position.”568 The Society’s 
insufficiently radical social program resulted from the organisation’s class 
composition – most of its members hailed from the gentry.569 
A number of members of the Polish Democratic Society were clearly 
conscious of the class limitations of its political program. These members 
promptly left the Society, dominated by “compromisers” and “liberals,” to fight 
for a revolutionary transformation of their fatherland. According to Baczko, it 
fell to the founders of the Communes of the Polish People to finally overcome 
the barrier created by the revolution’s identification with the gentry, in order to 
become true revolutionaries.570 Witold Łukaszewicz wrote biographies of the 
two leaders of this political group, a fact which in itself illustrates Marxist 
historiography’s esteem for their achievements. Łukaszewicz – a scholar noted 
for his criticism of the country’s history – even found himself capable of awe at 
Tadeusz Krępowiecki’s ideological maturity. He contended that Krępowiecki’s 
writings were “strikingly rich in the ability to apply dialectical thinking to 
problems as complex as the genesis and role of absolutism, feudal exploitation, 
nationalist and religious oppression; [his work] reveals a baffling array of beliefs 
with respect to peasant revolts in the Ukraine, the role of masses in the 
formation of nation-states, the popular dictatorship, property and work.”571 
The contributions of the other leader of the Communes centred around a 
problem of key importance to Marxist scholars. “As we all know,” wrote Celina 
Bobińska, “the main contribution of [Stanisław Gabriel] Worcell was a glorious 
rapprochement and engagement in cooperative work with Herzen …, a policy of 
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alliance with the Russian revolution, the emergence and development of which 
were registered and acknowledged by Worcell, albeit in a thoroughly naïve, 
Utopian Slavic phraseology.”572 Władysław Bortnowski stressed that Stanisław 
Worcell overcame nationalist prejudice and fully comprehended the 
fundamental discord between the reactionary tsarist regime and the progressive 
Russian folk.573 That an alliance with Russia was an element of the Humań 
(Uman, today’s Ukraine) Commune’s program was a fact noted even by 
Bolesław Bierut.574 The fact that this cooperation was initiated by the left spread 
terror among reactionary circles, particularly the Czartorist camp.575 
The Polish-Russian alliance, however, was not an alliance of equal partners. 
In terms of ideology, Russian émigré circles far outpaced even the most radical 
Poles. Alexander Herzen was unrivalled in the extreme as a model of a true 
revolutionary: his revolutionary democratic political program was decidedly 
more radical than anything the Polish revolutionaries would concoct, whether 
abroad or at home.576 Already before 1863, he unconsciously shared Marx’s line 
of thinking, despite not having contacted him yet by that point. “We should be 
impressed even more,” stressed Bobińska, “by the proximity of their ideas … on 
the uprising [of 1863] – Marx and Engels on one side, and the Herzen-Ogarev 
camp on the other.”577 Comparisons between members of the Communes of the 
Polish People and the Russian revolutionaries stripped the former of some of 
their virtues, which were conversely highlighted when related to the outlook of 
Polish Democratic Society representatives. While the Communes were 
comprised of revolutionary democrats, the Society was supposedly a gathering 
of revolutionary nobles. However, when compared to Herzen, members of the 
GLP seemed more akin to revolutionary nobles, with the Russian meriting the 
title of a “revolutionary democrat.”578 
In spite of their unquestionable – in the Polish context – progressiveness, the 
Communes of the Polish People and specific political leaders were criticised in 
Marxist studies, not only for not holding their own with regard to the Russian 
                                                            
572 Bobińska, Marks, 129. 
573 See Władysław Bortnowski, “Przedmowa,” in: Łukaszewicz, Stanisław Gabriel 
Worcell, 5; see also: Historia Polski. Makieta, vol 2, part 2, 339. 
574 Bolesław Bierut, O Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej. Konstytucja Polskiej 
Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej, Warszawa 1954, 41. 
575 See Irena Koberdowa, “Walka czartoryszczyzny przeciwko sojuszowi polskich 
i rosyjskich rewolucjonistów w czasie powstania styczniowego,” in: Z epoki, 215 & 
225. 
576 See Łukaszewicz, Stanisław Gabriel Worcell, 47. 
577 Bobińska, Marks, 157. 
578 See Historia Polski. Makieta, vol 2, part 2, 551. 
 On the Lookout for Progressive Traditions 161 
 
revolutionaries, but also for their so-called objective faults. For instance, 
according to Łukaszewicz, Stanisław Worcell failed to surmount the burdening 
relics of feudalism in his thinking, which inevitably limited the revolutionary 
impact of his ideology.579 An even more significant error of the Polish radicals 
was that, while they undoubtedly espoused socialism, they tended toward its 
Utopian incarnation rather than its scientific one represented by Marxism. As 
Władysław Bortnowski lamented, “Until the very end of his active life, Worcell 
proved incapable of choosing the right field of combat – he could not turn away 
from utopianism, and draw closer to the scientific socialism of Marx and 
Engels.”580 To make matters even worse, the ideological evolution of the 
Communes tended toward socialist messianism. 
The “methodological breakthrough” in Polish historiography coincided with 
the centennial anniversary of the revolution of 1848. Just as during the preparations 
to the Year of Renaissance or Year of Enlightenment in later years, historians were 
expected to play a very significant role in the celebrations. The year 1948 saw the 
publication of a whole series of historical works devoted to questions related to the 
anniversary, spearheaded by a volume edited by Natalia Gąsiorowska-Grabowska, 
W stulecie Wiosny Ludów 1848-1849 (The 100th Anniversary of the Springtime of 
the Peoples 1848-1849). In the first volume of the publication, its editor declared 
that “The People’s Republic of Poland looks for its roots in a period removed from 
our times by a hundred years, dating its emergence to the period of the Springtime 
of the Peoples as a source for its current constitution.”581 Given such an outlook, 
the evaluation of the revolution could not have been other than positive; hence the 
tone of the majority of publications from 1948. In the edited volume mentioned 
above, Stefan Kieniewicz wrote about the heroism of the scytheman from Miłosław 
who washed the Polish people clean of the disgrace of the Galician Slaughter. He 
stressed the unity of the nation in the struggle for independence.582 The image of a 
national, class-indifferent solidarity was drawn even more compellingly in Oblicze 
                                                            
579 See Łukaszewicz, Stanisław Gabriel Worcell, 30. 
580 Bortnowski, “Przedmowa,” 6. 
581 Natalia Gąsiorowska-Grabowska, “Sytuacja gospodarczo-społeczna na zachodzie 
i wschodzie Europy w połowie XIX stulecia,” in: W stulecie Wiosny Ludów 1848-1948, 
ed. Natalia Gąsiorowska-Grabowska, vol. 1: Wiosna Ludów na ziemiach polskich, eds. 
Natalia Gąsiorowska-Grabowska, Stefan Kieniewicz, Anna Minkowska, Irena Pietrzak-
Pawłowska, Leon Przemyski & Mieczysław Tobiasz, Warszawa 1948, 42; other 
publications of the anniversary year were listed in articles by Stefan Kieniewicz, “Polski 
dorobek naukowy stulecia Wiosny Ludów,” Marian Tyrowicz, “Tematyka dziejów 
1848/9 r. w jubileuszowej historiografii obcej” and Henryk Batowski, “Z pokłosia 
Wiosny Ludów w dziejopisarstwie słowiańskim” (all included in Kwartalnik 
Historyczny 1949). 
582 Stefan Kieniewicz, Czyn polski w dobie Wiosny Ludów, Warszawa 1948, 149. 
162 Chapter III  
 
ideowe Wiosny Ludów (The Ideological Countenance of the Springtime of the 
Peoples). There, Kieniewicz wrote that “the programs and social slogans 
promulgated at home and abroad – enfranchisement, government of the people by 
the people – for most patriots are means toward a national end.… In the upper 
strata of the nation, one would be hard-pressed to name more than a few individuals 
willing to renounce statehood, even if its price was cultural dependence.”583 It 
seemed only right, then, that “for later generations, 1848 became the year of the last 
armed effort in the [Prussian] partition, a memory of a reconciliation of all social 
strata in the struggle for a sacred cause, yet another proof of the vitality of the 
Polish nation.”584 
Another characteristic feature of the images of the events of 1848 drawn by 
Polish scholars in anniversary publications was criticism of all symptoms of 
pan-Slavism, particularly visible in depictions of the Slavic Congress in Prague. 
Henryk Batowski viewed the organisers of the Congress in a highly critical 
manner, though conceding that their pan-Slavism had not yet become as 
degenerate as it would be in the 1860s and 1870s. Still, even in this relatively 
benign shape, the ideology was inadmissible, primarily because of “operating 
solely according to nationalist criteria … in total disregard of universal human 
values.” As Batowski added “Revolution, the rights of the working masses, the 
class movement of the proletariat – all of this was foreign, perhaps even hostile, 
to pan-Slavists and Austro-Slavists.”585 A detailed description of the Congress, 
presented by Kieniewicz, criticised Czechs who “were game to remove Poles 
from the proceedings for fear of having a revolution on their hands in their 
native Prague. Powerless to avoid inviting them, they demanded that active 
participation in the Congress be restricted solely to Austrian subjects. 
Nevertheless, the Polish name commanded so much respect that no one cared 
much for the rule.”586 
The claims presented by Stefan Kieniewicz were an extension of his beliefs 
dating from before the war. Kieniewicz saw the Polish cause of the 1848 period 
as equivalent to the cause of revolution, a belief disseminated by Marxist 
classics as well. Nonetheless, the “methodological breakthrough” deeply 
transformed the manner in which the events of the period were assessed. 
Looking through Kieniewicz’s texts from 1948, one could, for instance, find the 
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claim that the tsarist regime served the cause of Russian national expansion.587 
Later publications typically included a disclaimer stating that the tsar and the 
nation – the Russian folk – had no common agenda (and would never have one). 
However, for Kieniewicz, even the most reactionary policies of tsarist Russia 
did not affect the assessment of “national expansion.” Furthermore, after 1948, a 
vehement critique of Czech pan-Slavism, and particularly the Slavic Congress, 
would contradict the accepted interpretation of history and stand in conflict with 
Czechoslovak historiographic foundations. 
Publications dating from after 1949, outlining the progress of the Springtime 
of the Peoples in Polish territories as well as its international ramifications, 
passed an entirely different judgment. Just as in 1794 and 1830, the people were 
said to have joined the national liberation struggle en masse. Attitudes toward 
the uprising in Greater Poland, however, were dependent on social status: “In 
the early days, the rural poor showed more initiative than the landowners.”588 
Members of privileged classes and even democratic conspirators faced much 
sterner judgment. In chapters of the “Draft” authored by Stefan Kieniewicz, the 
idea of a national solidarity of all Poles was patently rejected.589 
Polish Marxist historians stressed the ambiguous role Russia and the 
Russians had played in the Springtime of the Peoples. “News of the revolution 
in the West coincided with a rising tide of peasant unrest throughout Russia,” 
Kieniewicz observed. Furthermore, “Among the volunteers from the Kingdom 
joining ranks with Poles, there were also some Russians – soldiers of the tsar’s 
army.”590 Celina Bobińska, on the other hand, underlined the commonality of 
interests between Polish and German democrats, claiming that “in the Poznań 
area, Prussian reactionaries trumped not only the local folk, but also the German 
revolution.”591 Publications dating from before 1948 maintained that “the 
radicalism of the Polish social agenda in the Greater Poland revolution stands in 
glaring opposition to the social program of the province’s German population, 
overwhelmed by a love of the old order, adhering to a bureaucratic and military 
despotism, enamored of tyranny and slavish subjection.”592 Especially in the 
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pages of the Western Review, events in Greater Poland were treated as yet 
another chapter in the perennial struggle between Poles and Germans.593 
According to Marxist authors, the progress of the Springtime of the Peoples 
in Polish lands proved that “Polish revolutionaries had not yet forged strong 
enough ties with the people.” A section of the Polish possessor classes was 
scared by the realistic prospect of an agrarian reform, leading them to consider 
cooperation with occupying governments. The revolutionaries were expected to 
know that the future of Poland depended solely on the people, who – though 
unenlightened – remained the only class to have passed the exam of 1848.594 
The last of the great national uprisings, in 1863, was framed in a similar 
interpretive scheme. Beginning with the top rungs of the social ladder, “major 
landowners and the grand bourgeoisie, consumed with a fear of an agrarian 
revolution, were both opposed to the idea of an armed struggle for independence 
insofar as its success hinged solely upon the involvement of broad national 
masses, primarily peasants.”595 The middle gentry and bourgeoisie were not as 
openly hostile to an armed struggle for independence, but erroneously bound 
their hopes to the involvement of Western powers. Besides, “landowners and 
bourgeois wanted to create a Poland that would include the lands of the 
Kingdom as well as the Stolen Lands, i.e., territories of Lithuania, Belarus and 
right-bank Ukraine within 1772 boundaries. The native Polish lands of the 
Prussian and Austrian partition, however, were not considered.”596 
Marxists placed the rightist socio-political camps in opposition to the 
“plebeian-popular” radicals, among them students, a section of the intelligentsia, 
artisans and plebeian masses, especially in Warsaw.597 Members of this group 
were positively affected by contacts with Russian revolutionaries. Ties with 
Russians, on the other hand, also forced Poles to accept radical solutions to the 
peasant question.598 They could rely on ranks of Russian regulars for performing 
the complex task of reaching distrustful social strata. Consequently, the left 
attempted to claim and radicalize the patriotic movement. To limit the possibility 
of a settlement with the tsar, they imposed upon the demonstrators slogans that 
positioned them in support of the restoration of the Stolen Lands. In studies from 
the 1950s, this was treated as a hindrance: “Unitary manifestations were a 
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political error of the reds. Instead of acknowledging the national struggles for 
liberation of the Lithuanian, Belorussian, and Ukrainian peasants, they evoked the 
meanest tradition of the Polish nobility, claiming Polish dominion of these 
countries.”599 The fact that the problem of the Stolen Lands was addressed by 
some of the reds automatically threw them into the movement’s right wing, in 
accordance with the rule set out by Andrzej Ślisz, who stated that “All those who 
demanded the inclusion of the Eastern territories of the ancient, feudal 
Commonwealth were concurrently engaged in upholding a superior role for the 
nobility in the country.”600 An important judgment with bearing for the whites as 
well as the reds stipulated that the uprising was brought about not by 
manifestations of patriotism, but by peasant resistance to serfdom.601 
The outbreak of the uprising, like the months of national agitation that 
preceded it, moved different groups within Polish society to take divergent 
positions with respect to it. Having assessed the insurgents’ military efficacy, 
Adam Korta claimed that “parties” consisting of peasants or poor artisans and 
proletarians enjoyed the most success. The very fact that the uprising lasted so 
long was a result of the popular masses’ active support.602 Emanuel Halicz wrote 
that the increased revolutionary commotion in rural areas of Poland even 
suggested a kinship with a bourgeois-democratic revolution.603 The peasants 
involved in the insurrection “sought to mold it into a mass, truly popular 
movement.”604 Sadly, in the end, the inclusion of the popular masses in the 
uprising failed to spark a revolution, the reason being the lack of a working class 
– a hegemon capable of rousing the whole nation. Still, the uprising played a 
crucial role in accelerating the formation process of the Polish nation.605 
The people greeted the National Government’s 1863 program of 
enfranchisement with mild approbation. During the Otwock conference, 
Emanuel Halicz assigned the program the key role in forcing the tsar to approve 
peasant enfranchisement, in 1864, on terms beneficial to the peasants. (Halicz’s 
opinion did not affect the generally approved Marxist timeline, in which 1864 
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continued to carry greater significance than 1863.) The involvement of the 
peasantry in the uprising amounted to not only a direct engagement in combat 
against the tsar’s army, but also – perhaps even, most importantly – it 
represented “the involvement in an anti-feudal struggle against the manors.”606 
The fact that the peasants generally did not support the insurgents resulted 
primarily from the actions of the possessor classes who attempted to isolate the 
radical agitators from the peasantry.607 Representatives of a reactionary direction 
in the insurgent government, the whites, strove to gain control over the entire 
movement. With respect to the Russian people, they introduced a “decidedly 
nationalist line.”608 Marxists interpreted the gentry’s casting about for 
international support as the recruitment of allies for combat against the 
indigenous progressive camp. Even the members of the lower sections of the 
clergy were seen to have played an ambiguous part in the uprising, joining the 
ranks of the insurgency not for reasons of patriotism, but to prevent an excessive 
radicalisation of the movement.609 A major error of the red left was the pursuit 
of a compromise with the right-wing members of the movement because “the 
concept of a national front, of unity and cooperation with the landowners” 
would have never appealed to the peasant masses.610 
In addition to covert internal enemies, the uprising had powerful external foes 
(as well as equally deadly false friends) more perfidious than the tsar himself. “Pius 
IX offered his blessings to the ruling powers in the pursuit of a conservative, 
Catholic Poland. But … he refused Poles the right to liberate themselves, by means 
of a revolution.”611 In the “camp of enemies of the uprising,” Adam Korta counted 
Pius IX, Napoleon III and Władysław Czartoryski, next to Alexander III, Bismarck 
and Aleksander Wielopolski. Policies of countries such as England or France, 
though seemingly sympathetic, “hid a decidedly anti-Polish position behind 
platitudes about friendship with the Polish nation.”612 Indeed, Poles could only 
depend on the support of the popular masses and the revolutionary milieux of 
Western Europe.613 Finally, the uprising was also sabotaged by the tsar’s 
propaganda, which played up “a perfidious argument that its aristocratic, regressive 
nature was supportive of the privileges of the nobility and the Church.”614 
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Still, the uprising could depend on the most reliable of allies: the Russian 
folk and Marx and Engels, “two people who, with their genius minds, mapped 
out new pathways for all humanity to follow.”615 In studies on the January 
Uprising, it was customary to refer to both as “the tested friends of the Polish 
people.” In numerous works, one could find reproductions of the same 
photograph, depicting Karl Marx with his daughter who wore a stylised cross 
from the uprising on her neck. Celina Bobińska, who devoted a separate book to 
the attitudes of the classics toward Poland, stressed that both Marx and Engels 
assessed the situation of the Polish with uncommon sobriety: “Both friends felt 
particular unease concerning the Bonapartist influences and dealings in the camp 
of the reds,” while “the whites for them were already branded direct agents for 
Palmerston and Bonaparte.”616 After the fall of the uprising, Engels made a 
comment which was commonly reproduced in Polish Marxist studies (with or 
without a citation): “Polish independence and Russian revolution are mutually 
dependent.” “This ingenious guideline,” wrote Andrzej Ślisz, “for the Polish 
liberation movement signified another, far more fundamental realisation of a 
shift of the center of the revolution’s international forces from the West toward 
the East.”617 
For Marxist historians, it was abundantly clear that Russian revolutionaries 
deeply sympathised with the Poles, a view at times confirmed by the Russians’ 
personal involvement in the uprising. The Russians saw a connection between 
the Russian revolution they craved and the Polish national liberation movement. 
They also tried to educate Poles concerning the true nature of the liberation 
struggle: “Only an agrarian revolution could ensure the masses’ broad 
involvement in the Polish independence movement. The red left, commanded 
for the most part by men raised under the influence of the great Russian 
revolutionary democrats, understood this, and, thus, formed the closest of ties 
with the anti-tsarist movement in Russia, with its program of peasant revolution. 
The Polish landowning reaction, on the other hand, constantly pestered by 
peasant revolts, was scared of the Russian revolutionary spirit due to its 
radicalising influence on Poland.… The threat of an alliance with Russian 
revolutionaries also bode ill for the reds’ liberal-bourgeois right who willingly 
compromised with the feudal squire, the forerunner of the capitalist landlord.”618 
As already mentioned, Russian soldiers were deeply concerned with the fate of 
the Polish peasantry. Furthermore, “Even among officers who did not switch 
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sides for the insurgents, the uprising found some sympathisers, who covertly 
worked to its advantage. Among others, this group included the father of 
Nadezhda Krupskaya.”619 
Despite numerous reservations, Polish Marxist historiography assessed the 
uprising positively. In fact, one should perhaps rephrase this last sentence 
because the typically positive evaluation of the uprising in general was usually 
qualified by a series of reservations as to particular dictators, the leaders of 
specific units, politicians (whether whites, reds, or émigrés), and entire sections 
of Polish society. The January Uprising received a more positive reading than 
the November Uprising, primarily due to its National Government’s decision to 
enfranchise the peasants. Another reason for the positive response was the 
involvement of Russians on the Polish side, a precious ornament in the annals of 
Polish-Russian friendship. The November Uprising did not provide as many 
opportunities for celebration. Studies from the 1950s added a corollary of sorts 
to descriptions of the progressiveness of the January Uprising – a reminder that 
several decades after the executions of captured insurgents in Warsaw, in the 
very same locations, on the banks of the Warsaw citadel, activists of the first 
Polish socialist party were also hung.620 
The January Uprising concluded the period of national liberation struggles 
begun with the Kościuszko revolt. It seems instructive to consider attempts to 
develop a Marxist interpretation of the history of Polish struggles for 
independence, as well as an interpretation of the Polish national movement’s 
program. All revolts were summarily subjected to a unitary criterion of 
progressiveness and, at the same time, effectiveness: to win independence, the 
movements had to treat social issues as a part of the national liberation struggle 
and instigate the agrarian revolution. Some declared that these conditions were 
in fact met; Such was the case, for example, with Józef Cyrankiewicz, in his 
address at the Unification Congress of PPS and PPR, or with Witold Kula during 
the Otwock conference.621 Typically, though, authors pointed to the fact that the 
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class aspect of the Polish struggles for independence was far more visible from a 
general European perspective than from within Poland. While Celina Bobińska 
admitted that in the West, “Suspicious and distrustful of silver-tongued liberal-
bourgeois politicians, the masses tested their faithfulness to revolutionary 
principles by looking at their attitude toward the Polish question,” she 
nevertheless repeatedly stated that, beyond just the Kościuszko Uprising, all 
other Polish revolts played a far more progressive role outside rather than within 
Polish lands. For this reason, it was easy to effect a kind of “closing” of history. 
Just as the stated point of the constitution of 1952 was to correct the 
shortcomings of the Constitution of May 3rd, so “The agrarian revolution was 
completed only under the government of the People’s Republic of Poland, in 
1944 and 1945, when the working peasant gained a hegemonic ally in the 
industrial proletariat.”622 
Marxist scholars rued the Polish uprising’s missed opportunity – for 
engaging in cooperation with Russians. This notion infiltrated the analyses of 
nearly all patriotic outbursts, and was applied to all uprisings as parts of a single 
process. Generally, though, Polish national insurrections had a moderately 
progressive character. Pavel Tretiakov, the Russian historian, persuaded the 
participants at the Otwock conference to accept this belief on the very first day 
of the event, stating that “No one can question the progressive nature of the 
Polish national liberation movement of the 19th and early 20th century.… The 
movements directed against the Russian tsardom in the 19th century, though, 
such as the one in Kazakhstan, led by local feudal lords, should be treated in a 
completely different manner.”623 
Still, none of the Polish uprisings met each of the conditions of progressive 
national traditions. None enjoyed the kind of praise heaped on the national 
awakenings in Czechoslovakia by local historians. The success of these national 
movements – whose aim was to form cultures, literatures and political 
representations for the oppressed Slavs – was evident enough in the fact that, a 
hundred years later, people discussed them in Czech and Slovak. Meanwhile, the 
Polish uprisings failed. But even if they had succeeded, it is doubtful whether 
the Marxist assessment of their achievement would improve. How can one 
praise a successful war against Russia, even if it was ruled by a tsar? A 
conservative pan-Slavist, such as Palacký, Kollár or Štúr, seemed less 
controversial in that regard than an anti-Russian democrat like Kościuszko or 
Lelewel. 
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The problematic nature of assessments of the Polish uprisings according to 
their progressiveness becomes even more evident when compared with Marxist 
interpretations of a phenomenon which one would appropriately call a national 
counterrevolution. There were few events in Polish history which garnered as 
many unequivocally negative responses from later generations as the Galician 
Slaughter – an armed movement of Galician peasants in “good emperor’s” 
defense who had murdered insurgent noblemen or handed them over to the 
Austrian authorities. Karl Marx offered a different interpretation of the events of 
1846, claiming that the Kraków uprising constituted a revolution, an ultimately 
failed, but commendable attempt at combining a struggle for national 
independence with the fight for social liberation: “The Kraków revolution,” he 
wrote, “was neither reactionary nor conservative. On the contrary, it was more 
inimical to Poland than to its foreign oppressors, because it undermined the old, 
barbarian, feudal, aristocratic Poland that had been based on the bondage of the 
majority of the nation. Far from attempting to revive the old Poland, the Kraków 
revolution sought its complete devastation, so that, working hand in hand with a 
completely different class, it could raise from the old order’s ruins a new, 
modern, civilised, democratic Poland.”624 The revolutionary classic’s assessment 
served as a point of departure for the Marxist reinterpretation of the Kraków 
uprising and the Galician Slaughter. 
In the 1950s, scholars stressed that the Kraków revolution began a period of 
revolutionary commotion across Europe. In a way, events in Galicia heralded 
the Springtime of the Peoples.625 Though the efforts of Polish revolutionaries 
eventually proved futile, this fact did nothing to change their interpretation. As 
Celina Bobińska asked rhetorically, “So what if the uprising was a local affair, if 
… the broad peasant masses failed to comprehend it? … what mattered was that 
the peasant was counted upon, that he was promised agrarian revolution, while 
the landlords were threatened with it.”626 Despite historians’ high esteem for it, 
nothing could alter the fact that the Kraków uprising failed. This failure must 
have had causes; some of them, in a way, had to have displayed an objective 
character. Marxists stressed that, in economic terms, Galicia was particularly 
backward, while the local “landowning gentry” did everything in their power to 
prevent radical propaganda from seeping through to the country. A part of the 
responsibility for the failure of the revolution has been laid at the door of the 
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revolutionaries themselves. Roman Werfel accused them of an excess of 
moderation and inability to grasp the moment’s consequence.627 According to 
the authors of the “Draft,” the right wing of the revolutionary party bore the 
brunt of responsibility for the failure, since it “engaged in compromises with the 
possessor classes.”628 
Yet, the assessment of the Galician Slaughter proved a far greater challenge 
for Polish Marxist historiography. The anniversary publications, which also 
addressed the Springtime of the Peoples, typically offered criticisms of the 
peasant movement. In 1948, Stefan Kieniewicz wrote of an uprising “drowned 
in the blood shed by the hands of Polish peasants,” while claiming that the 
uprising in Greater Poland, two years later, cleansed the people of the taint of 
the Slaughter.629 His description of the course of events of February 1846, for 
the most part, followed the traditional narrative: “The peasants read the 
propaganda of the emissaries mistakenly: called upon to fight for liberty, they 
turned upon their lords and the insurgents. Ever perfidious, and at that point 
shaken with fear, the Austrian bureaucracy asked the peasants to quell the 
rebellion by themselves, leading to a catastrophe. A ‘popular leader’ emerged in 
the guise of Jakub Szela, who led the peasants on the manors, blindly avenging 
old wrongs committed against the people.”630 
The at times dramatic efforts to reinterpret national history are illustrated in the 
sections of the “Draft” authored by Stefan Kieniewicz. The attitudes of this 
particular historian to his subject of inquiry changed radically over a short span of 
time. The shifts introduced in his Ruch chłopski w Galicji w 1846 roku (The 
peasant movement in Galicia in 1846), a work honored with a national prize in 
1952, were still deemed insufficient by Natalia Gąsiorowska-Grabowska. As she 
observed, “One still finds the main chapter bearing the title ‘Slaughter,’ the case of 
Jakub Szela is not explained in view of historical truth, there is insufficient 
connection between social and national struggles and between the Kraków 
revolution and the peasant uprising, the subversive role of the Austrian authorities 
is assessed wrongly.”631 In the volume of the “Draft” published in 1956, 
Kieniewicz already argued that neither the ignorance of the peasants, nor the 
machinations of the Austrian bureaucracy were responsible for the Slaughter. In 
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fact, “opinion-makers of noble stock sought to denigrate this movement and distort 
its character,” and then “The enemies of the Polish people for decades pointed the 
finger at the peasant, blaming him for the sin of ‘fratricide’ in 1846.”632 
In the new, Marxist-Leninist interpretation, the Slaughter became a 
progressive peasant movement. “The peasant uprising of the time,” wrote 
Kieniewicz, “struck a severe blow against the feudal social order, … it sought to 
reverse the Prussian direction of capitalist development and reinstate the 
revolutionary way, and … it opened a road to liberation for the country through 
an agrarian revolution. The anti-feudal movement of the peasant masses was in 
essence, despite the errors it committed, a national liberation movement, which, 
though failed, deeply shook the system of bondage.”633 The peasants were not 
governed by a desire for financial gain, though the Austrian bureaucracy paid 
for every Polish noble’s head. The interpretation of the role played by Jakub 
Szela was also subjected to revision: the ironic designation “popular leader” was 
no longer printed in quotation marks. The “Draft” included the claim that “In his 
struggle with the nobility, Szela did not assume the mask of a servant to the 
emperor, but rather openly voiced peasant demands,” though sadly, “He did not 
control the peasant element to the extent that he could effectively command the 
resistance movement.”634 
Marxist scholars went even further in underlining the similarities between 
the political role of the Kraków Uprising and the Slaughter. Not only did both 
movements supposedly threaten Austrian rule in Galicia to a similar extent. 
Studies from the 1950s basically equated the insurgents to the peasants.635 The 
two liberation movements did not join forces, but, in a way, they did engage in 
cooperative action: “As we all know, the coming eruption of peasant fury 
became for the plotters of Tarnów an incentive to hasten the uprising. The 
insurgents’ assault on Tarnów, on the other hand, gave the peasant masses a 
chance to engage in combat.”636 During the Otwock conference, Natalia 
Gąsiorowska-Grabowska spoke of the commonality of goals between the 
insurgents and the peasants, stressing the progressive nature of the Slaughter.637 
The Galician Slaughter’s inclusion among the progressive traditions of the 
Polish nation stands in stark contrast with the approach of Czechoslovak 
historians to their native history. Polish scholars did not care to prove, as did 
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Slovaks or Czechs, that the national movement was a popular movement as 
such, even if peasants were not involved. Perhaps it was indicative of the belief 
that the history of Poland was in itself reactionary, anti-Russian, and focused on 
the nobles and not the masses. The same belief could lead to a search for 
connections between the revolutionary Hussite movement and the uprising of 
Spytko of Melsztyn, or between the Khmelnytsky Uprising and Kostka-
Napierski. Hence the uprisings were not picked up for their immanent 
progressiveness, but rather for their examples of cooperation with Russian 
revolutionaries, and the assessment of the insurgents proved far less compelling 
than that of the Polish peasants, who murdered Polish nobles at the behest of the 
Austrian administration. 
The search for an event in German history that would play a role similar to 
that of the Czech and Slovak national awakenings or the Polish uprisings should 
probably begin with a description of the Befreiungskriege. However, this topic 
was already sufficiently addressed in the previous subsection. Here, I will only 
discuss events which, for Marxist-Leninist historiography of the GDR, seemed a 
continuation of the progressive struggles for the unification of Germany. 
Marxist interpretations of Vormärz and the events of Springtime of the Peoples 
in Germany included elements bearing an uncanny similarity to the descriptions 
of the Polish uprisings. The 100th anniversary of the revolution became an 
opportunity for state-sponsored celebrations throughout the Soviet German 
occupation zone.638 At least until the 1960s, in the period when German history 
focussed on unification efforts, historical studies concentrated on workers and 
peasants who fought for a single Germany. (The absolute dominance of the 
working class among the actors of the Springtime of the Peoples did not 
necessarily mean that it received much attention from the writers.) Karl 
Obermann wrote that “the search for a solution to this question of national 
importance uncovered differences of approach among particular classes and 
strata with regard to common national interests. From the very beginning, the 
bourgeoisie’s treatment of the nation was burdened by its interests as an 
oppressing class.… It preferred for changes to occur not via a revolution, but 
through reforms, compromises with the feudal and militarist reaction. Already at 
that point, the bourgeoisie opposed the forces of democracy and prevented the 
unification of the country on a democratic platform. It raised its class interest 
above the interest of the German folk, thereby objectively taking the path of 
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treason.”639 This assessment of the bourgeoisie failed to account for the 
divergences within the unitary bourgeois camp, but Marxist historians cared 
little whether they were writing about liberals or conservatives (just as their 
Polish colleagues found it pointless to recognize the camp of Prince Adam 
Czartoryski for being more progressive than the conservative “national 
turncoats” like Henryk Rzewuski).640 The petite bourgeoisie occupied a more 
privileged position. Its actions, however, were marked by an inability to grasp 
the moment’s consequence and a fear of decisive action.641 
Though the bourgeoisie in its entirety was not determined to pursue 
unification, particular representatives of the social group sometimes received 
positive evaluations from Marxist scholars. The choice of figures for elevation 
could often be quite puzzling. While discussing “the struggle of the industrial 
bourgeoisie for German unity,” Obermann lauded Friedrich List’s attempts at 
eliminating tolls and creating a common German market. The fact that the very 
same List fathered the idea of a German Mitteleuropa did not deserve 
Obermann’s mention.642 Another protagonist in the struggles for unification was 
the liberal politician and physician, Rudolf Virchow, whom “bourgeois studies 
sought to depict as a Prussian patriot and nationalist.”643 Among the positive 
figures one often also found Hegel, whose idealism did not preclude or diminish 
the progressive nature of his philosophy – after all, he did introduce the 
dialectical method. At this stage of development, Hegel’s philosophy suited the 
needs of the liberal bourgeoisie who were striving to form an all-German 
constitutional monarchy.644 
The drive toward the unification of Germany was, then, progressive in itself 
(up to a point) and merited plaudits even when it did not come with a democratic 
ideology.645 The scholars’ attitude toward the movement began to change as 
soon as an organised working class entered the stage. From that point on, the 
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bourgeoisie’s struggles with the remnants of feudalism paled in comparison to 
the struggles of the proletariat with capitalism.646 This interpretation of the 
events of 1848 appeared already in Der Irrweg einer Nation... and continued 
unchanged from that point on.647 The first workers’ unions, such as Bund der 
Gerechten, and the first appearances of an organised working class, such as the 
Silesian weavers’ revolt, opened a new chapter in the history of progressive 
traditions. No longer were they national traditions, but the traditions of the 
German Communist party.648 
During the Springtime of the Peoples, the working class was not yet 
sufficiently organised to stand at the helm of the revolution. The petit bourgeois 
intelligentsia, on the other hand, was perfectly capable of taking up the task. 
According to Karl Obermann, two antagonistic classes – the workers and the 
bourgeoisie – vied for the attention of the petite bourgeoisie. The fact that the 
intelligentsia assumed the leadership of the revolution resulted in a dearth of 
resolve among German activists, who were multiplying “handsome resolutions” 
rather than actions.649 The Frankfurt Parliament’s demand that worker meetings 
taking place across the city be forcibly dispersed came to have a symbolic 
significance.650 
Evidently, this characteristic of 1848 revolutionary participants did not yield 
much optimism. The bourgeoisie betrayed the national movement by openly 
assuming reactionary positions. The petite bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia 
lingered awhile before taking the same step. Therefore, the only group 
remaining on the battlefield was the working class, which was, nevertheless, 
robbed of its “hegemony,” that is, its own political party. It was impossible to 
decide whether this hegemony was indispensable to the success of a revolution. 
East German historians tended to offer conflicting views on the matter, as the 
masses were often credited with a consciousness sufficient for independent 
revolutionary action even without an organised leadership.651 Still, the Marxists 
managed to note a number of shortcomings in the conduct of the German 
working class – primarily, the absence of a worker-peasant alliance: “The 
German proletariat stood at the forefront of all battles of 1848-1849 and 
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consistently fought for democracy. Yet, it was not strong enough to lead the 
peasants and the petite bourgeoisie, and, hence, the German bourgeoisie was 
allowed to sell the revolution off to reaction.”652 
As with Luther and the Reformation, the image of the German bourgeoisie 
during the Springtime of the Peoples grew more and more positive with time. In 
1962, in Jena, a research group devoted to the history of the bourgeois parties 
was formed under the leadership of Dieter Fricke. Its goal was to scientifically 
verify theories of “two lines” of historical development in Germany. At the 
same time, the group was also expected to specifically describe the “class 
enemy” responsible for the failure of a progressive unification of Germany in 
1848, as well as, to locate those among the bourgeois politicians who could 
merit inclusion in the catalog of East German progressive traditions.653 In this 
last case, any spectacular success was unlikely to occur. No one could rival 
Marx and Engels, who were not only commentators upon, but actors in the 
events of 1848. The treatment of the actors of the Springtime of the Peoples in 
Germany was determined by the fact that the failed revolution, to an extent, led 
to the top-down imposed unification of the country. This phenomenon was 
approached with much criticism until the turn of the 1980s, when a new, 
positive assessment of Bismarck and of Prussian heritage changed the way 
German bourgeois politicians of 1848 were looked at, as well. 
There are many analogies between the attitudes of East German and Polish 
Marxist historiographies toward 19th century national movements. Both the 
Polish uprisings and the German grassroots movements for unification were 
interpreted as narrowly progressive phenomena. They lacked an understanding 
of social questions and the support of the peasant masses and the working class. 
As Andrzej Walicki points out, the postulate of agrarian revolution, which for 
Polish Marxists constituted the sole condition of success for the Polish national 
liberation movement, was picked up and adopted from Lenin’s writings, where 
it was treated as a political postulate for his own party. The application of such a 
measure to the analysis of the Polish political movements of the 19th century 
can hardly be justified in Marxist terms and inevitably led to profound criticism. 
The Polish Marxists expected the national movement to espouse far more 
radicalism than the classics of Marxism themselves (and the classics of 
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Marxism-Leninism as well).654 From a Marxist standpoint, Walicki continued, 
the accusations leveled against the democrats, charging them with a lack of 
understanding for the national aspirations of Lithuanians, Ukrainians and 
Belorussians, were just as unfounded. By refusing these nations a right for self-
determination, activists of the Polish national movement were closely 
approximating the position supported by Marx and Engels at that time.655 
Analogous practices of Marxist scholars can be observed in the GDR. It 
remained forever unclear how and for what reason representatives of the 
German working class of yore should have become conscious of the necessity of 
establishing a peasant-worker alliance as a condition for the revolution’s success 
(rendering them more advanced than Marx and Engels). Even if it was possible, 
could this alliance (or, in the Polish context, the agrarian revolution) really have 
led to the victory of the revolution? 
This warrants the question: were Czech and Slovak national movements not 
riddled with the same faults, being additionally accused by Marxism’s classics 
of collaboration with the European forces of reaction? It seems they were. Yet 
still, the image of the national awakening painted by Czechoslovak 
historiography was far more positive than the interpretation of Polish and 
German national movements’ struggles with European reaction. It is hard to tell 
which of the potential reasons for this state of affairs played the key role. Was it 
because 19th century movements of “historical” nations were aimed against the 
bedrock of the Holy Alliance: Russia, while the Slavic national awakenings 
typically relied on a Slavophile, and sometimes even a pan-Slavic backdrop? 
Did it matter that there was a powerful defender of the national-liberal 
interpretation of history in Czechoslovakia, in the guise of Zdeňek Nejedlý, 
since neither Poland, nor the GDR produced a like-minded individual who could 
draw binding rules for the interpretation of the national past? Or was it because 
the compensatory role which history plays in the life of a nation was more 
relevant to Czechs and Slovaks than to Poles or Germans? Doubtless, it mattered 
that Polish or German Marxists who invoked national traditions were dealing 
with a much richer collection of political movements and a wealth of historical 
interpretations concerning them. A wealth of national historiographical 
traditions and a far richer tradition of national and radical movements in the 19th 
century was, in the case of Poland, but especially East Germany, more of a 
hindrance than a facilitator to interpretation. As a whole, the Czech or Slovak 
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national movement, which served as a basis for national cultures, proved 
resistant to a critique from the standpoint of historical materialism – the more so 
since, in its Stalinist guise, historical materialism no longer adhered to Marx’s 
belief in the existence of “historical” and “non-historical” nations. Since it was 
impossible to simply deem the Czech or Slovak nation reactionary, one had to 
include their respective national movements among the “progressive traditions.” 
Comparing the attitude of Marxist historiographies to the national 
movements of the 19th century, one should also take into account the fact that a 
commonality of critique of the indigenous traditions in the Polish and German 
context on the one hand, and the Czech and Slovak on the other, would yield 
divergent results with respect to the Marxist vision of history. Questioning the 
role of the Polish uprisings or the skeptical attitude of East German Marxists 
toward the achievements of the liberal bourgeoisie and the workers’ movements 
during the Springtime of the Peoples did nothing to challenge the fundamentals 
of national consciousness. Had the same brand of criticism been employed 
toward figures of importance to Slovak national culture, such as Ľudovít Štúr, it 
would have forced Slovak historians to reinterpret their national history anew, as 
the operation would result in casting away a man who framed the modern 
Slovak nation’s course of development – a man who, in a way, shaped the nation 
itself. In the final analysis, the role played by individuals such as Štúr or Palacký 
is incomparable to that of any insurgent commander or leader of the Great 
Emigration. In the Czech and Slovak case, a harsh, Marxist criticism of the 
national revivalists could have produced the effects which Rafał Stobiecki (in 
my view, erroneously) ascribed to Polish Stalinist historiography – a “rupture in 
the elementary rules of social life, expressed in the demand for a historical 
continuity of state and nation.”656 
 
The Impact of the Great Socialist October Revolution  
on the History of East Central Europe 
The Great Socialist October Revolution served as the key event for Marxist 
interpretations of the history of popular democracies. In every case, the claim 
that the revolution decisively affected the most significant socio-political 
processes became axiomatic. In Poland, the Great Socialist October Revolution 
was named as (to quote the title of a chapter from a schoolbook for 11th graders) 
“the decisive precondition in the reconstitution of the Polish state.” This 
relationship was explained by a Soviet historian: “The victory of the socialist 
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revolution and the constitution of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia 
enabled the rebirth of the Polish state and the unification of all Polish lands, 
including the Western territories. However, the ruling classes of bourgeois-
aristocratic Poland betrayed the interests of the Polish people. The majority of 
Polish lands in the West – a significant portion of Silesia, Pomerania, Warmia 
and Mazurias [sic], the delta of the Vistula including Gdańsk – remained in 
German hands. With the support of English, French and American imperialists, 
the Piłsudski faction and the National Democrats instigated a criminal war 
against the Soviet Union, seeking to claim the territories of Ukraine and 
Belarus.”657 
Marxist scholars paid particular attention to the activities of Józef Piłsudski, 
the leading Polish enemy of the revolution. “Piłsudski and his followers,” 
asserted Tadeusz Daniszewski, “were always characterised by extreme 
chauvinism and a deeply nationalist hatred of the Russian revolutionaries.”658 
The Polish-Bolshevik war was the crowning achievement of his anti-Soviet 
activities. Adam Korta devoted a sizable article to the subject, giving it the 
telling title “The Brawl that Became a Legend.” In the article, he recounted the 
already cited findings of Soviet scholars, who claimed that the war in the East 
shattered all Polish hopes of claiming the territories in the West. The Soviet state 
conducted a policy of peace, and “The working class of capitalist countries 
gazed at the first state of free workers and peasants in the world with a growing 
affection,” but the “bourgeoisie and landlords, dreaming of long-lost manors in 
the Ukraine and the factories of the Donbas, … were pushing for an aggressive 
war from the very beginning.”659 Semen Petlura, Piłsudski’s ally in Ukraine, 
was, in Korta’s words, “a half-criminal figure, a black reactionary, a Ukrainian 
chauvinist, a die-hard Polish-hater.”660 
Marxist scholars went out of their way to stress the superficial character of 
political differences between Piłsudski’s federal camp and Dmowski’s 
nationalists because of their common enmity to Soviet Russia.661 This 
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partnership was considered a continuation of a factual alliance between the PPS 
and National Democracy, dating back as far as the revolution of 1905. 
Adam Korta also engaged in an attempt at the “demythologisation” of the 
course of the Polish-Soviet war. He claimed that the debates over actual 
authorship of the Polish victory at Warsaw were of secondary importance, and 
the ascription of this “achievement” to Piłsudski was meant to “exemplify the 
supposed ‘genius’ of a Führer, a crucial aspect of every fascist ideology.”662 The 
significance of the debate was, in itself, quite questionable – elsewhere, Korta 
observed that the “Miracle at the Vistula” was only an “alleged” Polish victory. 
In fact, the whole image of the war was turned upside down: Poland was 
represented as the dominant, aggressive side, pursuing total obliteration of the 
enemy while Russia merely conducted defensive actions. The key role was no 
longer assigned to the Battle of Warsaw, instead having been ascribed to the 
Soviet counter-offensive “which became a great national war against the Polish 
landlords and ended in the banishment of the Polish armies from the 
Ukraine.”663 Meanwhile, behind the Polish lines, a fervent class war was 
brewing, with the people realising that – as Korta put it – “The Soviet army set 
out toward Poland as a liberator, an ally to the Polish working masses.”664 
Not all Poles, however, displayed as negative an attitude toward the Russian 
revolution as Dmowski or Piłsudski. Marxist scholars often stressed that members 
of the Social Democrats in the Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania wholly supported 
the October Revolution.665 Feliks Dzierżyński, who performed enormous services 
to the security apparatus of the revolution, took center stage: “The amount of hatred 
that the bourgeois of the world exhibited – and continue to exhibit – toward him is 
a just measure of this man’s dedication to the cause …. Dzierżyński was always 
typified by an affectionate care for the people, a revolutionary blaze, limitless 
dedication to the party, a deep patriotism and proletarian internationalism that 
always goes hand in hand with it.”666 Side by side with Dzierżyński stood other 
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supporters of the revolution – Julian Marchlewski, Bronisław Wesołowski, as well 
as numerous nameless heroes, because “Nearly all fronts of the civil war saw 
Polish revolutionary units engaged in heroic combat.”667 
Czechoslovak Marxist historiography similarly ascribed the collapse of the 
Habsburg monarchy to the October Revolution. This claim was staked out 
primarily in Jurij Křížek and Oldřich Říha’s work bearing the candid title Bez 
Velké říjnové socialistické revoluce by nebylo Československa (Without the 
Great October Revolution there would be no Czechoslovakia) (Praha 1951). The 
Czech and Slovak peoples’ struggle for independence and socialism had already 
begun with the arrival of news about the February Revolution. The later 
revolution only fueled that fire: “Though the working class, as we shall see 
further, tried to imitate the victorious progress of the Russian workers, it did not 
yet possess a complete understanding of all the fundamental conditions for their 
victory – first of all, it was unfamiliar with Leninism.”668 For this reason the 
working class would only enjoy limited success – it managed to break the 
monarchy apart, but it failed to erect a socialist Bohemia.669 Like Polish 
Marxists, their Czech counterparts did not pay heed to the essential divergences 
between different bourgeois organisations – in this case between the proponents 
and opponents of the monarchy. Furthermore, the bourgeoisie, in the guise of 
Masaryk, worked objectively against Czechoslovak independence. Since 
independence was gained through the Great Socialist October Revolution, and 
the Czechoslovak Legions, of which Masaryk was the political commander, 
were opposed to the revolution, Masaryk inadvertently acted as a stumbling 
block in the struggle for independence.670 The formation of Czechoslovakia was 
said to have incited “nationalist illusions” among the workers, leading them to 
abandon the struggle for social liberation.671 
In Czechoslovak historiography, the role played in Polish studies by 
Piłsudski’s Legions and the “brawl become legend” was ascribed to the 
Czechoslovak Legions in Russia, formed of prisoners of war and deserters from 
the Austro-Hungarian army. These units fought against Germans; similar units 
were also formed in Italy, France, and Serbia. Later on, the Legions in Russia 
fought against the Bolsheviks, and even managed to claim control of the Trans-
Siberian Railroad and significant portions of Siberia. During the interwar period, 
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the Czechoslovak legionnaires became a privileged group, like their Polish 
counterparts. This situation was completely upturned in the 1950s. The Legions’ 
Eastern escapade was recounted in a manner reminiscent of the treatment of the 
Polish-Bolshevik war: “The anti-Soviet intervention of the Czechoslovak 
Legions in 1918-1920 is a painful memory for every honorable member of our 
nations, a stain on the Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship, which nevertheless is 
today firm as rock and immutable.”672 The soldiers were not responsible for the 
conflict, instigated by the international forces of reaction, who craved the 
destruction of the Soviet Union. The Slovak author, Ján Kvasnička, added that 
within particular military units, subjectively progressive Czech and Slovak 
privates were influenced by tsarist and Czech officers “who, significantly aided 
by rightist social-democratic leaders, isolated the soldiers from the Russian 
revolutionary milieu.”673 Masaryk was said to have relished the international 
reaction, becoming a toady for his “superiors” by sacrificing the lives of Czechs 
and Slovaks.674 Despite accounts of personal bravery, the legionnaires were 
merely a tool. As Vlastimil Vávra put it, “Logic suggests that those who died 
sacrificed their lives for an alien cause.”675 
Czech and Slovak prisoners of war were easy to recruit because they lacked 
political experience. The social-democratic leadership was to blame for that, 
having fed them “toothless revisionist theories.” Because of this influence, only 
a few, “led primarily by a class instinct,” joined the Red Army.676 Numbering 
around 10,000, according to Vlastimil Vávra, Czech soldiers of the Red Army 
“salvaged the honor of the Czech and Slovak proletarian.”677 They were 
particularly exposed to the brutality of their countrymen.678 The Soviet 
government, on the other hand, as Marxist historians stressed, treated the 
legionnaires in a friendly manner.679 
Slovak historians copied in many points the historical framework elaborated 
by their Czech colleagues. They wrote of the people’s vivid reaction to news of 
the October Revolution, of a wave of strikes and calls for an immediate 
ceasefire. Much attention was devoted to the Russian revolutionaries’ slogan of 
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self-determination for all nations.680 The Slovak (and Hungarian) bourgeoisie, 
on the other hand, were unwelcoming toward the Russian proletariat.681 The 
emergence of a Czechoslovak state was an (unintended) effect of the people’s 
liberation struggle, inspired by the Great Socialist October Revolution.682 This 
lack of intention was apparent in the fact that the key participant in the events, 
the working class, had not actively sought to form a state. Sadly, in a decisive 
moment, national liberation efforts were taken over by the bourgeoisie, which 
led to the creation of an independent Czechoslovakia. The bourgeois-democratic 
revolution thereby failed to transform into a proletarian revolution.683 
This should not be taken to mean that there was no attempt in Slovakia to 
introduce a government of the Soviets. The invasion of Hungarian Bolshevik 
forces received a surprisingly positive assessment. As a rule, the progressive 
potential of the resulting Slovak Soviet Republic was never belittled – so much 
so that Ľudovít Holotík’s 1959 article, despite his accusation that the 
Czechoslovak bourgeoisie acted as agents for the French government during the 
suppression of the Hungarian revolution, was received as an assault on tradition. 
Holotík offered a very positive assessment of the revolution itself, lauding 
Slovak participants for their noble internationalism.684 Though highly positive, 
this assessment proved insufficient and became a hindrance to Holotík’s 
career.685 Readers of Slovak historical publications and later yearbooks of the 
Historický Časopis SAV will note, however, that the Slovak Soviet Republic was 
rarely mentioned, typically only during major anniversaries. 
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In Slovakia, the reactionary legend of Piłsudski and the Czech Legions had a 
counterpart in the legend of one of the founding fathers of the country, Milan 
Rostislav Štefánik. This tragically departed plane pilot became an iconic figure 
for Czechoslovakia, serving as proof of the state’s rootedness in the actions of 
the Czech and Slovak bourgeoisie. By referencing Štefánik, the ruling circles of 
Czechoslovakia attempted to disavow the impact which the Great Socialist 
October Revolution had on the emergence of the state. The right-wing 
“Ľudacy,” on the other hand, sought to prove that Štefánik pursued 
independence for Slovakia.686 Holotík intervened in this debate, contending that 
Štefánik played an anti-national role, like Masaryk and Beneš. This time, the 
focus of the debate was not on the person’s so-called objective role, but simply 
on an uncompromising recognition that Czechoslovakia’s founding fathers were 
in fact agents of France.687 
German historians found that the October Revolution’s impact on Germany 
was far harder to trace. Any attempt to describe the Weimar Republic as a 
product of the events of 1917 in Petrograd would have been ridiculed. Besides, 
the German state enjoyed a sizable presence even before that time. There was 
another problem, too: the Russian revolution had a direct counterpart in German 
history, the November Revolution of 1918, an unsuccessful, but nonetheless 
ideologically related event. Alexander Abusch named the Novemberrevolution 
the first stage in a process that culminated in April 1946, when the Communist 
Party and the social-democratic left joined ranks as the SED. Had such a united 
party of the working class existed in 1918, the revolution would have succeeded 
– he asserted.688 
In spite of several differences with other states within the Communist bloc, 
the historiography of the GDR also stressed the decisive influence of the Great 
Socialist October Revolution on the German working class. As Albert Schreiner 
noted in his anniversary speech, “The impact the Great Socialist October 
Revolution had on Germany before and after the November Revolution cannot 
be exhaustively described in a two-hour presentation.”689 In the first issue of the 
Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft, Heinz Kamnitzer mentioned the October 
Revolution’s influence as one of two discoveries made on the basis of 
documents studied by Marxists (the other being the contention that, during the 
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war, the German ruling classes had no fear but for the German workers.).690 
News from Russia had sparked a movement that ultimately established the 
Bavarian Soviet Republic. Officers on the Eastern Front were powerless to 
prevent simple soldiers from fraternising with Russians.691 Though bourgeois 
historiography fabricated a different explanation, it was, in fact, the Russian 
revolution that made the workers abandon stations and organize mass strikes.692 
The involvement of German prisoners of war in the revolution, on the Bolshevik 
side, was also of considerable importance.693 
The November Revolution, however, drew much more focus. Though 
Marxist scholars unanimously praised figures such as Karl Liebknecht or Rosa 
Luxemburg, the very task of defining the revolution proved highly problematic. 
In the first postwar publications, it was considered a proletarian revolution.694 
Albert Schreiner told the audience of his aforementioned speech that he was 
himself led astray as to the nature of the revolution. It was only after he read the 
History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks): Short Course that he 
developed the conviction that the revolution was indeed of bourgeois making.695 
Yet, when Schreiner shared this personal story with his audience in 1958, the 
Short Course was no longer the single, undisputed source of knowledge about 
the world. So, already in 1957, right after the thaw, the Zeitschrift für 
Geschichtswissenschaft initiated a debate on the November Revolution, focusing 
on two problems: the class character of the revolution and the assessment of the 
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workers’ and peasants’ councils’ progressive impact (the circumstances of that 
debate was described in some detail in chapter two). Historians gradually 
abandoned a radically positive assessment of the revolution, finding it more and 
more deficient. Peter Hintze stated that the councils had already lost their 
revolutionary character in December 1918.696 Roland Bauer claimed that the 
revolution, though proletarian in its beginnings, was not properly concluded and 
hence swiftly transformed into a bourgeois movement.697 Walter Mimtz offered 
a slightly altered interpretation, acknowledging that a proletarian revolution 
could not arrive in Germany until the bourgeois revolution was concluded (as 
we already know, this deficiency was an effect of the events of 1848). The 
November Revolution was therefore, in a way, doomed to certain limitations, 
though, of course, the fact that neither the Spartacus League nor the budding 
Communist Party of Germany was capable of leading working classes to victory 
was noted as well.698 Walter Ulbricht closed the debate by condensing the 
ruminations of the historians into a compromise formula: “In conclusion, we are 
forced to concede that the November Revolution had a bourgeois-democratic 
character, yet in some cases it was conducted by proletarian ways and 
means.”699 
A comparison of Marxist studies on the events of 1917-1920 in Poland, 
Germany, Bohemia and Slovakia, illustrates the ways in which bits of local 
history were placed in the context of the superior, revolutionary tradition of the 
Great Socialist October Revolution. Historians writing in the 1950s had no 
doubt that the Russian revolution was a special event, progressive in the utmost. 
Not only was its “superiority” over the founding fathers of the postwar states 
obvious – its impact on all events, not only in their region of the world, became 
indisputable. The scheme recurring in the outlines of the history of Poland, 
Bohemia, and Slovakia (the impact of the Great Socialist October Revolution on 
the struggle for independence, the reactionary intervention in Russia, the 
dominance of regressive possessor classes, the glorious engagement of Poles, 
Czechs and Slovaks on the side of the Red Army) becomes disputed however, if 
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we consider some of the problems presented by recent German history. The 
German November Revolution could well be an indigenous reference point and 
a standard of progressiveness. It had its own mythos, its own martyrs, and its 
own heirs – this final heritage claimed, as was often repeated, by the GDR. 
It seems that it was precisely this potential competition between the 
November Revolution and the October Revolution that convinced East German 
historiography to accept, in agreement with the Short Course, that the former 
was not of proletarian, but of bourgeois-democratic character. Interestingly, this 
amounted to equating it with events such as the formation of the Czechoslovak 
Republic in 1918, or the revolution of 1848 in Germany and Hungary. Rosa 
Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht’s revolution was thereby resignified as a link 
between the early bourgeois revolution (the Hussite movement, the Great 
Peasants’ Revolt, the uprising of the Slovak miners, Khmelnytsky’s Uprising) 
and the “real” October Revolution. It is unlikely that the members of the 
Spartacus League saw themselves in these terms. That they were thrust into it 
perfectly illustrates the fact that Marxist-Leninist interpretations of the histories 
of Germany, Poland, Bohemia, and Slovakia were not a simple continuation of 
some new current of Marxism, but rather an attempt to read the traditions of 
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Historians can show varying degrees of deference, honesty, and care toward 
national histories. Witold Kula accused Polish historiography of the 1950s of 
lacking respect toward national traditions: “The never-ending collections,” he 
wrote in the allusive Gusła, “comprised of Egyptian, Greek, Germanic, or 
Persian temples, weaponry of different nations, living quarters from all over the 
globe... That is their attitude toward history. A lumber room for minutiae 
acquired on the cheap, used for the most part only as ornaments. If plebeians or 
their chaplains dislike them – as the profane dislike the plebes – the minutiae 
can be replaced at all times. This lumber room is huge and wealthy.”700 
For the excavation of exhibits from this treasure-trove (or lumber room) to 
make sense, it has to be subjected to a set of rules. It is these rules, Lucian Boia 
writes, “[that] bring into history a principle of order, attuned to the necessities 
and ideals of a particular society.”701 The Czech and Slovak national revival was 
particularly marked by this sense of self-consciousness, by this need to provide 
assurance of the necessity of one’s existence. This sensation can also be traced 
in the idea of the reconstitution of an independent Poland or in the idea of 
German unification (as well as, for example, in pan-Slavist ideology). As Leszek 
Kołakowski observed, “factual history requires myth.”702 To make sense of 
history, we need to go beyond it, into the realm of myth. This claim applies not 
only to national ideas of the 19th century or historiography of the Stalinist 
period, but also to the achievements of well-known and revered founders of 
scientific historiography. It also applies to the following introduction to the 
traditions of historiography – German, Polish, Slovak, and Czech –, as well as to 
any other attempt at cataloguing the various research approaches, 
methodological choices, writing styles and positions particular to historians. 
Sadly, by reducing the creative work of historians to a set of beliefs on subjects 
of particular interest to posterity, we often lose sight of the most arresting aspect 
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of history: the individual historian. In the introductory sub-chapters below, I will 
for the most part follow the most commonly accepted interpretations of national 
historiographies’ output. I will also pay attention to those elements of 19th and 
20th century historians’ outlook which, in my opinion, were of particular 
significance to Marxist historiographies in East Central Europe. 
 
Historiography and the Concept of the State – German 
Historical Sciences 
German historiography is typically represented in two mutually contradictory 
manners. The first tendency characterizes Marxist studies and, even more, works 
published in countries which went through a period of German occupation 
during the war. In this case, authors repeatedly raise accusations of nationalism, 
racism, or Großdeutch arrogance, against German historians (going as far back 
as Thietmar of Merseburg, the Medieval chronicler of the Slavic-German 
borderlands), drawing abundantly from an arsenal of arguments and motives 
formed during the early postwar years. In the GDR, this manner of writing was 
tinged with a class critique of the bourgeois classics (discussed in more detail in 
a later section of this chapter). This brand of reflection on German culture 
persists even now, though nowadays one would be hard-pressed to find 
examples of it in scientific publications.703 Representatives of the other approach 
to German historiography assume that they are dealing with a leading European 
historiography, a host of exceptional scholars, whose theoretical ruminations 
inspired the entire continent. In effect, this tendency shifts the burden of analysis 
from the content and ideas about history to the methodological reflections of 
German historians. Though the latter tendency seems to promote a far deeper 
and wiser examination of the conduct of historians, in some cases the division 
between politics and research is not only hard to achieve, but also pointless. The 
shape of the German national concept in the 19th century unquestionably 
affected historiography no less than it did in other countries that will be our 
focus later. Broadly conceived, politics also explain some of the differences 
between German historians and their colleagues from other countries in East 
Central Europe, quite often graduates of the same German universities. 
                                                            
703 Among the exceptions are, for example, the activities of several employees of the 
Masaryk Institute (Masarykův ústav AV ČR), who condemned the supposed 
nationalism of contemporary German historians and the lack of patriotism in a section 
of the Czech intelligentsia. Cf. Miloslav Bednář, “Filosofie a historiografie – obtížné 
zvládání česko-německých dějin,” in: Spory o dějiny I. Sborník kritických textů, ed. 
Miloslav Bednář, Praha 1999, 70-80.  
 The Marxist History of Historiography 191 
 
These differences were comparatively less pronounced during 
Enlightenment. At the same time, though, Germans were distinguished by the 
institutionalisation of historiography to an incomparable degree. While in 
Poland or Bohemia historical syntheses were produced within closed circles of 
enlightened favourites at royal and aristocratic courts, often in works resulting 
from a private or public commission, in Germany science had already become 
institutionalised in the 18th century. Enlightenment-era historians simply 
became university professors – they lectured and published course-books. They 
also enjoyed a numerical superiority over their Eastern counterparts – so much 
so, that the first commonly acclaimed works of the Enlightenment-era German 
historiography more often than not focused on countries other than Germany 
itself. Among other endeavours, August Ludwig Schlözer, a member of the 
Academy of Sciences and Arts founded by Peter the Great, and the author of 
Geschichte von Russland (History of Russia, 1769), conducted research into the 
controversial issue of the beginnings of the Kievan Rus’, and succeeded in 
locating sources that supported the claim of the state’s Norman origins. His 
contribution to the development of Russian historiography did not consist solely 
in setting the standards for the practice of history, but also in sparking the 
critical reaction of scholars such as Lomonosov, and opening the debate over the 
so-called Norman theory, a subject prevalent years after East Central Europe 
became dominated by Marxist methodology.704 Of note is the fact that the 
critical edition of the chronicle of Nestor, prepared by Schlözer, preceded 
analogous editions of source materials on the history of Germany.705 The first 
works on lands Germans had inhabited for centuries, such as Livonia, were also 
written in German.706 
Another result of this institutionalisation was the preponderance of topics 
researched by professors from different German universities, spearheaded by the 
University of Göttingen. Historians such as Schlözer or Johann Christoph 
Gatterer made attempts at creating syntheses of general history. Other scholars 
focused on regional history, the history of law, of trade, of art, and so forth. 
Many of them shared Voltaire’s disdain for the Mordgeschichte, believing 
instead that history deserved subjects other than kings and commanders, and 
objects other than wars.707 Schlözer’s subject of choice was society organised in 
a state, conceived – typically of historians of the 18th century – entirely in the 
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abstract, as the perfect safeguard of freedoms of individuals and as the sum of 
all individuals – a peculiar machine in the service of the people.708 
Historians of historiography typically associate this shift in perspective, and 
most of all, the completely new concept of the state, with the Napoleonic Wars. 
Prussia’s humiliating defeat and the French occupation paved the way to ascribe 
a national character to the philosophy of Herder, to Wilhelm von Humboldt’s 
ruminations on national grammar, or to the collections of songs and legends 
created by the brothers Grimm. With the Befreiungskriege demonstrating 
German military might, the national past was expected to become a force just as 
indomitable.709 Critical editions of sources for the history of Germany began to 
emerge promptly (the first volume of the Monumenta Germaniae Historica was 
published in 1826). Conceptions of national history of the time often reference 
the figure of the state as a goal all Germans should have been seeking to attain. 
The way to this ideal was blocked by the military and spiritual domination of 
foreigners, who – as Ernst Moritz Arndt noted – first usurped dominion over the 
country, and then, when finally expelled from it, they ascribed the main roles in 
European conflict to themselves, completely ignoring the achievements of the 
Germans.710 Interestingly, Arndt, a poet and historical writer, believed Germans 
to be an exception on a European scale: a racially pure nation untainted by alien 
blood, simply deserving an eminent position in the world (his racial theory was 
also recalled in later times in the Third Reich).711 The postulated united German 
state ceased to be a purely philosophical entity when inspired by the “spirit of 
the nation.”712 
Ideas developed in Germany throughout the Napoleonic Wars did not 
immediately dominate local historiography. They were hindered not only by the 
restoration period’s conservative political order, but also by the influence of one 
of the most distinguished historians, Leopold von Ranke. After the war, this 
theoretician of the methodology of German historicism was accused of being a 
“precursor” to Nazism. In a way, the denunciation was paradoxical: the 
stipulation was that his theological vision of the state, implying its 
impeccability, was used to justify the Nazi state. For Ranke, history is “God’s 
playground,” presided over by Providence, and thus historians should abstain 
from passing judgment. Indeed, Pieter Geyl observed that Ranke’s works are 
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full of understanding for even the most drastic of events.713 Ranke did not 
perceive world history as a linear route of development; instead, he assumed that 
every epoch of humanity is characterised by its own spiritual tendency that it 
tries to fulfil.714 As he wrote, “every epoch stands immediately before God, and 
its worth is measured not according to that which it has left behind, but rather 
the very fact of its existence.”715 
With all its reverence toward the past, such an approach to history 
demanded the establishment of a periodisation. Ranke rejected Hegel’s 
philosophy as the epitome of determinism, leaving no room for man’s free will, 
but he did not propose an equally far-reaching conception to match Hegel’s 
theory of the successive stages of human development. He believed that each 
epoch had its own ideals which we may try to grasp, but without ever managing 
to organize them in an immutable sequence of successive stages. History is the 
realm of God: “From the perspective of God’s idea,” Ranke wrote, “I cannot 
imagine it in any other way than that humanity carries in itself an inexhaustible 
multiplicity of possibilities, which surface interchangeably according to a rule 
we cannot know, more mysterious and elevated than we are accustomed to think 
it is.”716 The epochal divisions he employed were practically limited to the 
region of which he believed himself to possess sufficient knowledge to propose 
a periodisation. As boundary dates, he used events from the history of ancient 
Greece, Rome, the Holy Roman Empire and France (e.g., the Reformation). In 
his view, each epoch was marked by a conflict of opposing powers, for example, 
the German idea of secular rule and the Roman Catholic idea of spiritual rule. It 
was not the historian’s prerogative to side with any of the competing ideas, as 
their competition and mutual complement to each other provided a necessary 
stability. There was generally only one event in human history which did not fit 
into that system because Christianity emerged through God’s direct 
intervention.717 
Ranke’s understanding of history was characterised by a partial return to the 
broad, general perspective typical of the Enlightenment. The historian would not 
place the history of his own people at the centre of general history. In 
accordance with the principle of stability, political events contemporary to the 
historian were also viewed as if from a distance. Ranke did not perceive the 
unification of Germany under the aegis of Prussians as the desired “end of 
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history.” For him, all of the numerous German states were useful institutions, 
and he perceived the dominant Austro-Prussian dualism as Germany’s strength, 
not weakness.718 As a faithful servant of the Prussian king, Ranke was far 
removed from the idea of any particular European power’s continental 
domination. His moderate views were based on a certain assumption pertaining 
to foreign policy, a sphere of action which he held in particular esteem. He 
believed that equilibrium between European powers was historically the key 
element of stability.719 In broad syntheses of the history of England and France, 
which he wrote on the basis of research conducted in foreign archives (he also 
visited archives in Belgium, Italy, Germany and Spain), he maintained an 
objective focus, writing – as G.P. Gooch observes – as a European more than a 
German.720 Attempting to describe the role Ranke played in German and 
international historiography, Gooch calls him “the Goethe of history.”721 I find 
the comparison to a later historian, Fernand Braudel, far more attractive, given 
that Braudel – in an even broader territorial focus than Ranke – was capable of 
writing impressive books of true general history, though using economy rather 
than politics as his frame of reference. 
Ranke’s objectivity did not consist in withholding the expression of any 
aspect of the author’s convictions, nor in providing a dry list of established 
facts.722 His objectivity resulted more probably from the ground rules he set for 
himself as a historian: the rejection of the idea of a linear narrative of progress 
and – consequently – a reluctance to express opinion on historical figures and 
events. 
Ranke’s influence on German historiography stemmed not solely from his 
methodological innovations, but also his pedagogical successes. The historian 
developed new methods for the critical analysis of sources, and the seminar he 
conducted became a widely replicated model. The success of his students might 
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serve as a measure of his achievement: they dominated German historiography 
even before their teacher’s demise.723 
Nevertheless, Ranke and his pupils faced competition in the guise of liberal-
minded historians with diametrically opposed views on objectivity. Karl von 
Rotteck and Friedrich Christoph Schlosser, as well as Georg Gottfried Gervinus, 
treated history primarily as a means of character formation. The task of the 
historian was to point the readers (as well as nations, that is, collective readers) to 
the proper manners of conduct. The assignment of grades, historical depictions as 
dictated by the concept of freedom, and a faith in progress found numerous 
analogies in Romantic historiography outside Germany (among others, in the 
works of Joachim Lelewel). In the preface to Weltgeschichte für das deutsche 
Volk, Schlosser wrote that “the main task of the author was to represent content, 
rather than expressing the tone of given period’s literature; to excite every free 
soul through contact with the work, rather than encouraging literary criticism. The 
author assumed that the free spirit of an unconstrained man can understand this 
better than the captive mind of the scholar, desirous of glory, and entangled in low 
pursuits.”724 Gervinus believed that the historian should primarily judge his own 
times.725 In history, on the other hand, he saw a combat between the democratic 
ideas inspired by the spirit of the Reformation and the aristocratic structures, 
rooted in the Middle Ages and monarchic absolutism.726 
The youngest of the liberal historians, Georg Gottfried Gervinus, went so far as 
to define the rightful place of this school in the academic world of Germany in the 
later 1800s. In his view, Ranke was not political enough, which, in fact, meant that 
he was a conservative because a lack of bias in historiography inexorably led to the 
consolidation of the status quo. Another reference point for Gervinus was the so-
called Prussian school. Its representatives in the period directly preceding the 
Springtime of the Peoples, the liberals Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann and Johann 
Gustav Droysen (who edited the liberal-patriotic Deutsche Zeitung together with 
Gervinus) were in his opinion too political, having been constrained by the 
Prussian-German authorities whom he himself deemed a military dictatorship.727 
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The development of the Prussian school, as well as the evolution of some of 
Ranke’s pupils, were strictly related to the program for German unification. The 
liberals were hoping for a strong state that would safeguard individual freedoms. 
Many of them pinned their hopes for unification on a Prussia increasing in 
strength. However, these hopes were very far removed from a liberal program 
(a fact painfully experienced by delegates to the parliament of 1848). The 
dilemma faced by liberals pertained to the hierarchy of values – to simplify, one 
could say that despite persistent support, liberal positions were soundly defeated 
in 1848, when it transpired that there was no real force capable of enacting the 
national program. A repository of this necessary force, the conservative Prussia, 
on the other hand, was (according to numerous liberals) capable of unifying the 
country. A sizable group of the revolutionary period’s nationalist activists 
decided in the latter 1800s to pin their hopes on the Prussian state, pushing the 
liberal program to the side. Chief among them were historians. Otto Hinze 
named this phenomenon “a spiritual process by which the nation of poets and 
philosophers created for itself a state.”728 
Heinrich von Treitschke, Heinrich von Sybel, Hermann Baumgartner and 
Wilhelm Dilthey also espoused views different from those of Ranke. While he 
was more of a moderate conservative from the restoration period, who was 
attached to the idea of an efficient, enlightened absolutism and the concept of 
the European balance of power, they opted for national liberalism and criticised 
his objectivity. Historians of the Prussian school openly expressed a 
commitment to support the policies of their state. In their view, then, historical 
objectivity could only mean not falsifying facts. It was perhaps Ranke’s 
successor both at the university and in the role of Prussian state historiographer, 
Heinrich von Treitschke, and also Sybel (one of Ranke’s pupils), who most 
vehemently rejected Ranke’s views in this regard.729 The latter commented on 
his tutor: “A historian who endeavours to retreat into an elevated neutrality will 
irrevocably become soulless and pretentious, and even if he conducts his 
research in the most thorough manner and expresses his thoughts in the most apt 
and decorative way, he will never attain the heights of real nature, with its depth, 
warmth, freedom.”730 The goal of the historian was not objectivity at all, but 
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rather the pursuit of truth. As Johann Gustav Droysen declared, “I do not seek to 
give more, or less, than a relative truth from my own point of view, the one I 
owe to my fatherland, my religious and political beliefs, and my times. A 
historian needs to possess the courage to admit his own limitations, as that 
which is limited is greater and richer that that which is limitless. An objective 
impartiality … is inhuman. It is far more human to side with a party.”731 
The difference of opinion between Ranke and the new school of history 
found perfect illustration in the dispute over German unity, which raged in the 
1850s. In Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserzeit (1855), Wilhelm Giesebrecht 
depicted the empire as an oasis of culture in Medieval Europe. He identified the 
Hohenstaufens’ reign as the apogee of German history, stressing the universalist, 
“European” content of their politics. Giesebrecht was critical of the Saxon 
dynasty’s rule, just as he was of Northern and Eastern Germany’s impact on 
national culture and history. Responding to Giesebrecht’s book, Heinrich von 
Sybel stated that Germany’s progress was distorted by expansion into Italy, 
which wasted the country’s potential. The idea was far from new – similar 
statements were made, for instance, by Johann Gottfried Herder, who wrote that 
“the finest … and least important of all jewels for the Germans was the Roman 
imperial crown; alone, it brought more misery upon the country than all the 
Tartar, Hungarian and Turkish invasions together. … The German was cheated 
by the Italian; in Rome, German emperors and empresses were insulted, while 
German tyranny defiled Italy.”732 According to Sybel, the only true and proper 
direction of expansion was the East. Soon, the Austrian professor Julius Ficker 
joined the dispute, criticising Sybel’s political engagement on the side of 
Prussia. Sybel responded in kind, pointing an accusatory finger at Ficker’s pro-
Austrian sympathies.733 
Indeed, the historical practice of representatives of the Prussian school 
depended on elements of liberal historiography, which were endowed with 
highly patriotic overtones. Droysen noted that the tendency toward the 
unification of the state had already existed among the early Hohenzollerns. 
Through the Reformation, they infused the German national idea with the spirit 
of Protestantism, which from then on became the determinant of true 
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Germanness. Austria, on the other hand, lost its German roots in Catholicism 
and cosmopolitanism.734 
In the Prussian state and the German empire, Treitschke saw primarily 
beauty and might typical of every great country, and particularly of the talented 
German nation. “The unprejudiced beholder,” he wrote, “of the majesty of 
history will see in the growth of our nation an even progress, so systematic, so 
certain, that our hearts brim with pride and hope.”735 In the history of Germany, 
Treitschke saw the transformation process of spiritual powers, which at first 
found expression in the realm of culture, but then morphed into political, 
national, Protestant unity under the aegis of the Prussians.736 
However, the differences between Ranke and the Prussian school did not 
consist solely in the rejection of Ranke’s idea of objectivity. A lack of 
objectivity was more likely an expression of a far more deep-seated dissimilarity 
in the understanding of history. One of the major “neo-Rankists,” Max Lenz 
(incidentally, Josef Pekař’s teacher), pointed to the idea of German unification 
as the perfect illustration of these differences. He observed that the national-
liberals did not connect their hopes for unification with Prussia out of a desire 
for any personal gain, but with German interests in mind. After unification, 
Prussia was expected to melt into the newly-formed national state, losing its 
distinction. By offering the Hohenzollerns the German crown in 1848, the 
liberals were therefore seeking to deprive them of the Prussian crown. They 
operated according to a unanimously accepted national-liberal dogma. For Lenz, 
this was the understanding of history which Ranke abhorred. In the days when 
liberalism shaped historical thought, Ranke sided not with the Whigs, but with 
the Tories.737 
The fundamental methodological difference between the two perspectives 
on history lay in an entirely different approach to the idea of historical progress. 
In his Historik, Droysen defined precisely these two mutually contradictory 
manners of describing the past. The first, where the scholar focuses on the 
ethical horizon of every epoch and culture, enables the ordering and translation 
of events and human actions in terms of a particular epoch and culture. The 
second, toward which Droysen himself was predisposed was based in a search 
for the moments in the past which anticipated the coming of a new, more 
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progressive order. Such a perspective allowed for the description of human 
struggles, victories and failures, on the road toward progress.738 
Questioning Ranke’s methodological assumptions had serious consequences 
for the historians of the Prussian school. A German-centric vision of history, 
culminating in the formation of the Reich, did not leave much room for further 
development toward progress. Generally speaking, the goal was already 
achieved. At the end of the road stood a German state that was neither the 
aggregation of individual citizens nor the realisation of their will. This state was 
the embodiment of freedom – the stronger it got, the more freedom it offered.739 
Hence, national-liberals leaned more and more toward conservatism. The 
youngest exponent of this approach, Heinrich von Treitschke, once an ardent 
proponent of English Whig historiography, soon ceased to perceive England as 
the realisation of his political ideals. “The old Treitschke condemned 
parliamentary reforms with the same vehemence he had applied in his youth to 
damning the Tories. Since the British had succumbed to the tyranny of ‘public 
opinion,’ the German state evidently offered much more freedom.”740 In a way, 
the fulfilment of the political objectives of the German national liberals deprived 
them of their rationale for existence. With the death of Treitschke in 1896, the 
Prussian school ceased to exist.741 
From that point on, German historiography came to be dominated by 
historians who invoked Leopold von Ranke’s works and accepted his principle 
of objectivity.742 After the unification of Germany, however, his views came to 
be interpreted in a very peculiar manner. Lenz wrote of Ranke’s “objective 
realism,” analogising it to Bismarck’s Realpolitik.743 The concept of balanced 
European empires no longer attracted much interest as an interpretative tool, 
with Germany tightening its grip on the continent. “Neo-Rankists” apparently 
borrowed not only from Ranke, but also from the members of the Prussian 
school.744 The most significant methodological battle of the late 19th century did 
                                                            
738 Johann Gustav Droysen, Historik. Vorlesungen über Enzyklopädie und Methodologie 
der Geschichte, ed. Rudolf Hübner, München 1960, 343. 
739 Ibidem, 353. 
740 Charles E. McClelland, The German Historians and England. A Study in Nineteenth-
Century Views, Cambridge 1971, 186. 
741 Gooch, History, 145. 
742 Fritz Hartung, “Otto Hintzes Lebenswerk,” in: Otto Hintze, Staat und Verfassung. 
Gesammelte Abhandlungen zur allgemeinen Verfassungsgeschichte, ed. Gerhard 
Oestreich, Göttingen 1962, 9. 
743 Elisabeth Fehrenbach, “Rankerenaissance und Imperialismus in der wilhelminischen 
Zeit“, in: Geschichtswissenschaft in Deutschland, 55-56. 
744 Ibidem, 65. 
200 Chapter IV  
 
not focus on objectivity, however, but on the philosophical basis of historical 
research: the theory of cognition. Within German historiographic tradition, the 
commonly accepted view on cognition within the humanities, perhaps most fully 
expressed in the philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey, was that it did not proceed in 
the same way as in the natural sciences. In the humanities, the hermeneut 
reconstructs the cultural context and interprets the object of his study anew each 
and every time, thereby approaching its truth. The search for a sense of history 
or faith in the progress of history belong to the metaphysical sphere, hence both 
are out of place in the work of the historian.745 This approach to the humanities 
ran counter to the philosophical assumptions of positivism, whose impact on the 
work of German historians grew in significance toward the end of the 19th 
century. 
The Methodenstreit between Karl Lamprecht and the “neo-Rankists” to this 
day remains a sort of model, a reference point for participants in all later 
historical debates. Lamprecht criticised what he perceived as the basic 
guidelines of historicism, proposing in its stead a Kulturgeschichte – a historical 
endeavour spreading across all spheres of social and individual life, a total 
history.746 In his opinion, the state was not the most fitting (nor actually, the 
only) object of interest for the historian. Neither did exceptional individuals 
captivate him: there was no room for the great national heroes in his works, as 
his exposition was all about materialism. Finally, Lamprecht questioned the 
possibility of hermeneutic cognition.747 
Lamprecht aimed his critique straight at Ranke. He asserted that “The time 
of descriptive historiography is reaching its end, its dominion claimed by 
evolutionist historiography. Our work is no longer about describing, but about 
progress: we are facing the transformation of one fundamental rule of research 
into another.”748 Though he renounced positivism, his theory and statements 
obviously displayed their positivist inspiration. Characteristic comparisons of 
historical and biological sciences led him to conclude that the ideal object of 
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study for both is an organism (human or state) in all its spheres of activity. In his 
view, economic and social history were indelibly tied to the history of art – his 
source of inspiration for the periodisation of general history. Lamprecht was 
convinced that all historical events belonged to a causal chain: any suggestion 
that history might be irrational was soundly rejected.749 
As I already mentioned, Lamprecht’s theses were opposed by the “neo-
Rankists,” primarily young historians who, in later years, played significant 
roles in German historiography (Felix Rachfahl, Hermann Oncken, Georg von 
Below, Friedrich Meinecke). They vehemently criticised both Lamprecht’s 
claims concerning the philosophy of history (rejecting primarily his Western 
positivism), as well as examples of the unreliability and arbitrariness peppering 
his works. His divisions of history into eras raised significant doubts because 
they were unrelated either to the periodisation approved by legal or political 
historians, but rather rooted in analogies between the history of art and 
economic history. For instance, Lamprecht wrote of the “intensity” of particular 
styles of art, which he found comparable to the level of economic development 
in particular eras. At the same time, he acerbically criticised idealism, dubbing it 
an “easy” interpretative scheme susceptible to the omission of myriad details 
shaping the life of societies.750 
On the face of it, the result of this dispute seemed unequivocal: German 
academic historiography disowned Lamprecht, proved his reliability lacking in 
terms of research, and did not exhibit significant interest in his methodological 
concepts. Still, the reception of Lamprecht’s positions abroad was far more 
positive.751 Even in Germany, Lamprecht enjoyed a significant impact on the 
development of regional historiography. His ideas, laying stress on the ethnic 
community rather than the state and its institutions, were widely referenced in 
the interwar period. He was cited by representatives of the Ostforschung, writing 
of the cultural achievements of Germans in the East, as well as proponents of the 
Westforschung, raising analogous issues in relation to German-French relations. 
His concepts were also referenced in the so-called Volksgeschichte.752 
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There are several issues within German historiographic traditions which 
could potentially play a significant part in Marxist studies, both in terms of 
methodology and politics. Marxists could relate to the liberal and patriotic 
historiography of the early 19th century, Though idealist, this brand of 
historiography was also dialectical and accepting of the laws of historical 
progress. The stumbling block in this regard was Leopold von Ranke. On the 
one hand, his political conservatism – the rejection of linear progress (outside of 
technical thought), or the assignment of a primary role to foreign policies – were 
unacceptable in Marxist historiography. On the other hand, the intellectual 
formation which followed Ranke in German historiography – the Prussian 
school – rejected Ranke not only in terms of methodological ideas, but also 
because of their German chauvinism, which Marxists would not assess in 
favourable terms. Finally, Lamprecht, whose positivist methodology 
approximated historical materialism to a certain degree, also held extremely 
right-wing political views. The wealth of German historiographic traditions thus 
proved to be a huge problem for Marxist-Leninists of the GDR. 
 
Dilemmas of Polish Historiography since the Late  
18th Century 
German historiography of the 19th and early 20th century was an obvious 
reference point and inspiration for historians in countries of East Central Europe. 
Other sources were also in use, of course, such as Romantic historiography – 
often of French origin – or positivism from France and England, but for the most 
part, Czech, Slovak and Polish historians (not to mention their numerous peers 
in the West) looked to Germany as a reference point. Of historiographies that are 
discussed in this text, only the German fails to conform to the formula devised 
by Josef Macůrek in relation to Central and Eastern European historical 
sciences, according to which the only feature distinguishing Eastern European 
historiographies from their Western counterparts was their backwardness.753 
German historiography was always among the finest of Europe. It was a source 
for guidelines concerning historical work and criticism, as well as the origin of 
the idea of the historical seminar. Part of the reason for its success lay with 
personal connections: many historians from East Central Europe studied in 
Germany.754 For numerous writers, German historiography also became an 
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adversary in journalistic and scientific debates. Tracing the methodological 
concepts inspired by German examples (or drawn from the same sources as their 
German counterparts), one has to keep in mind that the reception of 
historiography is neither straightforward nor unequivocal. Even if one ignores 
the obvious fact that every reading may be understood in a myriad of different 
ways, one cannot (and should not) construe straightforward connections between 
a Western methodological source and its East Central European counterpart. A 
difference in political, social and historical relations in each case colours 
common scientific concepts in a different way. Few historians look to a singular 
methodological influence – to call someone a “positivist” hardly makes for an 
exhaustive description. Typically, scholars summon a number of sources, 
borrowing from, for example, Ranke’s concept of progress (or rather, lack 
thereof), but also from some of the claims made by Lamprecht (this mixture 
seems prevalent in East Central Europe). Below, I will reflect on different 
visions of national history as well as detail the context of Polish, Czech and 
Slovak historiography to a larger extent than previously, while putting 
methodological concepts (that relate mainly to references from German 
historiography) in the background. 
Polish historians of the Enlightenment era – particularly the most celebrated 
of them, Adam Naruszewicz – supported a powerful and enlightened centralised 
government, and wrote their works from the point of view of the state rather 
than the gentry. Consequently, Naruszewicz found the “absolutist” reign of the 
Piasts, who held the country in a tight grip, especially arresting and valuable, 
while the liberties of the gentry and the magnates appeared to him for the most 
part as a reason for the Commonwealth’s demise and as a serious threat to the 
state’s future. In Naruszewicz’s opus, the six volumes of the Historia narodu 
polskiego (History of the Polish Nation), published between 1780 and 1786, 
aside from a professional approach to the issue, rooted in a thorough familiarity 
with the sources, readers found a political, monarchic program designed as a 
contingency plan for saving the Commonwealth from total collapse. 
Naruszewicz, alongside a host of Enlightenment-era thinkers and politicians, 
abandoned the idea of the nation as limited to the gentry and considered the term 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
222-224. Writing about Palacký, Pekař underlined that the high school in Bratislava 
Palacký attended was associated with a German Protestant university – cf. Richard 
Georg Plaschka, Von Palacký bis Pekař. Geschichtswissenschaft und 
Nationalbewußtsein bei den Tschechen, Graz 1955, 11. Czech and Slovak national 
revivalists (Ján Kollár, Pavol Jozef Šafarík) graduated from the University of Jena; there 
are numerous similar examples. Mapping of the scientific influence of various German 
schools of history on Central and Eastern Europe, beyond state borders and national 
boundaries, seems a fascinating task. 
204 Chapter IV  
 
in its political sense, as the totality of landowners. This redefinition of the term 
“nation” could hardly be called daring; some 18th-century authors suggested far 
more modern applications. “Nation – is a conglomerate of people sharing a 
common language, customs and mores, ensconced in a single code of law for all 
citizens,”755 wrote Franciszek Salezy Jezierski, who also believed that the 
Commonwealth would not prosper without returning the once revoked freedom 
to the people.756 The remaining portion of the definition quoted above refers to 
another previously mentioned trait of Enlightenment consciousness: “Nation and 
the reign of the nation are two separate things, even though it would seem that a 
nation cannot exist without a country, that is, its habitat, and then, that a country 
cannot exist without a government.”757 Though in a later section of his work 
Jezierski drew from the example of the Italians to eventually concede that a 
nation can persist without a singular state, state and nation remained the main 
subject of the historical imagination of the creators of the Polish Enlightenment. 
Toward the end of the 18th century, historians raised calls for a break with a 
strictly political history limited to a catalogue of rulers and the wars they 
conducted. This pushed interest in the meaning of the “nation” and the 
redefinition of that term to the forefront of historical thought. Naruszewicz 
included lawmaking, economy, and the development of the sciences among his 
interests – elements which decisively broadened the field of historical reflection. 
This new perspective served to highlight Poland’s backwardness as well as the 
potential (including the dormant force of the “nation,” regardless of the 
definition applied) which its rusty state apparatus was unable to fulfil. Only 
reform, a return to the road of progress, already followed by countries across 
Europe, could have saved the Polish state. This claim stood in stark contrast 
with past popular perspectives on the history of the Commonwealth, which saw 
Poland’s exceptional position as a virtue, not a vice – as Stanisław Staszic or 
Naruszewicz described it. 
The brash, Cassandra-like claims championed by Naruszewicz soon proved 
to have been timely. His prophecies of the Commonwealth’s demise under the 
weight of its own impotence were proven to be true with a painful precision. 
Even though after the Second Partition, a group of authors promptly produced O 
ustanowieniu i upadku Konstytucji polskiej 3 maja 1791 (Of the establishment 
and collapse of the Polish Constitution of May 3rd 1791), opposing the theory of 
a self-inflicted fall from grace with unequivocal condemnations of the 
rapaciousness of the partitioning states (and also a scathing critique of king 
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Stanislaus August’s conduct), Naruszewicz’s clearly stated question of 
responsibility for Poland’s failure remained for years the basic problem of 
Polish historiography. 
This penchant for assigning responsibility for the demise of the 
Commonwealth suited the general character of Enlightenment-era works, which 
viewed history primarily as a material for character formation and education, for 
depicting the good and bad routes of historical development. The Royal Society 
of the Friends of Learning (Towarzystwo Królewskie Przyjaciół Nauk), formed 
in the Duchy of Warsaw (established in 1807), assumed the task of producing a 
forthcoming history of the Polish nation: “The book of history, whose 
publication is planned by the Society, will not only contain the most detailed 
collection of facts, but also a genuine picture of the national character, 
considered as a source of the nation’s rise, consolidation, and decline. National 
character is understood as the virtues and vices, or rather the good and bad 
habits, which, like winds pushing a ship, thrust it upon the boundless canvas of 
the ages, and either raise it to the heights of supreme glory, or plunge it deep 
into the abyss.”758 Stanisław Staszic perceived the tasks of national history in a 
similar manner. He saw history as marked by “firm deeds” that had a bearing 
upon the prospects of a nation, and the task of identifying those deeds was 
assigned to historiography. Writing in the same year in which the Royal Society 
of the Friends of Learning published its address, the thinker attempted to trace 
the events that shaped Polish history. Characteristically, Staszic focused on the 
demise of Poland rather than the causes of its revival under Napoleonic 
patronage: “The enfeeblement and impending collapse of monarchic power 
(while the magnates gained in might), the extension of privileges for the gentry, 
the repulsion of the people’s claims to citizenship and the land, were all an evil 
growing steadily since Louis of Hungary until the death of Sigismund Augustus. 
It will be made apparent that even the glory of the reign of the Sigismunds was 
merely a persisting surface glimmer, reflecting off of past fame and the 
greatness of the nation. Inside, the political body was ill to the bone.”759 
Of course, the search for the causes of the Commonwealth’s demise was not 
Enlightenment-era historians’ only activity. Whether Poland enjoyed limited 
independence, or even none at all, historians continued to couple their 
ruminations with efforts to collect national memorabilia, reinforcing the 
traditions of a country which would reemerge again sometime in the future. A 
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serious debate over Naruszewicz’s claims began only when Joachim Lelewel 
presented his democratic, Romantic vision of Polish history. The notion of 
history as a means of character formation was retained, but the consensus of 
opinions on the causes of Poland’s collapse and the prospects for its restitution 
had changed. One of the most striking differences between Lelewel’s 
interpretation and the convictions of his predecessors was evident in the 
approach to the state: “At the root of Lelewel’s concept of Polish history lay the 
belief that the republican form of government was the necessary, and also the 
‘natural’ paradigm for unhindered progress.”760 Lelewel, politically a staunch 
republican, considered rule by the communes as the Slavs’ primary and native 
form of rule (this belief was also shared by the exceptional Czech Romantic 
historian, František Palacký). Furthermore, according to the historian, not only 
did this form of government predominate in primordial Slavic communities, but 
it also served as a basis for the democracy of the gentry. Again, this contention 
highlights the disparity between Lelewel’s and Naruszewicz’s claims: instead of 
serving as proof of the region’s backwardness with respect to other countries on 
the continent, the democracy native to Poland and other Slavic countries 
signified that “in terms of government, Poland was further ahead than the rest of 
Europe.”761 This politically backward Europe, however, affected the 
Commonwealth, causing deviations from the correct course of progress and 
imposing faulty, or even criminal, feudal rules upon the progressive state. 
Lelewel’s concept of national history often stood in stark contrast to the 
conceptions favoured by Enlightenment-era historians. For Lelewel, the reign of 
the despotic Piasts was a rejection of the ideals of rule by the communes – the 
Republic ought to have looked to its own past rather than apply experiences of 
the West. The collapse of the state was caused primarily by the countries that 
participated in the Partitions, with Poles cast in secondary roles. Lelewel’s 
interpretation of national history had a fundamental political significance both 
for Polish internal disputes and in the European context. It collected arguments 
for the democratic outlook of Polish Romanticism, and it nurtured the patriotism 
of Poles who had been robbed of their own state. It was also a product of an 
unusual time, when Polish exiles tended to think of themselves as Europe’s 
teachers and guides – whether because they belonged to a nation which 
experienced a suffering that made them more mature politically, or, as in 
Mickiewicz’s works, because Poland constituted a mystical redeemer for the 
entirety of humanity, suffering for the sins of all. Lelewel’s output also belongs 
to a period when Poles enjoyed a reputation for heroism in Europe’s democratic 
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circles, an opinion which, by and large, the historian shared, “All nations are 
bound in one indivisible family; in that family, no one is foreign, all are 
brothers.”762 
The defeat of the anti-Russian uprising of 1863-1864 marked a breakthrough 
in Polish intellectual life, opening a new literary era (positivism), and inspiring 
new readings of national history. Furthermore, the uprising’s aftershock was 
soon compounded by the unparalleled collapse of France, the empire Poles had 
hoped would aid Poland’s political reconstitution as an independent state. 
Defeated France, forced to defer toward Russia as a necessary safeguard against 
a possible assault by Bismarck’s Germany, ceased to act as an attentive host to 
Polish political exiles. At the same time, the introduction of a constitutional 
monarchy in Austria, and especially the granting of autonomy to Galicia, with 
its two Polish universities, meant that, even before Sedan, moderate Polish 
émigrés in France were considering siding with the Habsburgs in hopes of 
attaining at least a partial independence. In Galicia itself, a new current of 
historical thought, known as the Kraków school, emerged, taking an 
oppositional stance toward Lelewel (though not unequivocally). 
Rev. Walerian Kalinka and Józef Szujski, two historians most frequently 
named as the founders of the new school (next to Stanisław Smolka and Michał 
Bobrzyński), embraced the output of the Polish Enlightenment, stressing the 
firm ties between Polish and general history. Their attitude toward historians of 
the Romantic era, on the other hand, was far more critical. According to Szujski, 
the historiographic efforts of Lelewel and his followers were simultaneously 
unprofessional and overly tendentious: “Nothing is as common as the use of 
history, especially among us. … It is used as a weapon – quotidian, 
commonplace, stitched through with oversize platitudes and supposedly faultless 
dogmas. According to a fairly widespread belief, national history is completely 
removed from the currents of general history, a tool that only serves our current 
aspirations, a humble servant to political views and a boundless source of 
bombastic dictums.”763 
Historians associated with the Kraków school saw the causes of the demise 
of the Commonwealth in a similar light as did Naruszewicz or Staszic. In the 
preface to the book Ostatnie lata panowania Stanisława Augusta. Dokumenta do 
historii drugiego i trzeciego podziału (The final years of the reign of Stanisław 
August: Documents to the history of the Second and Third Partition, 1868) 
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Walerian Kalinka wrote: “The source of our political impotence, and therefore, 
the main, if not the only cause of the collapse, were … those countless 
deficiencies of the national character, displayed by and large by the entire ruling 
class of the time, which found their ultimate embodiment in notorious insolents, 
from Zborowski and Zebrzydowski down to the last hetmans of the 
Commonwealth.”764 
The critique which Szujski or Kalinka levelled at Lelewel and his successors 
only marginally touched upon the problem of methodological principles – or at 
least, in a manner quite distant from our contemporary perception of it. Though 
they accused their predecessors of manipulations leading to the exploitation of 
history for political or philosophical arguments, the works of the earliest 
exponents of the Kraków school were not entirely devoid of personal opinion. In 
their critique, the members of the school did not construct a general opposition 
between an ideological history and an objective history, but rather they 
condemned a false ideology, demanding that a different philosophical construct 
take its place. For Szujski, to a far larger extent than for Leopold von Ranke, the 
emergence of Christianity shaped all other historical processes. It was 
Christianity that moulded the concept of humanity and the national idea (which 
is why, Szujski wrote, Greeks and Romans had not constituted distinct 
nationalities in their time). The rule of history stated that nations transform into 
states. Poland abandoned this natural route of progress: “In the West, nations die 
out, leaving states in their wake, but in Poland, the state organism dies in the 
face of a increasingly self-sufficient nation.”765 Still, with the idea of history 
rooted in Christianity, one could share the Romantics’ hope for independence. 
Though Szujski thought of the state as a significant factor and desirable entity, 
he did not profess that its absence must necessarily precipitate the disappearance 
of a nation: “Only Christian nations share in unending progress and 
immortality,” he wrote, “only Christian nations possess the privilege of constant 
rebirth, as it is guaranteed to them through the idea, not contained in them, but 
standing beneath them, an idea that does not age, that always returns with 
renewed energy: the idea of the reunification of humanity.”766 
Slavs, and Poles in particular, became active participants in world history 
only when converted to Christianity. Szujski named the Baptism of Poland a 
“Piast revolution,” meaning a reconfiguration of loosely tied lands of the 
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Norman Lechites into a Slavic state.767 In European terms, the Piast state made 
the right choice in bonding with the Papacy against the barbaric German empire, 
as well as against the Byzantine civilisation (whose impact Szujski traced also in 
the Medieval history of Germany). Since the first elective kings, the history of 
Poland became “a veritable deluge, a muddle of forces and drives consuming 
one another, a storm of elements which never achieved harmony.”768 
Poland, born with the assumption of Christianity and unhappily torn apart 
from the proper route of progress, instinctively grasped for some means of 
renewal. Szujski acknowledged the efforts of the reformers of the Great Diet, 
and even noted Polish involvement in the Napoleonic epic: “Napoleon seemed 
destined to replace all the Medieval rubble with the rule of the nation whose 
greatness elevated him and made him a potentate. Such was the root of 
inspiration that made Poles join the Legions and die in the ices of Berezina. But 
every great idea has to mature before it can turn into a reality. Napoleon fell and 
understood it only in seclusion, on a lonely isle in the Atlantic.”769 According to 
Szujski, the situation changed only with the failed January Uprising: “Today, 
with enfranchisement complete, it transpires that conspirators are thoroughly in 
the wrong, while those who favour normal, organic work are absolutely 
right!”770 Szujski stressed the historical analogy between the perversions of the 
democracy of the gentry and the unceasing irredentism of the post-January 
Uprising period, between liberum veto and liberum conspiro: “Just as liberum 
veto turned into Targowica after the Constitution of May 3rd, so liberum 
conspiro after the emancipation of the folk would bring about another [national 
calamity like Targowica - MG], only in a far scarier form. It is not freedom – it 
is socialism; it is not independence – it is being devoured by Moscow!”771 
Neither political conservatism, nor methodological positivism are terms 
which could exhaustively describe the Kraków school in all of its guises. To a 
far larger extent, the positivist approach to writing history – whether in the sense 
of employing modern methods of historical research and an objective analysis of 
collected material, or in the sense of an acceptance of positivism’s philosophical 
dogmas – applies to the youngest exponent of the school, Michał Bobrzyński. In 
his interpretation of Polish history, Bobrzyński did not rely solely on a 
conservative, Catholic worldview, but also on sociological and political 
analogies between the West and Poland. He believed that “Historians who 
endeavour to reconstruct an image of the historical progress of humanity from 
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isolated facts, or manifestations of life, must assess and analyse these 
phenomena by depending on sound scientific bases (i.e., social and political 
sciences), analysing the social life of man and deciphering the conditions and 
laws on which it relies.”772 Bobrzyński considered the adjustment of facts to suit 
worthless philosophical beliefs just as pernicious as the principled rejection of 
any philosophy of history in order to shape views of the past exclusively on the 
basis of established facts. In the spirit of his time, just like Karl Lamprecht, 
Bobrzyński explained his beliefs with resort to natural sciences: “Every historian 
can be compared to a paleontologist, who dug up some remnants of several 
prehistoric animals somewhere. He found bones – not a complete skeleton, of 
course – and also traces of skin and hair. From the remnants, the paleontologist 
should reconstruct the prehistoric animals and reproduce an image of each of 
them. If he applies to this work an arbitrary conviction, for example, that the 
animals of that period were half-fish and half-bird, he will use the excavated 
remnants of fish and birds to construct bird-fish creatures that never existed. If 
he should seek to prove that all animals walked in an upright position, he will 
place all leg pieces at the bottom, beneath the spinal column, like the historian, 
who claims that Slavic peoples were originally ruled by love and virtue alone 
with no need for law or punishment, and who reconstructs some contrived, 
incredible oddities out of the historical traces of those peoples of yore. However, 
if the learned naturalist endeavours to place those remnants in their original 
order solely on the basis of a detailed analysis, without any predetermining 
forethought, he will promptly give up his work. After all, no bone cleaves to 
another bone so strongly that it always remains stuck there. There were once 
sinews and flesh between them that have decomposed, and sometimes even 
bones dissolve. Hence, there is nothing left for him to do but clean every single 
bone, describe it, put in separate boxes, and fill a whole cabinet with them. What 
lesson does such science teach?”773 
Bobrzyński favoured the use of the rules which social sciences had applied 
to the study of homogeneous entities, primarily nations and states. Analogies to 
Lamprecht’s methodological ideas lead us to believe that in his positive 
postulates, particularly with relation to the periodisation of history, Bobrzyński 
operated on a far more solid basis, dividing historical eras according to their 
forms of government.774 It seems that the difference between Polish and German 
positivists (because, in the eyes of their contemporaries, and also later 
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commentators, both Lamprecht and Bobrzyński, and Josef Pekař also, belong in 
this group) stems in part from the different recipients of their critiques. 
Lamprecht tussled with Ranke; and, attempting to create a philosophy of history 
that could rival historicism, he emphasised the role of all-encompassing theories, 
enabling the placement of history in a framework of (progressively) successive 
epochs. Bobrzyński, fighting against the successors of Polish Romanticism, 
criticised their idealism, their detachment of Poland from historical processes 
taking place in the West, and their excessive reliance on creating philosophical 
frameworks for history. Some of his beliefs would perfectly suit Ranke and his 
followers, rather than Lamprecht. Hence, Bobrzyński belongs among the 
historians from East Central Europe who responded in a highly creative manner 
to the various methodological concepts coming from the West, transforming 
them and enriching them in new contexts. 
The application of Bobrzyński’s methodological concepts in his magnum 
opus, Dzieje Polski w zarysie (An Outline of the History of Poland), produced 
an interpretation of history that completely abandoned Romantic ideas, but also 
differed from the historical interpretations shaped by the Kraków school’s elder 
exponents. Even Bobrzyński’s chapter titles betrayed the historian’s disposition 
toward the events described: “The weak and shortsighted policies of Sigismund 
I forfeit the historical mission of the nation and cause anarchy,” “The 
Reformation: Gentry fails in its battle against anarchy and its pursuit of reform 
in the Commonwealth,” “Return to Catholicism: Sigismund III wastes the fruits 
of Stephen Batory’s hard labour.” It was anarchy among the magnates, along 
with the weakness of the government, that led to the collapse of the 
Commonwealth. Bobrzyński rejected the idea of Slavic primacy in forming 
democracy, but lauded all phenomena which tied Poland to Western culture. 
Even when moralising, the historian did not adopt the overly religious tone 
typical of the elder representatives of the Kraków school.775 
The theory of a self-inflicted collapse (authoritatively supported by a 
positivist science striving for critical objectivity), along with the conservatism 
and overt Catholicism of the Kraków school historians (with each of those traits 
present in varying degrees in the outlook of particular exponents) sparked a 
vehement reaction from those who were incapable of cherishing the liberties 
available in autonomous Galicia, as well as from those with a strong affinity for 
a different, less self-critical view of national history. The outrage at Kraków 
historians’ critical analyses of the national past was distinctly palpable in the so-
called Warsaw school, formed in the 1870s and 1880s. Its members – such as 
Tadeusz Korzon and Władysław Smoleński – shared Michał Bobrzyński’s belief 
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that history is governed by laws which can be unearthed with the use of social 
sciences, yet, at the same time, they negated Bobrzyński’s objectivity in his 
pursuit of historical truth. Smoleński wrote: “Bobrzyński, like Szujski, is a 
doctrinaire, merely of a different kind. Szujski desires to bind Catholicism with 
Medieval scholastics and asceticism in the framework of an absolute monarchy. 
Bobrzyński, on the other hand, excludes moral and religious rules from politics, 
and approves of all methods, so long as they curb the people’s self-sufficiency 
and enable a strong government fashioned after the Byzantine model.”776 
The Warsaw historians rejected claims of Poland’s self-inflicted demise, 
proposing in its stead the thesis that Poland engaged in a modernising effort just 
before the final defeat, undergoing a period of revitalisation, which would have 
resulted in a new prosperity, were it not for the brutal violence of the states 
engaged in the Partitions: Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Still, since the 
Enlightenment, Poland was again on the right track of history and, sooner or 
later, it would have reclaimed its rightful place among the countries of Europe 
(this last claim was seldom expressed openly due to limitations instated by 
Russian censorship).777 It seems that the conflict between the Warsaw school 
and the Kraków historians (Bobrzyński in particular) resulted from differences 
in worldview rather than in methodological approaches. Historians on both sides 
of the barricade used the same methods of analysis and offered similar critiques 
of their sources, and they shared similar philosophical beliefs. Criticising 
Bobrzyński, Smoleński seemed not to notice these similarities, or at least, he 
considered them less important than the fact that Bobrzyński was a conservative, 
a Catholic and a high-ranking Austrian official. 
At the turn of the century, exchanges between the conservative historians 
from Kraków and the liberals from Warsaw were replaced by a far more volatile 
conflict of belief, and the ties between historiography and politics became even 
more pronounced than before, judging by the categories applied to these 
disputes. Historians of Polish historiography without hesitation referred to 
“national-democratic,” “conservative,” and “socialist” currents in the debate.778 
In more recent studies, divisions among Polish historians are often categorised 
according to three currents of thought: the traditional and conservative 
continuation of the Kraków school’s historiography; the liberationist current, 
best represented by Szymon Askenazy; and the nationalist current, with 
representatives such as Wacław Sobieski and Władysław Konopczyński, among 
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others.779 The fact that these divisions relate only marginally to the scientific 
outlook of the scholars involved highlights a certain deficit at the heart of the 
Polish history of historiography. It is useful to remember that, at least until the 
1970s, Marxist scholars were also unable (or unwilling) to apply any viewpoint 
to their descriptions of “bourgeois” historiography other than the one rooted in a 
consideration of their particular worldview. 
Wacław Sobieski, one of the outstanding representatives of the nationalist 
current, described two opposing tendencies in Polish historiography: the 
optimistic and the pessimistic. The latter was, in his view, represented by 
Kalinka, Szujski and Bobrzyński, though it found its perfect embodiment in the 
works of the youngest of the Kraków school historians. “Professor Bobrzyński’s 
stern judgment of our past,” wrote Sobieski, “though painful, would never have 
provoked such a spirited response if it was not for the Russian historians who 
borrowed from him eagerly and explained his claims in their own way.”780 
Władysław Konopczyński offered an even more brutal assessment of the 
attitudes of the young generation of historians toward Bobrzyński: “I recall how 
we pored over his audacious arguments on the beneficial role of the great 
despots – the Louises and Henrys, the Ferdinands and Ivans, on the wisdom of 
the aristocratic hierarchy which ruled Poland at the time of the Battle of 
Grunwald, on the ineptitude of the kindly kings and the do-nothing kings.... His 
schoolbook was a tad too big for us – and too foreign. Thanks to this, some of its 
lessons were missed. We did not grow to detest Polish history as much as we 
could have if we had soaked in all the bitterness and loathing toward traditional 
national sanctities expressed in The History of Poland, a text which we took as a 
confirmation of the poisonous teachings being served to us from the pulpit by 
the official educator.”781 
Historians criticising Bobrzyński and other exponents of the Kraków school 
expressed the conviction that history should not only strive toward truth, but 
also provide the nation with documented reasons for taking pride in one’s own 
past. Critical works by Galician professors became unwitting instruments for the 
hated Russification, whereas, as Konopczyński asserted in the text cited above, 
“Nations must defend themselves from others’ loathing and self-inflicted 
dejection.”782 Therefore, in 1890, at the 2nd Convention of Polish Historians, 
Tadeusz Korzon demanded that Polish historians condemn the Kraków school. 
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Though the Convention ultimately fell short of a complete excommunication of 
conservative historiography, the first decades of the 20th century brought about 
an emphatic return to an “optimistic” vision of history. This wave of 
“conversions” culminated during World War I, when studies of the Polish past 
were often geared toward justifying the country’s existence. As Andrzej F. 
Grabski asserts, though, nearly all European historiographies of the period 
exhibit similar tendencies.783 
Works produced by historians who, unlike Sobieski, were unrelated to the 
nationalist camp, were also often politically charged. New ideological boundaries 
between Polish historians replicated the general, national conflict between the 
biggest political camps – the Piłsudski camp and the National Democrats. Each 
camp was, in itself, quite heterogeneous, not only in scientific terms, but also in 
terms of ideology (a proponent of Piłsudski could have had any political 
background, as the Marshal was the decisive connector). The level of engagement 
in public service, understood in a highly particular way, also tended to vary: 
Marceli Handelsman, linked to the Piłsudski camp, accused Szymon Askenazy of 
fabricating national hagiography.784 It is a crucial task for the history of Polish 
historiography to emphasize perspectives other than those of this dichotomous 
political division. Works of Polish historians of the 20th century also reflect the 
methodological dilemmas raised by German historians. Early into the century, 
Stanisław Zakrzewski transferred the Prussian school’s concept of the historical 
significance of “great men” into Polish history, criticising “Lamprechtian” 
novelties in economic history and associated historical sciences.785 Polish 
historians often mentioned cultural history as the most likely future focus of 
historiography. Marceli Handelsman wrote of the problem of possibility and 
inescapability in history, which had come to the attention of German historians as 
well.786 Stefan Czarnowski, on the other hand, expressed the belief that “to satisfy 
the task of the historian, it is essential for him to become a sociologist.”787 
Conflicts of belief and a given scholar’s political orientations were overlaid with 
various methodological inspirations whose diversity equalled the variety found in 
other 20th century European countries. 
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In other words, the traditional conflict of belief among Polish historians 
gained a new meaning in the 20th century. The subject of the debate changed as 
well: scholars no longer focused solely on the causes of the Commonwealth’s 
demise. Andrzej F. Grabski singled out two competing historical orientations in 
the interwar Polish state: Western and Eastern, or the Piast and Jagiellon camps. 
The former Western-Piast orientation was dominated by proponents of a 
nationalist ideology. Aside from elder scholars, whose careers began in the 
previous century, this camp was represented by younger historians such as 
Zygmunt Wojciechowski (incidentally an outstanding expert in the history of 
Medieval law). Proponents of this orientation eagerly addressed subjects such as 
the beginnings of the Polish state or struggles against the Germans, and were 
particularly opposed to specific beliefs shared by their German counterparts (e.g. 
beliefs concerning the German cultural mission in the East). Zygmunt 
Wojciechowski formulated the concept of “indigenously Polish territories,” 
which were said to match the territories of Poland during the early Piasts. Ideas 
shared by historians adhering to this camp, in particular the principle of a return 
to the “natural” borders in the West, dominated the political imagination of 
Polish politicians during the Nazi occupation.788 They also played a significant 
part in the historiography and political propaganda of prewar Poland. 
In the interwar period, the “Piastist” doctrine faced opposition in the guise 
of a strong “Jagiellonian” current represented by historians such as Oskar 
Halecki or Ludwik Kolankowski. These historians developed different strands 
within the same historical school. While Halecki’s concepts were rooted in the 
idea of voluntary cooperation between Poland and Lithuania in a federated state, 
Kolankowski sided with historians who emphasised the Polish role as 
“Kulturträgers” in relation to Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Belorussians. Hence, 
the conflict boiling at the heart of this current of Polish historiography was 
rooted in a discord between scholars who interpreted the Commonwealth as a 
manifestation of cooperation between independent nations, and those who 
believed it to have been the product of the political expansion of the Polish state 
and nation. This was a discord between the historical programs of federation and 
incorporation.789 
The interwar period not only shifted the focus of Polish historical debates, 
but it also sparked a thorough reconstruction of the conditions of scholarly work 
in history. No longer did historians need to tackle restrictions imposed by 
occupying governments or evade the grasp of Russian censorship. However, one 
                                                            
788 Włodzimierz Borodziej, “Wstęp” in: Niemcy w Polsce 1945-1950. Wybór dokumentów, 
eds. Włodzimierz Borodziej & Hans Lemberg, vol. 1, Warszawa 2000, 46-49. 
789 Grabski, Zarys, 177-179. 
216 Chapter IV  
 
could still be fired for espousing beliefs contradictory to the ideology of the 
ruling party (which is what happened to Wacław Sobieski, among others). 
Working conditions undoubtedly improved, primarily in the territories of the 
Russian partition. Autonomous universities were crowded with students drawn 
not to corresponding worldviews so much as to historical methodology. These 
schools were able to offer steady work to exceptional scholars. New schools 
were formed by Marceli Handelsman, Wacław Tokarz, and Franciszek Bujak; 
Władysław Konopczyński and Wacław Sobieski were likewise surrounded by 
pupils. The two former scholars educated a whole string of historians who 
shaped the image of Polish historiography in the postwar era, for example, such 
historians as Tadeusz Manteuffel, Marian Henryk Serejski, Stanisław Arnold, 
Marian Małowist, Wanda Moszczeńska, Aleksander Gieysztor, or Henryk 
Jabłoński. The interwar decades also witnessed developments in the research of 
economic history (conducted by Bujak, Jan Rutkowski, Arnold, and Natalia 
Gąsiorowska-Grabowska). Polish historians could finally enjoy working 
conditions similar to those which had been available in other more fortunate 
countries for over a century before, and they promptly began narrowing the 
methodological distance that had developed under foreign rule. In this respect, 
the congress of the Comité International des Sciences Historiques which took 
place in Warsaw in 1933, achieved a symbolic status. 
 
Czech Historiography in the Shadow of the National 
Revival 
The historiography of the Enlightenment period played no less a significant part 
in meditations on the status of state and nation in Bohemia than the works of 
Naruszewicz, Kołłątaj, or Staszic did in Poland. Nevertheless, conditions faced 
by Czech scholars affected the political resonance of their works in a manner 
different than that traced in the works of Polish historians. During the reform 
efforts under the reign of Joseph II, historians sided with the gentry of Bohemia 
in a defence of its class privileges, implicitly opposing a strong, centralised 
government. The centralisation of power in Vienna would have inevitably led to 
a restriction of the historical rights of the Kingdom of Bohemia. At the same 
time, as evident in Mikuláš Adaukt Voigt’s Über den Geist der böhmischen 
Gesetze (1788), a defence of these rights paved the way for the formation of a 
history of the Czech nation as an entity distinct from the other constituent 
nations of the Habsburg monarchy.790 In describing any of the currents of the 
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19th century’s national revivalism, one should remember that the scholar’s gaze 
is inevitably ahistorical. Indeed, it was never a certain or established fact that 
books devoted to the history of the lands of Bohemia would affect the formation 
of the nation in the shape it took during the 19th century. The alliance between 
the aristocrats indifferent to the Czech national idea almost by default and the 
scientists engaged in furthering the revival lasted almost until the end of the 19th 
century.791 Yet, Czech historians had addressed the issue of the Hussite 
movement already during the Enlightenment, at first depicting it mainly as a 
protest against the corruption of the Church. František Kutnar and Jaroslav 
Marek pointed out that Enlightenment thinkers, such as Josef Dobrovský, had 
not yet embraced the political role that was ascribed to historians during the 
Romantic period. Dobrovský himself, for instance, did not hesitate before 
publicising a “patriot’s opinion,” judging in 1825 that the Manuscript of Zelená 
Hora was a forgery intended to further the political goals of Czech national 
movement activists. His personal (highly pessimistic) beliefs on the future of 
Czech nationality and the Czech language were also unsuited to the program of 
the burgeoning national movement. The new generation of historians, 
spearheaded by František Palacký, treated history as a science tied fairly closely 
to the national cause, and often even subservient to it.792 
The significance of František Palacký extends well beyond his work as a 
historian. The “father of the nation” was also a political – at first a moderately 
liberal, then conservative – leader of the Czech national movement. At the dawn 
of his political and scientific career, in the 1820s, the movement had barely 
developed; at his deathbed in 1876, the Czech nation was universally admired 
(at least in East Central Europe) for achieving a position equal to that of other 
respected European nations. His funeral established the pattern for Czech 
national ceremonies of mourning, even though no Czech state yet existed.793 As 
a scholar, he shaped a coherent concept of Czech history, which in many aspects 
retains validity to this day. For later historians, Palacký became a reference 
point. 
The creator of modern Czech historiography did not avoid critically 
evaluating the Czech national character and consistently strove to identify the 
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deeper significance of Czech history, the historical destiny of Czechs and the 
human virtues peculiar to the nation. Much like Lelewel’s work, his research 
produced a thesis on the possibilities and necessities of nationhood. In 
accordance with contemporaneous Romantic historiography, Palacký searched 
national history for traces of the spirit of freedom. It manifested itself with 
particular poignancy in two historical moments: the primary Slavic democracy 
(in this case, Palacký referred to works by Polish historians, Lelewel and 
Maciejowski),794 and the Hussite revolution. Palacký devoted far more attention 
to the Hussite period than to any other period in the history of Bohemia, editing 
an enormous collection of sources for the history of the 15th century. For him, 
the Hussite period constituted the only moment in history when Bohemia 
outpaced Europe in terms of ideological development – when its name came to 
represent historical progress. Still, Palacký staunchly opposed all religious 
fanaticism and viewed the cruelties of the Hussite wars as an abomination. In 
time, his views on the period altered somewhat (in the 1860s, he stressed the 
Slavic tropes of the Hussite ideology much more emphatically), but his 
fundamental premises remained basically unchanged.795 
Palacký was the first Czech historian to attempt to answer the question of 
the meaning of the history of Bohemia. From his perspective, it lay with 
Bohemia’s confrontation with Germany, a view reflecting his general outlook on 
history, perceived dialectically as a conflict between opposing terms (body and 
spirit, democracy and feudalism, etc.).796 This confrontation developed into an 
open struggle only very rarely, typically remaining confined to the spiritual 
sphere, with the peaceful coexistence of both nations unhindered; yet, for 
Palacký, it remained permanent and indelible.797 In politics, Palacký, the author 
of a famous letter to the Frankfurt parliament, established the fundamental 
distinction between Czechs and Germans with uncommon clarity. The Czech 
historian was also set apart from numerous idealist and liberal German authors 
by his interpretation of the German idealists’ philosophy of history. While he 
agreed that the logic of history was defined by the pursuit of freedom, he did not 
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believe this pursuit to have reached its apex in the history of Prussia, nor did he 
accept that it should end with the realisation of the objectives of the German 
national movement. Since Germans continued to observe the feudal idea, true 
freedom should rather be sought in the history and destiny of the Czech Slavs.798 
In the key moment of the history of Bohemia, the Hussite period, Palacký 
discerned a struggle for freedom of conscience, as well as an iteration of the 
everlasting Czech-German (and democratic-feudal) conflict. 
Palacký’s role in shaping Czech national culture is even more impressive for 
the fact that at the time when he set out to write his works, the existence of a 
Czech nation was less easily accepted than was the case with the Polish nation. 
His most significant work appeared first in German (entitled Geschichte von 
Böhmen, grösstentheils nach Urkunden und Handschriften). He only got around 
to publishing a Czech edition some 12 years later. As a result, the binding of the 
“Czech cause” to universal values seemed natural and necessary not only to 
Palacký, but also to many subsequent Czech thinkers.799 
Palacký’s domination of Czech historiography and the popular imagination 
of the past had already faced challenges in the 19th century – from both political 
and methodological perspectives. The year 1854 saw the publication of O 
synchronické methodě při dějepise rakouském, written by Václav Vladivoj 
Tomek Tomek Václav Vladivoj, a former democrat and admirer of Palacký, 
who became a political conservative following the Springtime of the Peoples. 
Tomek (incidentally a student of Johann Gustav Droysen) proposed the creation 
of a history of the Austrian monarchy that would incorporate the national 
histories of its constituent parts. He defined the task of Austrian (and, by 
extension, also Czech) historians to be a research project that sought to 
understand the means by which the state they lived in was formed. Such a 
supranational perspective allowed Tomek to, for example, consider Ottokar II as 
the first ruler to ever attempt the unification of the lands of the later monarchy, 
and, by that same token, he could even include elements unrelated to the 
traditions of the ruling dynasty among the historical traditions of the state.800 
With regard to the role of the Catholic Church, an issue of particular 
significance to the Czech national consciousness, Tomek expressed quite a 
different opinion from that of the national-liberal majority, because he 
appreciated the role the Church played in integrating Czech society. 
Furthermore, he saw the Hussite movement as an historical anomaly of fatal 
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implications, claiming that “Hus … had abandoned the path of progress which 
we had followed before his time.”801 Tomek believed that the Hussite movement 
had caused the decline of the king’s power, which had been increasing in the 
period before the Hussites. Antonín Rezek also favoured strong, centralised 
governments, while criticising the oligarchic rule of the gentry.802 Palacký’s 
views were placed under scrutiny from another angle as well, by Josef Kalousek, 
a devout Catholic of national-liberal persuasion, who defended claims 
concerning the authenticity of the manuscripts of Zelená Hora and Dvůr 
Králové. Kalousek considered Hus a Catholic and vehemently opposed all 
claims that he played a primary role in the Reformation (including those put 
forward by Palacký).803 
Czech historiography of the Romantic period faced a different challenge 
from Jaroslav Goll (who earned his habilitation from the University of Prague in 
1875, a year before Palacký’s demise). Goll did not seek to frame the entirety of 
national history with a particular philosophy of history. Neither did he share the 
conviction that a historian’s main task was to shape the tone of public debate. 
Goll unambiguously supported the legal government, siding with Austro-
Hungarian authorities during the First World War (a fact which, after 1918, 
became a reason for the boycott of Goll by his fellow scientists). He introduced 
new, German rules for the analysis of sources, laying stress on the precision of 
their work, which prevented him also from forming his own synthesis of 
national history. This task was assumed by his students, of which Goll had 
scores, many of whom dominated Czech historiography up until 1945.804 
Goll is usually typecast as a positivist, as is his school. In this context, 
however, “positivism” does not connote a philosophical perspective, but rather 
the so-called positivist, critical research attitude, with which Goll familiarised 
himself as a student in Göttingen. As far as his research perspective is 
concerned, he relied on German historicism, and particularly on Ranke, whose 
views on the task of the historian he shared.805 The Czech historian rejected the 
idea of linear progress (incidentally a crucial aspect of positivist philosophy), 
opting against the inclusion of elements of sociology into history and 
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approaching with utmost scepticism the idea of subjecting history to any kind of 
an overarching philosophy.806 Like Michał Bobrzyński, among others, he 
believed that “Ethical values and historical events often go separate ways. Those 
who find this appalling should not seek solace in history. It teaches us that 
oftentimes the best plan is the one which is not chosen, that virtue is seldom 
rewarded. We find the idea of a world that does not improve unedifying, and this 
is what makes history worthless ad usum delphini. By itself, history does not 
promote optimism, though neither is it pessimistic. Nonetheless, ethics, as far as 
it is binding to everyone, apply likewise to historians and their work.”807 
Goll’s belief in the ethical responsibilities of the historian compelled him to 
partake in the debate over the authenticity of the falsified manuscripts of Zelená 
Hora and Dvůr Králové, supposedly discovered in 1816-1818 by Josef Linda 
and Václav Hanka. In reality, the works were fabricated, most likely by Hanka 
(in fact, their authenticity had been placed in doubt already by Josef 
Dobrovský).808 The contribution of Goll and several other Czech humanists lent 
the debate a certain gravity, as both manuscripts had already become 
fundamental readings for the history of literature in Bohemia, and proof of the 
early existence of a highly developed Czech poetry, as well as of its precedence 
over German poetry in the use of numerous literary motifs. In his articles on the 
state of Czech historiography, published in the Revue Historique, Goll himself 
described the situation of those criticising the manuscripts in these words: 
“Public opinion treats them as heathens. … Political journals cast them out of 
the country and call upon the nation to rise in numbers to bear witness to an auto 
da fé.”809 In the end, though, the critics of the manuscripts emerged victorious 
from this debate. 
Jaroslav Goll’s favourite student, Josef Pekař, was a historian of very firm 
views, eager to reinterpret Palacký’s canonical theses. Pekař also excelled in 
economic history, proving his skills by capturing in a single panorama the 
political events, changes in laws, and accounts of peasant life in the 17th century, 
combined in a “Lamprechtian” comprehensive picture of the history of the 
Czech estate of Kost.810 Finally, he was the staunchest defender of the “purity” 
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of Goll’s teachings from the concepts propagated by Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk 
in his new philosophy of history. 
Yet Pekař himself proved a none-too-faithful apprentice to his master. As 
the Czech commentator on the conflict between the neo-Rankists and 
Lamprecht, while far from repudiating the latter’s concepts, he did not recognize 
historical laws or necessities. Both in his stated views and in his works, 
however, he included elements of economic history and sociology.811 Zdeněk 
Kalista, who compared Lamprecht’s views to those of Pekař, concluded that the 
latter did not treat the “laws of history” as determinative, but explicatory. Things 
did not have to proceed the way they did, and yet, the aggregation of cultural 
and developmental phenomena characteristic of a given epoch eventually 
prevailed and gave a new shape to the world. One could say that in his 
periodisation, rooted in the distinctions between the periods of the history of art, 
Pekař borrowed as much from Lamprecht and the positivists, as from Ranke. 
The latter’s role was underlined by the Czech historian’s claim that particular 
epochs should be approached as distinct cultures that were governed by different 
(or rather, differently apprehended) values and that breathed a different air. 
These epochs align, as in Lamprecht’s works, as links in a chain of stages 
following one after another in a strictly defined order.812 In Pekař’s dispute with 
Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk, this distinction between each successive epoch 
became the bone of contention between the philosopher and the historian. 
Masaryk’s Česká otázka, published in 1895, initiated a debate that lasted 
many decades, commonly referred to as the dispute over the meaning of Czech 
history.813 Thanks to his involvement in the debate over the authenticity of the 
Zelená Hora and Dvůr Králové manuscripts (on Goll’s side – the young Pekař 
also published a critical analysis of the manuscripts, pointing out anachronistic 
details concerning his native North Bohemia), Masaryk opened the dispute as a 
well-known person. He believed that “the history of nations is not the work of 
coincidence, but the manifestation of a certain plan of Providence, and hence the 
task of historians and philosophers, the task of every nation, is to fulfil that plan, 
recognize their place in it and act accordingly … in every line of work, 
including politics.”814 Masaryk’s vision of the history of Bohemia was rooted in 
Palacký’s claims. He contended that, while the Hussite period constituted the 
seminal moment in the history of Bohemia, the failure of the uprising of the 
Bohemian estates in 1620 was the result of the decline of Hussite ideals. During 
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the dispute, Masaryk pointed to religion as the defining factor in Czech history. 
The great universal human values once upheld by the Hussites returned to Czech 
history with the national revivalists of the 19th century.815 
In his argument, Masaryk committed factual errors, which, together with 
logical inconsistencies, became the main object of criticism for Jaroslav Goll’s 
followers, and Pekař most of all. The latter pointed out the lack of a direct 
connection between the Hussite movement of the 15th century and the national 
revival of the 19th century, indicating that the Czech national revivalists were 
influenced by German philosophy rather than by the thought of the Bohemian 
Brethren. In Pekař’s eyes, Masaryk’s theories were rich in such contentious 
claims, where facts were subjected to an overarching philosophical concept.816 
Pekař himself saw nationality as a “leitmotif” of Czech history. As he 
himself stressed, it was an idea picked up from the thought of Palacký, who 
perceived the history of Bohemia as the field of struggle between Slavic and 
German principles. Pekař believed in the continuity of national consciousness in 
the lands of Bohemia. His nationalism, however, of which he spoke openly, was 
peculiar in nature. The historian based his political ideas on the concept of 
historical rights granted to the crown of Bohemia, not on any particular ethnic 
basis. Hence, he showed no interest whatsoever with respect to Slovakia, and 
sought to improve relations between the Germans and the Czechs.817 Up until 
1918, he advanced a program for the transformation of the Habsburg monarchy 
into a federation of states. He hoped that the First World War would bring about 
the fulfilment of the Czechs’ political objectives in the same way that the 
Austro-Prussian War had resulted in the acceptance of the demands of the 
Hungarians.818 Masaryk, on the other hand, derived Bohemia’s right to 
independence from the innate rights of all nations. Kalista writes of Pekař’s 
“creative conservatism”819 – “creative” because, in political beliefs as much as 
in historical works, Pekař sought to join rather than divide, to do justice to every 
component of the national tradition rather than eliminate any of them in the 
name of “true patriotism.” In fact, Pekař defended himself against accusations of 
nationalism by drawing attention to the way in which Masaryk’s concept, 
supposedly developing national elements from religious ones, lay the 
foundations for nationalism in the interwar Bohemia.820 Pekař’s adversaries, on 
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the other hand, resented not so much his supposed nationalism, as the work he 
conducted to rehabilitate the period which followed from the Battle of White 
Mountain, the Baroque period. While Masaryk and his proponents saw that 
period as an intermission in national history, Pekař recognised the value not only 
of Baroque art, but also of Czech folk culture of the 17th and 18th centuries. 
Furthermore, he identified the latter as a source for the 19th century’s national 
revival. 
Czech historiography provides us with a particularly striking illustration of a 
phenomenon most likely relevant, to a greater or smaller extent, to every other 
country. While, in Bohemia of the early 20th century, history was almost totally 
dominated by the pupils of Jaroslav Goll and Josef Pekař, the popular 
imagination of history was shaped more profoundly by the inheritors of the 
Romantic vision of national history, whether in its original shape defined by 
Palacký, or in an “ahistorical” version produced by Masaryk. Because of this 
divergence between academic and popular audiences, the Marxist redefinition of 
historiographic traditions could take place, so to speak, on two levels. The new 
historiography could challenge Romantic clichés, thereby siding with critiques 
from Goll’s school (or from the Polish Kraków School). Or, it could approve the 
vision of history promoted by the Romantics, who, after all, shared many 
similarities with Marx and Engels in generational and philosophical terms (for 
example, with respect to the idea of historical progress). Finally, it could also 
strive to create a new entity, opposed to the entire historiographic edifice 
inherited from the past. 
 
A History Struggling for the Right to Exist – Slovak 
Historiography 
In the comments on Czech historiography above, a certain crucial aspect of its 
development, as well as of the development of all Czech culture, was omitted. 
That aspect is the Slavic idea, defined in the works of two Slovaks who bound 
their lives and careers to Bohemia: Pavol Jozef Šafarík (or, Pavel Josef Šafařík, 
in Czech) and Ján Kollár (Jan Kollár). At the same time, both belong to Slovak 
culture, espousing beliefs which warrant their inclusion in the lineage of 
Slavophile and pan-Slavic thinkers. At the root of their historiosophical ideas lay 
the conviction that Slavs were a single nation speaking a single tongue (merely 
divided into local variants, according to Šafarík). Within the confines of the 
great Slavic family (both the Czecho-Slovak authors and a plethora of later 
proponents of the “Slavic idea” repeatedly stressed the numerical strength of this 
family, totalling about 80 million members in the early 19th century), Czechs and 
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Slovaks formed a common branch. As Robert Pynsent observed, both the 
aforementioned graduates of the University of Jena not only developed marginal 
concepts from Herder’s Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, 
but also applied the principles of the German national movement, formulated in 
the wake of the wars of liberation from Napoleonic oppression, to Slavic 
realities.821 The characteristic equation of culturally and linguistically singular 
Germany with “artificially” divided Slavic peoples counted among the most 
common observations in the works of the Slavic national revivalists.822 
In their historiosophy, Šafarík and Kollár attributed the greatest 
achievements in furthering the progress of humanity to the Slavs. The Slavs’ 
exceptional virtues – their gentleness, as well as the ability to create cultural 
artefacts – set them apart from violent, primitive German tribes. Kollár went so 
far as to find Slavs among the inhabitants of ancient Rome, surmising that Latin 
was merely an ancient Slavic dialect.823 Meanwhile, Slovaks became something 
akin to “Slavs in miniature,” Upper Hungary being a territory endowed with an 
immeasurable wealth of Slavic dialects. Just as Slavs in general always fell 
victim to assaults from their aggressive neighbours, so did the Slovaks suffer 
from Hungarian oppression. The sense of belonging to a caste of people 
numbering in the millions fed hopes for retaining one’s own nationality, and for 
figures as poetic as Kollár, it also bred confidence. Besides, Slovak prophets of 
the Slavic idea kept their spirits high also by remembering Herder’s famous 
sentence on the dearth of opportunities for the Hungarian nation’s progress.824 
Pavol Jozef Šafarík and Ján Kollár occupy a very special place in the history 
of the Slovak historiography. Their predecessors, a few trained amateurs, 
typically engaged in disputes over regional issues, writing local histories in 
Latin, defences of the Slavic language spoken by the inhabitants of Upper 
Hungary, or tales of the past glory of Great Moravia. The creators of the idea of 
Slavic reciprocity placed Slovaks in the very broad context of an idealised 
Slavic land, at the same time picking them out from a specific, real local 
context. History, however, was not central to Slovak culture because the key 
problem was language. Historiographic theses became, in a way, subjected to 
linguistic considerations, while the latter turned into political programs in the 
context of the Slovak national revival. Kollár and Šafarík were Slovak 
Protestants, members of a group which treated Czech as a literary language 
appropriate for liturgical use among Slovaks. There was also a separate cultural 
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movement of Slovak Catholics who usually referred to the Slovak language 
codified by Anton Bernolák. This division was only overcome with the arrival 
of the Protestant Ľudovít Štúr in the early 1840s. 
Though Štúr was not a historian (incidentally, neither were Kollár and 
Šafarík), his impact on Slovak historiography cannot be exaggerated. On the one 
hand, he rejected the claim framed by his predecessors who endorsed Slovak-
Czech unity, invoking in its stead the idea of Slovak national independence on 
the basis of a separate language. In time, the success of his attempt at nation-
formation transformed him into a “father of the nation,” not only in the sense 
applied to the figure of Palacký, but also as someone who actually “invented” 
Slovaks (further on, we will discuss numerous examples of this aspect of Štúr’s 
historical significance). 
Štúr outlined his beliefs on Slovak history in his book Starý a nový vek 
Slovákov (The Old and New Era of the Slovaks) (manuscript dated 1841), which 
was written in a conversational tone. He wholeheartedly agreed with his 
predecessors, who wrote of the might and cultural power of Great Moravia. 
Nevertheless, it was constantly menaced by the invasive Franks, who insidiously 
murdered successive Moravian rulers. Štúr even attributed the arrival of the 
Hungarians to a Frankish plot. The Magyars initially exploited the peace-loving 
Slovaks, who tried to share some of the spirit of their Christian civilisation with 
their untamed neighbours. Finally, with the help of Saint Adalbert and 
missionaries from Bohemia, they succeeded in convincing the Magyars to 
accept Christianity. According to Štúr, “From that point on, Magyars and 
Slovaks lived side by side in peace, faithful to a common fatherland. They 
elected separate kings to administer their lands, treated them with deference and 
showed unbreakable faith. They led joyous lives, for their country gained in 
power through the harmony among its citizens.”825 Slovaks continued to excel in 
their abilities, lawfulness and intelligence; and Štúr devoted a portion of his 
work to the argument that nearly all Hungarian subjects who had achieved 
anything of note up until the 19th century had actually been Slovaks. This 
primacy of Slovaks in all walks of life inevitably incited envy: “The supremacy 
of Slovaks over the Magyars and the wealth they acquired through diligence 
sowed envy among the Magyars, who were enraged by their inability to match 
the Slovaks either in mind, or in riches.”826 This anger – wrote Štúr – lay at the 
foundation of the plan to rob Slovaks of their former laws and refuse them the 
right to their own language: to oppress them. 
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Starý a nový vek Slovákov, however, was not merely the historiosophic 
statement of a Slovak revivalist. Štúr’s magnum opus, Das Slawentum und die 
Welt der Zukunft (written after the failure of the Springtime of the Peoples and 
published posthumously in Russian in 1867) pushed to the extreme ideas which 
Štúr appropriated from Kollár. Maria Bobrownicka, who analysed Štúr’s claims 
very meticulously (and with a healthy dose of criticism) pointed out that his pan-
Slavic ideas were bound up with the rejection of culture outside of folklore: 
“Folklore is ahistorical,” writes Bobrownicka, “ … [H]ence, the promotion and 
entrenchment of Štúr’s cultural model in Slovakia resulted in the elimination 
from native cultural traditions of the ancient literature of the Renaissance, the 
Baroque and Classical Periods, which had been shaped – due to envelopment in 
the Latin Kingdom of Hungary – by the philosophy and aesthetics of the 
European universum. Even if the erasure was not definitive, these literary 
traditions were underappreciated and decidedly impoverished, as if the culture’s 
only role was the conservation of age-old forms of local folklore and the 
imitation of its elements.”827 This work of the national revivalist was also a 
manifesto of pan-Slavism. Perhaps dismayed by the defeat of the Slovak 
political movement of 1848-1849, he transferred his hopes onto Russia, in the 
expectation of peasant enfranchisement and the extension of the mir into aspects 
of economic life other than agriculture. The Russia he longed for was a state 
desired by every Slav; hence, he should promptly abandon his independence, 
embrace Russian as his native tongue and convert to the Orthodox faith.828 Štúr 
struck a prophetic note, proclaiming: “One revolution will follow another, and 
each shall wreak more and more misery upon the Western nations. Successive 
generations seemingly plunge ever deeper into madness and feebleness.”829 This 
rather typical pan-Slavic manifest, written from a conservative Russian 
standpoint rather than from a Slovak perspective, also included a critique of the 
Poles who “through their light-minded and ineffectual uprisings, through their 
incessant ties to maleficent foreigners, betrayed the trust of their own native 
folk. All their history clearly proves that they are unfit for the leadership of all 
Slavic nations.”830 This leadership was reserved for the noble and modest 
Russian tsars.831 
Though Štúr’s “final word” was far more pan-Slavic than the ideas of 
Šafarík or Kollár, he remained a patron for Slovak national and cultural 
independence. As a historiographer, he enjoyed undisputed primacy for many 
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years, the more so since, faced with oppression from the ruling Hungarian 
nation, the Slovak national revival continued to focus on the struggle for the 
preservation of language and culture. The development of historiography was 
also hindered by the absence of native universities and academic associations 
(the scientific-cultural Matica slovenská was dissolved in 1875 by Kálmán 
Tisza’s government). Administrative decisions were reinforced by Hungarian 
“scientific imperialism,” manifested in historical publications that 
wholeheartedly denied Slovaks the status of a nation.832 They were merely an 
ethnic conglomerate, primarily formed from the offspring of Czech colonists, 
Hussite bratríci and other minor Slavic groupings. The problem of identifying 
the primary inhabitants of Slovakia became a fundamental issue for Slovak 
historiography of the day. Hungarian theories were vehemently opposed by the 
most accomplished historian of the “matičny period,” Franko Víťazoslav 
Sasinek, who instead offered his own theory claiming that Slovaks inhabited 
Slovakia since time immemorial, and the seizure of their country by Hungarians 
was not a conquest, but a voluntary acceptance of the newcomers by the 
civilised Slovaks: “Since ancient times, Slovaks inhabited the territory they live 
in now. They lived here as Sarmatians or Quadi, before and after the Vandals, 
before and after the Goths. They were here before the Huns came, and stayed on 
after Attila’s death. The orphaned Slavic cohorts of the Rugians dominated, but 
could not eliminate, the Slovak population. After their departure, the 
Langobards, so to speak, passed the night in Slovakia, but after they were gone, 
the Slovaks were no longer troubled by anyone else in the shade of the 
Carpathian Mountains, up until the 9th century.”833 
Scholars who shaped modern Slovak historiography (and decisively affected 
the social imagination of the past) increased their activities only in the 20th 
century. The same period saw the development of dominant trends in Slovak 
politics and national life. An inquisitive analyst of Slovak relations during the 
interwar period, Henryk Batowski, distinguished four factions (one of them 
consisting of one person only) in Slovak politics on the eve of the assassination 
in Sarajevo. Milan Hodža, up until 1914 a close associate of Archduke Franz 
Ferdinand and a proponent of the transformation of the Habsburg monarchy into 
a federation of states, after the war joined ranks with the “Hlasist” camp 
(consisting of activists tied to Hlas magazine). They supported the notion of a 
Czechoslovak state. In 1920, Hodža published Československý rozkol, a 
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reinterpretation of the Slovak national revival. In his view, the success of Štúr’s 
linguistic endeavour was not the culmination of an organic process that roused a 
slumbering consciousness, but, rather, it was a political act. He saw it as an 
attempt at protecting the nation from Magyarisation at the cost of relinquishing 
Czechoslovak unity and creating a separate nation loyal to the Hungarian 
state.834 The “Hlasist” ideology was opposed by the pan-Slavists, such as 
Svetozár Hurban Vajanský, who, perhaps unwittingly invoking the jargon of 
Ukrainian nationalist activists, claimed that he would rather see Slovaks “drown 
in the Russian sea than in the Czech swamp.”835 Finally, Batowski identified a 
national camp, which in Czechoslovakia was dominated by the clergy of both 
denominations. Among the antecedents of this particular movement, one could 
name the prodigious historians, Július Botto and Josef Škultétý, authors of all-
encompassing interpretations of Slovak national development.836 Debates among 
historians tied to particular political camps inevitably took place in newspaper 
articles rather than in mass-produced books. 
The year 1918 was a turning point for Slovak culture. As Ľubomír Lipták 
observes, at the moment of Czechoslovakia’s formation, the last Slovaks who 
may have had the opportunity of attending a Slovak high school would have 
been around 60 years old. Common ignorance concerning the rules of 
orthography became a serious challenge.837 “Slovakness” experienced a painful 
birth. Hungarian monuments were torn down more often at the behest of visitors 
from Prague than of the locals; the newly-established state holiday 
commemorating Jan Hus was not appreciated by the Catholic section of the 
Slovak folk, who saw him merely as a heretic.838 Paradoxically, this tremendous 
political upheaval yielded only a minor shift in the views of the most revered 
elderly Slovak historians. 
In his works (primarily Slováci, vývin ich národného povedomia from 1906-
1910), Botto (1848-1926) depicted the struggle of the national movement 
against a setting of Magyarisation and the oppression of a people devoid of all 
support from the intelligentsia. The vision of history he promoted was anti-
Hungarian, but also anti-German and anti-Jewish, since Botto accused all those 
nations of exploiting the Slovak peasant. It was the peasant that bore the brunt of 
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anti-Habsburg Hungarian uprisings; it was the Slovaks who paid the price for 
the aggressive politics of Matthias Corvinus. Finally, Botto reinterpreted the 
Hungarian revolution of 1848 as just another assault on the Slovak people.839 
This history of their nation seen through the lens of its torments left a lasting 
mark on Slovak historiography, evident even after 1989.840 Botto authored the 
popular thesis of a several centuries long interruption in Slovak history. He 
believed that the “true” history of the Slovaks took place in the 10th century, and 
then was cut off until reemerging at the dawn of the national revival. The 
intervening period did not yield anything befitting the name of Slovak history. 
Paradoxically, this thesis did not suggest a pessimistic interpretation of national 
history – Botto identified similar discontinuities in the histories of Hungarians 
and other European nations: “Hungarians have no history between the year 1000 
and 1848, just like Slovaks. Ever since the formation of the feudal state, the 
political nation of Hungary became limited to the landowners.”841 
Škultétý (1853-1948) shared most of Botto’s beliefs. Before 1918, he 
engaged in disputes with his Hungarian peers, invoking the philosophy of 
Herder as well as the theses and achievements of Štúr.842 After the formation of 
Czechoslovakia, he debated the Czechoslovakists, such as Hodža, and a group of 
Czech professors at the newly-formed University of Jan Ámos Komenský in 
Bratislava. He pointed out to his rival colleagues that the claim that Slovaks and 
Czechs were bound by common ethnic origins was a simple restatement of ideas 
spread by Hungarian propaganda. Before 1918, the claim was used in support of 
statements denying Slovaks any sedition rights in Upper Hungary; after the 
formation of Czechoslovakia, it was reinstated in support of the fiction of a 
“Czechoslovak nation.”843 Škultétý also sought to prove the ethnically Slovak 
character of Great Moravia. In his opinion, Slovaks and Czechs were divided by 
too many differences for the nations to be capable of merging. Contrary to 
Václav Chaloupecký, the Czech lecturer at the university in Bratislava, he 
believed that the Slovak revival was in no way tied to the Protestant tradition 
that had cultivated a cultural bond with Bohemia, stating rather that it had arisen 
due to the personal efforts of the first generations of revivalists, such as Anton 
Bernolák.844 
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Chaloupecký represented official state ideology, providing it with arguments 
drawn from history and linguistics. In Staré Slovensko (published in Bratislava 
in Czech), he wrote that ancient Slovakia was inhabited by Czechs. In later 
periods, the language spoken by the locals was influenced by other languages 
and cultures, without substantially changing the Czech character of Slovakia: 
“In those olden times, Slovakia belonged geographically to the Czech people 
and formed a political entity in tandem with Moravia, while also maintaining 
unity with Western Czech territories in national and linguistic terms. This should 
not be taken to mean that the language used in the Western parts of Slovakia 
was devoid of its own unique colouring, yet throughout the Medieval period, as 
well as later on, for all its nuance, it was still considered a form of Czech, and 
the people who spoke it were thought of as Czech folk.”845 
In his typology of the political attitudes in Slovakia, Henryk Batowski failed 
to mention any intellectual current that supported the idea of tying Slovakia’s 
national future to the Hungarian state. In fact, after 1918, such attitudes virtually 
disappeared from the national discourse. Activists pursuing an autonomous 
status for Slovakia within a reestablished Hungary simply moved to Hungary 
and became engaged in revisionist propaganda efforts there.846 Foremost among 
the supporters of this current before 1914 was Samuel Czambel. He called upon 
Hungarian authorities to undermine Czech influence in Slovakia by supporting 
the development of Slovak nationhood. According to his philological theory, 
Slovaks belonged to the ranks of the Southern Slavs, having emerged from the 
South to claim territories heretofore inhabited by Polish tribes. While there was 
no room for any talk of a Czecho-Slovak kinship within this concept, the 
national policy of pre-Trianon Hungary rendered the formation of any Slovak 
sense of authentic belonging to the Crown of St. Stephen virtually impossible.847 
The troubling conditions of Slovak historiography’s development played a 
crucial role in delaying the impact of modern methodology (which was 
observable in Bohemia since the beginnings of Jaroslav Goll’s activity) until 
after 1918. It was precisely the interwar period that saw the beginning of the 
scholarly work of Daniel Rapant, a figure whose prominence in Slovak 
historical sciences did not diminish even during the 1950s, when, after having 
declined subjection to Marxist methodology and Communist politics, the 
historian was pushed to the margins. Rapant rejected the idea of a Czechoslovak 
nation, claiming that Czechs and Slovaks had formed separate nationalities 
“since always.” The historian’s magnum opus was the monumental Slovenské 
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povstanie roku 1848-1849. Dejiny a dokumenty (1935-1972), supplemented by 
numerous shorter monographs and academic and popular articles. Relying on a 
rich and well-developed collection of sources (a starkly distinguishing feature 
vis-à-vis most of his predecessors), Rapant painted the Slovak uprising of 1848 
as an eminently just struggle for liberty, even though it had been conducted hand 
in hand with the Habsburg army. This high esteem regarding the uprising 
resulted, in part, from his interpretation of the Hungarian revolution as a 
movement geared toward the maintenance of feudal relations and nationalist 
oppression rather than an upheaval meant to bring democracy to the Slovaks.848 
At the same time, the scholar rejected the tearful vision of national history put 
forward by Botto. He believed that Slovaks had been proven to be capable of 
forming their own state not only through the part they played in shaping Great 
Moravia, but also through their contribution to the formation of the Medieval 
Kingdom of Hungary.849 One should add that Rapant’s scholarly qualifications 
were also evident in his 1952 book on the peasant uprising of 1831.850 Though 
the author found himself under fire from Marxists because he did not discuss the 
social significance of the uprising sufficiently, he did not come close to claiming 
that the peasant revolts had national significance for the Slovaks, despite the fact 
that such an argument would have supported his own argument about the 
strength of the national spirit in Slovakia.851 Rapant sought above all to conduct 
himself in a professional manner, which was not a characteristic which his 
predecessors would have pursued as essential for themselves. 
 
*** 
One of the most urgent problems for Polish, Czech, Slovak, and East German 
historiographies of the 1950s was the critical evaluation of modern national 
historical science from its beginnings in the Enlightenment to the final years of 
the interwar period. Researchers were supposed to find their way between two 
extremes: a total rejection of the older historiography and a ‘positive’ search for 
a progressive historiographical tradition. One of the few Polish interwar 
Marxists, Wanda Moszczeńska (1896–1974), called it a “dialectical negation” of 
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the pre-Communist heritage.852 As a matter of fact, what Marxists were expected 
to do was simply to build up a new school in national history through suitably 
selected predecessors. The following remarks refer to the Marxist-Leninist 
history of historiography in the so-called Stalinist period. 
While describing the various attitudes towards pre-Marxist historiographical 
traditions, one should not overlook some differences between the respective 
national and political contexts. First of all, the frequency and sharpness of 
historical debates were more pronounced in the Polish and East German cases 
than in the Czech or Slovak Marxist-Leninist historical sciences (although the 
period under scrutiny was much shorter in Poland than in other countries). 
Czech and Slovak Marxist interpretations of the national past, in contrast, 
borrowed a great deal from the traditional stock of liberal-nationalist ideas; this 
influence was present in Czech culture since the first edition of František 
Palacký’s magisterial historical work, while the origins of the Slovak heritage 
had been linked to Ľudovít Štúr’s national movement program. One should not 
assume, however, that Czech and Slovak attitudes towards the history of 
historiography were ‘national’ in the same way.853 Meanwhile, neither the 
German, nor the Polish Marxists, followed their own liberal-nationalist tradition 
so explicitly. In these two cases one can observe a hesitation over recognition of 
various historical traditions, which led to more frequent and sharper ideological 
confrontations among Marxist historians. It should also be mentioned that 
interest in the history of historiography in the 1950s seems to have been more 
evident in the Polish case than in any other of the four previously mentioned 
historiographies. The number of Polish Marxist publications devoted to this 
issue was substantially higher than in the GDR or in Czechoslovakia. 
Marxists dealing with the history of historiography faced several important 
problems of a methodological, cultural, and political nature. The first set of 
problems related to the translation of historiographical traditions into the 
language of Marxism-Leninism. In this regard, 19th century historians were 
transferred from their original cultural and scientific context and transposed onto 
a different theoretical frame. They were interrogated with ahistorical questions 
from the point of view of Soviet Marxism, not from the point of view of their 
own times or the history of historiography. 
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The second group of problems may be described as geopolitical, as has been 
illustrated in the previous chapter. This is probably the easiest to understand and, 
in many cases, clearly leads to an obvious conclusion: Marxist historiographies 
in East Central Europe often praised those historical phenomena that were pro-
Russian without paying much attention to their social or political context. Thus 
the conservative pan-Slavists were less problematic than the anti-tsarist 
democrats. Even Marx and Engels could be wrong in those moments when they 
criticised or neglected the historical role of Russia. 
Finally, the third set of problems refers to the role of 19th century 
nationalism. Since Marxist-Leninist historiographies in East Central Europe 
never adopted a radical Pokrovski-type ‘Bolshevik’ historiography with all its 
anational and anti-national features, they remained deeply indebted to the 
national traditions shaped by such personalities as Palacký, Lelewel, Štúr, the 
Prussian school, or the Warsaw and Kraków positivists. In fact, it would have 
been drastic to sever the ties that had bound Marxist historians with the tradition 
of national movements, and none of the examined historiographies seriously 
dared to undertake such extreme measures. Gradually they became more and 
more ‘nationalist,’ but even in their beginnings, in the 1950s, one could find 
many traces of continuity between the older historiographical tradition and the 
new methodological trend. 
In the following considerations, I will present some sample problems 
illustrating the interferences of different methodological traditions, political 
affiliations, and interpersonal relations in the Polish, East German, Czech, and 
Slovak history of historiography. I concentrate on two main problems: different 
attitudes towards each nation’s tradition of national historiography, as well as 
the main methodological problems of Marxism in the debates on East Central 
European historiographies. Finally, I will try to select and describe several 
elements that were present in every Marxist history of historiography and that 
shaped the academic landscape of the 1950s and early 1960s. 
 
Poland: Criteria of Progressiveness and Pan-Slavism 
Assessing historiographical traditions was not only a difficult task, but proved to 
be a very complex topic and thus probably the only one that would occasion a 
broader discussion in Polish historiography of the 1950s. Marxists were 
supposed to look upon 19th century historians from at least three different 
angles. The first issue was the evaluation of the political sympathies of the 
historians, and their attitudes towards progressive ideologies of their time. 
Second came the evaluation of their work in both methodological and factual 
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contexts. Finally, it was deemed necessary to characterize not only particular 
individuals, but also the ideologies they had subscribed to, and to locate them in 
the established theoretical framework of socio-economic formations. This 
attitude towards history seemed quite natural for the representatives of Marxist 
ideology. As the Soviet Medievalist Evgenii A. Kosminskii put it, “from the 
Marxist point of view, historiography is just one of the disciplines of the history 
of social thought, and it is therefore always clearly and closely connected with 
politics. By various alternating visible and invisible means, bourgeois ideology 
is able to infiltrate historiography together with those achievements of bourgeois 
historiography which we both appreciate and make use of.”854  
To characterize the effects of new interpretative efforts, we shall focus upon 
a few crucial questions. Starting from the Polish example, we will see the way 
Marxist historians characterised one of the most important Polish scholars of the 
19th century, Joachim Lelewel, and another Romantic historian, the far less 
known Polish Slavist and pan-Slavist, Zorian Dołęga Chodakowski. Later we 
will focus on Marxist interpretations of the forerunner of positivist 
historiography, Karol Boromeusz Hoffman, and of the two historical ‘liberal’ 
schools of the second half of 19th century: the so called Kraków and Warsaw 
schools. What is important to note is that all the scholars under discussion 
belonged to a small group of Marxist historians from the 1950s who did not 
belong with the majority of Polish scholars. Thus, the controversies surrounding 
their work reflect—so to speak—the internal debates of certain scientific 
collectives and not a hegemonic act of dominance over the non-Marxist 
milieu.855 
Joachim Lelewel, perceived as the first Polish professional historian and 
author of the Romantic interpretation of Polish history, was also a democratic 
politician. The first postwar Marxist opinions on this friend of Marx and Engels 
were positive. A leading Stalinist historian and author of the first Communist 
guidelines for schools, Żanna Kormanowa, characterised him in 1946 as an 
exemplary progressive democrat.856 The same opinion was officially accepted 
by representatives of Polish scholars in the humanities gathered at the First 
Congress of Polish Science (I Kongres Nauki Polskiej) in Warsaw in 1949. The 
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1950s brought several editions of Lelewel’s writings, which constantly 
manipulated his texts to achieve the picture of a relentless fighter for social 
progress. His theory of ancient Slavic democracy as well as his internationalism 
and sympathy for the peasantry were highly appreciated. 
 However, as Marxist researchers analysed Lelewel’s opinions more deeply, 
they identified more limitations to his ‘progressivism’. For example, praising the 
democratic heritage of the Slavic past, Lelewel came to the conclusion that the 
democracy of the Polish gentry was a progressive phenomenon. Thus Marxist 
historians could rightly accuse him of ignoring the exploitation of the peasants 
that characterised the period. Even more important, Lelewel was not ready to 
recognize the rights of Ukrainians and Belorussians to foster national 
development (we should also mention that Polish democrats shared this 
erroneous position also with Marx and Engels). But the most problematic 
aspects of his biography were his critical attitudes towards Russia and his 
supposedly insufficient political radicalism. The most ill-fitting criticism of 
Lelewel can be found in a book by Celina Bobińska, Marks i Engels a sprawy 
polskie do osiemdziesiątych lat XIX wieku (Marx, Engels, and the Polish 
question until the 1880s), published in 1954. The historian, closely linked to the 
Party leadership, described Lelewel as a man “unable to decide,” a “liberal-
opportunist” if not clearly a reactionary politician. Disregarding the Polish 
national tradition and even Marx and Engels, she had attempted to prove that the 
Romantic historian’s “two great friends” had made a mistake in their 
appreciation of him, and did not realize that he was not “worthy of their 
friendship.” Only Marxist historiography was able to judge historians 
properly.857 Other critical remarks of Polish Marxist historians targeted the fact 
that Lelewel was not a Marxist. 
Relatively little attention was paid to other historians of the Polish Romantic 
tradition, more or less influenced by Lelewel. Perhaps the only exception is the 
particularly interesting case of Zorian Dołęga Chodakowski, who became the 
object of an article published in 1955 in Kwartalnik Historyczny by Andrzej 
Poppe.858 The author stressed Chodakowski’s democratic and pro-Russian 
opinions, incorporated him into the group of progressive heirs to the Polish 
Enlightenment and described him as a forerunner of revolutionary democratic 
historiography. Poppe pointed to Lelewel’s unparalleled influence on 
Chodakowski, which seems unlikely, especially if we take into consideration the 
fact that Chodakowski was older than Lelewel and died before the publication of 
                                                            
857 Bobińska, Marks, 32. 
858 Andrzej Poppe, “U źródeł postępowej historiografii szlacheckiego rewolucjonizmu: 
Zorian Dołęga Chodakowski (1784-1825),” Kwartalnik Historyczny 1955, 27–40. 
 The Marxist History of Historiography 237 
 
the most important and popular works of the Romantic historian. Nonetheless, 
Poppe claimed that almost every progressive feature of Chodakowski’s ideology 
was borrowed from Lelewel. Furthermore, all limitations in the works of the 
Polish Slavist were also attributed to Lelewel’s influence. An attentive reader of 
the article might have had the impression that Poppe was trying to prove that 
while Chodakowski’s virtues were his own achievement, it was Lelewel who 
was responsible for all his ideological shortcomings. 
A comparison of the official attitude towards these two historians allows one 
to conclude that, in the case of the almost forgotten Chodakowski, it was easier 
to include him in the category of “progressive traditions” than had been the case 
with the popular writer and influential politician Joachim Lelewel. The fact that 
Lelewel was a democrat, and Chodakowski a conservative Slavophile, was no 
obstacle. On the contrary, sometimes it was possible to be a reactionary thinker 
who in some aspects “objectively” represented progress; in fact, it could be 
preferable to being a “progressive” ideologist who made inexcusable mistakes. 
At the same time, this comparison shows how one’s attitude towards Russia 
became the basic criterion of Marxist evaluation. Both of these observations on 
Marxist research in the field of historiography will prove useful in further 
discussion. 
In 1953, the leader of a group of Marxist historians from Łódź, Marian 
Serejski, published a study on the liberal historian Karol Boromeusz Hoffman, 
who had been a representative of the 19th century liberal-conservative wing of 
the Polish Great Emigration and a forerunner of positivist historical research.859 
According to Serejski, Hoffman was not only a better, more professional 
historian than Lelewel, but also a representative of another stage of social 
progress (from the period of late feudalism to early capitalism). At the same 
time Serejski openly admitted Hoffman’s political liberalism and social 
conservatism and acknowledged that his ideology became reactionary in the late 
19th century. Nevertheless, at this particular stage Hoffman played a progressive 
role as a follower, and also as a critic, of Lelewel’s philosophy of history. 
Serejski’s book was strongly criticised by the Warsaw sociologist Nina 
Assorodobraj for having judged Lelewel unfairly. She accused Serejski of 
‘sociologism’—a serious methodological error. According to Assorodobraj, 
Hoffman could not be progressive and reactionary at the same time. He was 
actually always hostile towards the idea of agrarian revolution, the only 
progressive Polish ideology of his times. These conclusions led Assorodobraj to 
raise the theoretical problem of ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ criteria of progress. 
In short, Assorodobraj stated that not every change brings progress. If a liberal 
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thinker lays foundations for the development of capitalism, he remains a liberal 
and capitalist despite the fact that what follows capitalism in its late phase is 
socialist revolution. In fact, his activity may be interpreted as an attempt to 
repair and preserve an existing social order; thus his activities might have been 
more dangerous than open feudal reaction. Finally Assorodobraj compared 
Serejski’s picture of Hoffman to a hypothetical monument to a landowner who 
had introduced new capitalist methods, improving the productivity of his estate. 
Her article ends with the following statement: “People’s Poland draws from the 
progressive traditions of the Polish nation. It will not draw from Hoffman.”860 
 The methodological discussion begun by Nina Assorodobraj soon 
continued far beyond the biography of Karol Boromeusz Hoffman. The next 
point of contention was the Marxist-Leninist reassessment of the so-called 
Warsaw school of history: liberal historians from the Russian part of Poland 
who opposed the conservative Kraków school which had become influential 
after the fall of the January Uprising (1863–1864). Serejski described the 
leading Warsaw positivist scholar Władysław Smoleński as an anti-clerical and 
highly ‘progressive’ follower of Lelewel. According to Serejski, both Smoleński 
and the entire Warsaw school should have been incorporated into progressive 
national traditions, despite various limitations.861 Rather than Nina 
Assorodobraj, it was Celina Bobińska who criticised Serejski’s “attempts to 
fabricate a progressive political biography of Smoleński.”862 In her view, 
positivism belonged to the ideologies of reaction, along with positivist 
historiography and the positivist Smoleński. 
Marian Henryk Serejski decided to express his disagreement with 
Bobińska’s critical remarks openly and published a polemical article in 
Kwartalnik Historyczny.863 He questioned the very idea whether there was, after 
the fall of the January Uprising, any possibility of an agrarian revolution in 
Polish lands. This fact—Serejski claimed—placed limitations on the possible 
progressiveness of the liberal bourgeoisie. To reinforce his arguments, the 
historian built an analogy between the Warsaw school and a group of liberal 
Russian historians from the same period. According to Serejski, the Poles were 
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as progressive as their Russian contemporaries. In turn, Serejski criticised 
Bobińska’s attitude towards the youngest representative of the conservative 
Kraków school, Michał Bobrzyński. Bobińska praised the former governor of 
Galicia for his methodological achievements, especially his usage of 
sociological research in an attempt to establish universal principles of social 
development, which—according to her—was very close to Marxist 
methodology. During the First Congress of Polish Science, Bobińska even went 
so far as to assert that openly conservative historiography—above all the 
Kraków school—was in a way much less problematic for Marxist researchers 
since they did not need to unmask it, whereas liberal historiography required a 
new critical Marxist examination.864 
The debate possessed an interpersonal dimension as well. In 1956, several 
days before the massacre of the Poznań workers, a meeting of the scientific 
board of Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences took place. 
Marian Henryk Serejski claimed that Nina Assorodobraj and Celina Bobińska 
had conducted a political campaign against him.865 Bobińska answered that her 
polemic with Serejski was a “normal” scientific discussion (a rarity under 
Stalinism), and had nothing to do with politics.866 The continuation of the 
personal conflict between Serejski and Assorodobraj was even more 
embarrassing. In 1958, Serejski published a book on Joachim Lelewel for which 
he was accused of plagiarism by Assorodobraj. This personal conflict did not 
reach any final conclusion. The deterioration of the quality of scientific debate 
to this level of personal animus did not stimulate the growth of a new, 
homogenous interpretation of Polish 19th century historiography. 
Describing these controversies helps us to draw a schema of Marxist 
attitudes towards Polish historiographical traditions. Despite the scarcity of 
historical debates in the Stalinist period, in general, historiography inspired 
broad controversies. None of the Polish Marxists managed to create a general 
vision of the shortcomings and achievements of past historians. Different, often 
contradictory, interpretations divided the already numerically small group of 
Polish Marxists. Serejski, Bobińska, Assorodobraj, and Żanna Kormanowa were 
all representatives of largely the same methodological tendency among leftist 
scholars, but the conflicts and controversies between them made it impossible to 
create a ‘common front’ against non-Marxist historians. The effect was 
discouraging from the point of view of Communist authorities. Neither Lelewel, 
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Hoffman, Smoleński, nor Bobrzyński could be seen as a part of a Polish 
progressive tradition. Instead of a clear vision of the Polish history of 
historiography, Marxist historians contributed another chapter to the traditional 
debates shaped by their ‘bourgeois’ colleagues. 
 
Czechoslovakia: Defence of the Founding Fathers 
In many respects the founding father of Czech historiography, František 
Palacký, can be seen as a Czech counterpart to Lelewel. Like the Pole, he was a 
national political leader. His vision of national history is generally perceived as 
Romantic. They both shared the belief in an ancient Slavic democracy, the 
“German” character of feudalism, and the bright future of their nations. The 
most striking differences between Palacký and Lelewel were of a political nature 
and reflect the differences between Polish and Czech nationalism in the 19th 
century. Lelewel belonged with democratic radicals, whereas Palacký shifted 
from liberalism to a social conservatism with pan-Slavic undertones. His 
reception among Marxists was, interestingly enough, quite positive. Josef Macek 
deemed Palacký’s interpretation of Czech history progressive since Palacký had 
appreciated the importance of the Hussite movement. Palacký did not 
distinguish between the more progressive radical Hussite movement of Tábor 
and the moderate Hussites, but this detail did not change the positive reception 
of his work. According to Macek, Palacký as a historian and politician allegedly 
represented the most progressive part of the bourgeoisie in its glory days, 
especially before the revolution of 1848. As a liberal, and later a conservative 
politician, Palacký however could not always count on appreciation. The Soviet 
scholar Ivan I. Udaltsov accused Palacký of being not only conservative but also 
nationalist (chauvinist), and found Palacký’s idea of Austro-Slavism reactionary. 
Udaltsov also called the Czech national movement as a whole reactionary, as it 
had supported the Habsburg monarchy in its struggle against the 1848 revolution 
in Vienna and Hungary. This opinion presented by not only a Soviet historian 
but also a prominent Soviet diplomat in Prague could not be rejected openly by 
Czech historians. It was furthermore historically ‘justified’ by Friedrich Engels’ 
severe judgment of the Czech national movement. As far as research shows, 
only two Czech historians dared challenge Udaltsov in order to defend Palacký 
from Marxist criticism. In 1948, when the nascent Marxist-Leninist 
“methodological revolution” was not yet fully defined, Josef Macůrek, the 
brilliant “bourgeois” historian from Brno, confronted Soviet researchers during 
his stay at the congress of Polish historians in Wrocław. Macůrek debated 
Udaltsov, pointing to the international context of the Czech national 
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movement.867 Several years later the first president of the Czechoslovak 
Academy of Sciences and the main codifier of the Czech Marxist vision of 
history, Zdeněk Nejedlý, firmly (and successfully) rejected Udaltsov’s attempt 
to erase Palacký from the Museum of National Literature (Památník národního 
písemnictví) in Prague.868 Nevertheless, the only promising way to defend 
national values permanently was to try to “reconcile” Udaltsov with Palacký. In 
the university handbook on Czech history, Udaltsov was referred to as “the best 
expert on the revolution of 1848.”869 Josef Kočí, the reviewer of Udaltsov’s 
book in Československý Časopis Historický, shared this laudatory evaluation but 
added that Udaltsov did not pay attention to some positive aspects of the Czech 
national movement, especially to the role of Palacký as a historian.870 Bedřich 
Šindelář formulated the same idea in a different way when he wrote, “We must 
distinguish between Palacký the historian, and Palacký the politician.”871 
The Marxist assessment of František Palacký was more positive than the 
Polish Marxist assessment of Lelewel, despite Palacký’s political beliefs and the 
harsh criticism which Marx and Engels leveled against the Czech national 
movement as a whole. The Czech émigré Joseph F. Žáček wrote in the late 
1960s that Palacký’s work was “still regarded as classic, valuable not only for 
much of its factual content but especially for the philosophy of history which 
permeates it (It is, of course, the only comprehensive philosophy of Czech 
history besides the Marxist one).”872 
The Slovak Marxist interpretation of Ľudovít Štúr, the leader of the 19th 
century Slovak national movement, demonstrates striking analogies to the 
picture of Palacký. The Communist literary theoretician Vladimír Mináč 
described him as a creator of the Slovak nation: “In the beginning was the Word. 
And the Word was with Štúr. ... So, Štúr was the beginning.”873 Historian Karol 
Goláň described Štúr as a combatant for social and political progress, for Slovak 
national identity and Slovak culture, as well as for universal values.874 Although 
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critical of the idea of Czecho-Slovak national unity, Štúr always expressed 
sympathy towards Czechs.875 Július Mésároš called him an internationalist and 
political moralist on the way to becoming a revolutionary.876 He was said to 
have been the best student, economist, linguist, educator, publicist, poet, 
politician, and—last but not least—the best Slovak historian of his times.877 
Karol Goláň stated that he possessed some prophetic abilities, for he was 
supposed to have foreseen the decline of capitalism in Slovakia.878 In his later 
years Štúr became a pan-Slavist, dreaming of the assimilation of all Slavic 
nations into Russian language and culture, but this conservative turn did not 
fundamentally alter the positive assessments which Marxists made of Štúr.879 
In fact, if anything could tarnish this image of a national hero, it was his 
attitude towards the Hungarian revolution of 1848–1849. Not only did the 
Revolution belong to the ‘progressive traditions’ of socialist Hungary, it was 
also one of the democratic movements passionately supported by Marx and 
Engels. At the same time, their opinion of the Slovak national movement was as 
critical as it had been in the case of Czech liberals. In 1954, the young Slovak 
historian and ethnographer Vladimír Matula highlighted this conflict. According 
to Matula, the commonly used interpretation of the Slovak national movement 
was highly subjective and idealising. The truth was that Štúr and other Slovak 
politicians had supported the reactionary Austrian state against the spirit of 
European revolution, embodied in Lajos Kossuth. Only a few marginal radical 
democratic Slovak groups that supported Hungarians were truly progressive. 
The mainstream of the Slovak national movement had not come close to 
embracing any kind of democratic ideology. From 1848 on, Matula found no 
traces of social progressiveness in the Slovak national camp.880 
This reevaluation of Štúr radiated out like a local earthquake, eliciting an 
almost immediate response to some of Matula’s theses. Karol Goláň admitted 
that the Slovak national movement cooperated with Vienna, but it simply had no 
other choice: “The national chauvinism of the Hungarian movement ... had 
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excluded any other option.”881 In January 1955, Matula faced his opponents 
during a conference at the Historical Institute of SAV. This time Karol Goláň 
was supported by a curious coalition, composed of the Stalinist literary historian 
Andrej Mráz and the young, bright and ‘apolitical’ sociologist and historian, 
Július Mésároš.882 The first phase of the debate was closed in 1955, when the 
Slovak Academy of Sciences published the so-called “theses” for the Marxist 
university handbook for history students. According to the collective authors, 
Štúr was partly wrong because the agenda of the Hungarian revolution could 
have had a clearly progressive impact on all nationalities. On the other hand, 
they stated that he was correct in noting that the Hungarian liberal opposition 
had decided to accept historical-feudal rights and ignore national rights (and 
accordingly, they disregarded the objectives of the Slovak national 
movement).883 
In 1956, the Slovak scientific community celebrated the centennial of Štúr’s 
death. His portrait graced the cover of the central historical journal, Historický 
časopis SAV, and the foreword to the volume described the latest debates over 
the Slovak national movement of the 19th century. Its author criticised equally 
two extreme options: bourgeois nationalism and national nihilism.884 One of the 
studies by Július Mésároš was entitled “Boj Ľudovíta Štúra proti feudalizmu” 
(Ľudovít Štúr’s struggle against feudalism). Mésároš highlighted important 
social differences between Hungarian revolutionaries and members of the 
Slovak national movement. In his view, Slovaks were common people, whereas 
Hungarian liberals were of noble origin. Thus their social radicalism was 
seriously limited. For Štúr and his fellow fighters—as Mésároš claimed—the 
Hungarian revolution was simply not progressive enough: “Bourgeois reform, as 
shaped by the liberal gentry in March 1848, was only a shadow of the ideas for 
which Štúr had fought. The abolition of serfdom, and the radical transformation 
of the feudal means of production and of the gentry’s privileges were 
accomplished only in part. It was not enough.”885 These opinions were supported 
by Soviet researchers during the Štúr conference in Moscow in 1956.886 Several 
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weeks before, a conference in Bratislava had taken place. Its participants simply 
ignored any critical remarks concerning the national hero. Vladimír Matula 
himself gave a speech on Štúr’s Slavic idea, stressing its “healthy features” and 
by no means recapitulating his previous critical remarks.887 
In the meantime, Matula’s critical positions were completely abandoned. 
One should point to the Hungarian revolution in 1956 as one of the reasons for 
the posthumous victory of Štúr over Kossuth. In 1959, the Czechoslovak 
university handbook described Štúr as an unquestionable source of progressive 
traditions and national values. The Hungarian revolution was then compared to 
the contemporaneous Hungarian “counterrevolution” and thus excluded from 
progressive traditions.888 The rhetorical perfection of this construction warrants 
an extensive quote: “The aversion toward the Hungarian revolution … coupled 
with an apologetic attitude toward the Slovak interventions of 1848-1849 
became an ideologically important source for Slovak bourgeois nationalism. On 
the other hand, as the grievous events of 1956 in Hungary prove, they still exert 
a detrimental influence and lead to nationalist exaggerations and the blind cult of 
the Hungarian revolution. In truth, the Hungarian revolution of 1848-1849 was 
marked by even more pronounced limitations and indecisiveness than other 
‘true’ bourgeois revolutions. The particular merit of the Hungarian nation in 
1848-1849 was that it acted not only in its own name, but also in the name of 
international progress. Within the counterrevolutionary putsch of 1956, the 
wilful replication and manipulation of the revolutionary-democratic traditions of 
1848-1849 was a weapon used by reactionary instigators and false petit-
bourgeois democrats for the purpose of effecting the restoration of former 
exploitative classes, and by international imperialists, the greatest enemies of 
popular and national freedom.”889 Finally, Matula tried to defend the remnants 
of his theory by claiming that the old Štúr, while politically conservative and 
pan-Slavist, bore striking similarities to 1848’s radical democrats, “‘Kraľ and 
Francisci, of course without their revolutionary strategy.”890 Matula’s attempt to 
connect the “conservative revolution” with the democratic one did not open any 
wider debate. 
The more progressive Štúr and the Slovak national movement looked, the 
more reactionary the Hungarian revolution became. In the mid-1960s, Vladimír 
Mináč wrote: “This revolution we fought against was odd from its very 
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beginnings: drôle de revolution. The figures were changing: the casino in Pest 
instead of the Viennese court; five Hungarian aristocratic families instead of the 
emperor. It was characteristic of this strange revolution, that no other reaction, 
restoration, or counterrevolution was needed to stop it. This revolution had an 
inborn protest, reaction, and restoration—revolution bearing a victorious 
reactionary seed.”891 
In turn, Matula’s article had been extensively quoted after 1954 as a negative 
example, especially during the political liberalism of the so-called Slovak Spring 
period in the 1960s. His attempt to reinterpret Štúr and the Slovak national 
movement was labelled as the “Stalinisation of historiography.” Moreover, it 
became the main example for all the anti-national and ungainly ugly features of 
the Stalinist period. Ľudovít Holotík, director of the Institute of History at the 
Academy, wrote in 1963 that “the ideological campaign against nationalism was 
one-sided; it was restricted to Slovakia and accompanied by a system of distrust 
and terror. In those conditions the necessity of searching for Slovak progressive 
traditions was wrongly understood, it was labelled as nationalism (for example 
when it came to the characteristics of Ľudovít Štúr, etc.).”892 The allusion to 
Matula was quite clear, but it was still not the last assault on his claims. The idea 
of an anti-national Stalinist historiography that attempted to “destroy” Štúr is still 
present in Slovak public and scientific life. In 1991, during the congress of the 
Slovak Historical Society, Richard Marsina claimed that in the Communist period 
only the small nations were accused of nationalism, whereas it should be clear, 
that whatever they do, they do it to defend their existence from suppression by the 
large nations.893 Interestingly, a similar position is defended by Adam Hudek in a 
book which, by all accounts, is a work of undeniable quality. Accepting without 
reservation all manifestations of sympathy among Slovak Marxists for Štúr and 
national traditions, Hudek argues that up until the 1960s, historical discourse was 
in that regard dominated by the self-critical position of Ladislav Novomeský, who 
harked back to the 1930s.894 
Neither the Štúr controversy, nor any other element of the Slovak Marxist 
interpretation of history justifies such theses. It appears rather that the ‘purges’ 
at Slovak universities and historical societies did not produce a rapid 
reinterpretation of the national narrative. Daniel Rapant, probably the most 
outstanding Slovak historian of the 20th century and a symbolical figure, was 
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relieved from his duties as a historian, but his interpretation of the Slovak 
national movement remained widely accepted.895 In 1966, this traditional 
interpretation was challenged again by a Hungarian Marxist, Erzsébet Andics. 
The Slovak responses demonstrated already a good deal of distance from the 
national ‘nihilism’ of Matula. Július Mésároš quoted both Vladimír Mináč and 
Daniel Rapant to prove that—whatever Marx and Engels might have said about 
the Hungarian revolution—Kossuth was simply fighting for power. His victory 
would not have positively advanced the prospects of the Slovaks.896 
 
GDR: Rather Treitschke than Ranke 
Czech and Slovak Marxist historiographies do not offer many examples of bitter 
clashes between adherents of various “bourgeois” methodological directions. To 
find an equivalent to the vivid Polish debates on Hoffman, Lelewel, or the 
Kraków and Warsaw historical schools, one should search in the historiography 
that inherited the most sophisticated (but also the most problematic) tradition: 
East German Marxist historiography. I will focus on two problems of crucial 
importance: the reevaluation of Leopold von Ranke, and the so-called Prussian 
historical school consisting of Johann Gustav Droysen, Heinrich von Sybel, 
Heinrich von Treitschke, and Theodor Mommsen (considered as a member of 
this group by the East Germans). As in the Polish case, all the historians taking 
part in the East German debates were Marxists, though some of them did not 
necessarily belong to the mainstream. 
East German historians only started to elaborate on their pre-Marxist 
scientific traditions rather late. In the 1950s, one of the leading Marxist scholars, 
a professor at the university in Halle (and veteran of the Soviet Army), Leo 
Stern, addressed the issue in his work Gegenwartsaufgaben der deutschen 
Geschichtsforschung (published separately, as well as in the newly created 
Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft). The chapter devoted to Ranke was 
entitled simply “Ranke and the fall of German historiography.” Stern criticised 
Ranke’s notion of objectivity, which led to social and political conservatism, 
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and moreover, paved the way to German nationalism.897 He faulted the “moral 
indifferentism” of this form of objectivity, which could make every past crime 
justifiable. Surprisingly, Stern did not accuse Ranke of being a reactionary 
political thinker – he considered his striving for an objective picture of the past 
as serious and sincere. Still, he noted that, by resort to objectivity, Ranke 
weakened the moral strength of German historiography, leaving it unprepared to 
face the historical outcomes of 1918 and 1945.898 
In 1956, the prominent economic historian Jürgen Kuczynski (1904–1997) 
presented a completely different evaluation of Ranke’s impact on German 
historiography. Kuczynski wrote that Ranke was a brilliant historian who raised 
the professional level of historiography: “As a matter of fact Ranke used those 
new scientific tools to strengthen the ruling classes .... But how much closer we 
are to the uncovering of the real past thanks to his efforts! ... All means that help 
us better describe reality are important for social progress and therefore 
objectively help the new win its battle against the old in society.”899 Jürgen 
Kuczynski’s assessment of Ranke was one of the main arguments in an official 
campaign against “revisionism” that, thanks to his good political relations with 
the German and foreign Communist elite, did not have any serious personal 
effects.900 
The official GDR narrative of German historicism was created throughout 
the 1960s. It was much more simplified than any passage from Stern or 
Kuczynski. The young German sociologist, historian, and director of the 
Historical Institute at Humboldt University in Berlin, Joachim Streisand (1920–
1980), simply described Ranke as a part of the feudal reaction against the 
progressive intellectual current(s) of Enlightenment.901 Gerhard Schilfert noticed 
that Ranke’s reactionary character was evident even in his youth, when he 
remained unmoved by the flourishing radical movement of the 
Burschenschaften and thus supported European reaction during every single 19th 
century revolutionary attempt.902 He was set against such progressive Romantic 
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historians as Schlosser, Gervinus, Rotteck, and Zimmermann.903 When in the 
early 1960s the Marxist evaluation of Hegel began to change rapidly,904 and the 
philosopher was at least partly adapted to the progressive heritage, Ranke lost 
another point, for he had criticised Hegel’s philosophy of history.905 Ranke was 
unfairly accused of “worshiping the Prussian regime,” and, on the other hand, 
quite “fairly” faulted for negating historical progress and stressing the role of 
foreign policy and social conservatism. Ernst Engelberg, the leader of the GDR 
historical association, wrote, “shortly, Ranke was useful to justify imperialist 
aggression abroad as well as for fighting against the German workers’ 
movement.”906 
The Marxist appreciation of Ranke had gradually deteriorated, becoming 
more and more one-sided. The Prussian historical school had a similar 
trajectory, albeit in the opposite direction. In the late 1940s, when the Marxist 
vision of the German past was still under the influence of postwar criticism 
(with Alexander Abusch as the most prominent representative of the new 
historical direction), the role of Sybel, Treitschke, and Droysen seemed to be 
quite clear: through their works they had prepared the way for Hitler.907 As 
Gottfried Koch stated, “their works reflected a compromise between the great 
bourgeoisie and the Prussian feudal-absolutist reaction.”908 The young Marxist 
historian of historiography, Hans Schleier (born in 1931), characterised the 
Prussian school as antidemocratic and counterrevolutionary. Its members were 
Prussian chauvinists and militarists. They were afraid of social democracy and 
did their best to destroy its influence on German society. They supported 
Bismarck’s aggressive policies, and some of them (namely Treitschke) were 
also anti-Semitic.909 In methodological matters Droysen, Treitschke, and Sybel 
were said to combine the old liberal agenda with all the reactionary features of 
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German Romanticism (first of all its fondness for feudalism).910 They were 
hostile towards the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and—despite formal 
declarations—towards the progressive heritage of German Classicism.911 
Despite all this, East German Marxists saw some of the positive aspects of 
the Prussian school, and—interestingly enough—observed them mostly in those 
aspects where it differed from Ranke and his followers. Gottfried Koch stated 
that the conflict between Sybel and Giesebrecht had a clear political meaning: 
Prussian historians were correct in stating that the Medieval German empire 
spent its vital power in Italy instead of strengthening its internal coherence and 
expanding to the Slavic East. Figures such as Sybel or Treitschke wanted a 
united Germany, and thus they were more progressive than conservatives who 
supported existing political relations.912 Had they not supported the 
Ostexpansion as well, their assessment by Marxists could have been even more 
positive.913 
 It is thus very interesting to compare the Marxist attitude towards Ranke 
and his younger colleagues. Interestingly enough, the Prussian school came to 
be perceived more favourably than the most influential German historian. Hans 
Schleier explained this problem in a similar way to what Marian Henryk 
Serejski had done with the historians Karol Boromeusz Hoffman and Joachim 
Lelewel: “Political historians, representatives of an alliance between the great 
bourgeoisie and the Junkers, adherents of the national and political unification of 
Germany, represented a new school of historiography, more progressive than the 
conservative, Romantic Ranke.”914 Surprisingly, even such features of the 
Prussian school as its German nationalism were interpreted as having been 
inherited from Ranke, and thus were not seen as a difference between Ranke and 
national-liberals. Schleier noted that “there were many more methodological and 
political similarities between Ranke and the Prussian-German historians than 
they, or the later bourgeois history of historiography, were willing to admit.”915 
Of course, it was Sybel’s, Treitschke’s, and Droysen’s attitude towards the 
unification of Germany that played the main role in this Marxist interpretation. 
In the mid-1950s, the conflict between two leading personalities in German 
Marxist historiography, Alfred Meusel and Ernst Engelberg, also concerned this 
phenomenon. Meusel supported a more “national” interpretation and described 
1871 as a victorious moment for the German national movement and the 
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German working class. Engelberg (later known as the GDR biographer of 
Bismarck)916 claimed more ‘Bolshevik’ positions, declaring his hostility towards 
Bismarck and the idea of unification “from above.” Nevertheless in the 1960s, 
when Meusel died, and Engelberg was at the peak of his political and scientific 
career, he adopted the ideas of his former enemy. Odd as it may seem, this was 
bound to happen. Since the Marxist interpretation of German history in the 
1950s saw national unity as the main objective of all progressive movements, 
starting with Thomas Müntzer, the fulfilment of this task had to be finally 
interpreted as a progressive phenomenon. And thus, the Prussian school that 
avidly supported unification was finally labelled as more progressive than 
Ranke, who was rather sceptical towards every attempt to change the political 
map of Europe. 
 
*** 
We can now draw some conclusions from samples of Marxist historiographies 
in East Central Europe. We started with the Polish problem: how to define the 
criteria of progressiveness in the history of historiography. Then we examined 
the successful Czech attempt to ‘defend’ František Palacký from Marxist 
critiques, and the Slovak analogy—an unsuccessful ‘attack’ on Ľudovít Štúr. 
Finally, we demonstrated that the comparison of East German representations of 
Ranke and the Prussian school illustrate the same problem as Polish debates, 
namely the problem of recognising the criteria of progressiveness. At the same 
time, East German debates touched upon the question of the ‘defence’ of 
national tradition (in this particular example of the Reichsgründung in 1871) 
from a supposedly ‘Bolshevik’, ‘anti-national’ reinterpretation, addressed also in 
the Czechoslovak context. Now finally, we can summarize and re-consider the 
methodological parallels in this broad comparison. 
For Marxist historians, the crucial problem of the criteria of progressiveness 
remained unsolved. On the one hand, it was quite natural to search for 
progressive values in Romantic historiography. Lelewel and Palacký, as well as 
Štúr (the latter two in their early works), described the Slavs’ pre-historic 
freedom and equality, condemned German feudalism, and looked to the future 
with the optimism of liberal Vormärz democrats. They stressed the ‘democratic’ 
phenomena of national history: the Hussite revolution, previous Slavic freedom, 
and even the progressive elements of the democracy of the gentry. In many ways 
Marxists simply shared their conclusions. Still, on the other hand, it was clear to 
them that Romantic historiography was idealist, and methodologically less 
developed than later positivist or historicist schools. Thus some Marxists 
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identified with the latter, describing Karol Boromeusz Hoffman and Michał 
Bobrzyński as more progressive than Lelewel. Both options— ‘Romantic’ and 
‘Historicist-Positivist’—were equally likely to be representated in any given 
Marxist historian’s position, both could be described as truly Marxist, and in fact 
both were introduced as the Marxist response to previous ‘misinterpretations.’ A 
highly interesting appendix to the Polish, Czech, and Slovak cases was provided 
by the East German interpretations of the Prussian school, which was treated as 
more ‘national’ and less conservative than Ranke, but it was, as had been the 
case with Lelewel, Palacký, and Štúr, neither an ‘objective,’ apolitical, nor a 
strictly ‘scientific’ group. Droysen, Sybel, and Treitschke were at the centre of 
the German national movement in their times and thus, functionally could play a 
role similar to that of the Romantic historians in Poland, the Czech lands, or 
Slovakia. Even if their political stance had been officially labelled as 
reactionary, their nationalism proved to be closer to the Marxist interpretation of 
history than any disinterested art of ‘objectivity.’ 
The debate over the criteria of progressiveness saw the formation of a 
separate intellectual milieu, namely, that of socially and politically conservative 
scholars with strong pan-Slavic sympathies. In contrast to other Polish Marxist 
researchers, so reserved in their attitudes towards historiographical traditions, 
Andrzej Poppe tried to include Zorian Dołęga Chodakowski in the ‘progressive’ 
catalogue, and by so doing, he neglected the evident ideological shortcomings of 
pan-Slavism, not only in comparison to Marxism, but also in comparison to the 
democratic ideology of the first half of the 19th century. His attempt illustrates 
that in the eyes of the Marxist canonisers, a historian’s attitude towards Russia 
was a crucial feature, offering redemption for ideological or methodological 
‘backwardness.’ Unfortunately, neither the history of Poland in general, nor the 
history of historiography could supply many examples of pro-Russian 
sympathies. This was much easier to come by in the case of Czech or Slovak 
historiography, and in fact, according to Marxist researchers, a progressive pan-
Slavism characterised both Štúr and the late Palacký, as well as the Czech and 
Slovak national movements in general. 
Another aspect of the progressiveness debate was the adoption of the idea of 
historical progress. Marxist reassessments of different historical groupings 
rarely avoided this pitfall. Romantic historians, although idealist (and in fact 
simply because they were idealists), believed in historical progress, which to 
some degree made them similar to Marx and Engels. Adherents to a positivist 
philosophy, although in many ways different, also shared a belief in a linear and 
constant progressive evolution. This made them at least partly relevant to the 
Marxist vision of history. On the other hand, Ranke, with his critique of the 
Hegelian philosophy of history and with his division of history into separate 
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epochs meant to be judged according to their own rules, was unacceptable. In 
comparison to Ranke’s historicism, the nationalist tendency of the Prussian 
school was much easier to justify as a predecessor to German Marxist 
historiography. 
The differences between Polish criticism of Lelewel, on the one hand, and 
Czech and Slovak admiration for Palacký and Štúr, on the other, is not at all a 
unique phenomenon. Many historians of historiography see the immanent 
difference between more or less ‘nationalist’ Marxist historiographies, with 
more or less national groupings contained within each of them. The division 
between more and less ‘national’ models of Marxist historiography can be 
subsumed in the conflict of ‘right’ and ‘left’ interpretations described by Lutz 
Raphael. Those on the ‘left’ always focus on the class struggle and ascribe 
progressiveness only to the lower classes. The more moderate ‘right’ 
interpretation sees a continuity of progressive development culminating in the 
climax of national history: an independent, “people’s democratic” state. In this 
latter model, particular knights, kings and burghers are also included in 
progressive traditions.917 The Czech and Slovak cases are an example of the 
more ‘national’ model, the Polish case seems to represent a different pattern 
altogether, and the East German case is the most dependent on political 
conjunctions and also the most dynamic, shifting from radical postwar 
‘pessimism’ to the nationalist and Prussian ‘renaissance’ just before the collapse 
of the state. 
On the whole, of the cases analysed here, one can consider the 
‘Czechoslovak model’ as the most centralised. It is difficult to find any 
important historical controversies in the Czechoslovak context of the 1950s. If 
such a controversy emerged, it was almost immediately silenced (as happened to 
Vladimír Matula’s theses). The interpretation of national history was dependent 
on the liberal-nationalist historiographical tradition inasmuch as it did not 
confront Marxist dogmas too openly. Critical comments concerning the Czech 
and Slovak national movements by the founding fathers of Communism were 
simply ignored. The Marxist vision of the past drew on the liberal-nationalist 
conviction in general (it described the history of the nation, not of the class 
struggle or economic development), as well as on some of its specific details 
(such as interpretations of the Hussite movement, ‘national revival,’ and 
František Palacký or Ľudovít Štúr). Paradoxically, such a development meant 
that any other Marxist (but non-orthodox) interpretation was barely possible. 
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The dominant collective of Marxist scholars was reproducing a pre-Marxist, 
eclectic vision of the national past. 
The less ‘national’ models of Polish and East German historiography of the 
Stalinist period were much more open to certain types of historical discussion – 
which was quite different from the model of debates in ‘normal sciences’ 
because it stressed the need for achieving a single true interpretation for every 
single topic. The debates between Polish or German historians on the 
progressiveness of Lelewel, Hoffman, Ranke, or the Prussian school were 
supposed to lead (and in some cases really led) to the canonisation of one chosen 
solution. Once the canonisation was achieved, no other interpretation would be 
accepted, as there could not be two parallel Marxist interpretations of the same 
phenomenon. In practice, traces of ‘pessimism’ appeared mostly in places where 
Polish or German history interfered with the privileged Soviet vision of the 
national past. Polish democrats of the 19th century (such as Lelewel) 
unfortunately had been doing their best to fight Russian autocracy. Similarly, the 
anti-Slavic features of German history were summarily condemned (at least until 
the late 1960s) by GDR historiography. 
In addition, one should also highlight the relatively broad German and 
Polish non-Marxist historiographical traditions as a catalyst for the multiplicity 
of opinions within the Marxist historical community. The decisions concerning 
which part of the ideological domain to draw from, and which traditions to 
condemn to oblivion, often proved to be too difficult. Whether one should praise 
the democrat Lelewel, or point to positivist historians as representatives of a 
new social-economic formation, remained an open question. Paradoxically, it 
could be said that German and Polish Marxists of the Stalinist period prolonged 
and revived the main historiographical debates of 19th century scholars. In the 
1950s, though in a rather simplified way, the classic controversies between 
Romanticism and Positivism or Conservatism and Liberalism found their 
equivalent in the polemics of Bobińska, Serejski or Assorodobraj; Kuczynski, 
Engelberg or Stern. In contrast, in the Czech, and most clearly in the Slovak 
case, the exclusion of such an important figure as Ľudovít Štúr from the 
historical tradition was rightly perceived as a threat to the national identity; his 
role in his national culture cannot be compared to any Polish or German national 
hero. 
However, it should be stated very clearly that neither a ‘right’ nor ‘left’ 
Marxist interpretation of national history can be perceived as better than the 
other in any sense. Both were only variations within the frame of Soviet-type 
Marxism. Both ‘right’ and ‘left’ could be equally destructive to the quality of 
scientific discourse, excluding the possible multiplicity of interpretations. 
Interpretations of both types aspired to a monopoly in nearly every topic (as in 
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those described in this text). This monopolistic nature of historiography led to 
the application of a mythic structure of Stalinist science. If the interpretation of 
history (philosophy, biology, linguistics, or any other science) is understood as 
something similar to religious belief, and not as an ipso facto problematic and 
multi-faceted phenomenon, it transcends reality and begins to belong to the 
sphere of myth.918 Within this mythic structure, interpretations, whether more or 
less national, played the same destructive role. 
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Every characteristic discussed above with respect to select Marxist 
historiographies also applies, to different degrees, to other countries in the region 
which I did not discuss in this work. The most obvious similarities pertain to 
structural and organisational aspects, as pointed out by Rafał Stobiecki.919 After 
the war, the Party’s educational institutions were established in every East Central 
European Communist country. Their goal was to prepare future Marxist teaching 
staffs. Some of the older institutions were universally dismantled and replaced 
with new entities, Marxist from the ground up. The same methodological grounds 
often led to analogous conclusions. Finally, Stalinist history-writing everywhere 
“treated as its main goal the elimination of all other, competing methods of 
writing history.”920 All of these traits perfectly illustrate the theoretical similarities 
among various Stalinist historiographies. If anything, the idea of blaming the 
Stalinist system for the drive toward centralisation seems less compelling – not 
because there was no such connection, but more for the fact that, in the postwar 
world, similar phenomena transgressed the boundaries of political blocs. After the 
war, centralisation was accepted as the proper course of scientific development by 
non-Communist scientists as well.921 
Next to general characteristics shared more or less widely across Communist 
countries, one could name a few more specific traits, pertaining not only to the 
structures, but also to the content of historical analyses. The onset of Stalinism 
sparked the typically short-lived domination of Marxist interpretations of 
national histories that were strident in their criticism of the traditional 
perspectives. Mihail Roller’s history of Romania, first published in 1947, 
rejected the idea of the nation as a subject of historical research and focused on 
the history of the territories of postwar Romania. Instead of tracing the 
achievements of rulers of Moldavia, Wallachia and Transylvania, it concentrated 
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on uncovering the history of peasant involvement in class warfare, with scant 
regard for nationality, while also underlining the ties between the people of 
Romania and Slavic folk and culture. The unification of the nation, writes 
Lucian Boia, is no longer perceived as a natural outcome of history and an 
unquestionable right of the Romanian nation, instead being framed as an 
imperial type of expansionism.922 Roller completely ignored the formation of 
“Greater Romania” in 1918.  
In no other case of which I am aware did the relapse of interwar 
“internationalism” in historiography reach as far as it did in Romania of the 
1950s. Fairly early on, Bulgarian Marxists began to include the national revival 
among their progressive traditions, a fact Roumen Daskalov links with the 
shifting of perspective from class to state.923 Hungary was also quick to produce 
a list of supposedly progressive historical figures. The dominant ‘national-
Communist’ interpretation of Hungarian history was in many respects similar to 
that of Czech and Slovak history. The place of the ‘progressive’ anti-feudal 
revolutionary movement of the Czech Hussites or of the Slovak miners was 
occupied in early modern Hungary by the 16th century’s György Dózsa uprising. 
The reproduction of the kuruc924 narrative influenced the Marxist-Leninist 
picture of Habsburg rule over Hungary and of the Hungarian gentry who had 
opposed it. The anti-Habsburg uprisings of Imre Thököly (1672–1685) and 
Ferenc Rákóczi (1703–1711) were labelled as part of the ‘progressive heritage’ 
even though their ‘class character’ was ambiguous. Moreover, the ‘Jacobin’ 
conspiracy of Ignác Martinovics in the late 18th century attracted similar 
assessments. The peak of the continuous struggle for national and social 
liberation was the 1848–1849 revolution, with its undisputed leaders Lajos 
Kossuth and the Romantic poet Sándor Petőfi. Finally, after hundreds of years of 
misery and exploitation from time immemorial to the end of the First World 
War, the chain of Hungarian progressive traditions found its culmination in the 
1919 Soviet Republic. Interestingly enough, this state was associated with the 
postwar ‘Hungarian Stalin,’ Mátyás Rákosi, rather than with its factual leader 
Béla Kun (who had been executed at Stalin’s behest in the 1930s). 
The attainment of an agreement between the new, Marxist interpretation and 
the national tradition was crucial not only for society at large, but also for the 
elites. For Gyula Szekfű, a conservative historian who “converted” to Marxism 
and, between 1945 and 1948, even became the Hungarian ambassador in 
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Moscow, ideological transformation was rooted in the belief that Communism 
did not actually stand in opposition to the nationalist convictions he professed.925 
Though some changes to the dominant interpretations of Hungarian–Slavic 
coexistence in the Carpathian basin appeared, the hegemonic Communist 
narrative was largely shaped by the interpretations of two historians, József 
Révai and Aladár Mód. Both authors “presented an unholy mixture of 
superpatriotic kuruc and proletarian-internationalist historical analyses.”926 Thus 
the jump from the postwar vision of history to the Stalinist one proved less 
dramatic in Hungary than in Poland and Czechoslovakia. The postwar period 
had seen an attempt at uniting the ‘revolutionary’ with the ‘national’ even at the 
cost of reproducing explicitly nationalistic interpretations. 
Outside of Romania, the national “nihilism” of Marxist historiography 
(which the Romanian scholars of today tend to downplay)927 was exhibited only 
briefly and/or unconvincingly. Still, Roller’s interpretation possessed another 
trait which we can easily ascribe to most Communist historiographies – an 
emphasis on the role which Slavs, especially from the East, played in the 
histories of particular countries. Mihail Roller belittled the linguistic influence 
of Latin, which had been so obvious to earlier (and later) Romanian historians, 
and he did not set it against Dacian traditions (which would characterize his 
contributions to the traditional Romanian historical debates). Instead, he 
underlined the role of the Kievan Rus’ that had been responsible for laying the 
foundations for Romanian-Russian friendship.928 Bulgarian Marxists 
concentrated on the Russian theme when criticising their “bourgeois” 
predecessors, accusing them of shrugging off Bulgarian-Russian ties, and even 
of negating the Slavic character of the Bulgarian nation and culture.929 
All Marxist historiographies suffered from similar organisational issues that 
had resulted from objective problems posed by collective work on a mass scale. 
For this reason, delays in publication of Marxist syntheses of national histories 
were hardly exceptional. The achievement of significant scholarly output, both 
in numbers and in quality, demanded the cooperation of non-Marxist historians. 
This point is vividly illustrated by representative Communist addresses to their 
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“bourgeois” colleagues. In 1949, the Hungarian Marxist, Erzsébet Andics, made 
an undisguised appeal for help by observing that, without the aid of non-Marxist 
scholars, victory in the “battle for the 5-year plan” would prove impossible.930 
Members of the Bulgarian Communist Party drew similar conclusions when the 
first “draft” of the university history textbook proved so inadequate that the aid 
of non-Party historians appeared indispensable.931 
Romanian historiography differed also in this regard, as Mihail Roller not 
only questioned the traditional historical interpretations of the state and the 
nation, but also seemingly monopolised the 1950s book market. This was an 
isolated example of a “Bolshevik” historiography which actually rejected 
“national” values for the sake of class consciousness and internationalism, 
coupling ideological shifts with an unprecedented (outside the Soviet Union) 
postwar purge of historians.932 In other cases of which I am aware, Marxist 
historians based their interpretations on older elements, harking back to the 
traditions of national historiography, including Marxism-Leninism and pro-
Russian pronouncements only to a varying degree. 
For many Marxist historiographies, the end of Stalinism marked the return 
of nationalism. As Ulf Brunnbauer claims, this process was particularly intense 
in Bulgaria and Romania, or, in states where the Stalinist interpretation was 
comparatively the most distant from previous traditions. The publication of 
Marx’s works, which included positive assessments of the Romanian national 
movement and harsh criticisms of Russia, sparked a decisive paradigm shift, 
leading to the rehabilitation of the prewar historiography. After a relatively short 
period of liberalisation, the increasingly oppressive Ceauşescu regime 
suppressed a reinterpretation of the Marxist doctrine that had been inspired by 
the Annales school: “While only the devoted party historians would go to 
nationalist extremes, and most historians worked on ideologically less charged 
topics, almost all Romanian historians dealt exclusively with Romanian history, 
and stressed the role of the Romanian state which contributed to the party’s 
historical vision.”933 Romanian and Bulgarian historiography of the 1970s 
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exhibited a symptomatic interest in dubious theories concerning the 
ethnogenesis of the respective nations within dynamically developed and 
politically supported studies on ancient Dacians and Thracians. 
At the risk of oversimplification, one could claim that the political changes 
caused by Stalin’s demise had a lasting and positive effect on the development 
of historiography in only two countries of the Eastern Bloc – Poland and 
Hungary. In the changed climate, the path was cleared for a reconnection with 
the international historical community. And this time ‘international’ did not 
necessarily mean Western, since Stalinism had not only eliminated professional 
communication with Western historical scholarship but also had handicapped 
cooperation between countries within the Soviet bloc. It is telling that the first 
significant multilateral meeting of East Central European Marxist historians 
took place as late as 1953 during the congress of Hungarian historians in 
Budapest. In 1955 delegations from Eastern Europe, including the biggest Soviet 
delegation, took part in the congress of the International Committee of Historical 
Sciences (CISH) in Rome. It was only in the 1960s and 1970s that Polish and 
Hungarian scholars ‘caught up’ with the most influential and promising Western 
current of historical thought, the Annales school. Through unofficial, personal 
ties, such Polish authors as Witold Kula, Tadeusz Manteuffel, Aleksander 
Gieysztor, Andrzej Wyczański, Bronisław Geremek, and Marian Małowist were 
not only inspired by Fernand Braudel and his colleagues and students, but also 
started to honour this intellectual debt by delivering a comprehensive analysis of 
the development of capitalism in East Central Europe. This applied to Kula 
above all, whose theses concerning Eastern Europe were included in Braudel’s 
panoramic history of capitalism. Similar research agendas were realised in the 
works of György Ránki, Iván Berend, Péter Hanák, and Jenő Szücs. Along with 
these developments, a generation of researchers born in the late 1920s and early 
1930s arrived on the scene, bringing with them new topics and interpretations. 
Under the influence of Kula, a research centre for Polish social history was 
formed at the Institute of History in the Polish Academy of Sciences. Impulses 
coming from economic history stimulated the growth of further research fields 
such as the history of ideas, mentalities, and cultural history. Later on, this 
intellectual ferment sparked the formation of the so-called Warsaw school of the 
history of ideas (with Jerzy Jedlicki, Andrzej Walicki, Jerzy Szacki, Bronisław 
Baczko, and Leszek Kołakowski). Both in Poland and in Hungary, the liberal 
directors of the historical institutes of the national academies (Zsigmond Pál 
Pach and Tadeusz Manteuffel) supported new, ambitious research programmes. 
The main research topic of the period has both a symbolic and ironic meaning: 
in East Central Europe, the Stalinist narrative of progress was replaced by a 
focus on the backwardness of the region. Both Marxist historiographies 
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cooperated in a number of bilateral joint conferences and meetings, debating the 
backwardness of the region in historical perspective (with the notion of 
‘backwardness’ masked by euphemistic descriptions, such as the ‘Prussian 
course of agricultural development’).934 
The period that witnessed the most dynamic development in Polish and 
Hungarian historiography, the 1960s, lies beyond the chronological boundaries 
of this volume. It also does not consider the stable and fully controlled situation 
of East German historiography or the fleeting liberalisation and re-Stalinisation 
of historiography that followed the invasion by the Warsaw Pact states 
(including the GDR and Poland) – of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Still, the 
fact that Marxist historiographies in some countries of the Eastern Bloc 
managed to exploit the favourable political situation and create works of real 
value is significant. After all, it shows that Marxism had the potential for 
liberating historical discourse from the dichotomy of national and revolutionary 
values ubiquitous in the 1950s. 
 
*** 
In spite of a declared breakthrough and innovative intentions, the Marxist 
concepts of national history, whether “optimistic” or “pessimistic,” remained 
tied to existing traditions of historical thinking. The new paradigm did not take 
root. No “Bolshevisation” of historiography occurred – instead, in some cases, it 
was trivialised. Still, disadvantageous changes resulted from the manner of 
scientific conduct, the pursuit of a single, canonical perspective on every 
problem, rather than from any antipathies toward various elements of the history 
of Poland, Germany, Slovakia or Bohemia. In other words, it had been an 
attempt to force historians into active participation in a myth, or into partaking 
in the formation of a myth. Time showed that Marxist historiographies quite 
often “conserved” traditional interpretations, deeming them Marxist and 
defending their “purity” from any kind of criticism. 
The comparison of several Marxist historiographies in terms of their attitude 
toward national traditions compels us to modify or reject some of the claims 
raised toward each of them. Starting with Poland, it seems that the thesis about the 
anti-nationalist nature of Stalinist historiography cannot be supported. While 
several more or less “national” interpretations competed within Marxist 
historiography, there was no established “anti-national” pattern (barring the 
elements of Polish native traditions which collided with Russian traditions, of 
course). The schematicism of Marxist historiography did not consist in the 
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imposition of a previously framed interpretation, but rather in the acceptance of a 
singular perspective as unquestionably binding in every particular case. Whether 
that perspective was “national” or “anti-national” was of secondary importance, 
never a point of view established beforehand. One could, of course, always claim 
that science done in this way was antithetical to the Polish historiographic 
tradition (and the claim would largely prove to be true), but the same model was 
applied in every other people’s democracy, even in countries where “national” 
values were seemingly treated with more reverence than in Poland. Similar 
statements about Marxism’s anti-national intentions in historiography are 
currently made also by Slovak historians, though the supposed anti-Slovak 
tendency of Marxist historiography in question is frankly untraceable. At the 
same time, I believe that schematicism was far more detrimental to the 
historiographies discussed here than the potential “anti-national” reinterpretation 
of the history of Poland or Slovakia would have been, since it limited the freedom 
to form any – national or anti-national – competing interpretations. 
I counter claims about a breakthrough and rupture in the continuity of Polish 
and Slovak historiography with the model discussed herein, where the theory of 
formations, alliance with the Soviet Union, and aversion toward the Church 
acted as a scaffolding upon which historians could raise new Marxist visions of 
national history. The gaps in this scaffolding were filled for the most part with 
older, traditional interpretations, which thereby became, in a way, Marxist. This 
content, the evaluation of particular elements of national histories, remained 
somewhat shaky. That is, guidelines for deciding what was and was not 
“progressive” were missing. 
Several Czech historians are inclined to note the virtues of past, Marxist 
historiography, in its relatively positive attitude toward national traditions. One 
can find statements extolling the merits of particular Marxists (Zdeňek Nejedlý 
being the most prominent example) in “defending” Palacký, Havlíček-Borovský, 
or other remnants of national traditions supposedly threatened with 
“Stalinisation.” I cannot fathom any virtue in such a schematic, petrified 
historiography, which stifles all attempts at producing an alternative – “rightist” 
or “leftist” – reading of historical traditions. As was the case in Poland and 
Slovakia, the growing “nationalisation” or “Bolshevisation” of Czech Marxist 
historiography was merely a byproduct (and not necessarily final, at that) of a 
specific model of science. Assessments of particular national heroes, uprisings, 
national movements, and so forth, could change without shifting the foundations 
and mechanisms of Marxist historiography, fitting squarely within its logic. 
Comparing these few examples, I am led to believe that no national values, 
however defined, were endangered, but the quality of thinking about history, 
which, I am quite certain, does not count as a national value. 
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I believe that a comparison of several Marxist historiographies of Central 
and Eastern Europe also raises doubts concerning the German research model 
quite commonly applied to the study of historiography in the GDR, which 
repeatedly connects it with West German historiography and politics. It is clear 
as day that the East German vision of history contains many aspects which 
become intelligible only in comparison with other countries of the Eastern bloc. 
Meanwhile it relates to West German historiography only very superficially. 
Structural connections, evident in comparison to Polish, Czech or Slovak 
historiography, derive from the fact that East Central European historiographies 
(and histories) plainly represent the best mutual context. After all, they are tied 
together by shared traditions of writing about history (with an enormous role 
played by German historical sciences as the originator and transmitter of 
methodological ideas), post-1945 geopolitics, and obligations to submit to 
identical political pressures. This comparison does not exhaust all the virtues of 
setting the GDR against its Eastern neighbours; one should also take into 
account the vivid interactions between historians from East Germany and 
Poland, Bohemia or Slovakia, often tasked separately with fashioning Marxist 
interpretations of the same events and historical figures. Through their works, 
historians from the GDR engaged in a dialogue with their colleagues from 
Poland, the Soviet Union or Czechoslovakia, while their connections to West 
Germany went through prolonged dry periods, when one side or the other had 
little to say to the other side. 
To summarize, we should re-emphasize the most general conclusion of my 
work – the claim that there was a multithreaded continuity of content and form 
before and after the so-called methodological breakthrough, regardless of 
institutional changes, and a particularly catastrophic change in the manner of 
conducting scientific debates. Earlier, pre-Marxist concepts did not curl up and 
die, but were rather absorbed into Marxist historiography. They were then 
revived bit by bit – usually incognito – in Marxist interpretations. Marxist 
historiographies of the Stalinist period owed great debts to preceding schools of 
thought far more thoroughly than might appear from reading the manifestos of 
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